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Inspired by the Enlightenment’s principles of rationality, positivistic ideologies as well as the 
nascent modern-industrial state, sociology since its inception in Europe was conceived as a 
fundamentally secular enterprise. Whereas positivistic streams have been rather left aside, 
secularism in sociology still remains as a cornerstone of the discipline’s identity. However, is 
sociology in the 21st-century really ‘secular’? In this dissertation I present to the reader an 
empirical research about the epistemological influences of Catholicism upon sociology in 
Mexico, a constitutionally secular state since the 19th century. Theoretically, I draw from 
authors who have put forward the epistemological influences of Christianity upon western 
social science. I argue that these authors have unintentionally re-stated, with interesting 
additions, Durkheim’s rather neglected theses about the socio-religious origin of our 
‘categories of thought’ –‘classification’ and ‘causality’ in particular. Although I will not 
attempt to trace the origins of sociological classifications and causalities back to Catholicism 
in Mexico, I will argue that it is possible to find salient similarities between both knowledge 
fields in terms of these categories and other discursive characteristics. By analysing these 
resemblances in a (neo)Durkheimian-Weberian frame, I will explain how Catholic 
discourses in Mexico, combined with the Mexican state’s teleological discourses on 
democracy, modernisation and progress, influence sociological discourses not 
through Durkheim’s ‘imitative rites’ and a priori ‘necessary connections’, but through a 
series of ‘bridge’ institutions and particular cultural-ideological structures. Individuals’ own 
religious beliefs and their deliberate and unintended interactions with these elements and 
their emergent properties turn apparently parochial Catholic discourses into a series of 
‘discursive offensives’ which subtly yet pervasively shape common sense in society at large 
and also predispose sociology practitioners to adopt and develop i) ‘mono-causal’ and 
‘power-over’ interpretations of social phenomena, ii) implicit and explicit dichotomistic 
logics as well as iii) normative-prescriptive sociological stances. 
In arguing this, I account for how Weberian authority models and Weberian-Mertonian 
religious values are not only key ‘background factors’, but also constitute actual cognitive 
devices in the production of sociological knowledge. I also offer empirical evidence about 
the role that individuals’ religious beliefs play in the conception of sociological models of 
power and causality and, by extension, in the construction of scientific reason or scientific 
beliefs. These accounts support the view of contemporary religions as plastic discourses 
whose ideological powers permeate, under certain historical conditions, the knowledge 
produced in scientific domains whose secularity has been mistakenly taken for granted. And 
this, I conclude, strongly suggests the need to revise the secularist foundations of sociologies 
of science and scientific knowledge, of sociology in general as well as current monolithic 
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In 2010 one of the Church of England’s dioceses – Lichfield – reportedly issued a 
memorandum in which the diocese’s parishes were advised against inviting candidates from 
the British National Party (BNP) to the hustings organised by the Church in preparation for 
the 2010 General Elections in the United Kingdom (BBC News 2010a, 2010b). The decision 
was motivated by what the diocese called the BNP’s political practices of “fear and hatred” 
(BBC News 2010a). A similar reaction from religious institutions would have probably 
happened in Mexico as well, although differently. Churches in Mexico, mostly Catholic, do 
not call running political candidates for hustings, it is the running candidates who book 
appointments to meet with the Mexican Catholic clergy (Jimenez 2012; Gomez 2012). I am 
not pointing out here a mere variation in political etiquette. In 2010 the four separate 
meetings between Mexican bishops and presidential runners represented not an occasion for 
bishops ‘to be informed’ about the candidates’ aspirations and development plans. The 
meetings were rather both a common campaign strategy as well as the opportunity, relatively 
customary, for the Catholic clergy to “scrutinise” the candidates, as a journalistic source 
described the occasion (Jimenez 2012). The four running candidates to the Mexican 
‘presidential chair’ sought actively the public legitimation that the Catholic Church in 
Mexico is able to grant –whether appreciated eventually by the voters in the polls or not. 
Such is the political and ideological weight of the Catholic Church in a country where nearly 
93 million individuals, i.e., 83% of the total population, are nominally Catholic (INEGI 
2011a) and where, on the other hand, a paradigm of secularism, which I will qualify in due 
course as an exclusively political secularism, has been a firm constitutional principle applied 






The reader will find in this dissertation, however, scarce mentions of Catholic Churches and 
their ‘political power’ (Poggi 2001). A couple of years ago I received in my electronic mail 
                                                 
1
 Secularism as a constitutional precept has been safeguarded and applied with great zeal by state 
ideologues and in state practices (including public education) since the political separation between 
the Catholic Church and State was gradually passed by the Mexican parliament in 1850s-1860s. I will 
expand on this historical-constitutional context in chapter 3.   
 10 
address two particular mails from the state institution that sponsored me during my five 
years of postgraduate studies
2
. The first e-mail was signed by one of the divisional heads. It 
was a Christmas postcard sent to all the scholarship holders. The message in the postcard did 
not contain explicit Christian or Catholic messages, it was in that sense relatively neutral in 
its wording; it referred to wishes of “prosperity”, “affection” and “bliss” to be enjoyed “in 
our families”. The second e-mail was more peculiar. It was also a Christmas postcard sent to 
all the postgraduate students and researchers sponsored by the institution; the sender was the 
very head of the institution. Although the postcard included a quote from Charles Dickens –
on “Christmas sentiments” of “care”, “forgiveness” and “love”– and the sender’s wishes of 
“renewing the happiness” brought by “the adventure of life”, its most striking yet subtle 
peculiarity was not in these messages per se but in the background image that decorated 
them –a painting. Three grey-haired bearded men and a younger male on the left form the 
‘outer circle’ of this painting. A fourth bearded man lies on the left as well, with his hands 
put together. A female figure in the centre leans with slightly open arms towards the 
painting’s focal point: a baby, lying awake in a wooden crib, with golden pale beams 
radiating shyly from his head. The image in the postcard has no signature or title, yet it is 
clearly one of the several representations of Jesus’ birth in Bethlehem. In this dissertation I 
will analyse empirically the ‘ideological powers’ (Poggi 2001; Hearn 2012) and 
Christian/Catholic discourses that subtly yet persistently flow not necessarily within but 
rather outside the Catholic Church as part of the Mexican society/ies’ various Catholicisms. 
 
In will analyse such religious ‘powers’ and discourses in relation to what seems, at first 
glance, an odd subject: sociology itself. In an edited volume Legorreta (2010a) presents a 
series of essays by Latin American theologians who assess the contributions of social science, 
mostly sociology, to the different theological streams and schools adopted or developed in 
Latin America, e.g., ‘mission theology’ (Sota 2010), ‘intercultural theology’ (Cervera 2010), 
‘liberation theology’ (Legorreta 2010b). In the doctoral research I present in this dissertation 
I reverse the enquiry. My main research questions are: what are the epistemological 
                                                 
2
 The Mexican Council for Science and Technology. The administrative-scientific goals and political 
agenda of this institution do not inform the content or aims of this dissertation. 
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influences of Catholicism over sociology in Mexico? In what follows the reader will find a 
non-reductionist answer to this certainly counter-intuitive, perhaps awkward, question, that is, 
an account of how Catholic discourses, by means of subtle yet pervasive causal mechanisms, 
and together with the ideological influences from the ‘politically secular’ modern 
Mexican state, shape the epistemological bases of sociological discourses in Mexico.  
 
One of the main general assumptions upon which this research is based is a basic sociology-
of-knowledge/science tenet: knowledge and scientific knowledge are fundamentally social. 
In the following chapters I take for granted that scientific knowledge, including sociological 
discourses in Mexico and elsewhere, cannot be fully analysed and explained without taking 
into account the social and cultural contexts in which they are embedded and flow constantly 
across. Such a broad assumption certainly requires further refinement. My position in this 
research is ‘not-Mannheimian’ (Bloor 1976:8; Swidler and Arditi 1994: 305-6; cf. Pels 1996), 
that is, my analysis of how Catholicism shapes sociology in Mexico is not anchored upon a 
normative stance on how ‘true’ sociological knowledge ‘ought to be’ socially constructed. 
My position could be framed as part of the Edinburgh’s strong programme (Bloor 1976; 
Yearley 2005:21-8) since I am interested in analysing sociological discourses in Mexico 
regardless of their ‘truth’ or falsity’ (Bloor 1976:5, 8-10; Yearley 2005:22). The reader can 
also find in this dissertation a particular interest in “causal accounts” and a “reflexive” 
sociology-of-sociology exercise
3
 (Bloor 1976:4-17). My position, however, may also be 
interpreted as departing from this strong programme, or at least from Bloor’s original version, 
for my ‘impartial stance’ will not be free of ‘teleologies’ entirely.  
                                                 
3
 The reader may catalogue this dissertation as an instance of “meta-sociology” (Ritzer 1988) in which 
I, the ‘sociology practitioner’, look at fellow practitioners and de-construct them and account for them 
with the very sociological ‘tools’ I acquired from sociology. This meta-sociological label is both 
misleading and adequate. My ‘sociological imagination’ did not really develop in Mexico. My contact 
with sociology in this country was rather short-lived  –in an undergraduate university course I 
attended and whose content I soon forgot. My sociological thinking developed later, in territories 
across the Atlantic, in two broad stages. Firstly, in a Spanish university I attended as part of an 
international student exchange programme and, secondly, in the context of the United Kingdom, since 
my arrival to the University of Edinburgh in 2007 as a master student. In this dissertation, therefore, I 
am not dissecting ‘fellow practitioners’ in sensu stricto but rather a group of professionals and kind 
individuals whose disciplinary milieu I began to explore consistently only until my first year of my 
doctoral programme in 2009. Having said that, my dissertation is still, in a sense, a meta-sociological 
analysis, i.e., a sociological account of a group of sociologists and their sociological discourses.  
 12 
In this dissertation I also assume particular political-epistemological aims. Firstly, I want to 
advocate the ‘ontological status’ of the sociologies the reader will find dissected here –an 
ontological status that seems at times, and rather unsurprisingly, ignored abroad, amid the 
complexity of the discipline, of social science and of ever-changing ‘global’ phenomena. I 
want to bring these sociologies to the light of academic debates outside Mexican and Latin 
American audiences. And this takes me to my second aim. I want to present the sociologies 
in this research not as ‘the others’, not as the ‘subaltern’ (Spivak 1988) sociological 
discourses and sociologists whose distant colonial background and ‘developing-world’ stamp 
would make them the object of merely polite sympathy or sterile notice. I want to present 
these sociologies outside their borders as sociologies made by colleagues, by profession-
mates, by peers, even if these peers and their sociologies are called “impostors”. Let me 
explain briefly. In his (very short) introduction to sociology, Steve Bruce (2000) argues that 
despite both some of sociology’s founders
4
 and some of the early European sociology 
faculties
5
 working on clear “reformist” agendas, the sociological discipline today “must be 
distinguished from social reform” (2000:83). In Bruce’s view, “a productive dialogue 
between sociologists” takes place only if they adequately distinguish “between the values 
necessary to the discipline” and “extra-disciplinary concerns that should be laid to one side” 
and left to “utopians” and “impostor” sociologies (2000:84). The sociological discourses that 
constitute my study object, which I will describe precisely as normative, prescriptive and 
interventionist, would certainly disappoint Bruce and those who share his views
6
. However, 
if Bruce and other western-centric scholars want to label the sociologies I will present here 
as “impostors”, then so be it. In such case, and however sceptically, visibility would be 
gained, the ontological status of these sociologies may thus be acknowledged and two-ways 
discussions about whether such “impostors” carry out epistemologically consistent 
sociologies or not might then begin, among peers across the two sides of the Atlantic. As I 
                                                 
4
 E.g. Marx 
5
 E.g. The London School of Economics through its links with the founders of the Fabian Society 
6
 It was the ‘reformist’ or ‘interventionist’ tones and nuances of the sociological discourses in Mexico, 
and the striking degree of similarity between them and religious discourses, what actually caught my 
attention. Yet unlike Bruce, and not without a painstaking and long process of personal reflections in 
which I have questioned my own Western-centric beliefs, I do not take those nuances and other ‘extra-
disciplinary’ elements as ‘pollutants’ of sociological knowledge, but rather as relevant phenomena to 
be sociologically analysed or at least brought to conversation –instead of sanctioned automatically.   
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stated previously, I will not engage particularly in such discussions
7
, yet I would strongly 
encourage others to do so, specially if the field of “global” sociology is becoming as crucial, 
(and marketable) as their western adherents (e.g., Macionis and Plummer 2008) claim.    
 
It is only by granting this ontological status –and epistemological (in)consistencies– to the 
sociologies the reader will meet soon that one of the key contributions of this dissertation 
may be fully appreciated and taken into account. In the following chapters I will gradually 
account for the reasons why the Enlightenment-inspired model of ‘secular science/social 
science’ cannot be taken for granted, even in constitutionally-secular ‘modern’ societies of 
the very 21
st
 century. Having said this I must explicitly state that my position towards both 
‘secular’ science/social science and ‘religions’ will not be exegetic. I personally advocate 
neither normative paradigms of ‘secularism’ (Asad 1993; Casanova 2009; Calhoun et al. 
2011) nor any public or private form of religion. What I will advocate in this dissertation is 
the thorough study of religious discourses, their neglected ‘plastic’ properties, their complex 
interactions with non-religious elements and their epistemological impacts on sociological 
domains. I will do this by presenting to the reader the final results of the empirical research 
that I carried out in Edinburgh and some regions in Mexico. 
 
In the first chapter the reader may find the theoretical and conceptual frame I adopt and the 
particular theses I will analyse empirically. Some of the main authors I refer to in this 
chapter are not only sociologists but also anthropologists and theologians who have 
discussed Christianity’s effects over western social science. One of the core references in 
this chapter is Durkheim and what I argue is a neglected series of Durkheimian theses: the 
socio-religious origins of the ‘categories of thought’ or what I call the religion/society-
knowledge-science theses –regarding ‘causality’ and ‘classifications’ in particular. In this 
chapter, however, I go beyond Durkheim’s causal arguments and note, tentatively, different 
                                                 
7 
I will argue briefly (chapter 7, section IV) that the sociologies the reader will find here show an 
epistemological coherence that seems to fit neatly into the discursive dimensions of Mexican/Latin 
American societies overall. Such epistemological consistency, however, seems to decrease 
significantly if these sociologies are extracted from their social contexts and compared to, for instance, 
the sociologies by Northern European scholars and institutions. I will not make such comparisons here, 
but I would certainly encourage others to make them  
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explanans for an alternative causal account of religion-science influences. In chapter 2 I 
present the methodological framework of the research, which includes a brief account of my 
critical-realist/social-constructivist stance, the technical details about my ‘case study’ 
research design, and my data collection activities in two theoretically-opposite locations in 
Mexico. Consonant with my critical-realist/social-constructivist approach, I also present to 
the reader a justification of my data-analysis general strategy, i.e., both contextual analyses 
of social structures ‘out there’ and interpretive analyses of individuals’ actions and their own 
meaning-making activities. As part of the former, the reader may find in chapter 3 a 
historical overview of the Catholic Church and Catholicism in Mexico. Here I will also 
counter the argument offered by some of the main respondents (sociology lecturers) I 
interviewed, who stated the impossibility of sociology being shaped by Catholicism given 
the legally-secular character of public education in Mexico. My counter-argument is based 
on documentary evidence that suggests that the passing of secular laws by the Mexican 
parliament in the 1850s-1860s comprised, exclusively, the removal of the Catholic Church 
from its public-administrative roles and not from its unique cultural-ideological position in 
society. In this chapter I also present a key report of the current religious beliefs and Catholic 
discourses I found during my fieldwork, including a series of discursive features I will 
constantly refer to in the following chapters. In chapter 4 I describe the beginnings of 
sociology in Mexico and its institutionalisation processes. I include two instances of early 
sociological thought in Mexico that represent the first cases of religious imprints in this 
discipline. I also offer a picture of the current sociological, university and social-research 
fields as experienced by the set of sociology lecturers I interviewed. I conclude by pointing 
out the underlying prescriptive-interventionist rationale of current sociologies in Mexico and 
the professional moral sensitivities of their practitioners. 
 
Although all the chapters in this dissertation add up gradually to my causal account of 
Catholicism’s influences upon sociology, chapters 5 and 6 are particularly related. In chapter 
5 I present qualitative data about the religious background and current religious profiles of 
the sociology lecturers I interviewed and conclude that their current religious beliefs and 
practices do not appear totally detached from the Catholic discourses these individuals were 
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once socialised into or deliberately interacted with. In chapter 6 I present the confirmatory, 
cautious and/or oppositional comments by the sociology lecturers about my research 
question. I conclude this chapter by analysing and refining the Weberian values-related 
influence that some respondents suggested as feasible. Yet before rushing into premature 
conclusions I will offer in chapter 7 an analysis of the actual sociologies produced by the 
main respondents in this research, as representative ‘samples’ of sociological discourses in 
Mexico. Here I note the resemblances between these sociologies, or sociological discourses, 
and the Catholic discourses discussed in chapter 3. Once these parallels are located I move 
on in chapter 8 to an account of such resemblances as actual instances of Catholic 
discourses’ influences. In this (neo)Durkheimian-Weberian causal account the reader will 
not find a conclusive and definitive explanation but a carefully constructed approximation to 
the individuals’ actions, institutions and structures whose emergent properties and complex 
relationships eventually deliver Catholic discourses’ epistemological influences to sociology 
practitioners and their sociological discourses. In the ‘Final conclusions’ the reader may find 
the specific contributions of my work to the fields of sociology of science and scientific 










This opening chapter comprises four related ‘clusters’ of scholarly literature. In the first 
section I offer to the reader an outline of my theoretical approach by drawing from literature 
on secularism, sociology of religion and science-religion debates. In the second section I 
present a group of authors who have put forward the epistemological effects of Christianity 
upon sociology and anthropology in the West. After this I offer a third section based on 
Durkheim’s theses (1915), rather forgotten and neglected, on the ‘socio-religious origin’ of 
lay and scientific ‘classifications’ and lay and scientific notions of power/force and causality. 
These theses, I argue, adequately summarise the scholarly arguments in section II.  The last 
‘cluster’ includes authors whose theoretical propositions and research findings provide what 
I regard to be more plausible accounts of causal links between religion and science/social 
science – more plausible than the ‘imitative rites’ and Kantian a priori ‘necessary 
connections’ that Durkheim advocated. 
  
From Poggi’s Weberian point of view, religion is the chief manifestation of the 
“ideological/normative” form of power and the Christian Church would represent one of the 
main “institutional embodiments” (2001: 97) of this power form. Echoing Weber, Poggi 
argues that there was a time when the Christian Church possessed a monopoly over the 
generation of meanings, norms and aesthetic practices. This monopoly was gradually taken 
over by scientists, lawyers and artists who, respectively, became the guardians and makers of 
‘new’ meanings, norms and aesthetic practices. After this, and this time echoing Durkheim, 
Poggi states that the Church and intellectuals would cohabitate, not necessarily amicably, by 
each focusing on their respective ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ domains. However, Poggi also 
argues that there are “reminders, in the activities of profane suppliers of meaning, norms and 
aesthetic experience, of the original religious matrix and context of those activities” (2001: 
 18 
100). I will begin my exploration of these possible “reminders” with a brief review of the 
literature on secularism, sociology of religion and science-religion debates. 
 
 
I. Theoretical positioning and conceptual introduction 
 
The secular/ism/isation paradigms 
 
The idea of the secular is reportedly older than the institutions that represented it in the post-
Enlightenment and ‘modern’ societies of the West. Calhoun et al. (2011: 8) state the term 
saeculum represented a unit of time among the ancient Etruscans. The term was adopted by 
the Romans afterwards who used it as synonym of “a century”. In the Middle Ages, the term 
referred to the clergy members working in “worldly, local parishes” as opposed to those 
working within religious orders. Salvatore (2005:9), citing Talal Asad, similarly states that it 
the term saeculum was used in medieval times to refer to the religious “external” life as 
opposed to the monastic enclosed life. Bremer (2008) argues the noun ‘secularisation’ as 
such emerged in 16
th
 century France and meant “the transfer of goods from the possession of 
the Church into that of the world” and by the 17
th
 century, the term implied the transfer of 
the Church’s goods to “the world of the lay people” (2008:433). This would be Asad’s view 
as well, for him the initial meaning of secularisation was the handing over of the Church’s 
properties into “private hands and market circulation” (cited by Salvatore 2005:9). In 
Germany, according to Bremer, the term was used basically in this sense and became part of 
the laws of the German empire
8
 in the early 1800s –an adaptation of a concept and practice 
that, without easy manoeuvres, took place in Mexico’s post-independence state context in 
the 1800s as well (chapter 3). After recalling Marx’s and Dilthey’s occasional use of the 
term in secondary statements, Bremer suggests it was with Sombart, Weber and Troeltsch in 
the early 20
th
 century “that a new era in the usage of Säkularisation gradually becomes 
visible” (2008: 434). Rather overlooking Comte’s positivistic separation of “temporal” and 
                                                 
8
 Namely, the term was used to describe the compensation the German emperor was entitled to receive 
for the loss of one portion of the Rhine to Napoleon –a compensation constituted by the then German 
Church’s assets (Bremen 2008:434). 
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“spiritual” powers ([1848]1865: 92), Salvatore points Asad’s statement on Durkheim’s 
sacred-profane separation, which reinforced the “insulation of religion” (2005:9) in social 
science discourses and debates on secularism. Kateb (2009) suggests an even earlier “secular 
disposition”, which may be found in both Plato and John Locke. According to Kateb, John 
Locke’s secular disposition is evident in his defence of a morality that does not have to be 
overshadowed by religion but represents the end of it. Thus Locke would uphold “the 
supremacy of morality over all values”, and this, for Kateb, suggests “the commitment of 
any mature secular society” (2009: 1006). Moving on from the scholarly debates about the 
genealogy of ‘the secular’ and ‘secularisation’, what is the secular, secularisation and 
secularism today?  
 
From a normative yet apparently customary stance Kateb (2009) addresses the term 
‘secularism’ and, acknowledging variants and exceptions, defines this term as a 
“disentanglement of politics and religion”; as the state’s tolerance of “all or nearly all 
religions”; as an absence of religious “concepts and mandates” in political discourses; as a 
“general decline” of religions’ influence over society and individuals, and as “the even more 
marked decline of religious influence in intellectual life” (2009:1002). Reflecting on the 
complexity of secular/ity practices. Casanova (2009) distinguishes between the empirically-
related concepts of ‘the secular’, ‘secularisation’ and ‘secularism’ as follows. Firstly, ‘the 
secular’ refers to a set of realities, and their empirical constituents, that are essentially 
opposed to ‘the religious’; scholarly debates around these concepts would focus on the 
“legitimacy and “autonomy” of each field (2009:1049). Secondly, ‘secularisation’ for 
Casanova represents the “empirical-historical patterns of transformation and differentiation” 
(2009:1050) in, and between, the religious (e.g., ecclesiastical institutions) and the secular 
fields
9
, (e.g., the state). These social transformations, according to Casanova, are the focal 
point of a ‘theory of secularisation’ and its theses on the decline and/or privatisation of 
                                                 
9
 Casanova (2011:60) also distinguishes three modes of “being secular”: the “mere secularity”, or the 
“experience of living in a secular world […] where being religious may be a normal viable option”; 
the “self-sufficient and exclusive secularity” or the “experience of living without religion as a normal 
[…] taken-for-granted condition” and the “secularist secularity”, that is, the “experience […] of being 
[…] liberated from religion as a condition of human autonomy and human flourishing” 
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religion, a theoretical view Casanova finds essentially Eurocentric –see also Salvatore
10
 
(2005). Thirdly, the term ‘secularism’ refers to  
 
a whole range of modern secular worldviews and ideologies that may be consciously 
held and explicitly elaborated into philosophies of history and normative-ideological 





Casanova then offers a perspective of modern secularism which my data and my data 
analyses, as I will show later on, support. Arguing explicitly what Salvatore (2005) suggests 
implicitly, and what Kateb (2009) and other ‘secular secularists’ would rather refute, 
Casanova states that modern secularism may alternatively be interpreted 
 
as an epistemic knowledge regime that may be unreflexively held and 
phenomenologically assumed as the taken-for-granted normal structure of modern 
reality, as a modern doxa or as an ‘unthought’ [which] also comes in multiple 
historical forms, in terms of different normative models of legal-constitutional 
separation of the secular state and religion, or in terms of the different types of 
cognitive differentiation between science, philosophy, and theology […]. (2009: 
1051; emphasis added) 
 
Calhoun et al. (2011) distinguish as well between secular-related terms, that is, between 
“processes of ‘secularisation’, the practices of ‘the secular’ and the political ethic of 
‘secularism’” (2011:3). What I want to highlight from these authors, as I did with Casanova, 
is their assertion that the “dominant modes” of secularism could be rather seen as “multiple 
forms” (2011:4) that would have to be carefully analysed for they could conceal a rigid or 
“mythic” understanding of state-religion relations. Such a downplaying of religion, the 
authors argue, would not be consistent with actual contemporary demonstrations of 
religions’ public relevance, e.g., the 9-11 episodes in United States in 2001. This revision of 
secularism is necessary because the ideological separation of church-state informed not only 
the “relative autonomy of state, economy and civil society” but also the view of these three 
                                                 
10
Salvatore (2005) defines “secularisation” similarly as “a social process of differentiation of a 
religious sphere, linked to modernization” (2005:8). He finds as well a parallel ethnocentrism in 
contemporary uses of the term “secularity” as an Enlightenment-period outcome that is a “typically 
European construct” embedded in “concrete life forms and modes of governance” (2005:9). 
11
 Similarly Salvatore also acknowledges the operation of a “secularism” that usually boils down to a 
“merely ideological and normative school” (2005:9) 
 21 
fields “as separate from the proper domain of religion” (2011:4). In a statement that is 
consonant with Casanova’s above, Calhoun et al. state that this principle of separation spread 
and motivated the division between social science and humanities faculties in the late 19
th
 
century university context and was echoed in the then objectivity-based, positivist scientific 
discourses. Furthermore Calhoun et al. state that the assumed natural link between 
secularism and modernisation has become a “model of secular modernization that many 
newly emerged non-Western nations attempted to emulate in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century” (2011: 6). The authors include as an example the case of independent India and its 
first prime minister’s remarks on the “prejudices and superstitions” of religion as obstacles 
for the country’s modernisation. In this particular sense, the case of Mexico is not 
necessarily different. According to Staples (1986:122-3), the secularisation measures taken 
by the Mexican state in the 19
th
 century, after independence from Spain, were aimed at 
“modernising society” and putting “the modern state” above the Catholic Church, its “old 
rival”. I will expand on this topic in chapter 3.  
 
The suggestion by Calhoun et al. (2011:6), certainly shared by Casanova (2001, 2009, 2011) 
and a significant number of scholars too, is clear: in an era where religion is all but forgotten 
(Weigert 1974; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Sahlins 1996; Hervieu-Léger 2000; Stark and 
Finke 2000; Cannell 2005, 2006; Davie 2007; Cipriani 2001, 2003, 2011), in an era where 
religion, not necessarily as an institution but as a “discursive reality”, has turned into “an 
indisputable global social fact” (Casanova 2011: 62), it is urgent to rethink the concepts of 




Religion as cultural phenomena, practices, discourses. 
 
In this section I will review scholarly definitions of religion and will outline what I think is 
the perspective that fits better into the aim of this dissertation: religion as culture and cultural 
discourses. Davie (2007) and Cipriani (2001) review the two general categories scholars’ 
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definitions of religion usually fall into. On the one hand there are substantive definitions of 
religions that pay attention to what religions are (Davie 2007:19) and so stress the contents 
of religions – e.g., beliefs, practices, rituals, discourses, institutions. On the other hand there 
are functional perspectives that highlight what religion does and therefore discuss the 
functions or effects religions exert in society, e.g., social cohesion. Durkheim’s classic 
analysis of religion, for instance, may be interpreted as falling into both analytical 
approaches (Cipriani 2001). Whereas he explicitly defined religion as a system of beliefs, 
practices, sacred and profane things, church and churchgoers (Durkheim 1915: 47), he 
emphasised as well the role of religion, or of “the sacred” in particular (Davie 2007: 30), as 
promoter of “moral unity and cohesion” (Durkheim 1915:400). Davie (2007:20) warns about 
the weaknesses of both views. Substantive approaches can restrict the analysis of religions if 
they take as compulsory the elements in their definition and therefore overlook individual or 
collective activities that, lacking supernatural or institutional elements for example, could be 
otherwise properly analysed as religious phenomena. Functional approaches, on the other 
hand, could overextend the analysis of religions by taking as religious phenomena a varied 
range of activities and events that would not necessarily fall into the spectrum of substantive 
definitions -this is, for example, Weigert’s (1974) complain about Luckmann and his all-
encompassing ‘forms of religion’
12
 (1974: 183). To overcome these gaps, Hervieu-Léger 
(2000:97-99) proposes three elements to account for in a religion “the expression of 
believing, the memory of continuity and the legitimising reference to […] a tradition”. This 
implies that not all traditions in modern societies are related to believing, therefore not all 
traditions are religious, and vice versa, not all acts of believing refer to a tradition therefore 
not all acts of believing are religious.  
 
Here I want to emphasise religion’s relations to an element that does not seem to be explicit 
in synthetic definitions of this concept: culture. For Davie (2007) it is “the principle” of Max 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic that is above all significant, that is, the possibility of religions 
                                                 
12
 Which, according to Weigert’s (1974) reading of Luckmann, range from vague ‘universal-
anthropological’ processes by which individuals transcend their biological nature, to other vague 
‘universal forms’ such as ‘worldviews’ and ‘identity’ as well as institutionalised forms of religion, e.g. 
churches. 
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engendering “forms of action that have an important impact in everyday life, including the 
economic sphere” (2007:29), and, I would add, the cultural sphere as well. Weber’s 
contribution to the understandings of religions’ cultural influence is undoubtedly 
paradigmatic (Kippenberg 2009; Ter Borg 2009; Waggoner 2009). According to Waggoner, 
Weber reversed Marxist reductionisms of religion to socio-economic conditions and element 
of the State’s dominion and proposed instead the analysis of religion rather as an ‘enabler’ of 
those socio-economic contexts. Thus, as part of his discussion of religions’ effects on 
economic spheres, Weber carefully addressed how a particular Christian religion “enabled 
the ideological atmosphere in which capitalism could and did thrive in Europe” (Waggoner 
2009:216; emphasis added) –a thesis Robert Merton (1938) would later on apply to the field 
of science. Similarly, Waggoner argues that religion is not “subjectively imagined” but 
actually grounded “beyond brains and bodies, beyond myth and performance […] in 
something like a culture or a social system […] in discourses of truth and subjectivity”. 
Waggoner proposes a study of religion whose analysis departs from the individual or 
collective consciousness and focuses instead on “another locus exterior to one or more 
subjects”
13
 (2009: 220). 
 
Italian scholar Cipriani and his “diffused religion” (2001, 2003, 2011) via particular 
‘channels of socialisation’ and ‘structures of values’ might be an instance of just the ‘exterior 
locus’ Waggoner suggests. Cipriani proposes the term ‘diffused religion’ as an account of 
Catholic religious phenomena in Italy that surpass the limits of the institutional Catholic 
Church, and run deep into society as a historic-cultural outcome. Being neither Bellah’s civil 
society
14
 (Cipriani 2011) nor one of Luckmann’s invisible religions (Cipriani 2003), this type 
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 In the next chapter I offer a brief account of my personal critical realist-social constructionist stance 
from which I assume both the existence and operation of social structures ‘out there’ as well as their 
socially-constructed character. 
14
 Although Cipriani detaches his “diffused” religion from Rousseau’s or Bellah’s ‘civil religions’, he 
acknowledges that the former functions as an “adequate space for wide-spectrum critical reflections as 
regards the state and politics, and the entire civil society” (2011:3-4). Both diffused religion and civil 
society would work as allies against the State and would share their “use of the family and its 
socializing action”, which “induces new generations to acquire a particular vision of the world, a 
decisional autonomy in ethical choices, a critical ability, a conscious orientation […]”. Moreover, 
Cipriani concludes that the tradition of civil society in Italy “was not born by coincidence, but is 
rooted in the presence of a dominating religious form, Catholicism, which since centuries has shown a 
particular attention to this sector” (2011: 4) 
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of religion is “diffused”, Cipriani explains, for it extends to “vast sections of the Italian 
population”, goes “beyond the simple limits of church religion”, usually “in open contrast” 
with it, and “has proved to be a historical and cultural result of the almost bi-millennial 
presence of the Catholic institution in Italy”. (2011:2). This type of religion 
 
is both diffused ‘in’ (through) many channels of socialization and education (mainly 
in schools and universities) and diffused ‘by’ (thanks to) specific structures and 
actions of values proposals (2011:2) 
 
Although Cipriani sees an Italian society that goes astray from the values of the Catholic 
Church and favours “ethic pluralism”, he sees as well an Italian society whose “system of 
values” is “not so very different as regards the Catholic social doctrine” (2011:2). Despite 
research results showing the diverse levels of Catholics’ religiosity
15
 and the different types 
of organised religions in Italy
16
, Cipriani argues that the evidence shows as well the “Italian 
society’s standard values” being “somehow stable”, that is, youth’s values embedding “the 
same hierarchy of values of their fathers”; as well as a series of “family values” and 
“religious and social engagement” still operational in society, along with “a marked 
individualization of the religious feeling” and a deep-rooted “pro-social activity”
17
 (2011:9). 
Thus Cipriani concludes: 
 
Even in case of scandals, protests [or] abandonments, religion – whether in church 
form or other – maintains its own incisive public function, at least as a parameter for 
value reference, in close continuity with the past (2011:10) 
 
According to Davie, modernisation – and corresponding ‘modern secularism’ paradigms – 
“need not bring with it the marginalization of religion to the private sphere” (2007:3). The 
view of religions as a cultural result (Cipriani), a cultural system (Waggoner) or cultural-
ideological phenomena (Weber, Merton) may both sustain such a claim and advance the 
understanding of its implications. This is not all. In Talal Asad’s view (1993), Western 
                                                 
15
 “Integrated”, “individualists”, “secularized” and “distant” Catholics; or, “militant”,  “critical”, 
“peripheral” believers and “non-believers.” (2011:8). 
16
 “Oriented” or “hetero-directed” church religions, “reflexive” or “self-directed” church religions, 
“Modal primary” diffused religions, “Modal intermediary” diffused religions, 
“Modal perimetric” diffused religions’ and “Non-religions.” (2011:8). 
17
 Altruism, assistance and voluntary work. 
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definitions of religion such as Clifford Geertz’s
18
 eventually “define religion (like any 
essence) as a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon” and neglect the fundamental 
relation between power and religion (see also Hearn 2012: 163-4). This type of definition 
ends up supporting “the liberal [post-Reformation] demand in our time that it [religion] be 
kept quite separate from politics, law and science” (1993:28). Asad rejects “universal 
definitions of religion” and suggests the study of “particular religions” as “different kinds of 
practice and discourse [whose] possibility and […] authoritative status are to be explained as 
products of historically distinctive [social] disciplines and forces” (1993: 53-4; see also Asad 
1983: 252; cf. Hearn 2012:164). Unlike Asad and his critique of Geertzian meanings and 
religious symbols, I will not downplay the cognitive dimensions of religion. However, I will 
side with Asad’s advocacy of the study of ‘particular religions’ and particular religious 
(Foucauldian) discourses and practices –in short, with non-universalist and non-Western-
centric approaches to religions.  
 
Now, what does the literature that deals more closely with the relations between religion and 
science tell us about the interplays between these two fields? Does this literature assume 
Calhoun et al.’s ‘mythic’ (2011) versions of secularism, Casanova’s (2009) ‘unreflexive 
epistemic regime’ or Asad’s (1983,1993) ‘universalist’ definitions of religion? 
 
 
Science and religion literature 
 
Barbour (1998) outlined what Bainbridge (2009:304) calls “[p]erhaps the most influential 
scholarly typology of relations between science and religion”. According to the former, there 
are four types of relationships “between the methods of science and those of religion” 
(1998:77): conflict, independence, dialogue and integration. The conflict or ‘warfare’ view, 
frequently illustrated with the case of Darwin and his theological opponents, includes 
                                                 
18
 As a “(1) system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods 
and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing 
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic” (cited by Asad 1993: 29-30). 
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“scientific materialism” from the science’s trench and “biblical literalism” from the religious 
legions. Both, says Barbour, claim that scientific knowledge and theological knowledge offer 
“rival literal statements about the same domain”, that is “the history of nature”. Barbour 
notices that the scientific-materialist forces end up “making broad philosophical claims” and 
the biblical-literalist opponents making “claims about scientific matters” (1998:78). The 
‘independence’ perspectives see rather science and religion having self-sufficient and 
distinct domains, methods and languages that must be kept apart from each other (1998:84-
90). The ‘dialogue’ perspectives recognize the limitations of both science and religion and 
the contributions that one can make to fill the gaps of the other. Some ontological questions, 
for example, reportedly unanswerable by science, would be left to religious insights. 
‘Dialogue’ perspectives take into account as well common methodological instruments 
between science and religion and the role the concept of nature plays in both sides (1998:90-
8). ‘Integration’ views are those of authors who hold “that some sort of integration is 
possible between the content of theology and the content of science”. These views consider a 
closer relation between theological doctrines and particular scientific theories. Barbour sees 
three versions of integration: that of a “natural theology”, which holds “that the existence of 
god can be inferred from the evidence of design in nature”; that of “a theology of nature” 
which accept that “the main sources of theology lie outside science, but scientific theories 
may affect the reformulation of certain doctrines”; and the systematic-synthesis version 
which regards science and religion as contributing “to the development of an inclusive 
metaphysics such as that of process philosophy” (1998:98). Interestingly, in the four types of 
views Barbour outlines, religion is unequivocally presented as a separate construct – either 
as institution or mere collection of instruments and knowledge – that produces (prohibited, 
undesirable, potential, or actual) distinct contributions clearly differentiated from those of 
science. Even in the ‘integration’ views, science is thought of as a field that contributes with 
discrete and independent inputs to either theology or ‘an inclusive metaphysics’
19
. As I will 
suggest below, such a science-religion separation may not be as clear-cut as it is assumed. 
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 Such independent-contributions scenario, Bainbridge argues sceptically, would actually be more 
feasible in the minds of “young people” than “among the intelligentsia” (2009:315-6) 
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Evans and Evans (2008) discuss this taken for granted notion in the science-religion 
literature as well: the assumption of an inherent epistemological separation, and 
epistemological conflict, between science and religion. These authors review the science and 
religion literature and divide it into two types: symbolic analyses and social-institutional 
analyses. The authors subdivide ‘symbolic analyses’ into those based on epistemological-
conflict assumptions and those based on ‘directional influences’. Symbolic analyses on 
epistemological conflicts tend to consider religion as systems of ideas, beliefs and discourses 
that compete with the ideas and discourses of science; Weber’s thesis on the increasing 
rationalisation of religion and its replacement by “calculation and technical means” being 
one of the earliest examples (2008:91). More examples of epistemological-conflict analyses 
would be found in the secularisation literature that focuses on what Evans and Evans call 
“macro” phenomena –e.g., institutional separation of religion and other social institutions, 
and the secularisation literature that analyses “micro” events and patterns –e.g., changes in 
individuals’ religious beliefs and practices. An example of the latter is the literature that 
analyses “how religious scientists are” and how scientific religious people are. This literature 
reportedly assumes that individuals “who are the most expert in science or religion should 
then exhibit the least adherence to the opposing symbolic system” (2008:92). Evans and 
Evans note, however, that recent research results show that 
 
scientific discipline is a less useful predictor of the religiosity of scientists than are 
many other variables, including age, marital status, and childhood religious 
background (2008:93). 
 
The second variant of symbolic analyses of religion and science, the ‘directional-influence’ 
analyses, would leave aside the epistemological-conflict assumption and focuses instead on 
“how other aspects of the religious symbol system influence the symbol system of science” 
(2008:94). This type of literature would be represented by Merton’s Weberian thesis on 
Puritanism contributing to the rise of scientific research in 17
th
-century England. In Merton’s 
thesis, (1938:419) it is not the Puritan theology but the “sentiments and values which 
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permeated the thought and action of [Puritan] believers”
20
 what contributed to the ideological 
atmosphere suitable to the rise of British science. In Evans and Evans’ (2008) view, the 
disputed relations between Islam, science and whether the former fostered or inhibited 
‘Islamic science’ would constitute another example of ‘directional-influence’ literature –as I 
will explain later, my research does not address “positive” or “negative” influences of 
religion in sociology in Mexico, yet I will focus on both the influence of religion on social 
values in Mexico overall, and the former’s epistemological impact on “scientific knowledge” 
as well. The second type of science and religion literature according to Evans and Evans, the 
‘social-institutional conflict studies’, puts aside “the truth or falsity of religion or science” 
and rather studies the “authority or the power to determine truth between science and 
religion” and the corresponding “power-inflected discursive struggles” (2008:97).  
 
Evans and Evans (2008) notice that in the ‘social-institutional’ and ‘directional-influence’ 
types of literature the assumed epistemological conflict between science and religion is not 
addressed but bracketed out. The authors’ recommendation is not to take for granted the 
epistemological conflict model, but rather “leave the question of conflict over truth open” 
(2008:101). And that is precisely the question that drives the research I present in these 
pages. If religion constitutes in certain societies a pervasive ‘cultural result’ which may be 
‘diffused through’ families, schools and universities (Cipriani 2001, 2003, 2011; Waggoner 
2009), are there not possibilities of religion and social science – or sociology in particular – 
sharing epistemological bases? Furthermore, are there not possibilities of the 
epistemological bases of religion influencing those of the social science –an influence that 
secularists under their ‘secular epistemic regime’ (Casanova 2009, 2011) would rather reject 
automatically? Evans and Evans note that anthropologists Sahlins (1996) and Cannell (2006) 
have indicated “important ways that anthropology’s own classifications and conceptual 
apparatus are tied to specifically Western versions of Christianity” (2008:96). It is precisely 
this type of religion-social science epistemological influences that this research is aimed at. 
In the next sections I will present a series of authors who address this particular topic.  
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 Values such as a “blessed reason” to appreciate God’s work, or the glorification of God by material-




In order to offer a fair review of the whole range of scholarly voices, I will present and 
discuss next one author from the ‘theological literature’ Evans and Evans decided not to 
include in their review –for this literature, they paradoxically assert
21
, is “outside of the 
interest of most sociologists” (Evans and Evans 2008:90). Although my position in this 
research is far from an exegetic religious stance, I do think no harm is done if we at least 
have a look at what theologians have argued, and anthropologists such as Cannell (2005, 





II. Epistemological influences 
 
Theological methods and metaphysics in social science. 
 
Milbank’s (2006) Theology and social theory is a collection of four sub-treatises that put 
forward a clear theological agenda: the validity, acknowledgement and ‘use’ of a Catholic 
harmonic “ontological peace” as a way to overcome violence and nihilism and, in the 
process, reinaugurate theology as “the queen of the science” (2006: 382-442). In order to 
sustain such a proposal
23
, Milbank reviews in each sub-treatise what he considers are the 
very origins of political science, positivism, sociology and Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. 
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 What I wonder is whether Evans and Evans’ exclusion of theological literature on the grounds of an 
unaccounted ‘academic indifference’ is precisely evidence of sociologists assuming a priori the 
uselessness of such scholar field and therefore getting unavoidably close to the rigid secularist 
position that not only Calhoun et al. warn about but Evans and Evans themselves try to overcome. If 
scholars’ exclusionist views of religion and theological knowledge are an intellectual habit, it would 
be far more resilient, and probably more unconscious, than social scientists – even those in the ‘soft-
secularism’ or ‘plural’ streams – would admit. 
22
 See also Asad’s (1993: 43) brief comment on Geertz insisting “on the primacy of meaning” and so, 
apparently, “taking up the standpoint of theology”. 
23 
Trying to relate science and religion epistemologically would not be a ‘one-man battle’, especially 
not among the religious scholars. American theologian Roy Clouser (2005) argues that scientific 
theorising is necessarily shaped by religious world-views and the belief on a divinity. Scripture would 
not shape scientific theories by explicitly addressing all the theoretical issues and topics the latter 
comprises. Scripture would shape theories by means of the presuppositions on the divine that all 
theories, according to Clouser, include explicitly or implicitly (Cooper 1995). This theologian presents 
individual cases of thinkers in the mathematics, physics and psychology fields and the way they 
would embed in their theories such presuppositions on the divine. In this section, however, I will not 
present Clouser’s, but John Milbank’s arguments on the theological origin of the academic disciplines 
this research addresses, that is the theological origin of social science and sociology in particular. 
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These chapters provide the reader with a dense and rich recollection of philosophical-
scientific arguments and conjectures that, the author claims, were originated from Christian 
theology via Catholic or Protestant thinkers. This “archaeology” of ideas aims at tracing “the 
main forms of secular reason in such a fashion as to unearth the arbitrary moments in the 
construction of their logic” (2006:3). Next I will present only a selection of the dozens of 
connections Milbank draws between theology and social science. I will focus in particular in 
his sub-treatise on theology and sociology, and from it I will present only a set of statements 
- which would not be enough to explain in full Milbank’s propositions but would be at least 
illustrative and could offer a partial background to what non-religious scholars, e.g. 
Cannell
24
 (2005, 2006), would draw from Milbank as well. 
 
Milbank argues there are continuities in terms of both “method and metaphysical 
assumptions” between theology and sociology (2006: 52). He start tracing these continuities 
from early-19
th
-century French philosophers Louis Gabrielle Ambroise de Bonald and 
Joseph de Maistre, whose works Milbank categorises as “secular theology” or “post-
enlightenment” combinations of “empirical discussion of finite realities and invocation of the 
transcendent” (2006:55). In de Bonald’s and de Maistre’s secular-theological reasoning it 
was customary to attribute “power” and “cause” to human and divine “agents” and to 
“invoke the divine presence as an immediate explanatory cause” (2006:55; emphasis added). 
These French thinkers would as well “associate God with the operation of arbitrary and 
material power” and would further suggest that it is not “any old mythos of power” which 
would hold society together but “a devotion to a particular mythos”. As a consequence the 
legitimation of “real, factual” power does not lie in its formal properties, i.e. formal 
ownership, but in its very internal self-foundation, its “self-establishment through mythical 
inscription” (2006:55-6). Yet individual will is still powerless and does require mediating 
instances that confer powers on it. “Thus throughout the cosmic and the political order runs a 
universal triadic logic of faits sociales which are ‘general’, ‘external’ and ‘visible’” and 
function as power mediators, that is, “the universal ratio pouvoir/ministre/sujet” which is 
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 Anthropologist Cannell seems to agree with Milbank and acknowledges his idea of the theological 
origins of social science, including anthropology. Cannell refers to the theologian’s statements briefly, 
mostly in footnotes (2006: 3, 46, 49). 
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further “expressed as I/you/he, father/mother/child, sovereign/executive/subject and 
God/priest/faithful” (2006:56). De Bonald then argues that societies’ conservation requires, 
prior even to political institutions, such a triadic power-logic. For Milbank this appeal to 
treble social entities is evidence of de Bonald’s ‘sociologization’ of the idea of natural law. 
De Bonald and de Maistre would share the Malebrancheian idea on creations being 
necessary God’s work and not only language, but also writing, the family and political 
sovereignty being all revealed institutions. Yet, unlike Malebranche, de Bonald would place 
the departure point not on the individual, but on the group of individuals, the collectivity. 
 
It is only human beings in relationship who have access to the realm of ‘general 
ideas’, which […] is to be regarded as the direct conserving presence of God – so 
that, indeed, society is literally a ‘part of’ God (2006:57)  
 
Following the same rationale, this French thinker would argue that “‘general ideas”, and not 
particular ideas, would be “equally and immediately, general ‘social facts’”. From this “strict 
dualism” it follows that “genuine scientific generalizations” are necessarily based on “more 
basic observations” of particular ideas that portray “the general facts about society”. This is 
the backbone of positivism, Milbank argues, and it is “firmly in place in de Bonald” 
(2006:59). Milbank then states what a sociologist would have seen coming from the outset -
that de Bonald’s proto-positivist theorisations are to be found in Comte and then in 
Durkheim. Comte would put forward his ‘social physics’ as the study and promotion of the 
life of the spirit, a companion to his division between temporal and spiritual powers (section 
above), where the supremacy is granted to the latter and to law as well. Just as de Bonald 
theorised, Comte argued that such supremacy is not granted by the individual but by society. 
Comte would then reproduce “both a dualism of irreducible social whole over against 
particular constituent parts, and the association of the former totality with religion” 
(2006:62). Comte would not be the only one reproducing what Milbank claims are de-
Bonaldian theological dualisms. Despite Durkheim’s sociology sharing “neo-Kantian 
liberalism and republican socialism” precepts, he would reproduce as well de Bonald’s 
metaphysics through Comte and would end up manufacturing “a new and perverse theology” 
(2006:63-8). The link between French Catholic theologians and Durkheim would not be 
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evident simply because the latter would not cite the former. However, it was not only the 
Kantian dualism of categorical universal-empirical intuition, but also de-Bonaldian and 
Comtean separation between general categorical ideas (“faits sociales”) and particular facts 
that made Durkheim see “an intensified dualism which governs all aspects of human 
existence”. The sacred-profane vital opposition in religions being just one instance. After 
offering an interpretation of the theological foundations in Durkheim’s theorisations on 
‘sacrifice’, Milbank addresses the ruptures and continuations between the theological 
metaphysics in the French positivist sociology and early German sociology. The author 
summarises these continuations as follows 
 
the association of ‘the social’ with given, permanent categories; a dualistic 
conception of humanity as caught between ‘real’ nature and ‘spiritual’ values; an 
identification of ‘the religious’ with irrational and arbitrary forces which are 
irreducible and unexplainable; the importance still given to functional causality; an 
empiricist attitude to ‘facts’, and a historical narrative which compares the 
postreligious stage to the stage of primitive religion (2006:75) 
 
What Milbank wants to demonstrate as well is that whereas Durkheimian sociology regarded 
the social and the religious as equals, early German sociology did the opposite: it regarded 
both as separated realms. Therefore the Weberian view of the ideological and the social-
economic as irreducible to each other, and the view of irrational religious values as opposed 
to instrumental reason, would unsurprisingly take place.  
 
Milbank’s fundamental theological agenda - summarised in the first lines of this section - is 
indeed an intention that did not go without critiques from other theologians, e.g., Roberts
25
 
1993. I will not attempt to discuss that debate though. I will suggest, however, that 
Milbank’s essay constitutes an exceptional ‘archaeological’ interpretation of sociology’s 
epistemological foundations that nonetheless overlooks, as many other theological analyses 
would, both the non-intellectual institutions (i.e. political regimes, educational contexts, 
family backgrounds) in the biographies and actual social interactions among the philosophers 
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 Robert reviews Milbank’s first edition of Theology and social theory, published in 1990 
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and scholars he discusses
26
, as well as the very religious personal backgrounds of such a set 
of thinkers. However, and regardless of his theological agenda and his exclusively 
intellectualist archaeology, I want to highlight Milbank’s references to dualistic theological 
schemes and ‘triadic power logics’. ‘Classifications’ and ‘dichotomistic classifications’ are 
topics I will return to constantly in this dissertation. Next I will review the work of a non-
religious author that proposes a likewise ambitious set of relations between Christianity and 
social science: cultural anthropologist Marshall Sahlins and his essay on the Christian 
cosmological traces in Western social science. 
 
 
The effects of Christian ‘long-term native cultural structures’ in social science. 
 
Sahlins advises from the outset that his essay (1996) should not be read as a comprehensive 
catalogue of Christian theology or history of ideas. This essay may be read instead as an 
extension of Sahlins’ agenda (1976) to give ‘cultural reason’, as opposed to 
utilitarian/materialist reason, a more central role in the understanding of human social 
behaviour for, among other things, “it is culture which constitute utility” (1976:viii). Similar 
to Milbank’s ‘archaeological’ analysis, Sahlins’s genealogical view dissects a series  of 
relentless religious notions that would have a remarkable capacity to penetrate *into non-
religious intellectual fields. Sahlins focuses on what he calls one of the Western “native 
cultural structures of the long term” (1996: 395): Adam and Eve’s original sin, or the 
creational “wickedness of humanity” (1996:396, 424). This biblical passage, variously 
interpreted
27
, would cut humans away from God, paradise, nature and from themselves and 
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 See for example Collins (1998). Based on a social-conflict perspective this author offers an 
extensive historical study on ‘networks’ of philosophers and their ‘interaction rituals’, which are 
affected by ‘macro social conditions’, from ancient to contemporary times. 
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 It can be found in the book of Genesis’ chapter 3. The woman created by God, tricked by a serpent, 
eats a fruit from the prohibited tree “in the middle of the garden” and then offers the fruit to her 
husband, who eats the fruit as well. According to the Catholic Bible, when God confronts the 
disobedient couple “[t]o the woman he said, ‘I will greatly increase your pangs in childbearing; in 
pain you shall bring forth children, yet your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over 
you.’ And to the man he said, ‘Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of 
the tree about which I commanded you, ‘You shall not eat of it, cursed is the ground because of you; 
in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you […]’” 
(The Holy See, n.d.). This biblical passage has been interpreted differently by both Catholic and 
Protestant theologians through the centuries (Wiley 2002).  
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became, Sahlins argue, the foundation of further theological dogmas, e.g., “[…] the 
possibility of salvation, […] the ontological distinctions of Heaven and Earth, body and soul, 
humanity, nature and divinity” (1996:424). Adam and Eve’s original sin expelled humanity 
from eternal life and infinite wisdom and condemned human kind to a “world of thorns and 
thistles”, pains and death (1996:396) and, more importantly, to a world of human 
imperfection and incompleteness. Sahlins argues it was the theologian and bishop of Hippo, 
Saint Augustine, who would be one of the main spokespersons of the original sin. Like 
Milbank’s transmittable theological metaphysics, this myth and its corresponding notions of 
human imperfection went beyond the religious sphere too. They were taken up by classic 
political philosophers, economists, classic social theorists and contemporary social thinkers. 
 
For Sahlins the pervasive idea of human incompleteness or imperfection begot the idea of 
‘human needs’, which would be conceived as a counterbalance to such an original-sin-
inspired human incompleteness. This idea of ‘human need’ would not be contested but rather 
used as a foundational ideal for further political-economic ideologies. This idea would feed 
Bernard Mandeville’s ideas of the “Chaos of Evil” (396) and, later on, Mandeville’s 
colleague, Adam Smith, and his “Invisible Hand”, which “might well have been the wrathful 
hand of God, as it would create the wealth of the nation out of the feeling of privation it 
visited on the person” (1996:401). As a result, in the field of classic economics, “the 
Economic Man of modern times was still Adam […] the same scarcity-driven creature of 
need” (1996:397). The Fall of man would not only end up underpinning the cosmology 
behind Smith’s invisible hand, it would aid as well a certain biological understanding of 
human nature, or an “anthropology of biology” (1996:400-4), that rests on a duality where 
the flesh is the natural “brute”, “animal”, part that corrupts the progress of the more 
reasonable human spirit. Sahlins then notices a parallel dichotomy in scholars’ references to 
“higher” and “lower” bodily parts and other associations such as bestial man-earth and 
spiritual man-heaven, as in Bakhtin’s references on Rabelais’ grotesqueries where the 
“lower” body,  
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links man to the earth and to birth and death, expressing his basic bestiality and 
sexuality, [whereas] [a]bove is the spirit or soul affiliating man with the angels and 
heavens (1996:401) 
 
Durkheim would follow this binarism as well. Echoing Milbank (1996) indeed, Sahlins 
argues that the French sociologist “was fully aware that he was drawing on a long 
philosophical-cum-theological tradition”
 28
 when he literally stated that man is “double”: an 
organic individual being on one hand and, on the other, a social being that “represents the 
highest reality in the intellectual and moral order” (1996:402). One of the consequences of 
this dualism is that men, as ‘brute flesh’, devour one another, and this is the principle, 
Sahlins argues, in both Saint Augustine’s The City of God and Hobbes’ Leviathan. The result 
for Sahlins is an “anthropology of power” (1996:404-7) that takes for granted men’s need of 
control over themselves, men’s need of a power that watches and rules them. The concept of 
society as a controlling entity that stands “versus the individual” would then emerge in two 
variants: as the Hobbesian necessary Leviathan or as Adam Smith’s “unwanted imposition 
on personal freedom”.  Whereas Sahlins compares Foucault’s oppressive, power-constituted 
society to Adam Smith’s, he notices, by citing Raymond Aaron, the Hobbesian assumption 
in Durkheim, who would see individuals “motivated by unlimited desires” and resembling,  
 
the creature around whom Hobbes constructed his theory […].Since individual man 
is a man of desires, the first necessity of morality and society is discipline. Man 
needs to be disciplined by a superior force (1996:405) 
 
Therefore Durkheim’s sociological conception of society’s coercive nature would be, in a 
sense, another derivative of the Judeo-Christian long-term set of ideas on human 
incompleteness and human needs. Furthermore, the risk of disobeying this cosmological 
principle was “chaos”, a pervasive underlying conjecture Sahlins says can be found in 
anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown and French and British anthropology in general, scholar 
fields that would be “specially disposed to the anxieties of anarchy and a corollary respect 
for order and power” (1996:406). French and British scholarly concepts of “civilization” and 
German analogous concepts of “culture” would represent, in Sahlin’s view, ideological 
                                                 
28
 Indeed, Durkheim introduces this dichotomy as a “well-known formula”, as “a duality of our 
nature” (Durkheim 1915:16). 
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companions to such a ‘naturally-human’ chaos. And then, “[e]verything happens as if we had 
been waiting for Foucault” (1996:407), who would turn upside down the Hobbesian 
principle of individuals constituting an omnipresent power, just to say, Sahlins argues, that 
an omnipresent power
29
 constitutes individuals.  
 
The six scholars who comments are included in Sahlin’s essay are critical of different 
arguments. One of the commentators criticises Sahlins for overlooking non-Augustinian 
Christian theologies that do not insist on the God-nature division. An Israel-based 
commentator argues that Sahlins ignores the ‘alterity’ of the West and the second chapter 
(second account of creation) of Genesis –which presents Adam’s classificatory approach 
towards God’s creatures. Another commentator points out Sahlins’ lack of answers to what 
anthropology is supposed to do today with its putative Judeo-Christian roots. Two 
commentators find further problems with Sahlin’s emphasis on continuation and non-rupture 
stories and his putting aside of difference and resistance accounts –to which Sahlins replies 
by stressing the similarity of the opposites, or “denials” of a “cultural order”, taking “their 
logic and meaning from this order” (1996: 424). However, except perhaps for the reviewer 
that leaves to expert scholars the assessment of Sahlins’ thesis, all the commentators seem to 
be convinced about the ideological links that Sahlins depicts between religious thinkers and 
their ‘unintentional’ successors. None of the commentators questioned the non-explicit 
causal assumptions – mere relations of ‘similarity/dissimilarity’
30
 and temporal sequence – 
Sahlins draws from to connect, at a theoretical level and in genealogical terms exclusively, 
theologians, thinkers, scholars and their ideas. One of these reviewers explicitly states:  
 
As Sahlins shows, the human sciences since the Age of Enlightenment have tried in 
vain to exorcise theology. Our ‘native Western anthropology’ is so imbued with 
basic Western Judeo-Christian ideas that the attempt to rid it of them is tantamount 
to abolishing anthropology itself (1996: 416).  
                                                 
29
 Sahlins also argues that natural law and theologies of the divine providence are connected, for “the 
‘humanization’ of the Renaissance and the ‘secularisation’ of the Enlightenment” transferred “the 
attributes of an omnipotent Deity to a Nature at least as worthy of reverence”(1996:408). But it 
occurred so, Sahlins continues, because nature had been de-deified since ancient Hebrew religion, 
which distinguished and legitimised itself by brandishing a dogma opposed to paganism and its sun-
gods: “God was not in the sun or stars, the rain or wind […]”, therefore “the ancient bond between 
man and nature was destroyed” (1996:411). 
30
 Different, for example, from “substantial” relations of actual interaction (Sayer 1992:88) 
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But is it really so? Is Western Anthropology still carrying Judeo-Christian imprints? Or does 
the statement above represent rather a group of scholars that were carried away by Sahlin’s 
alluring genealogical analysis? Next I will present another anthropologist whose work is 




Christianity in anthropology 
 
Anthropologist Fenella Cannell argues that (2006:50) Sahlins’ critique of Western 
anthropology carries the same Christian traces the author himself is trying to exhibit. 
Although Cannell does not expand on this objection she further disagrees with Sahlins about 
his interpretation of Saint Augustine. In the former’s view, the fall of man and the sinfulness 
of his flesh – as opposed to his soul - are not necessarily Augustine’s statements but would 
belong to a “pessimistic”, “post-Reformation” reading of the theologian (2005:353). 
However, Cannell states her ideas on the Christianity of anthropology are “often compatible” 
with those of Sahlins (2006: 33). Cannell (2005, 2006) adopts a Milbankian position about 
the origins of anthropology and social science in general. From her point of view, 
anthropological theory claims to be a secular enterprise, but this claim would be mistaken, 
“[a]s the theologian John Milbank has succinctly noted, this claim is a fiction: ‘Once there 
was no ‘secular’ […]” (2006:3). For Cannell it is clear that anthropological theory’s original 
identity was defined in opposition to theology and,  
 
since the theology it was repudiating was specifically Christian theology, 
anthropological theory has always carried within it ideas profoundly shaped by that 
act of rejection, from which there can therefore never be a complete separation 
(2006: 45) 
 
Her views of sociology’s origins are not different. For this author both sociology’s and 
anthropology’s claim of an “absolute break” with theology is “a misleading one”. As for 
anthropology, its relationships with Christian theology are not evident today for they were 
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“increasingly backgrounded as time went on” and as a result anthropology ended up 
believing,  
 
without much qualification its own claims to be a secular discipline, and failed to 
notice that it had in fact incorporated a version of Augustinian or ascetic thinking 
within its own theoretical apparatus (2005: 341) 
 
What are, then, these Christian/ascetic ideas in anthropology’s theoretical frames? In one of 
her research articles Cannell suggests three Christian-theological derivatives. In her research 
on Mormon communities in United States Cannell finds that biblical genealogies are a key 
belief. Churchgoers are “religiously commanded not just to trace but to love” both their 
human and divine kin (2005: 346-9). This finding seems to make Cannell recall the 
genealogical methodology in early anthropology
31
.What Cannell wonders after this – 
perhaps having in mind Milbank’s ‘theological methods’ in social science
32
 (above) – is 
whether anthropologists have really reflected about “the crucial significance of Christianity 
in the making of the whole concept and methodology of genealogy in Europe”. Cannell 
argues the concept of genealogy and the method of tracing genealogical stories date back to 
the “royal and aristocratic genealogies drawn up and devised by clergy, specially monastics” 
whose prime model was the very genealogy of Christ (2005: 350). According to Cannell, this 
Christian background of genealogies was forgotten and the cause of this oblivion is yet 
another effect of Christian thinking in anthropology. In this author’s view, genealogies 
would be taken as accounts of the “pedigree” of human kind, and this was eventually 
considered as an unfair, inappropriate object of scientific inquiry. Yet this interpretation of 
genealogies was merely taking for granted the human body-spirit opposition which would 
actually “belong to the realm of the ‘ascetic’ Christianity of anthropology” (2005:350). So, 
genealogies as concept and methodology in early anthropology would be derivatives of 
Christian theology; and their oblivion by later anthropologists – based on the denial of the 
‘body’ element within an a priori body-spirit folk-theological interpretation – would confirm 
further the link between Christian and anthropological logics.  
                                                 
31
 A methodology that, Cannell says, languished as time went by but was recently brought up to light 
by scholars doing “some interesting excavations of its history”. (2005:348) 
32
 Cannell does not include here any explicit citation or quotation from Milbank. 
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The second element Cannell considers a theological derivative in anthropology is certain 
types of anthropological understandings of the concept of modernity and the time scale it is 
usually defined with. The Christian idea of the transcendent as a non-human, heaven-like 
sphere of the divine or as an “irreversible change in the nature of things” constitutes a 
“postulate of beyondness” that would be replicated in the “beyondness” between pre-modern 
and modern times and the sense of total rupture between them. Thus, modernity “is a 
postulate of ‘beyondness’ in social science as heaven is a postulate of beyondness in 
Christianity” (2005:351). In another publication Cannell (2006), based on ethnographic 
research findings, would draw the same parallel but this time between anthropological 
understandings of modernity and the Christian idea and practice of “conversion”. A 
“conversion” in Christian communities would depend “on a break in time”; it “changes the 
individual, and however much he might backslide, the event itself cannot be undone” 
(2006:38). From there Cannell draws the parallel, thus modernity,  
 
[i]nsofar as it implies and irreversible break with the past, after which the world is 
utterly transformed in mysterious ways […], is itself modelled on the Christian idea 
of conversion (2006:39) 
 
The third element arises from Cannell’s experiences with scholars’ accounts of alternative 
Christianities. According to Cannell these scholarly accounts are based on Christian 
parameters. Firstly, the author notices that Mormon churchgoers, in their everyday life, do 
not take for granted the theological division between the mortal/ profane and the divine; they, 
for example, often imagine themselves doing in heaven what they used to do in earth and 
relating to the same people they relate to in their mortal lives. Hence, the Christian 
theological separation between heaven-earth, human-divine is not as clear-cut in certain 
Christian communities. Secondly, Cannell notices as well that certain scholarly accounts of 
religions would rather take for granted that all religions should somehow exhibit the heaven-
earth, human-divine principle and, when this characteristic is not met, the scholars’ answers 
is to label those religions as instances of “local resistance” or “peripheral” variants of “real 
Christianity” (2005: 352). In the author’s view, these scholar labels would simply represent a 
 40 
reification of a theological dichotomy that is taken for granted and used as a yardstick. 
Cannell concludes 
 
Anthropology is a discipline that is not always so ‘secular’ as it likes to think. Were 
it to become less ascetic in its understanding of religious experience, it might more 
often remember its own theological prehistory (2005:352) 
 
Similar to Milbank’s and Sahlins’, Cannell’s genealogical analysis, understandably so, 
consist mostly of relations of external similarity (Sayer 1992:88-93) between Christian 
constructs and anthropological concepts, methods and criteria. For Cannell the resemblances 
between the biblical genealogies of Christ and churchgoers’ worshipping of those 
genealogies resemble and may be traced back the concept/method and use of genealogies in 
early anthropology. Cannell traces as well the same similarity between the idea of modernity, 
as a total rupture with pre-modernity, and both the idea of the transcendent as an absolute 
human-divine separation and the notion of the irreversible Christian conversion. After such 
resemblances are noted, the causal connections between the Christian and the 
anthropological sets would be established by following the Milbankian thesis about the 
theological lineage of social science and its implied causal principle: causes always precede 
their effects chronologically. But, would this Milbankian statement suffice to link the mere 
resemblances that Cannell depicts between Christianity and anthropology? What if the 
anthropological elements that reportedly resemble those of Christian theology were taken 
from, or reinforced by, similar constructs from other knowledge fields or ideological realms? 
Even if we presuppose the pervasive theological roots of social science and social theory, 
how would early and contemporary social scientists – most, if not all, having a secular 
sensibility – end up with no choice but to reproduce the Christian notions identified by 
Milbank, Sahlins and Cannell above? Neither Sahlins nor Cannell – or Milbank, despite his 
lengthy archaeological analysis of Durkheimian sociology – seem to have in mind Durkheim 
and the series of theses he suggested on religion/society-knowledge-science relations. I will 




III. Epistemological influences re-stated: Durkheim’s theses. 
 
Religion, causality and classifications 
  
In his ‘strong programme’ manifesto David Bloor (1976) stated that Durkheim “dropped a 
number of hints as to how his findings might relate to the study of scientific knowledge”
33
 
(1976:2). I certainly agree. This section is a review of a particular fragment of Durkheim’s 
sociology of religion-knowledge: his theses on the substantive relations between religion and 
two components of human cognition: causality and classifications –or “the two most 
important concepts from an epistemological standpoint”, in Anne Rawls’ words (1996:440). 
Next I will present Durkheim’s arguments on ‘causality’ and ‘classifications’ and their, 
apparently forgotten, causal links with religion. 
 
Religion, force/power and cause. 
 
From the first pages of The Elementary Forms, Durkheim (1915:8-9) is explicit about his 
aims: exploring not the “very first beginning” of religion but its “most essential” 
representative in order to explain the formation of human knowledge –a quest that, 
Durkheim stated, had been the job of philosophers exclusively, since Aristotle’s times. 
Philosophers would propose a set of universal properties of things and of the understanding 
called categories
34
 –“time, space, class, number, cause, substance, personality, etc”
35
 – 
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 Bloor finds useful Durkheim’s division of the sacred and the profane and the derived idea of science 
as sacred. “The puzzling attitude towards science [as objective, independent, unquestionable 
knowledge] would be explicable if it were being treated as sacred” (1976:41).  
34
 Schmauss (2004) reminds us that The Elementary Forms is not, however, the first publication by 
Durkheim about categories of thought. One of the first publications by Durkheim on the topic is his 
philosophy lectures at the Lycée de Sens, from 1884. There Durkheim holds the existence not of 
necessary universal but of necessary principles ruling the human mind. These principles would arise 
from the ideas of unity, order and simplicity as needs of the mind (2004: 112). Whereas dimensions of 
time and space order our experience locating things internally and externally respectively, the mind 
groups things and experiences assigning an “entity at the centre of each group”: the substance. Further 
order is required by the mind, which arranges phenomena based on precedence and antecedence, so a 
phenomena that appears as a condition of another one is the cause; and the latter the effect. The five 
necessary principles in Durkheim’s early theory of the categories are: space, time, substance, causality 
and final causality. In these early theorisations, Durkheim would follow the French “spiritualists” –
like Cousin, who followed Kant’s critics- and so would see no difference between “the forms of the 
intuition and the concepts of the understanding” (2004:113). Likewise Durkheim would support the 
apriorism of such a set of principles or categories. But even then Durkheim would disagree with the 
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which, Durkheim stated, are “naturally found in religion” and were “born in religion and of 
religion” (1915:9). In Durkheim’s view, religion has not only “enriched” people’s 
knowledge, but has “formed” the “intellect itself”
36
 as well  philosophy and science (1915:11, 
237). After this introduction, Durkheim sets out to analyse two of the then mainstream 
perspectives on religion: animism and naturism. Once Durkheim dismisses the possibility of 
finding a “sacred character” inherent in the individuals’ dreams (animism) or in nature 
(naturism), he suggests totemism as a “more fundamental and more primitive” (1915:87-8) 
religion and therefore more plausible as source of sacredness and more suitable for his 
purposes. Durkheim then chooses his case studies: Australian tribes and their totemic 
religions.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
idea of the categories originating in the individuals’ “introspective experience” and with Cousin’s 
proposition on the “divine” direct origin of the categories - an argument Cousin reportedly elaborated 
as a response to what he understood as the “sceptical implications of Kant’s theory of the categories” 
(Schmauss 2004:20). Durkheim distinguished by then two components of the categories, the 
universal-a priori and the particular-empirical. As for the category of causality, for example, there 
would be an universal a priori principle that makes individuals to conceive as a necessity the fact of 
phenomena having causal relations with other phenomena, and a principle of particular experience of 
causality that provides the empirical representation of the necessary causal relations: whereas the 
former provides the frame, the latter fills such a frame with concrete experiences (2004:116). In his 
later theorisations Durkheim, Schmauss argues, would rather dismiss the a priori principle of causality 
and would replace it with an “empirical, sociological account of the universality of the categories” 
(2004:117).  
35
 Rawls (1996:434-5) states Durkheim analysed six categories in particular in The Elementary Forms: 
time, space, classification, force, causality and totality. 
36
 Before and after Kant, Rawls (1996) argues, epistemological debates centred around a dualistic 
separation between human thought and reality, where reality was not perceived in itself but only 
through human categories of thought (1996: 431; see Sahlins’ anthropology of reality as well (1996)). 
Durkheim, Rawls states, tried to overcome the Humean empiricists’ individualistic perspectives – 
which promoted scepticism over individual realities seen as changing and unstable – the Kantian 
apriorists’ naturalistic views  – which did not solve the problem of experience but rather just imposed 
the criteria of a apriorism – and Jamesian pragmatists’ positions –who did not offer explanations of 
the ways in which individual utility becomes a valid general utility (1996: 432-3). Social forces for 
Durkheim, on the other hand, could be perceived and shared collectively and could therefore provide a 
valid source for human categories of thought. The above, Rawls says, is why Durkheim replaced the 
individual by the social – via religion, I would add. Schmauss (2004) disagrees on the idea of 
Durkheim drawing from Hume directly. This author argues that the French sociologist was not 
familiar with Hume’s work directly, but only through French philosophers Élie Rabier and Paul Janet 
(2004:126, 164-5). From Schmauss’ view, Durkheim’s categories were developed from the “eclectic 
spiritualist tradition” of French scholars like Victor Cousin, Maine de Biran and Paul Janet who 
discussed Hume but also Kant and helped to spread the latter’s work into France (2004: 59-60). These 
French spiritualists would take Kant’s epistemological arguments on the “conditions for objective 
scientific knowledge” for “a psychological theory of […] sensations” (2004:56). For this group the 
categories were psychological faculties not Kant’s logical a priori conditions for human reasoning. 
Durkheim would support the spiritualist’s claim on the empirical existence of the categories, his novel 
contribution, though, would be the conception of social, rather than psychological-individual 
categories.  
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While describing the totemic organisation and religious practices of the tribal clans, 
Durkheim points at a common “principle” between the very “emblem” of the totem, the 
clan’s “human members” and the “animals or vegetables” that materialise the clan’s totems: 
a sacred force. This force is intrinsically collective, “anonymous and impersonal” (1915:188); 
it is independent of individuals and generations and remains in time. This force “is the god 
adored by each totemic force”; a god that is “immanent in the world and diffuse in an 
innumerable multitude of things” (1915:189). This force/god is materialised by the clan and 
its members through the totem, which becomes the material representation of the force/god
37
. 
The totemic force/god acts as both “mechanical” and “moral” force (1915:190), for it can, 
from the member of the clan’s view, produce physical effects and cause actual sickness; it 
also compels the member to observe the religious rites “because he feels himself morally 
obliged to acts thus” as if “obeying an imperative”. Adding up to his impersonal force/god 
concept/s Durkheim then provides ethnographic evidence: among American tribes such a 
“pre-eminent power” is the wakan or the orenda; in Melanesian tribes this “anonymous 
force” is mana; among the Australian Arunta and Loritja tribes it is the “magic force” 
reported as Arungquiltha (1915: 192-8). Durkheim then states that this force/god/power 
constitutes the very “notion of the totemic principle” and, furthermore, a pre-scientific idea 
of force that explains not only natural phenomena but “everything that acts and reacts that 
moves and is moved”; it is “an universal principle of explanation” and the ultimate “cause” 
of the clan’s life and its members’. Durkheim then concludes, “the idea of force is of 
religious origin”, moreover, “it has been borrowed first by philosophy then by sciences” 
(1915: 203). ‘Force’, however, is not the only concept Durkheim sees arising from tribal 
religious experiences. I will present next Durkheim’s idea that the category of causality is a 
derivation of religious experiences as well. First I will review what those particular religious 
experiences would be. 
 
Firstly, religious imitative rites, i.e. rituals where members of the clan reproduce the gestures 
or characteristics of animals for the sake of the latter’s reproduction and the clan’s wellbeing 
(1915: 355-60), have “moral efficacy” (1915:361). It is an efficacy linked to faith, to a 
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 A force/god Durkheim also calls “immaterial substance” and diffused “energy” (1915: 189).  
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predisposition to belief. In cases where the rite does not yield the expected effects, faith in it 
is still “impermeable to experience” for the member of the clan could not deny the rite’s 
efficacy “without causing an upheaval of his own being”
38
 (361). Durkheim notices that in 
the science field, the same resistance to ‘disbelieve’ is present; in this field there is a 
commanding inertia in the prioritisation of confirmatory scientific evidence over evidence of 
failures or exceptions. Just as disbelieving in the rite causes moral chaos, it would be 
“against all method to renounce” to, and to disbelieve, scientific laws. In this sense, the 
believer and the scholar would differ from each other “only in degree”; the latter “only […] 
introduces more method” (1915:361). But the religious imitative rite and the faith that 
sustains it would not be only impermeable to experience just as the scholar’s beliefs in 
scientific laws would be, the religious rite rests upon two key principles that would have 
further epistemological implications for lay people and scientists. One of those principles is 
the “law of contagion” by which a “condition or a good or bad quality are communicated 
contagiously from one subject to another who has some [physical] connection with the 
former”. The second principle is that of “the like produces the like” by which the mere 
“representation of a being or condition produces this being or condition” (1915:356). In 
Durkheim’s view, the origins of the category of causality are equivalent to the origins of the 
principle ‘the like produces the like’ in imitative rites. Furthermore, the latter “is a concrete 
statement of the law of causality and, in all probability, one of the most primitive statements 
of it which has ever existed” (1915:363). After this, the philosopher-sociologist from Alsace 
addresses the different conceptual pieces in his category of causality. 
 
As he implied in earlier chapters, the notion of force
39
 is contained in the idea of cause. As 
presented in the paragraph above, the main characteristic of such a force or power is its 
collective ritual nature, or, as Durkheim now qualifies, its “social” origin. The ‘prototype’ of 
the idea of force/power was collectively forged by society via religion, not necessarily by the 
                                                 
38
 Even among “cultivated people”, Durkheim states, there are “believers who, though having doubts 
as to the special efficacy attributed by dogma to each rite considered separately, still continue to 
participate in the cult. They are not sure that the details of the prescribed observances are rationally 
justifiable ; but they feel that it would be impossible to free oneself of them without falling into a 
moral confusion” (1915: 360) 
39
 Here Durkheim adds further conceptualisations: a cause is a force that may remain dormant; if it is 
triggered off such a force becomes both an effect and an instance of actualised power (1915:363) 
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individual’s senses or external experiences, as in a Humean or empiricist interpretation of 
causality; nor created a priori as in a Kantian theory of the mind
40
. After discarding the 
“individual will” as origin of the idea of force
41
, Durkheim argues, in a clearly aprioristic 
statement that combines both Humean and Kantian precepts, that the idea of force in 
causality must hold two characteristics: firstly it should come from the individual, yet not 
from his/her external, sensorial experiences
42  
but from his/her spiritual or internal 
experiences, therefore it must be related to the only forces individuals can so experience: 
moral forces
43
. Secondly, it must refer to impersonal powers, the first type of force thought 
of. These two conditions, from Durkheim’s perspective, are met by the religious “collective 
forces” – mana, waken, orenda – which are impersonal, and contagious as well made of the 
individual’s feelings. 
 
Now, how does this religiously-originated force/power operate? The next conceptual piece 
Durkheim addresses is the idea of a “necessary connection” between cause (or force) and 
effect (or actualised force, power). This necessary connection is an a priori component of 
causality, it occurs in the individuals’ minds “under the empire of a sort of constraint from 
which it cannot free itself” (1915:366). Unlike empiricist (Humean) approaches that held that 
the idea of causality was no more than an expectation of precedent-antecedent reinforced by 
habit, Durkheim sees causality and “necessary connections” from another angle. They are 
not a mere “tendency of our thought”, but an authoritative “external norm superior to the 
flow of our representations”. This norm’s authority emanates from the collectivity and its 
reproduction, that is, the very existence of the social organisation and collective life as such, 
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 See footnote 34. 
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 For Durkheim this would not be possible for the first notions of force would have to come, as he 
discussed in previous chapters where he defined the ‘sacred force/god/power’, from an impersonal 
energy, a power with no clear-cut identity but a diffuse collective constitution. According to Schmauss 
(2004:124) Durkheim was challenging spiritualists like Main de Biran’s and Rabier and their 
‘animistic’ derivation of the concept of power from the individuals’ “internal experience of willed 
effort” or internal desires. 
42
 Which would be “incommunicable”, and therefore unable of collective contagion and collective use 
(1915: 364-5).  
43
 From Rawls’point of view, this does not mean Durkheim discarded the notion of feelings entirely. 
Individual feelings for Durkheim cannot be communicated but collective “feelings of moral force” 
(1996:450) can. So following a Humean reasoning, Durkheim would argue that if participants can 
collectively hold the same type of moral feelings they can collectively hold the same categories as 
well.  
 46 
which are the very aims of the imitative rites. Imitative rites are then “obligatory” and have 
to be “executed regularly” for the collectivity’s very existence. Having such an external 
obligatory status, the “necessary connections” between cause and effect that are enacted in 
imitative rites become then the model for further non-religious causal relations and the 
category of causality as such.  
 
Although Durkheim accepts his theorisations are not “a complete theory of the concept of 
causality” and that this concept varies in different times, geographies, and even among 
different professions, he defends his sociological theory of the category of causality and the 
categories in general (1915:368-9) on the grounds of its combination of aprioristic and 
empiricist stances, as it takes into account the a priori character of causality and necessary 
connections without discarding the contribution of the individual experience, which provides 
subjective feelings of regularity which the collectivity forges into stable, general and 
authoritative categories of thought and causality. Another ‘category’ Durkheim saw 
emerging from religion was ‘classification’.  
 
Religion and classifications 
 
Durkheim also stated that religion is a “system of ideas” whose “primary function” is to 
represent to individuals “the society of which they are members, and the obscure but intimate 
relations which they have with it” (1915: 225 –emphasis added). Durkheim then explained 
that whereas science would teach us that minerals and plants belong to different sets, totemic 
religions combined these elements and provided instead different classifications: “the sun, 
moon and stars are men or women who feel and express human sentiments, while men on the 
contrary are thought of as animals or plants” (1915: 235). So, Durkheim states, the 
classifications of primitive religion – which blended plant’s essences into men’s – would not 
have come from our senses like the empiricists claimed: our senses would have not been able 
to perceive the plant and the man being oneself. Therefore, Durkheim goes on, “some 
exceptionally powerful cause intervened […] It is religion that was the agent of this 
transfiguration” (1915: 236; emphasis added). Totemic religions dictate that men and plants 
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partake from the same essence. The belief in this shared essence, became a “bridge”, a model 
for making further logical connections.  
 
What are exactly these ‘bridges’? First Durkheim notices that the frequent opposition 
between phratries, or groups of tribal clans
44
, i.e. a ‘water’ phratrie versus an ‘earth’ phratrie, 
‘extends’ to persons; as a result, “the logical [water phratrie-earth phratrie] contrast has 
begotten a sort of social conflict” (1915:146). Durkheim then suggests that phratries include 
clans where things that are assumed to hold “the greatest affinities” with a totem are placed 
and included as part of the clan. Out of this totemic organisation of things arises a 
classificatory “framework” which Durkheim defines as “a definite form, with fixed outlines, 
[…] which may be applied to an undetermined number of things, perceived or not, actual or 
possible”. This framework or “class” would have “possibilities of extension […] beyond the 
circle of objects which we know” (1915:147) and would entail hierarchies and relations of 
superiority, inferiority and equality whose model would be taken from the clan/phratries 
organisational hierarchies. Although Durkheim states this could be considered a crude logic, 
its contribution to “the intellectual evolution of humanity” would be unquestionable for it not 
only fed the first explanations of natural and physical phenomena but also constituted a 
foundational criterion to establish, outside the religious realm, similarities between elements. 
Hence, just like the ritual principle ‘the like produces the like’ originates further non-
religious causal models, 
 
“[t]he great service that religions have rendered to thought is that they have 
constructed a first representation of what […] relations of kinship between things 
may be […]. From the moment when men have an idea that there are internal 
connections between things, science and philosophy become possible. Religion 
opened up the way for them (1915:237 –emphasis added).  
 
Primitive logic and scientific logic would not be essentially different, Durkheim argued. 
Although the former does not associate the same things the former would, both elaborate 
explanations and, therefore, both “show how one thing participates in one or several others”, 
that is, both unite “heterogeneous terms by an internal bond” (1915:238). Thus, 
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 A phratry, Durkheim explains “is a group of clans which are united to each other by particular 
bonds of fraternity.” (1915: 107) 
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between the logic of religious thought and that of scientific thought there is no abyss. 
The two are made up of the same elements, though unequally and differently 
developed. (1915:239) 
 
According to Rawls (1996) scholars usually mix up the three different meanings, or “levels”, 
Durkheim would unclearly refer to when he addressed the concept of classification. From 
Rawls’ point of view, the first Durkheimian meaning of classification is an “ability to 
perceive similarity and difference in crude terms […] that humans share with animals”. The 
second is classification as a cosmological “system of classifications” that are “patterned on 
divisions in social relations”. The third is, finally, the category of classification that develops 
“through the direct perception of moral force in the enactment of those practices that create 
the binary relations of sacred and profane, totem and nontotem” (1996:453). Rawls claims 
scholars tend to focus on the second “level” and forget the third one. As a result, scholars see 
classifications as part of Durkheim’s sociology of knowledge, not as part of his “social 
epistemology” (1996: 435, 452-5). Although I would not strictly separate from each other the 
three different “levels” of classifications noted by Rawls – for the three can empirically be 
found mixed up in real settings and one could lead to the identification of the other – I would 
agree with Rawls’ conceptual distinctions and would argue something similar to her claim 
about certain oblivion, or (un)conscious neglect, of Durkheim’s epistemological theses. 
 
The whole set of passages from The elementary forms where Durkheim clearly grants a 
‘beyond-religion’ epistemological influence to totemism in particular and to religion in 
general, seems to be overlooked by scholars. For example, Thompson seems to put aside 
Durkheim’s references to religion and rather focus on the “socially-derived” status of 
Durkheim’s cosmologies (2002: 100), or on his categories of thought being “derived from 
the society’s own life” (2002:109) or simply being “socially-derived” (2002: 114). Even 
Rawls, despite her review of Durkheim’s totemic classifications (1996: 455-7), seems at 
times more inclined to discuss Durkheim’s “moral forces” within “certain enacted practices” 
(1996: 438, 451, 461) than within their originally-reported religious matrix. Similarly, and 
despite his interest on Durkheim’s sacred-profane distinction, Bloor (1976) focuses on how 
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scientific knowledge has “the character of transfigured conceptions of society”, just as 
religion does
45
 (1976:45; emphasis added). Scholars that overlook Durkheim’s 
religion/society-knowledge-science arguments, and focus instead on the society-knowledge 
association only, would focus exclusively on the statements where Durkheim leaves aside 
the totemic/religious factor and deliberately replaces it with “the social”. For example, 
Durkheim states religion is able to perform its classificatory-model role for religion is “a 
social affair”, it occurs by and in society, the only instance where “a super-excitation of the 
intellectual forces” and the corresponding necessary “collective thought” are possible (1915: 
238). The same religious-by-social replacement can be found in Durkheim’s initial 
theorisation of the totem not as god but as the clan as such. It is because the totem is the 
clan’s material flag that the clan’s totem, Durkheim states, “can be nothing else than the clan 
itself”
 46
 (1915: 206). Scholars like Thompson would probably focus as well on an earlier 
piece of Durkheimian sociology of knowledge: Durkheim and Mauss’ Primitive 
Classifications ([1903] 1963) and its thesis on the social origin of classificatory systems. In 
this acutely criticised work
47
, Durkheim and Mauss analysed the correspondence between the 
classificatory schemes of Australian, Amerindian and Chinese native groups and their very 
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 See also Bloor’s discussion of there being “truth in the conviction that knowledge and science 
depends on something outside of mere belief […] [i.e., in] society itself” (1976:72; emphasis added) 
46
 It is not only that the categories of the understanding would be socially constructed because society 
is the god/power/force that originates the categories. Durkheim notes as well the religious-like 
characteristics society displays to “arouse the sensation of the divine”. Since it is a god/force society 
constitutes too the “superior” power individuals’ dependency feelings emanate from. This God-like 
society “imperiously demands our aid” for the sake of collective ends.; individuals would become “its 
servitors”; its “empire” over individuals’ consciences would be driven by the “moral authority” it 
instils, which is “the emotion […] we experience when we feel this interior and wholly spiritual 
pressure operating upon us” (1915: 207). So, when society “commands” the individual, there are no 
doubts, no hesitation. This internalised “moral ascendancy” of society and its commands is a 
guarantee of efficacy (209). These passages back up both Milbank’s idea on Durkheimian sociology 
claiming an equal status between society and religion, and Sahlin’s statements on Durkheimian 
society’s necessary coerciveness over ‘naturally-wicked’ men. 
47
 The introduction by Needham in the 1963 English translation of the text is probably the clearest 
example of this criticism. There Needham points at the authors’ “logical flaws”, e.g. lack of actual 
evidence to prove both “changing modes of classifications” and the assumption about clans 
constituting less evolved forms of moieties (Durkheim and Mauss [1903] 1963: xii). Lukes (1973:446) 
notes as well the authors’ avoidance of counter-evidence and deviant cases and their baseless 
assumption on there being one single classificatory scheme among tribal societies. But perhaps the 
riskiest flaw is Durkheim and Mauss’ petitio principii tendency ([1903] 1963: xii; Lukes 1973: 31), 
which makes the authors to include the conclusion (classifications of things reproduce the individuals’ 
social organisation) in the initial premise, (there are classifications of things that reproduce the 
individuals’).Yet, as Coser (1988a) and Lukes (1973:448) note, Durkheim and Mauss’ thesis’ remains 
as a breakthrough in sociological and anthropological fields.  
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tribal divisions, and put forward their hypothesis on the classification of things by 
individuals reproducing that of the very individuals in society. In any case, these 
interpretations and readings of Durkheimian sociology of knowledge – probably driven by 
the ideological paradigms of ‘secularism’ and ‘secular science’ presented above – clearly 
miss or downplay the very cognitive connections Durkheim painstakingly suggested between 
religion – or religious ‘moral forces’ (Rawls 1996) – and both people’s logics and scientific 
logics. 
 
In his often-quoted work on Durkheim, Lukes (1973:449) states that Durkheim’s hypothesis 
on religions containing “the germs” of scientific logics “is, in many ways, both challenging 
and plausible”. However the same author states Durkheim offers no valid empirical evidence 
to sustain his causal association between religion/society and “particular classificatory or 
conceptual systems”, for his arguments on “sentiments and affective values” as causal links 
between one and the other are simply “not sufficient” (1973:448). This is a fair complaint, 
however, are Milbank, Sahlins and Cannell basically not arguing what Durkheim did in 
terms of scientific classifications arising from religious classifications? Milbank (2006:56) 
states that French philosopher de-Bonald did establish a connection between the “universal 
ratio” pouvoir/ministre/sujet and the triads “I/you/he, father/mother/child, 
sovereign/executive/subject and God/priest/faithful”. Furthermore, Milbank states that 
Durkheimian sociology carries Christian theological dualisms (or dichotomistic 
classifications) that travelled from De-Bonald, to Comte and then to Durkheim, i.e.,  general 
ideas, or social facts, as opposed to particular ideas; the divine-social whole versus the parts; 
‘real nature’ on the one hand and ‘spiritual values’ on the other. Similarly, anthropologist 
Sahlins (1996) argues that the Christian dualism of corrupt human flesh versus the human 
spirit would inform an “anthropology of biology” that takes for granted this separation. 
Durkheim’s thesis on religious-scientific classifications is also similar to Cannell’s 
statements on both anthropological genealogies (i.e., classifications) deriving from the 
Christian genealogies and the concepts of pre-modernity and modernity in anthropological 
theory constituting an incommensurable division (i.e., classification) of phenomena that rests 
on the Christian idea of irreversible religious conversions (a before-after dichotomistic 
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classification) or on postulates of transcendent beyondness of the divine over the human (yet 
another dichotomistic classification). Despite these three authors not drawing explicitly from 
Durkheim’s thesis, they indirectly corroborated its plausibility. 
 
In one of the most recent critiques of the Durkheimian approach, Schmauss (2004:123) 
considers Durkheim’s theorisations about the origins of ‘necessary connections’ as a 
“somewhat implausible hypothesis”. Indeed, the scholarly and religious fields today are 
‘somewhat’ different to both those Durkheim learnt from ethnographies on ‘primitive 
societies’ and those he personally experienced in the 19
th
-century European-French context 
(Greenberg 1976; Pickering 1984; Moore 1986; Strenski 1997). Individuals making animal 
gestures for the sake of their ‘totem’ and community’s wellbeing would definitely not be a 
typical act among today’s ‘(post)modern’ ‘technology-driven’ societies. Even if religion is 
still an active force in contemporary societies, its prevalence relies perhaps less on 
Durkheimian imitative rituals than, for example, on Cipriani’s (2011) ‘diffuse’ cultural-
religious practices. And even if rituals were still relevant, what Schmauss notes could still be 
the case: individuals may participate in the ritual yet their personal beliefs may not 
correspond to the group beliefs (2004:130). Durkheim’s ‘necessary connection’ troubles 
Schmauss (2004: 131-32), who thinks Durkheim did not explain sufficiently what type of 
necessity he meant and did not account, either, for the source of society’s power or authority 
to impose such a norm
48
. Sahlins (1996), as I have said above, does offer an answer in this 
sense. Sahlins sees the coercive nature of Durkheim’s society as an ideological derivation of 
the long-term Christian concept of dual human nature that Durkheim would not contest but 
would take for granted. In this scheme, the human corrupt predator – as opposed to the 
human moral spirit – has to be watched and controlled; society then, in its role of ‘secular 
religion’, would perform this imperative. Here I ask, would not Sahlins’ reading of 
Durkheim’s attribution of a religious-like ‘coerciveness’ to society be a possible instance of 
Durkheim’s own thesis on the scientific idea of force/power being taken from an analogous 
religious notion of force/power? If French philosophers de Bonald and de Maistre would 
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 He nonetheless accepts the validity of Durkheim’s explanation of necessary connection as a 
principle whose actualisation allows both society to reproduce itself and individuals to have “moral 
and legal obligations” (2004: 133).  
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explicitly invoke “God” as “an immediate explanatory cause” (Milbank 2006:55; italics 
added), would this statement by Milbank not represent further evidence of the plausibility of 
Durkheim’s hypothesis on the religious origins of the notions of causality?  
 
The first difficulty in answering this type of question –as in answering the question on the 
plausibility of Durkheim’s thesis on the religious origin of classifications – is the 
chronological scope of Durkheim’s theses. With his ‘positivistic genealogy’ of the categories,  
Durkheim wanted to account for both “the most essential” (1915: 8) religion and the 
‘creational processes’ of the categories. This was perhaps an analytical-methodological 
strategy that might have been not only the preferred analytical approach of one scholarly 
stream (e.g., just as Foucauldian ‘genealogies’ in the second half of the 20
th
 century were/are) 
but a taken for granted notion amid the political, social and cultural discourses of the 19
th
-
century European and French contexts Durkheim was part of
49
. In this dissertation, rather 
than searching for origins and drawing positivistic genealogies, I propose to focus more on 
the search for/analysis of shaping forces (chapter 2). Therefore the question is not whether 
classifications, notions of power/force and the category of causality have all a “religious 
origin”, but (1) whether the forces shaping them could be those that emerge from religion/s, 
and if so, (2) how those religious forces would eventually shape these cognitive elements. 
Although Milbank, Sahlins and Cannell are searching for ‘origins’ as well, their Foucualdian 
genealogies offer evidence to answer the first question tentatively. The question then is how 
this shaping process may occur. Sacred proto-forces, imitative rituals and their obligatory 
connections (causality) as well as totemic ‘moral’ hierarchies across and within clans and 
phratries (classifications) are explanans Durkheim proposed a century ago. Next I will 
review alternative explanations suggested in Durkheimian and Weberian literature. 
 
                                                 
49
 In terms of taken for granted approaches to ‘historical origins’ or ‘creational processes’, see for 
instance late-19
th
-century French Jewish scholar Darmesteter’s statements (1895) on the “truths that 
would save us” reportedly coming from the “authority” voice “heard eighteen hundreds years ago”, in 
a clear reference to Christ and the “misunderstood [Jewish] masters of Christianity” (1895:9-10). 
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IV. Same theses, alternative causal links. 
 
Partly based on Durkheim, Mary Douglas (1986) considers the acts of dividing the world and 
making classifications as key components of human cognition (1986: 3, 62-7, 91-109). These 
cognitive acts, along with “conferring sameness”, “remembering” and “forgetting”, depend, 
in Douglas’ view, not on religious imitative rites but on social institutions
50
 –see also 
Zerubavel (1999) for a relatively more recent reviving of Durkheimian-Douglasian sociology 
of knowledge and society’s role in individuals’ cognition which also includes individuals’ 




Douglas shares Durkheim’s functionalist view of patterned human cognition which demands 
“order and coherence and control of uncertainty” (1986:19). Following scientist Ludwig 
Fleck too
52
, Douglas (1986:12-9) puts forward the idea of “thought worlds”, which represent 
“the social grouping that is defined by its distinctive thought style”, e.g., “science worlds, art 
worlds, music worlds” (1986: 17). How, in these thought worlds, is cognitive order and 
control of uncertainty achieved? Douglas responds by referring to the concept, development 
and cognitive properties of institutions. Douglas borrows some tenets from information 
theory
53
 and portrays institutions as constructs that control “informational complexity” by 
“encapsulating” past experiences, “encoding” expectations, and reducing “entropy” (1986: 
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 In their respective reviews of Douglas’ book, Lewis Coser (1988b) and Bruno Latour (1988) touch 
upon the ambiguity of Douglas’ answer to the classical questions about deterministic “group minds” 
and whether institutions are mere “metaphors” to explain human cognition or actual independent 
agents with cognitive capacities. I share both reviewers’ comments. Although Douglas asserts that 
“institutions cannot have minds” (1986: 8) and clearly explains individuals’ active interventions in the 
development of institutions as non-independent social constructions, she also stresses, for instance, 
that “institutions remember” and “create shadowed places in which nothing can be seen” (1986:69), 
e.g., the Nuer’s “institutionalised memory” (1986:77).     
51
 Zerubavel (1999) revives what I think are useful Durkheimian tenets for a sociology of knowledge 
or a “cognitive sociology”. His main proposal (a “sociology of the mind” that fills the gap between on 
one hand merely psychological accounts of ‘individual thinking’ that overlook society’s influence and, 
on the other hand, more universalist approaches to ‘human thinking’ such as those in neuroscience, 
where cultural cognitive differences are obscured ) is supported by numerous empirical cases from 
anthropological and sociological literature. However, Zerubavel’s (1999) cognitive sociology does not 
really include detailed casual accounts of the sociological processes through which society shapes 
individuals’ cognition –or patterns of classifications. In this sense, Douglas’ work (1986) is more 
useful.  
52
 And his work on the social bases of scientific thinking and the existence of a “thought collective” 
(or Durkheim’s social group) and various “thought styles” within it (or Durkheim’s collective 
representations) (Douglas 1986: 12). 
53
 The work of economist Andrew Schotter in particular. 
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47-8). But these social institutions are not given, they undergo specific processes of 
legitimation. Minimally, institutions would be “conventions” that would gradually become 
“naturalised”. One of Douglas’ contributions to this old sociological concept, is the idea that 
this from-convention-to-institution legitimation process begins with a “cognitive device” 
(1986: 55) or a “parallel cognitive convention” that sustains the development of an 
institution (1986:46). A convention starts off by setting forth a cognitive analogy, for 
institutions need stability, and conventions-analogies provide precisely this stability. For 
example, an institution of a basic division of labour would begin to materialise by using the 
analogy female-male so the female and male types of work are distinguished and then 
properly justified. However this analogy might be challenged at any point and therefore lack 
stability. Here is where parallel analogies would come into play. The female-male division of 
labour convention finds legitimation by drawing from further equivalent analogies, i.e. left-
right, people-king. So, Douglas asserts, “‘female is to male as left is to right’, reinforces the 
social principle [i.e., the female-male division of labour] with a physical analogy” (1986:49). 
When these analogies are  
 
applied back and forth from one set [of] social relations to another and from these 
back to nature, [their] recurring formal structure becomes easily recognized and 
endowed with self-validating truth (1986:48) 
 
This is how conventions avoid being renegotiated every time and so can work properly as 
tools for ‘entropy-reduction’ by demonstrating that their ultimate “formal structure 
corresponds to formal structures in non-human realms” (1986:55). In other words, a 
convention becomes an established institution if the replies to the question ‘why do you hold 
this convention?’ refer eventually to reasons of cosmology and human nature, that is, when 
institutions find a “fit with the nature of the universe” (1986:46).  
 
Iterative and mutually reinforcing analogies also indicate, according to Douglas, the ways “a 
political hierarchy” and political-cultural geographies may develop too. The analogy female-
male would reinforce not only that of people-king, but also that of south-north, east-west, etc. 
Analogies may carry a contagious sense of asymmetry, or as Douglas puts it “the 
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preeminence of the right hand over the left, of the east over the west, of the north over the 
south” (1986:49, emphasis added). In Douglas’ view analogies “load” things or items within 
classifications “with moral and political content” (1986:63). For instance, the institution of 





Spiritual – Material 
Poetry and religion – Economics 
Speculative philosophy – Applied science 
Vague metaphor – Rigorous theory 
Intangibles – Measurables 
 
It is not only that institutions are based on analogies, institutions offer analogies or 
“classifications” to individuals too; in a sense, “institutions make classifications” (1986: 91). 
Furthermore, institutions make and offer classifications to scientists as well. Just as there is 
“a tension” between individuals’ own personal stock of analogies and society’s “founding 
analogies” which generally take over the former (1986: 55), there is also a similar interplay 
between scientists’ classifications and society’s: “[a] thinker who classifies the phenomena 
to be examined according to known and visible institutions saves himself the trouble of 
justifying the classification” (1986: 94). Douglas states that there is “a fundamental shift” 
(1986: 159) between social and scientific classifications
55
, however she points at the 
continuities between one and the other
56
. Weber, for example, would classify religious and 
secular lives into the compartments of the then mainstream secular paradigms and would 
analyse religions in Israel, China and India using “the institutional framework of Western 
society” (1986: 94), which includes a series of primitive, feudal and urban classificatory 
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 Similarly, Sayer (1992: 23) argues that there is a reinforcement and “leakage of meaning” running, 
not just horizontally but vertically as well, along aligned pairs of dichotomistic classifications. Sayer 
(1992:62) seems to base this idea on Douglas, who seems, in turn, to draw from Levi-Strauss 
(Douglas 1986:63). 
55
 She seems to assign to these types of classification a different nature, since “the quest for 
knowledge is not one of [the social classifications’] objectives” (1986:59) 
56
 Classifications by institutions would change though. Douglas (1986:102-8) suggests an  account of 
classificatory dynamics by analysing wine producers, the categories of wine they produce and the 
changing labels of their products – i.e. the label ‘Bordeaux’ which remains for wines from Bordeaux, 
France, yet would change afterwards to ‘Bordeaux-type’ for equivalent wines from California. “First 
the people are tempted out of their niches by new possibilities of exercising or evading control” by 
previous institutions and their classificatory political-economic charges. After this, people “make new 
kinds of institutions”, and then “the institutions make new labels” and so classifications’ change 
would continue. 
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stages that Weber, according to Douglas, loaded with Western political/moral characteristics 
–feudal sacredness, nobles and peasants; urban markets, bureaucracies and disenchantment. 
Similarly, Douglas asserts, Durkheim divided societies into ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’ 
following the mainstream late-19
th
-century social discourses, and thus he discussed 
‘primitive mechanic solidarity’ and ‘modern organic solidarity’ (1986:96). Douglas argues 
that scientists “are never completely free of their own contemporary society’s pressures”, 
therefore 
 
[s]cientific theory is the result of a struggle between the classifications being 
developed for professional purposes by a group of scientists and the classifications 
being operated in a wider social environment. (1986: 56) 
 
Institutions do not only provide classifications, they also “secure the social edifice by 
sacralizing the principles of justice”
57
 (1986:112). Interestingly, Douglas states that 
“[w]ithout appeal to religion, intuitionism or innate ideas” the justification of “a substantive 
principle of justice as universally right” (1986:117; emphasis added) becomes problematic. 
Just as emerging institutions pretend to be anchored in natural analogies, justice “had to have 
existed long before humans came into the world; so it appears old and immutable as one of 
nature’s fixtures”
58
 (1986: 120).  
 
Additional to these properties of institutions, a ‘Durkheimian possibility’ could be 
theoretically suggested at this point, at least tentatively. If ‘causality’ entails the 
identification and association of causes, mechanisms and effects (by ‘conferring sameness’ 
and establishing differences), is not ‘causality’ an instance of a special type of classification? 
If causality would additionally imply the attribution of ‘power’ or ‘force’ (Durkheim) and 
therefore any sort of moral ‘load’ (Durkheim) which analogies-classifications would 
inherently hold too (Douglas), is not that further evidence that causality can be a ‘higher-
complexity’ instance of a classification? So, if institutions ‘make classifications’ for 
individuals, would institutions make ‘causalisations’ as well? From a strictly logical and 
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 Here Douglas’ statements could be seen as consonant with Cipriani’s statements on ‘structures of 
(religious) values’ in general being ‘diffused’ by social institutions in Italy. 
58
 In this author’s view, there would rather be different systems of justice that are comparable to each 
other and do allow for room to assessments of their consistency. 
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theoretical point of view, this would be a valid possibility and a potential function of 
institutions too. I will return to this point in the last two chapters. 
 
In short, Douglas analyses how institutions and their cognitive ‘properties’ and ‘foundations’ 
– either as classifications, memories or concepts of justice (and perhaps ‘causalisations’ too) 
– develop over time and how they shape individuals’ cognition and judgement. Yet unlike 
the authors in the sections above, and despite stating that justice principles are anchored in 
religions, Douglas does not seem interested in linking scientists’ classifications or 
parameters of justice to religious institutions. In any case, here we face a theoretical 
contradiction, which I hope the following paragraphs help to resolve tentatively. 
 
Cipriani’s arguments on ‘diffused religion’ (2001, 2003, 2011) indicate that the influence 
and presence of formal ecclesiastical institutions, even in a historically Catholic country such 
as Italy, would be rather declining. The religious “indisputable global social fact” that 
Casanova advocates (2011:62) is not a ‘church’ per se but a religious “discursive reality”. 
Therefore, if priests, bishops, nuns, religious orders and their formal-material institutions are 
not as relevant as they once were, what are then the ‘Douglasian institutions’ that could 
‘make’ and offer to social scientists Durkheim’s religious classifications and causality –and 
Milbank’s ‘theological metaphysics’, Sahlins’ ‘Christian cosmologies’ and Cannell’s 
‘Christian methods’? An easy answer to this question would be to recall the concept of 
religion as cultural discourse, and then argue that religion, as a ‘cultural institution’, may act 
as transmitter. But this idea is excessively vague. Cipriani (2011) provides glimpses of more 
accurate answers. For instance, he asserts, without expanding on the subject, that religion in 
Italy would be ‘diffused through’ channels such as the family, schools and universities
59
, 
where specific “values proposals” are disseminated (2011:2). A less obvious and more 
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 Cipriani states afterwards what may back up this inference: different research projects whose results 
suggest that Italian students “do avail themselves of the opportunity to study the Catholic religion at 
school”; or that the Italian “youth substantially confirms the same hierarchy of values of their fathers” 
(2011: 8). 
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complex institution that Cipriani does not explicitly account for -yet he himself, perhaps 
inadvertently, seems to draw from
60
- is a certain institution of “authority”.  
 
It was Max Weber who put forward perhaps the most popular account of this concept and its 
three ‘pure’ forms: rational, traditional and charismatic. Here I will review in particular the 
“charismatic authority” type Weber analysed. First he conceptualised charismatic authority 
or charismatic domination (Swedberg and Agevall 2002:33) as a personalised, unstable type 
of authority that rests “on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary 
character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained 
by him” (Weber 1978: 215). Charisma is then a particular type of personality “endowed with 
supernatural. superhuman, or […] exceptional powers or qualities” that are considered  “of 
divine origin or as exemplary”. The individual with charismatic authority is therefore a 
“natural leader” (1978: 241) made partly by his/her followers and whose saliency is 
circumstantial. Yet, this temporal and volatile charismatic authority may mutate to more 
permanent forms “[w]hen the tide that lifted a charismatically led group out of everyday life 
flows back into the channels of workaday routines”. After this “routinisation” process “the 
‘pure’ form of charismatic domination will wane and turn into an ‘institution’.” (1978:1121 
–emphasis added) As a result, the charismatic authority of “a prophet, artist, philosopher, 
ethical or scientific innovator may become a church, sect, academy or school” (1978: 1121). 
Along this process, Weber argues, tradition- and charisma-based authority merge together. If 
the charismatic leader is involved in routinised practices s/he “turns into a priest” whose 
original gifts become part of the charismatic “institutional structure” (1978: 1134-5). Weber 
argues Catholicism underwent this process; it went from bishops with a mere personalised 
charismatic authority to a Church of Rome with institutional powers and political 
jurisdictions (1978: 1140). In what seems a clear reference to Durkheim, Weber argues the 
mana and orenda in primitive tribes are instances of these charismatic “permanent 
institutional structures” too (1978: 1133). I am interested in this more permanent, yet 
                                                 
60 With a clearly deferential tone, Cipriani addresses the work of an Italian scholar (Gian Enrico 
Rusconi) whom he describes as “an intellectual who constitutes a true reference point […] because of 
the solidity and rigour of his ideas, being present for more than forty years in the field of public 
polemic on religion and civil society. He is then a protagonist and a master interlocutor, careful, 
documented, respectful.” (2011:6) 
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modifiable, sense of a “charismatic domination” which, regardless of its religious or non-
religious origins (Riesebrodt 1999:5-8), may turn into a very “social institution” that does 
not necessarily have to be embedded in material organisations like the Catholic Church, but 
in a stable and relatively extensive set of practices-beliefs that form underlying “models” for 
further social interactions. This is more or less the sense that Smith (2000) gives to his 
Weberian ‘cultural model of charisma’. His model, empirically based in the cases of Hitler, 
Winston Churchill and Martin Luther King, is based on a relatively autonomous ‘cultural 
system’ and a charismatic leader that is “framed within a salvation narrative where strong 
binary themes contrast images of evil with those of the good”
 61
. This model of charismatic 
authority would reach its peak “when images of evil are at their most threatening” (2000: 
105) and would weaken  
 
when binary rhetoric is no longer produced and when inflated salvation narratives 
are replaced by frames which substitute economistic and piecemeal visions of 
mundane political life” (2000: 110). 
 
Interestingly Smith (2000) suggests here a condition of an institution that Douglas (1986) 
would rather see as the institution’s foundation or product. If Douglas asserts that institutions 
are founded upon analogies, Smith’s Weberian charismatic authority could be regarded as an 
example. Furthermore, if narrative binaries are a condition of the institution of charismatic 
authority in Smith’s view, the same binaries (classifications) may well be the ‘cognitive 
outcome’ of the same institution in Douglas’ view. There is no statement by Smith that could, 
in theory, refute the possibility of such a Douglasian attribute in his cultural model of 




Here I want to sum up and argue three main points at a theoretical level. Firstly, although I 
personally support the search for historical and contemporary shaping forces over positivistic 
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 Smith takes this idea from “Durkheimian body of work [that] indicates the centrality of binary 
oppositions in culture” (2000:103). From his empirical cases, Smith offers, among others, the example 
of Churchill and his defence of the English “great national traditions of democracy” versus the “evil” 
German war machinery and their leaders (107). 
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genealogies focused exclusively on ‘chronological origins’ or ‘creational processes’, I argue 
that the plausibility of Durkheim’s thesis (1915) on the religious genealogy of scientific 
classifications may be validated by Milbank’s (2006) statements on theological dualisms 
‘landing’ in Durkheimian sociology; by Sahlins’ (1996) Christian duality of human nature 
encouraging a similar assumption in social science; and by Cannell’s (2005, 2006) 
statements on genealogies (or classifications) in anthropology being rooted in the concept, 
practice and worshipping of Christian genealogies and her statements on anthropological 
concepts of pre-modernity and modernity (dichotomistic classifications) being ingrained in 
the concept of irreversible religious conversion and human-divine beyondness (further 
dichotomistic classifications). Secondly, I argue that Sahlins (1996) account of Durkheim’s 
attribution of coerciveness to a society that stands versus the individual are both an example 
of the classifications with moral-political “load” that Douglas (1986) suggests, and evidence 
of Durkheim’s own thesis on religious ideas of force/power being the origin of scientific 
concepts of force/power. This and de Bonald’s and de Maistre’s invocation of God as 
‘immediate cause’ (Milbank 2006) gives, I argue, further corroboration of the plausibility of 
Durkheim’s thesis on the religious origins of causality notions. Thirdly, I suggest that rather 
than the institutional Catholic Church per se and instead of tribal imitative rites (Durkheim 
1915; Rawls 1996; Schmauss 2004), it may be the family, the school, the university (Cipriani 
2011) and/or a cultural model of authority (Weber 1978; Smith 2000) that are the 
institutional entities (Douglas 1986) which may diffuse not only collective moral forces 
(Durkheim 1915; Rawls 1996), religious values (Cipriani 2011) and concepts of justice 
(Douglas 1986) but also patterns of classifications (Durkheim 1915; Douglas 1986; 
Zerubavel 1999). This series of institutions could then represent, in theory and tentatively, 
more adequate elements for an empirical-causal account that explains further the reported 
epistemological resemblances (Sahlins 1996; Cannell 2005, 2006; Milbank 2006; Evans and 
Evans 2008) between religion and social science –and the causal explanation of these 
epistemological resemblances would definitely contribute to a more reflexive understanding 







In this chapter I present the epistemological and ontological stances I assume in this research, 
the research design selected for the research’s empirical phase, the most relevant findings of 
my pilot case study as well as other key methodological elements. First, I present a personal 
statement with theoretical-methodological implications. What follows is not my conclusive 
view of epistemological and ontological matters of social reality. It is rather a position I hold 
at this stage of my career –a position I will perhaps modify, greatly or not, in the future.  
 
 
I. Epistemological and ontological assumptions 
 
Realist scholar Bunge (1993:207) calls social constructivism a “false” philosophy which, 
along with subjectivism, relativism, conventionalism and hermeneutics, “damage” social 
science since it claims that “all social facts” are “constructions of ‘thought collectives’” that 
hold “mutually ‘incommensurable’ views of the world” (1993:214-5). I argue that this type 
of reading of social constructionism is unnecessarily radical and hinders the possibilities of a 
dialogue between some of its variants and some streams of realism and of critical realism in 
particular. In this research I adopt both a ‘soft’ social-constructionist perspective of social 
phenomena and a ‘soft’ critical-realist approach to social realities. I account for this stance 
next. 
 
I am convinced that reality is hyper-complex and our cognitive capacities are limited. Reality 
cannot be ‘scientifically known’ in its entirety either (Sayer 1992, 2000). We have actively 
coped with such complexity though; we have partially deciphered it –and increased it as well. 
Through likewise complex social processes, we have metaphorically and literally constructed 
certain knowledge categories and certain knowledge institutions (e.g., Douglas 1986; Berger 
and Luckman 1966) that assist us in the partial control or understanding of complex realities. 
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However, I do not support radical and over-optimistic social-constructionist views that 
portray human agency as nearly limitless and explain knowledge and social phenomena as 
undetermined/undeterminable realities (Sayer 2000:91). I rather agree with the ‘soft’ or 
‘weak’ social constructionist idea that however contingent or deliberate social construction 
processes and outcomes are, such processes and outcomes are open to influences and various 
levels of determination and may become part of exterior entities, or exterior entities in 
themselves, which gradually transform into constructions partly independent of their 
‘makers’ (e.g., Douglas 1986; Foucault 2002, 2007). As Sayer argues, the fact that 
knowledge is socially constructed “does not mean that it cannot successfully identify real 
objects (including social constructions) which can exist independently of the researcher” 
(2000:90); or as scholar Calhoun (chapter 1) said recently about the phenomena of “human 
emergencies” in particular, they are “socially constructed phenomena [though] it doesn’t 
make them less real in the world” (quoted in ‘Event explores…’ 2012:16). 
 
In this research I support a ‘soft’ version of critical realism as well (Elder Vass 2011; Sayer 
1992, 2000). It is a ‘soft’ version because I am personally aware (see section above) of the 
risk of assuming ‘emancipatory’ (Sayer 2000) stances that may be rather unreflexive and 
bias analyses and research results. I am aware as well of the restrictive scepticism that the 
taking of such positions may generate within established communities where social 
research’s aims are not necessarily related to ‘emancipatory ends’
62
. However, I am 
convinced that certain forms of reflexive and cautious social criticism and teleologies (Cf. 
Bloor 1976) do fit into specific types of social research and specific types of research 
paradigms. Similarly, although I find slightly rigid the critical-realist categories of 
“intransitive” and “transitive” dimensions of knowledge
63
 (Sayer 2000: 10-11), I support 
critical realism’s three interconnected levels of reality or its “stratified ontology”: the real, 
the actual and the empirical. I interpret “the real” as the realm of all types of occurrences 
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 Doucet (n.d.), for example, argues that the methodological choices researchers take in the course of 
their research would depend on the criteria of the epistemic community the researcher is addressing 
“You need to be clear on what kind of evidence will satisfy your scholarly mentors, your colleagues, 
intellectual peers, and the readers who will evaluate your work” (Doucet n.d: 25) 
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 Categorising social reality as part of an “intransitive” dimension (Sayer 1992, 2000) may indeed 
lead to an underestimation of the flexible and rapid-change characteristics of certain social phenomena. 
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and possibilities, or more specifically, the realm of “objects”, whether physical or social and 
“their structures and powers”, whether active or passive (Sayer 2000:11). “The actual” 
would be constituted by occurrences, or the exercise of those possibilities by objects and 
their powers, and “the empirical” would represent our experiences of the actual and the real. 
The empirical does not exhaust the actual and the real, but it may get fairly close to them and 
therefore may describe and adequately explain parts of them. Next I will detail further the 
(soft) critical-realist/social-constructionist epistemological presuppositions that I will assume 
throughout this research. 
 
Critical realism does not only rely on observability in order to know the actual and the real. 
Critical realists also accept “a causal criterion” in such a way that “a plausible case for the 
existence of unobservable entities can be made by reference to observable effects” (Sayer 
2000: 12; emphasis added). These effects may “emerge” from the objects or elements 
involved but may not necessarily correspond to them. In other words, social phenomena, like 
some natural phenomena (e.g. chemical reactions), have emergent properties that are 
“irreducible to those of their constituents” (Sayer 2000:12-13). Unobservable entities, 
observable effects and emergent properties will be key concepts in the causal accounts that I 
will construct in the next chapters. 
 
Sayer (1992, 2000) and Elder-Vass (2000), following Roy Bhaskar, argue that critical-realist 
accounts of causation involve causal powers in objects that involve mechanisms. These 
causal powers are not only individual properties, they would further depend on sets of 
particular social relations and social structures. The nature of an object and its causal powers 
are necessarily related, they explain each other; yet whether the object’s causal powers are 
activated or not, Sayer states, “depends on conditions whose presence and configuration are 
contingent” (1992: 107). These “contingent conditions” are in turn further objects with their 
own causal powers, whose contingency may deliver divergent events or results –even from 
the same initial object. Therefore,  
 
 64 
depending on conditions, the [...] same mechanisms can produce quite different 
results and, alternatively, different mechanisms may produce the same empirical 
result (1992: 108).  
 
In this view Catholic discourses in the West may be perfectly conceived as delivering both 
similar outcomes and very different effects to those delivered by Catholic discourses in 
Mexico or Latin America, given the different historical conditions and ‘particular’ contexts 
(Asad 1983, 1993) that prevail in the two regions –topics I will address in chapter 3. Sayer 
also suggests two epistemological assumptions I find useful, the first consists of the idea that 
“[c]ounteracting forces can override and conceal the effects of the operation of a particular 
mechanism” (1992:110) and the second one is the assumption that “the reasons given by 
actors for their actions may not always be the real reasons” as they might be unaware of 
“structural conditions and their historically specific character” (1992:111-2; see as well 
Blaikie 2000: 111). Is the epistemological influence of Catholic discourses in Mexico (and 
the West) concealed perhaps by a ‘counteracting force’ derived from the operation of 
secularisation and secular-science paradigms (chapter 1)? Were main respondents (university 
sociology lecturers) during data collection aware of the different historical-structural 
background and conditions of secularism, Catholicism and sociology in Mexico and the 
West? –I will offer an answer to this questions in chapter 6, where I present and analyse 
some Mexican sociology lecturers’ replies to the main research question in this dissertation. 
 
I must say as well that my accounts will include some aspects about the ‘history’ of Catholic 
and sociological discourses, but will not offer an exhaustive explanation of ‘chronological 
origins’ –or what I would call ‘positivistic genealogies’, as opposed to Foucualdian 
genealogies that go beyond exclusively chronological moments of inception. Sayer considers 
this analytical strategy a mistake made by functionalists (1992:97). I would add that 
analysing ‘chronological origins’ or ‘moments of inceptions’ is, in fact, a philosophical-
anthropological quest that religions and theologians around the globe have been discussing 
and answering since dozens of hundreds of years ago before social sciences. In particular 
contexts, it is therefore very easy to step over and reproduce, rather unreflexively, religious-
theological arguments while trying to provide an account of origins –something that might 
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have occurred in Durkheim’s, functionalist indeed, sociological accounts of the ‘categories 
of the intellect’ and their socio-religious origin (1915). My aim in this research is not to 
explain chronological moments of inception, but to account for the religious, and other social,  
historical structures, conditions and mechanisms shaping sociological discourses in Mexico 
today,  
 
Leaning more towards the side of social-constructionism I also want to add the following. 
Causal explanations do not have to overlook the presence of structural constraints and 
shifting conditions (Sayer 2000:97), nor the possibility of individuals and communities 
escaping or resisting these constraints or, in Elder-Vass’ words (2011:156), innovating 
discursive practices. In this research I take into account both individuals’ capacity to put 
social determinants reflexively aside and what Elder Vass (2011) suggests about the “causal 
powers” of discourses: discourses may influence individuals’ discursive choices without fully 
determining them. This ‘influence’ would mean that a discourse’s causal powers would not 
generate a direct, complete, or “hard” determination but “a tendency to observe the 
[discursive] norm concerned, a disposition to do so” (2011:153 –emphasis in original), 
which emerges along with many other dispositions from different types of discourses. 
 
 
II. The research design 
 
Unlike the authors presented in the literature review chapter – except for Durkheim (1915), 
and Cannell (2005, 2006) to some extent – this research is not an exclusively theoretical 
exercise. This research does include an empirical component with its corresponding stages of 
data collection, data analysis and construction of accounts/explanations. This empirical 
evidence will indeed provide an opportunity to corroborate whether the theses presented in 
the literature review chapter would apply to the cases of Catholicism and sociology in 
Mexico and whether these theses can be further refined. Whereas Durkheim (1915) analysed 
ethnographic accounts of indigenous tribes to underpin his statements on the religious 
origins of the categories of the understanding and whereas Cannell (2005, 2006) drew on 
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findings from her research on Mormon communities to back up her conceptual-
methodological links between Christianity and anthropology, I instead collected empirical 
evidence from objects and subjects that are closer not only to one of the types of social 
phenomena to be accounted for but to both of them. I collected empirical evidence on both 
Catholicism and sociology in Mexico, from the very ‘makers’ (individual and/or institutional) 
of both, and from the contexts where both exist and flow in everyday life, e.g., “actual” 
university classrooms, Catholic services, etc. 
 
A survey design in this research would have probably delivered statistically generalisable 
findings, yet it would have been inadequate to unearth deeper evidence of historical 
conditions and structures. An exclusively historical study based on bibliographical sources 
and archival data would have perhaps meant a more manageable field-work in logistic terms, 
but would have likely limited the scope of the research to ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘how many’ and 
‘how much’ questions and their descriptive answers (Yin 2009:8-9). A series of interviews 
with sociologists and Catholic clergy members would have provided richer, thicker data yet 
it would have missed a more holistic view of Catholic/sociological discourses and their 
“real” and “actual” (Sayer 1992, 2000; Elder Vass 2011) operation in real-life settings. 
Given these advantages and disadvantages, empirical data for this research was collected 
following a case study research design (Blaikie 2000; Gerring 2007; Yin 2009), frame 
(Stoecker 1991) or approach (Creswell 2007). Flyvbjerg states that case studies are “detailed 
examinations” perfectly suitable for “human learning” insofar as they deliver limited yet 
specific and manageable “examples” individuals can inductively transform into more 
comprehensive and complex knowledge frameworks (2001: 66, 71). Apart from the 
pedagogical advantages of the practical ‘case study’, I find the case study frame or approach 
suitable because it allows for explanatory accounts (Yin 2009; Blaikie 2000; Stoecker 1991, 
Flyvbjerg 2001, 2006) or answers on “how causes interact in the context of a particular case 
or a few cases to produce an outcome” (Bennett and Elman 2006:458). Case studies also 
facilitate a holistic analysis (Creswell 2007) of sociological and Catholic discourses, their 
constitution, occurrences and interplays with other discourses, conditions and social 
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structures in a real/actual context. Flyvbjerg indicates two types of contexts case studies can 
address  
 
the small local context which gives phenomena their immediate meaning and the 
larger […] context in which phenomena can be appreciated for their general and 
conceptual significance (2001:136) 
 
Case studies are usually criticised precisely because of their context-dependent, and 
therefore limited, results and their consequent inability to underpin ‘generalisations’ about 
social phenomena (Stoecker 1991:90-1; Blaikie 2000:218; Yin 2009:14-5). But, according to 
Flyvbjerg, this complain arises because it emerges out of research paradigms where scientific 
knowledge equates to “universal truths”, a paradigm that Flyvbjerg (2001:67-71) traces back 
to ancient Greek philosophy –see also Asad’s critique of universalisms in the study of 
religion (1983; 1993). This research, however, does not seek to attain ‘statistical 
representativeness’ of Catholic/sociological discourses in Mexico and their epistemological 
connections
64
. Case studies in this research are based on the critical-realist principle of 
partial knowledge of ontologically stratified social reality/ies I have explained above.  
Further criticism against case studies points out their collection and generation of qualitative 
data that might be unreliable and not necessarily valid. In order to decrease that risk my case 
studies follow what Yin (2009: 47) calls a “replication logic” applied to a “two-case case 
study” design (2009: 60-2), which, unlike one-case study frames, is aimed at strengthening 
research findings by providing comparable evidence from more than one location. In 
Gerring’s words (2007:90) the case studies choice in this research would be examples of the 
“most-different-cases” approach. In Flyvbjerg’s terminology my cases would represent 
“maximum variation cases” (2006:230) and Creswell would describe them as instances of 
“purposeful maximal sampling” (2007:75). Two different locations in Mexico were thus 
selected Aguascalientes City (AgC, henceforth) and Mexico City (MxC, henceforth). 
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 In Sayer’s terms this research would be “intensive” (1992:242-50; 2000:20-2), since the tracing of 
“substantial relations of connections” is the analytical priority – as opposed to the location of mere 
resemblances and statistical generalizations which would be characteristic of, but not limited to, 
“extensive” research.  
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III. Catholic and sociological discourses 
  
However, my main focus in this research, or “unit of analysis” (Yin 2009), is not these two 
locations as such nor the institutions or people I collected data from – my “units of data 
collection” (Yin 2009:88) – but the Catholic discourses and sociological discourses flowing 
or being produced there. As I did with the concept of “religion” in the literature review 
chapter, I will not define in advance the concept of “discourse” in this section. I will only 
indicate the interpretations that are consonant with my epistemological and ontological 
positioning and guided my data collection activities. Elder-Vass (2011:147), for instance, 
based on Foucault’s theorisations, distinguishes between language and discourse. In this 
sense, there would be both linguistic expressions or sentences (language) and also statements 
(discourse); the rules of language would not necessarily equate to those of discourse; yet in 
this ‘regulatory’ sense, the latter would comprise the former. Fairclough’s view of discourses 
(2003), more on the side of “language” and “linguistic rules” according to Elder-Vass, 
comprises a conceptual division between discourse as an “abstract” entity or an “element of 
social life […] closely interconnected with other elements” as well as discourse as 
“particular” (2003:3-4) social phenomena, or relatively constant, stable and generalised ways 
or statements for representing certain aspects of the world –either “processes, relations and 
structures of the material world” or “the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so 
forth” (2003:124). Fairclough (2003: 129) suggests as well two ways to think about 
discourses: as representing some particular part of the world –or themes; and as representing 
those parts of the world or themes from a particular perspective, angle or point of view. 
 
 In this research I assume the context-dependent existence and operation, mutually inclusive 
or not, of Catholic and sociological discourses (Fairclough 2003; Elder-Vass 2011) that 
constitute key and relevant, yet not unique, instances of “Catholicism” and “sociology” in 
Mexico. As part of a stratified social reality, these discourses would be indicative of, and 
therefore suitable to research empirically, “actual” and “real” social phenomena (Sayer 2000) 
such as the not always evident, but partly observable, epistemological interplays between 
Catholicism and sociology in Mexico. As social phenomena themselves, these discourses 
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would possess “emergent properties” (Sayer 1992, 2000; Elder-Vass 2011) and therefore 
both their constitution and their effects cannot be reduced to a ‘linguistic set’ of words and 
sentences (Elder Vass 2011, Fairclough 2003). As Fairclough does (2003:3), I will assume 
that these two types of discourses carry in themselves evidence of their mutual 
“interdiscursive” interactions and their interplays with other social discourses.  
 
I also assume the possibility of sociological discourses influencing Catholic discourses in 
Mexico – and in other societies, e.g. Baum (1989), Lawler (2002); cf. Greeley (1989) – but I 
will rather focus on the possibility of Catholic discourses being tacitly implied in 
sociological discourses and influencing them along with other types of discourses. Given 
their historical significance and current ideological saliency in Mexico (see chapter 3),  I will 
particularly consider the possibility of Catholic discourses not determining totally, but 
influencing to some extent, what Foucault (2002:34-43) calls a “discursive formation”, a 
concept that Elder-Vass (2011: 145) uses as well and defines as the “sets of rules about what 
can be said and what should not be said (what statements can be made or should not be made) 
in a particular social space”. From his “linguistic” perspective Fairclough, somewhat 
similarly, refers to the “order of discourse”
 65
, i.e., “the relatively durable social structuring 
of language”(2003:3).  
 
Having these Catholic and sociological discourses in mind, my data collection activities in 
AgC and MxC were aimed at gathering different types of “texts” as well as other “primary” 
and “secondary” data (Blaikie 2000: 184), in both qualitative and quantitative formats. In 
this research I use the concept “text” in the terms Fairclough does, i.e., “[w]ritten and printed 
texts […] but also transcripts of spoken conversations and interviews” (2003:3). This 
definition is similar to Mason’s (2002:130), who defines texts in a broad sense as well: 
“printed or virtual, text-based or visual, documents”. The texts – e.g. printed texts (scholarly 
publications, Catholic periodicals), interviews transcripts, university seminars transcripts, 
Catholic priests’ homilies transcripts etc – and additional quantitative and qualitative data 
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 These “rules” or “social structuring” could be found, for instance, in Sahlins’ (1996) statements on 
the conceptions of ‘human wickedness’ and their prescribing Christian original-sin-related ideological 
roots 
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from primary and secondary sources I collected
66
 do not exhaust Catholic and sociological 
discourses yet represent adequate vehicles to trace and analyse the epistemological 
influences of Catholicism upon sociology in Mexico. 
 
 
IV. Case studies choice and data sources 
 
AgC and MxC were selected as geographical locations conducive to relevant case studies 
given their apparently divergent local atmospheres (Yin 2009: 47; Gerring 2007:90; 
Flyvbjerg 2006:230). Both cities are similar in terms of having analogous economic fields 
with a proportional degree of industrialisation. Both cities accommodate public universities 
where sociology as discipline is taught and where sociological and social research is carried 
out by full time university lecturers. However, these two locations may be described as 
‘opposite’ in terms of religious-ideological local contexts. Aguascalientes City is located in 
the state of Aguascalientes  –see appendix 2.1. According to the 2010 national census, 
Aguascalientes state’s population amounts to 1, 184, 996 inhabitants
67
; 92.9% of the 
population is nominally Catholic, 3.4% is “Protestant and Evangelical”
68
, 0.91% is “non-
Evangelical Biblical”
69
; 0.004% Jewish and 1.8% “without religion” (INEGI 2011b) . AgC 
was considered a location where a rather conservative
70
 and relatively ‘closed’ religious-
ideological context is perceived to prevail
71
, not necessarily within the university context, but 
as part of the local social environment. The following is the description of the local social 
context by an AgC-born social science lecturer I interviewed during my fieldwork: 
 
People who come here [to Aguascalientes] from other states of the country 
immediately notice that they are not part of the local networks […] that 
                                                 
66
 For instance, reports from surveys on religion in Mexico (some of them kindly offered by a couple 
of respondents); brochures, leaflets and organisational documents on/by the universities I visited. 
67
 According to the same census the population in AgC, including suburban areas, amounts to  
797, 010 inhabitants. 
68
 This category includes Pentecostals, Neo-Pentecostals, members of the ‘Church of the Living God, 




 Day Adventists, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and 
Jehovah Witnesses. 
70
 See also ‘Pilot Case Study’ section below. 
71
 Here I am referring to perceptions by respondents themselves (e.g. lecturers) on AgC and MxC and 
not to these cities’ factual attributes. 
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happens very often, this sort of patriarchal networks that ease your personal 
identification ‘oh, so you are the daughter of …’ […] it occurs in local politics 
and business […] those are codes natives like us can read and outsiders 
cannot, so they [outsiders] obviously feel rejected  
 
Mexico City’s population amounts to 8, 851, 080 inhabitants; 82.5% of them are nominally 
Catholic, 5.4% “Protestant and Evangelical”, 1.4% “non-Evangelical Biblical”, 0.2% Jewish, 
and 5.5% “without religion” (INEGI 2011b) –see table below. Mexico City was considered 
to be perceived as the opposite case in religious-ideological terms, i.e., a context were 
religiosity seems, at least statistically, somewhat more diverse and where leftist and more 
liberal economic-political thinking would take place. This is how Norma, a MxC-based 




Mexico City is more leftist; the level of education here is higher;  
people are better informed; the divisions between the private and the 
public are clearer […] abortions are allowed here; gay marriage is legal; there 
is a series of things which would be unthinkable in other regions in the country, […]. 
    
 
Table 2.1. Statistics on population and religion in Aguascalientes and MxC 
 Aguascalientes State Mexico City 
Total population 1, 184, 996 8, 851, 080 
Catholic 92.9 % 82.5 % 
“Protestant and 
Evangelical”* 
3.4 % 5.4 % 
“Non-Evangelical 
Biblical”* 
0.91 % 1.4 % 
Jewish 0.004 % 0.2 % 
“Without religion” 1.8 % 5.5 % 
    Source: INEGI (2011b) 
    *See footnotes 68 and 69. 
 
 
I collected texts and data on Catholic discourses from “multiple” sources (Stoecker 1991; 
Yin 2009) in these two locations. Some of these sources were thought of in advance and 
comprised (1) “documentation” e.g., bibliographical sources on the history of the ‘local’ and 
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 I do not agree with the either/or type of contrast between Mexico City and “other regions in the 
country” this respondent suggests. However this contrast is precisely illustrative of the type of 
perceptions I found about a “liberal” or “open-minded” Mexico City and other “conservative” states 
such as Aguascalientes. 
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‘national’ Catholic Church, newspapers and Catholicism-related notes/articles, (2) 
“interviews”, e.g.  structured short interviews with priests and (3) “direct observations”, e.g. 
of Catholic services (Yin 2009:102). However, following in fact the ‘real-life context’ 
rationale, I did find data from sources that I ‘bumped into’ unexpectedly during my 1-2 
months field work in each location
73
, e.g. textual fragments of ‘folk Catholicism’ in religious 
“physical artefacts” (Yin 2009: 102,113) which I found frequently in downtown shops; 
Catholic magazines volunteers were giving away in the street; ‘mini soap operas’ about 
Catholic saints broadcasted by (non-religious) open-signal mainstream television channels 
and mentioned by pedestrians and bystanders in casual conversations. 
 
My sources of sociological discourses were multiple as well, yet relatively more structured 
as I focused on one specific higher education institution in each location. The selected 
institutions are both public universities funded mostly by Federal-level and state-level 
budgets. The universities’ legal status and general operations are subjected to the 
constitutional laws of public education in Mexico, and the well-known “Constitutional 
article 3”, whose paragraphs I and II read: 
 
I. Additional to the religious liberties established under article 24, educational services 
shall be secular and, therefore, free of any religious orientation 
II. The educational services shall be based on scientific progress and shall fight against 
ignorance, ignorance’s effects, servitudes, fanaticism and prejudices (The Political 
Constitution of the Mexican United States, 2005:7) 
 
These two public universities have social science schools where sociology as an 
undergraduate discipline has been taught, since the 1950s in MxC’s university and since the 
1970s in AgC’s university. Both universities have a department-school type of organisational 
structure where teaching is carried out by both part-time lecturers and full-time lecturers, 
being the latter who carry out research activities. In these two institutions I collected data 
from (1) “documentation” on the history and organizational structure of the universities and 
their sociology departments, (2) “interviews”, e.g. with sociology lecturers, social science 
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 It was not until my fieldwork activities that I visited AgC for the first time. Although I had visited 
MxC in several occasions before, it was during my field work that I met and talked to MxC-based 
Catholic priests and MxC-based sociologists for the first time as well. 
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lecturers, undergraduate and postgraduate students; and (3) “direct observations”– and 
“participant observation” to a lesser extent – in undergraduate and postgraduate lectures, 
seminars, workshops and conferences. Although all the interviews were different and the 
questions I asked were rather tailored in situ, there were three main themes I discussed in 
most of my interview sessions: (i) biographical data (place of birth; family background and 
religious practices; type of and experiences during basic and secondary education); (ii) the 
university and social research fields (the interviewee’s comments, accounts, perceptions, and 
concrete experiences as sociology student, member of academic staff, social scientist, and/or 
university lecturer); (iii) Catholicism-sociology links, i.e., the interviewee’s sociological and 
personal comments, objections, and impression  on my research topic. As I will explain and 
in Section VI below and in Chapter 6, my interview questions on the last theme were, on 
some occasions, not necessarily followed by enthusiastic replies. 
 
Although the former are indeed multiple sources, my collection of ‘sociological’ texts per se 
(published and unpublished manuscripts, research reports, essays, university lectures, etc), 
and of individual instances of Catholicism-sociology discursive interactions, focused on a 
series of main “micro sources” (Blaikie 2000:188), i.e., the set of full-time sociology 
lecturers I met in each location –six full-time sociology lecturers in AgC’s university and 
seven full-time sociology lecturers in MxC’s university. These two sets of lecturers do not 
represent the totality of lecturers working in these departments, i.e., about twelve full-time 
lecturers in AgC and about twenty five lecturers in MxC. It was mainly time restrictions, but 
also practical issues in AgC
74
 and ‘official’ limitations to meet lecturers in MxC
75
, the 
circumstances that prevented me from interviewing them all. These two groups of lecturers 
kindly provided me as well with biographical material and opinions on religion and 
Catholicism that represent crucial inputs for the causal accounts I will present to the reader in 
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 Some of the lecturers worked in different premises. 
75
 The head of the sociology department in MxC’s university gave me a pre-selected list of lecturers I 
would interview, saying that they would be the most helpful interviewees given their considerable 
academic and research experience. When I replied saying that I personally preferred to knock at the 
doors of each lecturer’s office, introduce myself and personally ask for an interview, the head of the 
department insisted on the list and the expertise of the lecturers. Eventually I did interview only the 
listed lecturers, not all of them though as I could not contact (neither physically nor via e-mail) some 
of them 
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chapters 7 and 8. Given the personal, and at times intimate and ‘professionally sensitive’, 
questions and answers these respondents and I exchanged during our interviews, I assured to 
them from the outset that their personal names would be anonymised in order to avoid the 
disclosure of their identities. The reader may find in Table 2.2 below the pseudonyms I will 





Table 2.2. Main respondents and sources of ‘sociological texts’ 
AgC’s university: MxC’s university: 
1. Brigitte 1. Angela 
2. Edward 2. Gregory 
3. Julia 3. Joseph 
4. Laura 4. Norma 
5. Michael 5. Peter 
6. Rita 6. Rachel 
 7. Suzanne 
 
 
Secondary, yet likewise valuable, “sources” (Blaikie 2000) of sociological discourses in 
Mexico were some of the colleagues of the full-time sociology lecturers listed above. These 
colleagues were chosen from the academic staff of different social science departments 
within the same university and were interviewed in order to get the views of sociology in 
Mexico from academic “outsiders” as well. The number of colleagues interviewed in each 
location ranged from 3 to 5 academics. Regarding interviews, my research design originally 
included the “realistic interview” technique suggested by Pawson (1996). This type of 
interview focuses on, and facilitates, 
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 Except for a few moments during a couple of interviews, respondents were usually not troubled by 
‘anonymity issues’ during the interviews and shared with me personal information without major 
explicit reserves. Yet in this dissertation I will stick to my promise of not disclosing real names in the 
data I present in the following chapters. I must, however, also add that it is possible to trace both the 
authorship of the data I use below (specially in chapter 7 and my references to the material published 
by the interviewees and used as qualitative data) and the respondent’s personal identities as detailed in 
the biographical content of chapters 5 and 6. Thus it is eventually possible to identify the real persons 
behind the pseudonyms I will use. I will reduce the possibilities of contributing to such unintended 
identity disclosing by including only minimal bibliographical references of the material authored by 
these respondents and by decreasing the amount of personal identity-related data in chapters 5 and 6, 
without compromising the methodological and explanatory aims of such chapters. 
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the creation of a situation in which the theoretical postulates/conceptual structures 
under investigation are open for inspection in a way that allows the respondent to 
make an informed and critical account of them (1996:313). 
 
Following this technique I expected to approach lecturers empathetically, acknowledge their 
sociological expertise in such a way that both, interviewer and interviewee, were able to 
build together responses to my research questions. In practice though, this technique turned 
out to be of little help given the reaction of the interviewees to my research topic and 
questions. I met with these reactions from the outset during my “pilot case study” (Yin 2009: 
92-4).  
 
V. Pilot case study 
 
I conducted a pilot case study in a city I visited for two weeks, before my data collection in 
AgC and MxC. This city is located in a similar religious-ideological context, or ‘cultural 
region’
77
, to that where AgC may be found. I rehearsed there the collection of documentation 
on Catholic discourses, the scheduling and conduct of interviews with priests, and my non-
participant observation during Catholic masses. I also interviewed for the first time 
university lecturers and students and rehearsed participant-observation in university lectures 
and seminars.  Whereas collecting documents, carrying out non-participant observation and 
interviewing priests and university students did not entail major obstacles and modifications 
to the field work plan, the interviews with lecturers did, to some extent.  
 
The reactions of interviewees to my introduction of the research thesis were diverse, 
although mostly sceptical. In each interview my initial comments about the possibilities of 
Catholicism shaping sociology in Mexico were followed by either silence or heads nodding 
cautiously; in both situations the interviewees’ physical gestures and reactions indicated 
most of them were genuinely puzzled by what I was suggesting. The immediate answer of 
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 Generically called “El Bajío”, a socio-geographical region within Mexico that comprises some of 
the central states in the country and is characterised not only by a similar economic base (industry and 
agriculture) but also by a particular religious (Catholic) cultural configuration –see, for instance, the 
section ‘Catholics vs. The state’ in chapter 3, for an example of this common religious-cultural 
background. 
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one of the lecturers to this initial introduction of my research may be translated
78
 as “I do 
know the history and development of the Catholic Church but I cannot say I am Catholic 
because of my professional and ethical coherence” –the lecturer here was clearly referring to 
the constitutional article number 3, whose clauses I partially noted in the section above. 
Another immediate answer from another lecturer was, 
 
No. The association you do between these two topics is something I have not seen 
[…] Other than research groups on religious phenomena, I have never heard social 
scientists talking about that.  
 
I tried, however, to overcome these succinct answers and ask more specific questions such as 
the interviewee’s opinion about whether “Catholic values” would “leak into” lecturers’ 
“academic-research values”. To this question, one of the interviewees, for instance, replied 
with a long answer on the need to assess what Catholic values are and what type of Catholic 
group is the one holding those values; the interviewee did not at any point comment about 
researchers’ values as such. Another lecturer during our interview stated critically that 
Mexican researchers would be “sons of the West” and that “a son hardly rebels against his 
father”. Intrigued by this statement, I asked this lecturer, as cautiously as I thought was 
possible, whether this type of son-father “authority model” would be somehow related to 
religious factors. The lecturer rejected the connection immediately and gave instead an 
account based on a Marxist stance
79
. Afterwards in the same interview, the lecturer and I 
discussed Marxism’s  ‘dogmatisation’ in Mexico. After noticing the interviewee’s sympathy 
towards this view of Marxist thought in Mexico, I asked her whether she would see a 
relationship between the highly religious character of Mexican society and the development 
of these Marxist dogmatic groups. The lecturer replied: “I do not have the least idea […] I do 
not have information on that” and made no further comment. In the situations like those 
described above I found myself feeling particularly unable to keep insisting on questions and 
ideas the interviewees seemed to avoid intentionally. 
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 All the interviews during my field work were conducted in Spanish. All the interview quotations I 
include in this dissertation were translated by myself. 
79
 She explained to me: “No, there is no relation, not at all. Authority models come, from my view, 
from the economic attitude that prevails in Mexico […] [from] the State’s participation in economics 
and the community. That is authoritarian. […] that is the parental figure one could recall. Everything 
else derives from that. If the production model is authoritarian, everything else is authoritarian”. 
 77 
 
This set of mostly brief or oppositional answers made me change my interviewing approach 
to sociology lecturers, not because I regarded the respondents’ answers as untrue (Back 
n.d.:12), but because they were mostly concise and short and therefore unsuitable for an 
interviewer-interviewee co-construction of accounts (Pawson 1996). Although I kept the 
‘realistic interview’ approach for most of my interviews in AgC and MxC – getting both 
brief and extensive responses (chapter 6) – I also added more questions focused on the 
interviewees’ biographies (Harding 2006; Back n.d.) and particularly, their personal-family 
experiences with Catholicism and their current views on the Catholic Church (chapter 5). 
 
Another key result of the pilot case study was the selection of AgC as the location for my 
first case study. My first choice for a “conservative context” suitable to analyse and compare 
Catholic and sociological discourses was originally a city and a public university where I 
located a pair of lecturers that explicitly included their Christian-Catholic religiosity, or 
opinions informed by Catholicism, in their academic publications
80
. However, later findings 
about the ideological-religious context of this city and state did not reveal particularly salient 
conservative/Catholic local atmospheres. Looking at AgC as a context with a 
conservative/Catholic atmosphere was recommended explicitly by one of the sociology 
lecturers during the Pilot case study. AgC was pointed out as well by another lecturer who 
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 This was a city in the central-east part of the country and a public university located there, where 
one of the social science lecturers based at this university published an academic article that contained 
an explicit defence of Catholic education and Catholic schools; and another social science lecturer, in 
an academic publications as well, made implicit references to her devotion towards Virgin Mary. 
81
 “No [not all Mexican sociologists are anti-Catholic], for example, in Aguascalientes’ university 




VI. Data-analysis logics 
 
My strategy to explain the causal relations between Catholicism and sociology in Mexico via 
Catholic and sociological discourses started by identifying discursive “regularities” (Sayer 
1992:114; cf. Sayer 2000: 20, 24), and locating resemblances at a theoretical-discursive level, 
like Sahlins (1996) and Cannel (2005, 2006) did (chapter 1). After this I moved forward to 
avoid atomistic and linear cause-effect accounts and focused instead on the non-observable 
“bridges” (i.e., mechanisms, conditions, structures) between Catholicism and sociology in 
Mexico, the historical contexts these ‘bridges’ are part of and the cultural-ideological 
dimensions that surround them. These bridges were, in a sense, located and identified as part 
of the ‘real world’ outside, and also constructed, by means of both the interviewees’ 
statements – particularly sociology lecturers’ – on their experiences in/with the sociological 
and Catholic fields and also my own observations of the Catholic and sociological fields and 
my inferences from the collected documentation. My series of analyses therefore involved on 
one hand a set of structural-causal analyses (Sayer 1992: 114; 2000:17-8), or what Blaikie 
(2000:108-14) refers as a “retroductive” type of analysis focused on unobservable 
mechanisms and structures out there in the real world and, on the other hand, “interpretative 
analysis” (Sayer 1992, 2000) or what Blaikie (2000:114-9)  calls an  “abductive” logic aimed 
at understanding actors’ meaning-making activities and, particularly, scientists’ discourses 
and their ‘socially-constructed contexts’ (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984:39; Mulkay 1993) 
 
The structural-causal analysis I will present to the reader pays attention to historical 
conditions and contexts which I discuss mostly in chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3 I analyse the 
Catholic context in Mexico, its historical development and relevance and its current saliency 
in ideological terms. This is a brief historical analysis but provides key conclusions that 
broaden conventional (secularist) views of Catholicism and the Catholic Church in Mexico 
and Latin America. In chapter 4 I present documentary evidence of Catholic traces in 
Mexico’s early sociological discourses and an overview of the institutional development of 
sociology in Mexico, including some of the sociology lecturers’ statements I collected during 
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our interviews. The final chapters offer an account of the context-dependent mechanisms by 
which Catholic discourses shape sociological discourses. 
 
My ‘interpretive’ or ‘abductive’ analyses of texts, biographical (interview) data and the 
making of meanings by individuals, consisted of gradual stages that correspond to Mason’s 
three types of data reading: literal, interpretive and reflective (2002:148-150). The first 
series of analyses consisted basically of literal readings to identify the most frequent explicit 
ideas and statements (regularities) in my data set. This first set of readings may be described 
as well as an elementary content-analysis exercise (Silverman 1993: 59). The second round 
of analyses or “interpretive readings” yielded more frequent ideas and, in the case of 
sociological texts, produced a series of initial codes or categories by which sets of frequent 
notions and ideas were grouped. This series of qualitative analyses may be classified as 
(critical) discourse-analysis exercises, focused particularly on “discourse-specific 
assumptions” (Fairclough 2003: 58), i.e., the implicit statements in the observable instances 
of discourses (Elder-Vass 2011; Foucault 2003), or texts’ “propositional content” and their 
“assumptions and presuppositions” (Armstrong, quoted in Peräkylä 2005: 872). The third 
stage consisted of further ‘interpretive’ and ‘reflective’ readings that produced a meta-
analysis or an analysis over my own analytical outcomes, some of which I have partly 
presented in the first section of this chapter and the ‘Introduction’ to the dissertation. My 
analyses of sociological texts and sociology lecturers’ interview statements shares Gilbert 
and Mulkay’s (1984) approach to scientists’ discourses as well. From this position, 
scientists’ statements cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of social phenomena and so 
used by the analyst as definitive proof; scientists’ discourses have rather to be analysed as 
social phenomena per se which the analyst has to deconstruct in order to account for the 
“systematic ways” in which scientists “fashion their discourse” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984:15; 
Mulkay 1993).  
 
Having specified above my data-analysis general strategies, I want to state that since I am 
assuming the context-dependent character of Catholic and sociological discourses and the 
open determinacy of social phenomena, I will not discard accounts of sociology and social 
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science in Mexico and Latin America that authors and scholars have previously suggested 
and related to non-religious elements, e.g. economic and political contexts, the figure of the 
state, internal disciplinary aspects of sociology’s development –I present some of these 
authors in chapter 4. The outcomes of this research are not meant to ignore or refute those 
accounts but to supplement them, by adding an analysis of a pervasive discourse that has 
been clearly neglected. This research is not enough to bring the neglected element to the 
light, explain its operation and then integrate it to the descriptions and accounts that other 
authors have suggested and so answer how all religious, political, economic and other 
cultural entities and mechanism shape sociology and social science in Mexico and elsewhere. 
Without reductionisms, this research will primarily focus on the religious factors. Next I 
present the first piece of contextual-structural analysis and its outcomes: Catholicism in 





The religious context: Catholicism in Mexico 
 
 
In the next sections I present a brief and limited, yet balanced, description of the Catholic 
Church, Catholicism in Mexico and, particularly, of Catholic discourses in Mexico, their 
history and their persistent underlying patterns. Here I take into account both the 
resemblances and differences, firstly, between the ‘Vatican-Roman’ Catholic Church, the 
Mexican Catholic Church and its series of internal (sub)institutions
82
; and secondly between 
the Church’s official discourses, Catholic (sub)institutions’ discourses
83
 and people’s 
Catholic (cultural) discourses (Cipriani 2011; Blancarte 1996). My first aim is to present not 
an exhaustive historiography of the Catholic Church and Catholic dogma but to present 
historical evidence about the extraordinary relevance of the Catholic Church and Catholicism 





but also during post-independence periods (19
th
 century) and post-revolution stages (early 
20
th
 century). To accomplish this, I will address the wide-ranging activities of colonial 
Catholic Church and Catholicism and what I think is an overstated 19
th
-century ‘reform’ 
period in Mexico’s history (Zavala, forthcoming). After this I will argue that despite some 
secularist-pluralist voices from the state and the academia advocating ‘religious diversities’ 
in Mexico, Catholicism and Catholic discourses are still a core part of the country’s current 
cultural-ideological structures. To discuss this I will present, without reductionist or 
essentialist intentions, evidence from multiple sources about the most frequent notions and 
ideological principles of (i) the current institutional discourses of the Catholic Church, (ii) 
people’s adaptations of official Catholic discourses, or ‘non-official’ Catholic discourses 
today, and, most especially, (iii) the remarkable intensity, extensiveness, depth and 
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 E.g., Specific archbishoprics, bishoprics, religious orders, ecclesiastical and ‘lay’ organisations and 
so on.   
83
 As I was told by some of the sociology lecturers I interviewed (sociologists of religion some of 
them), holding a conversation with a Jesuit priests who lectures in a Jesuit university may not 
necessarily be the same as talking to a member of the ‘high clergy’ working at a bishopric.  
 82 




I. Colonial Catholicism and education. 
 
Spain’s conquista of American territories was not only political and economic, it was also 
“spiritual” (Ricard ([1933]2000). Latin Americanist philosopher Dussel argues that the  
Spanish colonial Catholicism emerged out of the Spanish church-state’s belief in being the 
“instrument chosen by God to save the world” (quoted in Sota 2005: 57). Scholar Lomnitz 
(2001) also reminds us that “Columbus and other explorers speculated on their proximity […] 
to Eden, and to other biblical sites, when they reached the new world” (2001: 340). Although 
Ricard ([1933]2000) argues that some scattered missionaries did preach in the newly 
discovered New Spain after Hernan Cortez’ ships arrived to Mexico’s shores in 1519, it was 
not until 1524 when an official evangelisation campaign started with the arrival of the 
Catholic Franciscan order
84
. References to this Catholic order and its evangelisation 
activities are, by the way, actual elements within the contemporary cultural spaces and 
discursive environments I explored in Mexico during my field work
85
. Franciscans were 
followed by other religious congregations. By 1559, there would be “380 Franciscans, 
[working] in 80 centres; 210 Dominicans, in 40 centres, and 212 Augustinians, in 40 centres” 
in the then “New Spain” (Ricard [1933]2000: 3). According to Ricard, the first Catholic 
missionaries used sign language to teach basic Catechism to the native population. Since 
linguistic devices for translation had not yet been developed, the first missionaries would 
preach about basic doctrinal notions as follow: 
 
                                                 
84
 Lomnitz states that these Franciscan missionaries “interpreted their evangelising mission […] in 
terms that were consonant with the messianic scholastic philosopher Joachim de Fiore” (2001:340), 
the theologian founder of the order of San Giovanni or the Joachimites. 
85
 For instance, in the main square of AgC’s old town a board with illustrations provides the tourist 
with information about the city’s history. The board explains that one of the landmarks in 
Aguascalientes is the San Diego Catholic ex-convent and temple, established by the Franciscan order, 
which “would become the spiritual arm of the Spanish conquest” –see appendix 3.1. 
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to illustrate the hell they pointed their hands towards the ground, saying there were 
fires, toads, and snakes; immediately after this they raised their eyes to the sky, 
saying one single God was above ([1933]2000: 118)  
 
Spanish historian Resines (1992) states Catholic missionaries were actually trying to carry 
out the same conversion practices they did in Europe, where people were relatively familiar 
with the figure of Jesus and Christianity. In Mexico, however, there was a clash of mind-sets 
between the once polytheist native population and the monotheist intentions of their 
converters. Resines argues this clash was not really worked out by missionaries and their 
Catechist practices as there were no “pre-evangelisation” stages (Resines 1992:26). But 
whether the Catholic Church could eventually adapt its evangelisation techniques to the 
social realities of the native population or not is not a point to be discussed here. What I 
suggest is that whether properly adapted or not such evangelisation campaigns – and 
missionaries’ gestures and references to toads on the ground and a god in the sky – may be 
alternatively interpreted as instances of the first cognitive and moral classifications spread by 
Catholic institutions (Durkheim 1915, Douglas 1986; Zerubavel 1999) in the same 
geographical region where Mexico as a society emerged from.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘clash of mindsets’ that Resines (1992) reports certainly did not prevent the 
Catholic Church from becoming the most influential institution, if not the only one in some 
regions, in terms of education in colonial Mexico. Jimenez (1990) cites the work of Catholic 
friar Mendieta, author of Historia Eclesiastica Indiana (1596) and historian Bramford Parks, 
author of A History of Mexico (1938); both authors, Jimenez argues, state that Catholic friars 
taught native population reading, writing and Christian doctrine in the schools that were 
built in “all the towns”. And  the pupils soon became the teachers:  
 
[t]he Indians at Tlatelolco
86
 learnt Latin and Theology, and they made such rapid 
progress that within ten years their teachers were able to turn the college over to the 
Indian Alumni. There was a time where pure blooded Indians were to be found 
teaching Latin to the sons of Spaniards (Bramford Parks, quoted in Jimenez 1990:4) 
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 Mexico City today. 
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According to Tanck (1985), the first decades of the 18
th
 century were characterised by major 
“religious and educational constructions”. What Tanck means by “constructions” is the 
series of primary schools and colleges for arts, philosophy and theology established by the 
Jesuits. These centres constituted “a true educational network” that offered opportunities of 
social mobility to the Creole population (Tanck 1985:31). Unsurprisingly, Spanish king 
Charles III’s decision to expel the Jesuits from Spain and its colonies (Mörner 1966) in 1767 
would bring distress to most of the colony’s inhabitants (Zahino 1996). The distress arose 
not only because of the temporary closing of Jesuit schools and colleges but because of the 
abrupt stop to Jesuits’ “considerable presence” in the colonial society, which also comprised 
the establishment and administration of shelters for the female native population and of 
labour-skills-related training centres for the male population (Zahino 1996:199). The 
relationships between the Jesuits and Mexico’s population would not be the type of teacher-
student relationship one finds today. These relationships, Zahino argues, extended to the 
family too, they were “for life”, and were not only aimed at religious-educational matters but 
also at an economic mentorship relationship as well (1996: 200). After this Zahino 
interestingly argues that “there is nothing more important in a person’s intellectual training 
and ethics than the bases she receives in her childhood”, and as for the case of many 
inhabitants of the colony, the provision of such a basic education  was “in the hands of the 
Ignatians” (1996: 204). In the 1930s, Jesuit priest Jacobsen published a commentary about 
what he considered the “downfall” of Mexico’s education under what was perceived by then 
as a pro-communist Mexican state. Jacobsen introduces his complaint by referring to the 
contributions of the Catholic Church to Mexico’s education during the colony: 
 
More than 400 years ago primary and industrial
87
 schools were reared there by the 
Franciscans, and 400 years ago the first college of arts was begun. Three centuries of 
colonial life witnessed the establishment of a fine, system of primary schools and 
another system of secondary schools and colleges under the Jesuits, while several 
universities were built and maintained from the earliest Spanish times. This 
remarkable educational edifice was Catholic […] (1935:346). 
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 This concept is unclear in the original text. It is probably related to the training centres Zahino 
(1996:199) mentions.  
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The Catholic Church and its network of schools and colleges were not the only colonial 




 century private mentoring, mostly in Mexico City, 
was carried out by independent teachers that eventually established the “Guild of teachers of 
the most noble art of the first letters” (Tanck 195:33), a regulatory body aimed at organising 
primary schools and the concession of credentials to teachers. Tanck states that whereas an 
equivalent guild was established in the city of Puebla, the rest of the cities and provinces did 
not follow the guild’s norms and apparently did not establish satellite versions of this 
institution. Evidence suggests that the educational field, even after the Jesuits’ temporal 
expulsion in the 1760s and the functioning of the Guild of teachers in two of the country’s 
largest cities, was still controlled by the Catholic Church and its diocesan structure and 
networks of seminaries (Tanck 1985:51-5).  
 
The Catholic Church and Catholicism developed into stable, wide-ranging and particularly 
appreciated series of institutions and religious practices in the colony. Tanck (1985) notes 
authors in the 18
th
 century praised “the pride and the satisfaction Mexican society felt about 
its [Catholic] religiosity”; Mexican colonial society believed their home land was genuinely 
“a land blessed by God” (1985:29). Although lacking a clear causal link between the Jesuit 
ideology and that of Mexican society, and perhaps in an overstated conclusion, historian 
Jauregui (2004) goes further and argues that the Company of Jesus and its members can be 
regarded as the founders of “the Mexican national identity”. However overstated, this 
reported Catholicism-Mexican nationalism strong link (see also Wolf 1958) was related not 
only to the Catholic Church’s educational activities. Other economic, political and cultural 
institutions were not totally separated from the Catholic Church either, and in some cases 
they were constituted by the latter. For example the Catholic Church, via its religious orders 
and corresponding organisational structure, had turned by the end of the 18
th
 century into 
“the largest money-lender in Mexico” (Kirkwood: 2000:79; Lida 2007). Similarly, in Mexico, 
and likely in other colonial territories in America, public health services comprised hospitals 
established and administered by religious orders like the Dominicans, the Bethlehemites or 
the Joanites (Fajardo 2005). As for other social domains, bishops were allowed to hold 
public-administration roles and this did occur in Spain’s colonies (Lynch 1992: 71-72). In 
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Peru, both indigenous and Spanish “authorities” participated in public Catholic festivities 
such as Corpus Christi (Gareis 2008). In Elliot’s words, Spain’s’ American colonies 
represented “a state church in a church state” (2006: 198). 
 
Although my aim here is not to discuss Mexico’s colonial religiosity, religious education or 
Catholic Church in detail, I want to point out the fact that, regardless of the Catholic sources’ 
partisan statements and some scholars’ over-statements, there is certainly an agreement on 
the “monopoly” of Catholicism in the colonial religious field (Sota 2005:60). I want to stress 
that this religious monopoly developed into a quasi-monopoly, if not a monopoly as such, in 
Mexico’s colonial cultural-educational fields as well. In historian Vazquez’ view (1985), the 
Catholic Church brought “a true educational reform, as it changed the values, behaviour and 
customs of the Indians”, a reform that “has not been repeated [today] despite the efforts to do 
so” (1985:24). It is precisely the ideas of ‘Catholic values’ and ‘Catholic ethics’ (Zahino 
1996; Weber 2003; Merton 1938), along with dualistic cognitive-moral classifications 
(Durkheim 1915; Ricard [1933]2000; Douglas 1986; Zerubavel 1999), a series of topics I 
have addressed in the literature review chapter and will refer to throughout this dissertation. 
 
 
II. Mexico in the 19
th
 century: independence and reform. 
 
By the end of the 18
th
 century, Mexican society’s discontent with Spain’s shifting colonial 
policies was evident. A group of creole army officials, public servants and clergy members, 
the ‘conspirators’, organised meetings to discuss possibilities of an uprising. As soon as it 
was alerted, the Spanish Crown began the capture of the dissenters. Miguel Hidalgo, a 
Catholic priest in charge of a parish in Guanajuato state, and one of the conspirators, after 
hearing about his captured associates, hastened the original plans and gathered the local 
population outside of his parish in September, 1810 (Hamnett 1999; Kirkwood 2000). After 
rousing the local population with the so-called speech ‘Grito de Dolores’ – which Kirkwood 
(2000: 83) interestingly qualifies as conservative: “Long live Ferdinand VII… Death to bad 
Government…Long live religion” – Hidalgo led, alongside other priests and ‘lay’ army 
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officials, the first ‘insurgent’ army that battled against the Spanish crown and its royalist 
army. Hidalgo was captured, excommunicated and executed in 1811. It was not until 1821 
when Agustin de Iturbide
88
 (royalist official), Guadalupe Victoria and Vicente Guerrero 
(insurgent leaders) signed the Plan of Iguala, which, despite the Crown’s resistance, led 
afterwards to the independence of Mexico. The country then entered into a series of fierce 
political disputes and armed conflicts –which seem to characterise several post-independence 
ex-colonies (e.g., Engineer 1991; Vetik 1993; Bates, Coatsworth, Williamson 2007). Amid 
this post-independence unrest
89
, Santillan (1995) states, “the basic laws of the country 
consecrated a religious intolerance” in favour of Catholicism (1995: 176). The Plan of Iguala 
had postulated Catholicism as the new country’s official religion (Santillan 1995; Sota 
2005:62). Mexico’s independence war constituted a rupture with Spain, not with the Catholic 




-century European context, ‘reformation’ in Britain and other countries consisted 
roughly of a break with a Roman Catholic authority and its representatives. The rupture 
unequivocally involved a set of Christian protestant theologies that would turn into 
alternative Christian religious practices and, eventually, distinctive Christian institutionalised 
religions (Hazlett 2003). In the post-independence 19
th
 century Mexico did not experience a 
theological ‘reformation’ movement by any Lutheran, Calvinist or Protestant priest, or 
group of these. By then, liberal and conservative political coalitions in Mexico disputed the 
control of the State. It was liberal minister of justice, Benito Juarez, who proposed the Juarez 
bill in 1855. This bill –as other liberal or liberal-like political measures in the country, 
inspired by the European-Enlightenment principle of state-church separation (Hamnett 1999: 
158; chapter 1, first section) – was aimed at dissolving the Catholic Church’s fuero or its 
previous colony-times charter, in particular, the Catholic Church’s courts (Kirkwood 
2000:103). After this bill and fearing that the conservatives’ funding was coming mostly 
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 Lomnitz (2001:349) notes that it was the royalist officer Iturbide who crafted the Plan of Iguala and 
forged “an alliance with both the upper clergy (who never supported Hidalgo […]) and the Spaniards 
by providing them with ample guarantees of continuity and belonging in the new republic”. 
89
 Knight (1992: 101), for example, reports forty five different administrations in the country between 
1821 and 1871. On the other hand, Fernando Escalante argues that such ‘unrest’ is actually a mistaken 
account; for this author there was rather a “political order” based on volatile central and regional 
cliques (cited in Brachet-Marquez 1997: 294-5). 
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from the Catholic Church’s assets, liberal congressmen passed further restrictive bills. The 
‘Lerdo bill’
90
 disentitled the Church and civil corporatives of their properties. In 1857, along 
with Mexico’s new-brand liberal federal constitution, the ‘Iglesias bill’ prohibited the 
Catholic Church’s collection of marriages, baptisms and funeral services fees. Conservatives 
fought these laws and their liberal supporters ferociously in the political arena and actual 
warfare. Cornered in the south, the liberal government lead by then by president Benito 
Juarez continued with its radical political secularisation, by prohibiting tithes collection and 
restricting religious public practices (Kirkwood 2000: 104-5; Puente 1995). In 1861 liberals 
would take Mexico City back and secular laws remained in force. Schmitt (1962) reports 
both the radical and conciliatory reactions of the clergy to these laws. The then Puebla state’s 
bishop, who would become Mexico’s archbishop afterwards, insisted that “the church was 
not subject to the State in the manner in which constitution and laws provided”, and that  
“[i]n spiritual matters the civil government was under the supreme authority of the [Catholic] 
Church”. Some yeas after, Schmitt states, a defiant yet less “belligerent” member of the 
clergy would still argue, without referring to Mexico in particular, that “religious authority 
exercises its dominion over all things spiritual and temporal” (1962:184). More importantly, 
scholar Lida (2007) argues that after this ‘reform period’ in Mexico it was possible to find 
“[a] more consolidated [Catholic] Church in its ecclesiastic structures, […] and even its 




-century volatile political environment, what Mexico experienced was a political 
reform (Zavala, forthcoming) where the Catholic Church was made redundant from its 
official political-administrative roles. Puente Lutteroth (1995: 295) refers to Benito Juarez’ 
explicit defence of Protestantism and Lomnitz notes the liaisons between the Freemasonry
91
 
and some of the country’s post-independence political elites (2001:350). However in the 
greater social scene, i.e., in downtown streets and urban barrios, in the daily social 
interactions in rural settlements and indigenous communities, no further counter-theologies 
were brandished by ‘rebel’ ideologues; no alternative religions were afterwards established. 
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 By the then minister of finance Miguel Lerdo. 
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 Both Scottish and Yorkish Masons, allies of British and American (USA) economic interests 
respectively.   
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Furthermore, other than the Church’s formal political functions, the Catholic Church did not 
lose its central cultural role as provider of the only religious cosmology that had 
ideologically legitimated society’s religious beliefs, classifications of the world, moral 
values and authority models for more than three hundred years (Durkheim 1915; Weber 
1978, 2003; Douglas 1986). Unlike British and European reformations (Foucault 2007:148-
50; Devine 2009), these secularist reforms in Mexico did not remove Catholicism’s three 
centuries of educational and cultural (quasi)monopolistic influence (Zavala, forthcoming). 
Further evidence is offered in the next sections. 
 
 
III. Catholics vs. the State: early 20
th
-century religious conflicts. 
 
In the late 1920s, that is, more than half a century after liberal-secular laws were passed in 
the country, a revealing historical episode, or “the most violent challenge” to the post-
revolution Mexican state
92
 according to Knight (2001:193), took place. It was an 
extraordinary three-years conflict that involved not the Church and the country’s 
ecclesiastical authorities but ordinary parish-based priests, fervent groups of Catholics and 
actual armed battles between the latter and the state. Historian Padilla Rangel (2001) states 
the Cristiada started after elected president Plutarco E. Calles in 1925 strengthened the 
punitive character of the laws that regulated the Catholic Church’s public activities. The state 
closed down Catholic asylums, and expelled female religious orders and priests. Control of 
Catholic schools was tightened and religious elements in the curricula as well as “religious 
objects in school buildings and the priests’ interventions in school issues” were banned 
(Padilla Rangel 2001:96). Whereas the response from the Catholic Church’s hierarchy was 
cautious, people’ reactions were not; their faith had been undermined. The new legal 
measures, for instance, unsettled Aguascalientes’ inhabitants who organised a resistance to 
boycott businesses associated with the state (Camacho et al 1994). According to historian 
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 The Mexican revolution spanned from 1910 to early 1920s. Knight (1990) argues it was more a set 
of “provincial” rebellions than a “capital-city” revolt;  in rough terms, its aim was to give a more 
tangible ‘independence’ to an Indian-rural population, whose members, even after one hundred years 
of post-colonial life, “continued to plant corn and beans under new masters” (1990: 3). 
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Meyer (1973: 49), the Mexican army captured and executed 125 ‘rebel’ priests that sided 
with the Catholic population and did not comply with the state’s new rules. Organised 
groups of Catholics answered accordingly and so battled against the state’s forces. 




 and Cristeros took 
place mostly in rural areas. Although the new law’s enforcement had national scope, 
people’s oppositional reactions were reportedly stronger in Mexico’s central region –e.g., 
Michoacan, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Aguascalientes
95
 states. The conflict spanned from 1926 to 
1929. Interestingly, once the conflict was over, former groups of Cristeros would continue 
the fight against local and state-level authorities in the 1930s, in what Guerra (2005) 
describes as a more fragmented guerrilla-like ‘second Cristiada’. The Cristero leaders of this 
saga kept fighting for various political motives, but also because of their “genuine passion 
about their religion and their unbreakable faith” (2005:569). 
 
In Meyer’s view (1993), the ‘first’ Cristiada was a movement composed mostly by the rural 
population. This author argues that whereas the Cristero rebels came from a rather deprived 
background and were illiterate, they did not lack “complex and intricate” knowledge of 
reality. Cristeros’ was “a folk culture based on the bible, Christian [Catholic] oral tradition, 
chivalry books, and colonial poetry” (1993: 273). Meyer suggests the “kingdom of Christ” 
was the main ideological reference for Cristeros, whose background Meyer describes as 
follows: 
  
We are in a land which is poor in civic culture; what happens depends on elites […] 
[this land] does not have outstanding buildings other than the churches, convents, the 
bishop’s palaces […] The toponymy is almost completely religious and peasants 




Meyer (1993) analyses further the Cristeros’ ideological perspectives by means of surveys 
and interviews with Cristero survivors. Meyer states Cristeros saw the Mexican government 
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 Mexican army’s soldiers 
94
 Peasant population who had previously received (or given back) lands by the State and were thus 
encouraged, or coerced, to fight against Cristeros. 
95
 Cristero rebels in Aguascalientes were led by Jose Velasco who upraised in Calvillo town in 
November 1926 (Camacho et al 1994). 
96
 Statement Meyer cites from a Cristero leader. The statement refers to Miguel Hidalgo –see previous 
section. 
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led by Plutarco E. Calles as the devil, as Protestant and Mason. Calles’ government was “the 
Caesar one had to pay obedience to” but, according to the views of Meyer’s respondents, it 
had instead become “the antichrist, the devil”; it was “a bad government”, “enemy of 
religion”, and “a rebel against God and homeland” (1993: 282-3). For Cristeros, the 
Mexican army had the same characteristics, except for some minor differences: “the majority 
is good, but the bosses are bad” (1993: 283). Meyer states that Cristeros’ arguments were not 
unreasonable, they accepted that “the legitimacy of established powers” came from God; 
“even anti-Christ’s authority [comes from God], for not even a tree’s leaf can move without 
God’s will” (1993: 286). Cristeros were willing to “render unto Caesar that which is 
Caesar’s” as long as Caesar did not fight against God. Caesar, however, attacked God, 
therefore Catholics fought back. Meyer quotes a statement from a Cristero leader: “It is 
better to die fighting for Christ the King and the Virgin of Guadalupe […], and never stand 
against the only true god, even if the devil gets angry” (1993:288). Although I do not claim 
any causal relation, I want to highlight here the ideological-discursive resemblance between 
the basic dichotomies (hell-heaven) missionaries reportedly taught to Mexico’s colonial 
population (Ricard [1933]2000) and the Cristeros’ dichotomistic references that reportedly 
include the ideas of good and bad army members and ‘good God’ versus the ‘evil State’. 
Moreover I want to emphasise the importance of the idea of God’s will as the cause 
(Durkheim 1915) or the source of “established powers’ legitimacy”, that reportedly includes 
the “anti-Christ’s authority” as well.  
 
In addition to the Cristiada as an example of the country’s deep-rooted post-colonial and 
post-revolution Catholicism I want to highlight that Cristeros and their collective and 
individual stories have gradually turned into a relatively popular subject in documentaries
97
, 
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 In a short documentary, a state-run local television channel, introduced the happenings as follows: 
“At the end, what are we as Mexicans if we do not fight for what is ours, what belongs to us, what we 
believe? What are we without our ideals and our spirit? In the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, Queretaro, 
Aguascalientes, Nayarit, Colima, Michoacan, Mexico City, Yucatan, and Zacatecas, the Mexican 
army and Cristero forces fought each other 80 years ago. Today the atmosphere is very different to 
that of 1927; it smells like freedom. That 1929 July, the pride won, dedication won, passion and love 
won. The people won the liberty to proclaim ‘long live Christ the king and the most holy Virgin 








 and even casual family stories
101
. These 
various outcomes constitute, I argue, further evidence of the outstanding relevance not of the 
Catholic Church as such, but of both institutional and people’s Catholic discourses in the 
country’s cultural and discursive spaces.   
 
 
IV. Catholicism and the Catholic Church today. 
 
According to Mexico’s 2010 national census, the total population in the country amounts to 
112, 336, 538 inhabitants. The reader can find their reported religious affiliations in Table 
3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 Religious affiliation in Mexico, 2010 census. 
Religious affiliation 
Percentage of the 
total population 
Catholic 82.7 % 
“Protestant and Evangelical”
102
 7.5 % 
“Non-Evangelical Biblical”
103




 0.9 % 
“Without religion” 4.7 % 
Source: INEGI (2011a) 
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 “El coloso de mármol” (1928) directed by Manuel G. Ojeda; “Los cristeros o Sucedió en Jalisco” 
(1946), by Raúl de Anda; “Lluvia roja” (1949) by René Cardona; “Los recuerdos del porvenir” (1968) 
by Arturo Ripstein; “De todos modos Juan te llamas. La historia de una gran traición” (1974) by 
Marcela Fernández Violante; “La Guerra Santa” (1977), by Carlos Enrique Tabeada; and finally 
“Cristiada” directed by Dean Wright and launched in 2011. 
99
 Mostly Cristero priests who were executed and sanctified later by the Vatican, e.g. San Luis Batiz 
Sainz, San Agustin Caloca, San Atilano Cruz Alvarado, San Mateo Correa, San Miguel de la Mora, 
San Pedro de Jesús Maldonado, San Pedro Esqueda Ramirez, San Margarito Flores, San Jose Isabel 
Flores, San David Galvan Bermudez, San David Roldan Lara, San Salvador Lara Puente, San 
Cristóbal Magallanes, San Rodrigo Aguilar Aleman, San Roman Adame Rosales, San Julio Alvarez 
Mendoza, San Jesús Mendez Montoya, San Sabas Reyes Salazar, San Toribio Romo Gonzalez, etc. 
(Aciprensa n.d.). 
100
 Folk songs “Corrido de Valentin de la Sierra”, “Corrido de Victoriano Ramirez ‘El Catorce’” 
“Corrido de Polino Guerrero”, “Corrido del General Gorostieta”, “El arreglo religioso”, etc. (Garcia 
and McKinley 2004). 
101
 A lecturer during my Pilot case study referred to stories of Cristero priests (getting shot or hanged 
from trees) being frequently told by his relatives when he was a kid. 
102
 Includes “Historical” (0.7%), “Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal” (1.6%), members of the “Church 




 Day Adventists” (0.6%), members of the “Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints” (0.3%) 
and “Jehovah Witnesses” (1.4%). 
104
 Not specified. 
 93 
Here I want to emphasise that, despite the official census documents (e.g. INEGI 2005) 
insisting on the existence of a “religious diversity” in the country, the majority of the 
reported population is nominally ‘Christian’ (about 93%) and most of it is still ‘Catholic’ 
(83%). The above are not the only relevant statistics. Surveys by different organisations 
indicate that ‘churches’ or ‘the church’ are ‘the most trusted’ social institution in the country 
too. According to the World Values Survey (2005) 70.4 % of the sample surveyed in Mexico 
(N= 1, 500) reported having either ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in 
“churches”
105
. Research by the Mexican government (ENCUP 2008; N= 4,383) indicates 
equivalent results. According to this source, 72% of the sample said they have ‘a great deal’ 
or ‘quite a lot’ of trust in “the Church” making this institution “the most trusted social” 
institution in the country
106
. A larger survey (N=16, 000) by two private organisations 
(Banamex 2010), suggests, once again, that ‘churches’ are the most trusted institution in 




. Although the 
questionnaires from these three surveys do not include the adjective “Catholic [Church]” in 
the question, it would not be analytically inappropriate to associate that reported ‘church’ 
with the ‘Catholic Church’ that, despite 19
th
-century reformist episodes, has been part of 
Mexico’s history from 1520s up to current days. 
 
Today, 18 ecclesiastical provinces, 18 archdioceses and 67 dioceses constitute the 
organisational skeleton of the Catholic Church in Mexico (CEM 2009a, 2009b). According 
to a 2004 census published online (Cheney 2005), the total number of priests in the 
country
109
 amounts to 14, 618. Mexican historian Blancarte, in his often-cited work on the 
                                                 
105
 Only 44.8 % and 33.6 % of the sample granted the same levels of confidence to “the Government” 
and “the police” respectively 
106
 In this survey, only 26% and 23% of the sample assigned the same levels of trust to “the police” 
and “political parties” respectively. 
107
 40% of the sample. 
108
 28% of the sample. In this survey the ‘church’ was followed by “the army”, which is reportedly 
trusted “a lot” only by 27% of the sample. This survey shows as well that whereas 8% of the sample 
reportedly belongs to social networks such as Facebook and Tweeter, 11% of the sample reported to 
belong to religious groups, which would then be the type of organisation with the highest number of 
affiliates. 
109
 ‘Diocesan’ priests (priests based within a particular diocese) reportedly amount to 11, 016 and 
‘religious’ priests (members of Catholic religious congregations, e.g. Franciscans) amount to 3, 602. 
The same source reports that the number of Catholic priests in Great Britain reaches 5, 653. 
Considering that the population in the United Kingdom amounts roughly to 60 millions inhabitants, 
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Catholic Church in Mexico, catalogued the Mexican Catholic clergy’s ideology from 1930s 
to 1980s as “integral-intransigent”
110 
(1993:22-7), that is, as an official mainstream discourse 
aimed at both denying liberal and socialist ideologies (intransigent) and intervening not only 
in spiritual matters but in the cultural and social realms of society as well (integral). Is the 
current post-second millennium Catholic Church different in that sense? To answer this 
question, I offer in the next section evidence of the Catholic clergy’s ‘institutional’ or 
‘official’ discourses I found flowing in the social-discursive environments I explored during 
my fieldwork. These discourses were collected from multiple sources (chapter 2). Although 
the following paragraphs are but a brief glimpse to these complex series of 
‘institutional/official’ Catholic discourses, they give a proper idea of some of their most 
frequent notions and ideological bases. 
 
 
The Catholic clergy’s discourses 
 
A documentary about Mexico City’s Catholic archdiocese broadcast by a local television 
channel
111
 one afternoon during my pilot study provides us with data on the institutional 
configuration and ethos of the Catholic Church in Mexico as well as some of the most 
representative elements in the Catholic clergy’s discourses. First, the documentary’s narrator 
explains the complex layers of the primate archdiocese’s organisational structure
112
. After 
this, one of the assistant bishops appears in the screen and declares that assistant bishops and 
vicariate-heads “follow up” what the head of the archdiocese and his team “design for the 




                                                                                                                                          
these figures would mean that there would be three priests for every 20,000 people in Mexico and two 
priests for the same figure in Great Britain. 
110
 A term he borrows from French scholar Poulat and his work (1983) on French Catholicism  
111
 One of the local channels operating in the state of Guanajuato. 
112
 Which reportedly includes three “functional” vicarages and eight “territorial” vicarages, as well as 
a “collegiate Episcopalian council” that works as the “central government body” and is constituted by 
nine “assistant bishops”. 
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It was for me a great honour that The Lord Cardinal trusted me and assigned to me 
the responsibility of the vicariate. Of course, he is the one who takes decisions about 
main matters. In other [matters] I have to be there with the priests, with the 
communities, with the parishes, with the members of religious orders and [I have to 
be] in many environments too, in the government environment, in civic associations, 
people organisations, one has to be there with the whole town  
 
The narrator goes on and (re-)states that the archdiocese aims at reaching “all the social 
reality of the Mexican state”. Consequently, the work by the archdiocese has to be diffused, 
therefore the archdiocese seeks “to be present in the media” and so invites “more than forty 
reporters from different media” to attend Sunday mass at Mexico City’s cathedral. In this set 
of statements two elements are unequivocal: the references to a centralised-authority 
organisational structure in Mexico City’s archdiocese and the reported scope of the 
archdiocese’ Catholic discourses and practices: impacting social life in its entirety. This type 
of organisational authority structure and its ‘all-embracing’ or ‘integral’ (Blancarte 1993) 
discourses produce a diverse range of thematic institutional discourses whose ideological 
bases are, however, consistent. First off, as a ‘Servant of the Word’ Sister explains in a 
Catholic magazine a volunteer handed me in AgC’s downtown,  
 
We enter into the field of religious values when we acknowledge that God is the 
supreme Value and that it is because of Him that all that leads to Him has value and 
all that separate us from Him does not (Carapia 2010:34 –emphasis in original) 
 
This would turn out to be a simple yet consistent and accurate account of the dichotomistic 
and non-relativistic values I found being referred to in Catholic rituals such as Catholic 
masses and priests’ homilies –perhaps an empirical case of what Zerubavel calls cultural 
“styles of cutting up the world […] by strict adherence to a purist either/or logic” (1999:56) 
and certainly a different instance of religious values compared to the non-dichotomistic 
values (e.g. a glorificatory ‘social utilitarianism’; a calling oriented towards the public-good) 
Merton (1938) identified in his analysis of Protestant religions in 17th-centruy England. For 
instance, in September 2010, in MxC’s Coyoacan borough, a priest in the downtown’s 
church is delivering his Sunday homily to churchgoers. He is preaching about love, 
churchgoers’ hearts and about Catholics driving their actions by mistaken criteria:  
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There are many probabilities of us having our hearts in something superficial that  
has no importance, [in something] very close to the earth instead of [close to] those 
goods and treasures of heaven (emphasis added) 
 
In April 2010, in AgC, I attended a Catholic wedding ceremony in one of the city’s 
downtown churches. There, the priest stated “We mistake love for passion and lust” 
(emphasis added); then he preached to the couple in front of him and the rest of attendees 
“we have to love our beloved one well. Every day you have to give the biggest, the most 
beautiful, the most holy to your beloved one”. The same day in the same church, another 
priest conducted yet another wedding ceremony. This second priest touched upon the same 
‘passion versus love’ dichotomy his peer had referred to earlier:  
 
We cannot think about satisfying passions only, we cannot! That goes away […] that 
is why I warn you again brothers, marriage is a delicate sacrament […] so let’s pray 
to God so this couple has an example of married life […].  
 
This priest’s homily also included instances of normative statements and explicit social (and 
personal) criticism,  
 
We are Christians so we cannot marry like pagans, pagans who do not know God. 
Unfortunately today there are many married couples that get together like pagans 
[…]. The Church is about love, the talent of divine love and we have to have it very 
clear. 
 
After this, the priest stopped his speech and, still holding the microphone and pointing at a 
group of young female attendees wearing short and bright dresses, said 
 
Listen to the sacrament of marriage, you have to practice it in your lives. So those 
young ladies that are listening to me can marry and get ready for it, by taking 
marriage as something holy and not full of sex sins! 
 
After the homily, and before the service was over, the priest, once again, spoke as follows to 
the group of female teenagers in short dresses, 
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To the women that come ill dressed: I am not telling you off, I am just warning you 
that you are doing evil, you are inciting lust. You cannot be dominated by fashion, 
but by Christ […] I’m not telling you off, it is just a warning for you to dress well 
 
At a Sunday mass, in an improvised tent in one of the upper-middle class neighbourhoods in 
the outskirts of Aguascalientes, another Catholic priest preaches about ‘Catholic faith’ 
without the finger-pointing approach of his peer above. However, at some point during his 
speech this priest, brandishing normative and particularly critical statements too, said  
 
Our Church has to walk straight over a very clear line: sanctity of life. This includes 
looking for wisdom; a Catholic that does not know his faith, that does not study, 





A couple of minutes later the priest interestingly stated that despite the Church being 
attacked, “its methodology” remains: “see, judge, act”. I will return to this ‘see-judge-act 
methodology’ in chapter 6. During the same homily, the priest also stated that the 
“fundamental task” to be carried out by both church and churchgoers is to take the “doctrine 
of faith” to young generations by means of the Holy Spirit, which drives people to be 
“straight, good, holy” and aware of their “fragility and proclivity to sin”. In fact, this was not 
the only reference to a ‘superior religious power’ in the Catholic discourses I collected. The 
priest that ‘warned’ female teenagers during the wedding ceremony in AgC stressed during 
his homily that “Christ comes to us through the sacred Eucharistic” for “He, as infinitely 
powerful […], did not have anything else to give us but Himself” (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in the first minutes of the documentary reported above the cardinal head of 
Mexico City’s archdiocese, states that “one of the first images” he got familiar with was 
Virgin Mary –see also Wolf (1958). The cardinal then stated “I think she [Virgin Mary] is 
the main evangeliser of these lands; we could not achieve our evangelisation mission if we 
do not see Mary as model”; Catholics that left the Church and converted to other religions 
would have not done so  
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 The Spanish original phrase is a sort of rhyming, and certainly harsh, aphorism:‘Catolico ignorante, 
seguro protestante’. 
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had they known about the role of Mary in the history of salvation […] it is because 
of her that the saviour comes. Mary brings the Holy Spirit. Mary congregates the 
apostles […] so Mary has this fundamental mission in the Church; we would not be 
a Church without her. 
 
In a newspaper published by Aguascalientes diocese, the editor in the first page addresses 
notions of divine/superior power as follows:  
 
Not even the human sciences or the most advanced technologies […] are able to 
solve the serious problems our world faces today, so we have to acknowledge, as 
Christians, that the only resource left to humanity is God, the God humanity has 
abandoned. So we have to implore for a second coming of the Holy Spirit, which is 
the love and the power of God, for it was because of love that god used His 
omnipotence to create the world […].  
 
Another concept I found in the reported documentary, the homilies I have referred to and the 
Catholic magazines I collected was “the family”. In the documentary, the cardinal stated that 
“the family is the fundamental cell of society” and that it “is unfortunately suffering many 
attacks, it is coming apart in many places, therefore problems come”. The documentary’s 
narrator then stated that “pastoral of the family” is another target of the archdiocese as it 
would represent a means for the society’s and the Catholic Church’s development. The 
article by the ‘Servant of the word’ sister (above) who writes about values in dichotomistic 
and non-relative terms (cf. Merton 1938), is actually part of a whole section in the magazine 
titled “Family Values”.  
 
The evidence above suggests that the Catholic institutional discourses are underpinned by an 
underlying discursive structure whose bases include (i) asymmetric dichotomist values –
where “the family” as value per se or as a vehicle to spread religious values plays a key role 
too; (ii) references to God, the Virgin and Holy Spirit as absolute or intercessory “powers”; 
and (iii) explicitly normative-prescriptive and particularly critical messages in which (i) and 
(ii) are embedded. I found these discursive characteristic not only in the Catholic media, 
Catholic printed media and Catholic homilies. In AgC I could interview one of the priests 
that conducted the first wedding ceremony reported above. Unsurprisingly, in the priest’s 
replies there are references, once again, to dichotomist asymmetric values 
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(conservative/liberal), to the Virgin and her sacredness, and, interestingly, to what the priest 
sees as an ‘innate religiosity’ in Mexican Catholics. Noticing the priest’s foreign accent and 
after confirming his Spanish background, I asked him about the differences he would see 
between Mexico’s and Europe’s Catholicism. The priest replied saying that a distinctive 
Catholic feature in Mexico was the “devotion to the Virgin […] as a permanent miracle that 
encourages faith”. After this I ventured to ask about the reported “conservative religiosity” 
people said prevailed in regions such as AgC. The priest replied by referring to the 
conservative/liberal dichotomy:  
 
When the term liberal is used, what does that mean? That I do not practice religion? 
That I interpret it as I want, as if I were God? I mean, the traditional [believer] is not 
[traditional] because he ill interprets God’s word, but because he wants to be faithful 
to what God have said once and forever. Today liberalism says ‘I am God and do 
what I want, God does not count’. 
 
Then the priest stated he does not see the liberal attitudes in Mexico he would see in Europe, 
for  
 
it [Mexico] is not like in Europe, [where] they feel satisfied and say ‘I do not believe 
in God’. Here it is a totally different mind-set, it is a religious mind-set that is 
therefore genuine because the religious is not superimposed but is part of people’s 
essence. 
 
The paragraphs above might give an impression of highly normative, critical and dichotomist 
Catholic discourses flowing mostly, and perhaps exclusively, from and between AgC’s 
Catholic institutions. However, I met remarkably normative, critical and dichotomistic 
official Catholic discourses in MxC as well. I have presented above some examples of the 
‘integrally prescriptive’ messages from Mexico City’s archdiocese, its cardinals and vicars. 
In the same temple in Coyoacan borough where the priest reported above preached about 
love, earth and heaven, I found a series of small handbooks for sale. They were placed in a 
shelf next to one of the temple’s front interior columns; the handbooks were all written by 
Catholic clerics and ranged from every-day life topics – e.g.  ‘Television, the negative and 
the positive’, ‘Dating’, ‘Sweet sixteen’, ‘Virginity’, and ‘Chastity’ – to more theological and 
dogmatic themes – e.g., ‘Why the Catholic religion is not just the best but the only one’, 
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‘The ten commandments still rule’, ‘The legitimacy of the Catholic Church’, and ‘The two 
best proofs of Protestantism’s falsehood’. The author of the handbook on ‘Television’, for 
instance, states that television represents a vehicle to “promote universal values”, and a 
“rich” pedagogical tool that contributes to “elevate the cultural level of the public”. 
After this, the author goes on and, more critically, states that the television also plays 
the role of a teacher that teaches “passive” children about “crime, violence, 
selfishness, sensuality, materialism, etc”. The author of the handbook ‘Why the 
Catholic religion is…’ opens up his text by stating that the “[t]he expression ‘all 
religions are good’ is well known and is uttered by ignorant or malicious people”. 
 
Now, what echoes in society from the Catholic ‘institutional/official’ messages and 
discourses above? What do people in general remember, adopt and/or adapt from these 
institutional Catholic discourses and their systematic references to (1) the family, (2) 
dichotomist values, (3) notions of God/the Virgin/Holy Spirit as absolute or intercessory 
‘powers’, (4) the normative and critical statements those references, values and notions are 
embedded in, and (5) the integrally-prescriptive scope of such a set of messages and 
discourses? Next, based on data from diverse sources, I will suggest the discursive elements 





In this section I will argue that Catholics’ religious discourses are both different and similar 
to the institutional Catholic messages/discourses I have presented. More importantly, I will 
argue that people’s Catholic discourses do flow and operate as part of the country’s cultural 
dimensions and do shape the morality and beliefs of individuals. First I present a foreword 
about people’s ‘various’ Catholicisms. 
 
Whereas institutional Catholic discourses are thematically diverse yet would keep a 
relatively consistent discursive core – at least in AgC and MxC – a description and analysis 
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of religious discourses in/by Mexico’s Catholic population represents a bigger challenge 
given the huge diversity of voices and their locally-constructed contexts and backgrounds. 
For example, despite the Cristiada (section above) being catalogued as part of the country’s 
history (Meyer 1973, 1993), it seems to be, after all, a regional historical episode that 
supplied cultural references to the inhabitants of those regions exclusively. Acknowledging 
this Catholic heterogeneity, Scholars De la Torre and Gutierrez (2008) present a series of 
different Catholic profiles or ‘Catholicisms’ in Mexico. Based on survey data from an 
unspecified sample in Mexico the authors present Catholics’ different opinions on the 
political role of the Catholic Church. In this sense they distinguish three groups of Catholics: 
(1) a majority group that agrees on the separation between the State and the Catholic Church 
and disagrees on the idea of the Catholic Church influencing public policies, giving advice to 
churchgoers about running candidates and who they should vote for; (2) a “minority clerical 
core”
114
 group that represents 15% to 20% percent of the sample and agrees on the Catholic 
Church influencing public policies as well as giving advice to churchgoers about political 
issues; and (3) a “hardcore clerical mini-group”, between 7% and 12% of the sample, whose 
members do not only agree on the Catholic Church shaping the State’s decision but support 
also the idea of the State governing with the criteria and principles of the Catholic Church. 
The authors stress that it is the latter that usually possess more social and economic capital 
than the rest and therefore have more social influence. The authors state too that there is a 
clear distance between the Catholic Church’s criteria on sexual morals and those of Catholics. 
Sexual morals, related mostly to the use of contraceptive methods and sexual education, 
reportedly constitute a ground where the Catholic Church has lost control and where “the 





                                                 
114
 The original electronic text lacks page/paragraphs numbers. This citation can be found in the 
section ‘Los diversos rostros de los católicos y sus percepciones sobre la iglesia’. 
115
 These percentages reportedly change when the sample is disaggregated into ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ 
sub-samples. 
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Except for a succinct statement about the “celebrationist, ritualist, festive and pilgrim 
Catholicism” of “Mexican identity”
 116
, De la Torre and Gutierrez (2008) do not seem keen 
on stressing the commonalities of Catholicism in the country. Moreover, for these authors, as 
well as for some of the sociology lecturers I interviewed during my field work (see some of 
their statements in chapter 6, section I), it is rather the country’s “religious diversity” that is 
more significant and therefore should be highlighted over the mistaken perception of a 
monolithic Mexican Catholicism. This ‘religious diversity’, as I said previously, is taken for 
granted in official census documents as well (INEGI 2005). However, although I do share 
these academic and state voices’ rejection of reductionist and homogenising interpretations 
of Catholicism in the country, I want to stress two counter points. Firstly, nominal ‘Catholic 
heterogeneity’ or nominal ‘Christianisms’ do not deliver actual ‘religious diversity’ 
automatically –not in a country where only one of those ‘Christian’ religions has had a 
historical quasi-monopoly in extra-religious cultural dimensions. Secondly, nominal 
Christianisms and Catholic heterogeneity do not necessarily equate to absence of 
‘ideological patterns’
117
, and even less ‘ideological irrelevance’. In other words, there being 
0.6% of Jewish population and 9.7% of other Christian populations in the country – 
“Protestant”, “Evangelical” and “Non-Evangelical Biblical”
 118
 (Table 3.1) – does not 
necessarily mean that the central place of Catholicism has been suddenly removed from both 
the historical archives and the contemporary cultural and ideological domains of Mexican 
society/ies, as I will show next. It seems to me that the ‘religious-diversity’ scholarly stances 
eventually downplay, or discard entirely, what I have presented about the Catholic Church 
and Catholicism during the country’s colony, independence, post-independence and post-
revolution periods. The normative paradigms of secularism and their “epistemic knowledge 
regimes” (Casanova 2009:1051) I referred to in chapter 1 are very likely related to these 
‘religious-diversity’ views, which are consonant with a ‘pluralistic’ approach to social 
phenomena, yet miss or deliberately avoid addressing the various Catholicisms that have 
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 Statement located in the section ‘Los diversos rostros de los católicos y sus percepciones sobre la 
iglesia’ 
117
 Without falling into essentialist views, it could be argued in analytical terms that such 
heterogeneity develops precisely because there are strong and solid enough religious-ideological core 
‘models’ (Weber 1978; 2003) with possibilities of diverse and divergent materialisations. 
118
 Some of these religious minorities arrived or converted in the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 
century; others developed until the 1970s (INEGI 2005; Sota 2005: 69-92). 
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permeated, and still permeate Mexican society overall. Next I will offer quantitative and 
qualitative data to support this last statement and explore whether Mexican Catholicisms 
draw from the discursive elements – ‘the family’; dichotomist-asymmetric values; God/the 
Virgin as ‘powers’; normative-critical statements; ‘all-embracing’ prescriptive scope – found 
in official Catholic discourses. 
  
In one of the surveys cited above
119
 (Banamex 2010), one question in the questionnaire asked 
respondents about what they believe was “the reason for his/her success in life”: 61% of the 
sample reported “their efforts and dedication” as the reason; 27% of the sample reported 
“their family”, 9% reported “God”, and 2% reported “the government” (Banamex 2010:25).  
The answers to this question might give the impression of people rather ignoring God in their 
everyday lives. But when respondents were asked the question “How important is god in 
your life?” and were asked to give a number between 1 (not important at all) and 10 (very 
important), the average answer
120
 was 9.1 (2010:101). The same type of question, this time 
addressed to the importance of the “Virgin of Guadalupe” in the respondents’ lives, received 
an average
121
 of 8.2. (2010:102). When the respondents were asked about the “quantity” of 
different social elements or situations occurring in their respective states (where number 1 
represented “there is nothing of it” and 10 “there is a lot of it”), the options that received the 
highest average was “corruption” and “poverty” both with 8 points, followed by “religious 
faith” with a 7.5 average response
122
 (2010:15). What would this apparently strong ‘religious 
faith’ and ‘belief in God’ and ‘the Virgin’ mean for Catholics? When respondents in the 
same survey were asked about “how much” they drive their actions based on the belief of 
“God will provide”, 23% of the sample responded “a lot”, 36% of the sample replied “some”, 
27% of the sample “a bit” and 13% “nothing” (2010: 81). Although 59% of a 16, 000 
persons sample reporting to guide their actions “a lot” or “some” on the idea of a God that 
“provides” does not clearly explain people’s belief in God, it is nonetheless evidence of the 
                                                 
119
 This survey includes Catholic and non-Catholic respondents. The former amounts to 82% of the 
total sample (Banamex 2010: 109). 
120
 77% of the sample chose marks 9 or 10. 
121
 66% of the sample chose 9 or 10. 
122
 “Opportunities for success” and “justice” received the lowest marks with 5.8 and 5.5 respectively 
(Banamex 2010:15). 
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presence of the notion of God in people’s minds and a glimpse of what people believe that 
God actually does or can do. The centrality of God as ‘potence’, ‘power’ or actual ‘force’ 
(Durkheim 1915) would not therefore be a strange element in people’s thoughts and does 
seem consonant with the official Catholic discourses presented above. I will offer qualitative 
data about this specific topic in this section’s last paragraphs. 
 
What other particular beliefs and ideas can be regarded as part of people’s Catholicism? 
“The family” was already mentioned above as a “reason for personal success” reported by 
27% of the sample. Interestingly, respondents’ answers to the question about “the three 
things that reflect a person’s success in life”, comprise 25 % of the sample reporting “the 
family” as one of those three things
123
. The results of a smaller survey carried out by 
Aguascalientes Planning Institute
124
 (IMPLAN 2004), suggest that the three “most important 
values” in Aguascalientes’ society are “the family”, reported by 96% of the sample; followed 
by “work”, reported by 87% of the sample and, of course, “religion” reported by 72%. The 
Catholic Church’s historical and contemporary “pastoral work” on the family as society’s 
“fundamental cell” (above) cannot be counted as the only discourse shaping the sampled 
respondents’ beliefs and ideas on the family, but would definitely constitute one of the forces 
giving legitimacy to such a ‘successful’ institution.  
 
If the family is such a key institution in Mexico, inevitably sustained by official and ‘folk’ 
Catholic discourses, what are then the ‘in-family’ Catholic messages or ideas that prevail 
there? In Banamex survey (2010) respondents answered a question about the most important 
qualities they think children should be taught about at home. From a list of different options 
only 31% of the sample chose “religious faith”, 46% of the sample chose “obedience”, 62% 
chose “hard work” and 73% “responsibility”
125
. The reader may find in Table 3.2 below the 
“most important values to be instilled in children” in Aguascalientes according to 
                                                 
123
 Followed by 21% of the sample that chose the option “having a degree” and 17% of the sample 
which selected the option “having a respected work”  
124
 The sample was chosen from Aguascalientes’ inhabitants exclusively. The sample size, the 
survey’s questionnaire and technical information is not included in IMPLAN’s report. This report is 
not publicly available; I collected it personally in IMPLAN’s premises, from a staff member who 
kindly agree on me accessing and keeping an electronic copy of the original document. 
125
 Respondents were allowed to choose more than one option. 
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IMPLAN’s report (2004). These results are comparable to the results from Banamex survey, 




 place in Table 4– would be more 
esteemed by Aguascalientes’ and Mexico’s population than what Banamex report indicates.  
 
 











 Responsibility 19 1º 
2
o
 Tolerance and respect 17 2º 
3
o
 Work 14 9º 
4
o
 Obedience 12 3º 
5
o
 Religious faith 11 4º 
6
o
 Savings and care 8 7º 
7
o
 Independence 8 6º 
8
o
 Generosity 6 5º 
9
o
 Determination, perseverance 3 8º 
10
o
 Imagination 3 10º 
  100 %  
 Source: IMPLAN 2004: 39 
 *Unspecified survey 
 
 
Results from Banamex survey support the distance De la Torre and Gutierrez (2008) see 
between the Catholic Church’s values on ‘sexual morals’ and ‘life rights’ and those of 
people. To the question on “how much” (i) homosexuality, (ii) euthanasia and (iii) abortions 
“are justified”, where number 1 stood for the position “it is never justified” and number 10 
stood for “it is always justifiable”, the sampled respondents gave an average answer of 3.9, 
3.9 and 3.4 respectively. These life events, along with “divorce” (4.6 average points), would 
represent the “most justifiable” events from the respondents’ view. The “less justifiable” 
events were “killing a person” (2.0 points), “a man beating up his wife” (2.1 points), 




Whereas De la Torre and Gutierrez’s assertion on people’s non-Catholic (or ‘less-Catholic’) 
sexual morals may find support in these answers, the later indicate as well two situations I 
want to highlight. Firstly, these answers show a strong tendency to disapprove, apparently 
with the same intensity and at least ‘discursively’, not only universally repudiated acts such 
as killing or cheating on your partner, but also simple actions such as pretending to be sick 
and not going to work
126
. Secondly, it is likewise revealing that divorce was “the most 
justifiable” event; however, it was eventually placed, like the rest of the answers indeed, 
below the 5 points mark or the ‘never-justifiable’ end of the scale. If the British (N:1000) 
and Mexican (N:1500) samples from the World Values Survey (2005, 2006) are compared, 
the picture is similar
127
. For instance, whereas only 7.2% of the British sample reports 
“divorce” as a “never justifiable” event, 26% of the Mexican sample reports divorce in the 
same terms. Similarly, whereas 20% of the British sample reportedly considers 
“homosexuality” as “never justifiable”, 34% of the Mexican sample holds the same 
opinion
128
. Is this apparent tendency to hold a rather ‘strict’ (discursive) morality related to 
the official Catholic discourses’ persistent and ‘all-embracing’ normativeness-
prescriptiveness I presented glimpses of above? Catholic discourses’ normativeness does not 
determine (Elder-Vass 2011) people’s moral beliefs. However, I argue that if “churches” are, 
and have been for a couple of centuries, “the most trusted” social institution in the country 
and if “religious faith” is a relatively solid ‘value’ in Mexican society today, the relations 
between people’s apparently strict morality and the Catholic Church’s ‘integrally 
prescriptive’ discourses are unmistakable related and might even suggest a mutually-
dependent relationship, if not an asymmetrically-reinforcing link.    
  
                                                 
126
 This answer is explicitly included as one of the options in the questionnaire. 
127
 Results from the Mexican sample only (World Values Survey 2005) suggest, interestingly, that 
respondents would have more flexible stances when it comes to events involving ‘civic 
responsibilities’ or the figure of the state. For example, only 37% of the sample reported both 
“claiming government benefits” and “avoiding a fare on public transport” as “never justifiable” acts, 
and 11-13% of the sample reported both acts as “always justifiable”. Answers to the same questions in 
the British sample (2006) indicate that British ‘civic morality’, would be, discursively at least, more 
strict or rigid than the Mexican public services/state-related morality.  
128
 These results actually might refute De la Torre and Gutierrez (2008) statements about the Mexican 
population holding a ‘free’ sexual morality. For example, whereas only 20% of the British sample 
reported “abortion” as “never justifiable”, 54.5% of the Mexican sample reported the same answer, 
and whereas 30% of the British sample reports that “prostitution” is “never justifiable”; the same 
“event” was reported as “never justifiable” by 42% of the Mexican sample. 
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As for further religious beliefs, IMPLAN’s survey (2004: 67) includes a question on whether 
respondents “believe in hell”. To this question 63% of respondents replied affirmatively. 
Similarly, 89% of the sample reportedly “believe in heaven”. In a report from another survey 
carried out by a private agency in Aguascalientes (IMO 2009; N: 800
129
) the same questions 
were asked to respondents. In this survey 66.5% of respondents reportedly “believe 
definitely” in hell and 20% of the sample “believes probably” in hell
130
. The same type of 
question was asked to respondents about “heaven”; 75.5% of the sample chose the option “to 
believe definitely” in heaven and 15.1% “to believe probably”
131
 (IMO 2009:36). Are these 
beliefs in heaven and hell related to the constant dichotomistic references and values (e.g. 
earth-evil/heaven-good; love/passion-lust) found in the institutional Catholic discourses? 
Very probably. In the same survey (2009:41), when different statements were given to 
respondents, who were asked to select the statement closer to their “feelings about the bible”, 
49.4% of respondents chose the option “The bible represents exactly the words of God and 
has to be taken literally, word by word”; 42.3% of the sample chose the statement “The 
Bible is inspired by the words of God, but it does not have to be taken literally word by 
word”; only 4.6% of the sample chose the statement “The bible is an ancient book of fables, 
legends, history and moral precepts recorded by men”. Before, during and after field work, I 
did not find similar surveys focused on samples from MxC only, except for a survey 
included in Sota’s (2005) analysis of religion and “modernity” in Mexico City. Results from 
this survey (N: 1080) indicate that 80% of the respondents are nominally Catholics; 95% 
reportedly believe in God; 64% do not support abortions; 57% agree on the idea that 
churches and religious groups have to renovate themselves and 30% agree on the idea that 
“the truth” never changes therefore “churches and religious groups should not change their 
rites” (2005:150).  
 
Now, other than the possibly inaccurate and casual answers to surveys’ questionnaires, is 
there additional evidence that would suggest people’s Catholic discourses do contain ideas of 
God/the Virgin as ‘powers’, the family as a central social institution, dichotomistic values 
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 Representative of the urban and rural areas of the state. 
130
 Only 6.5% of the chose the answer “not to believe definitely” in hell. 
131
 4.1% chose “not to believe definitely” in heaven. 
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and a strict and ‘wide-ranging’ folk morality? Next I present evidence I collected 
ethnographically from different sources during my explorations of MxC’s and AgC’s 
everyday-life discursive environments. 
  
In MxC’s northern bus station a statue of the Virgin of Guadalupe within a nine-feet glass 
case flanked by marble columns lies at the centre of the building off the front gates –see 
appendix 3.2. A box for donations is located on one side. Echoing what seems an implicit 
allusion to Christian base communities and Theology of liberation, a sign above the donation 
box asks the public to support “the preferential option for the poor” and donate money for 
three shelters where kids and teenagers “suffer the consequences of the moral, social and 
economic disequilibrium of the current world” (italics added). Around the corner, inside the 
same bus station, I found a religious-items shop. The shop’s glass front walls were covered 
with decorative posters for sale that show images of Jesus Christ and different prayers 
intended for different professions, or life circumstances. In bold or capital letters the titles of 
the posters read: “The heaven’s shop”, “The value of life”, “Dialogues with the Lord”, 
“Letter from a son to his atheist parents”, “The athlete’s prayer”, “The physician’s prayer” 
and the like. A poster on the top of the right glass wall, titled “What our son feels” lists 
sixteen “commandments” about how to raise children, the commandments are told first-
person by a hypothetical infant, e.g. third commandments: “Do not change your mind 
frequently about what I should do. Make up your mind and keep your decision”; sixth 
commandments: “Do not correct me in front of others. Teach me how to improve when we 
are alone”. Below this poster, the “The athlete’s prayer” poster reads:   
 
Thank you Lord for allowing me to run this marathon. I thank you for this life you 
gave me […] because every day of training […] you allow my soul and my body to 
enter into the Nature you have created for me. I thank you Lord because in the 
solitude of my training you allow me to get close to you […], opening my soul and 
my body to all the creatures you have created (emphasis added) 
 




instil in me a great love for studying and practicing medicine […]; inspire me to be 
charitable and love my patients […]; preserve people’s lives if your lofty decisions 
do not command the opposite, because science and all efforts are in vain when you 
declare the end (emphasis added) 
 
In AgC’s downtown, the front showcase in a bookshop exhibits a series of books on English 
grammar, ocular medicine and Mexican Architecture –see appendix 3.2. The books to the 
left of the showcase are books for kids about dinosaurs, riddles and the Mayans. In between 
these two groups of books the showcase also exhibits books for kids titled “David and 
Goliath”, “Cain and Abel”, alongside other books titled “Jesus and the blind guy” and “Palm 
Sunday”. On the other side of the showcase, a poster of the Virgin of Guadalupe facing the 
street is stuck to the glass. A couple of blocks away, another shop in AgC’s downtown 
exhibits books, small electronic appliances, and decorative wooden frames with short 
messages printed over. In one of those frames the printed message reads: “‘I know the plans 
I got for you’, the Lord says, ‘plans of peace, not of evil, […]”. Pedestrians could read ‘The 
prayer of Saint Francis’ (Cunningham 2004:146) in another frame,  
 
Lord, make me an instrument of your peace. So, where there is hatred I will plant 
love, where there is offence I will give forgiveness, where there is doubt I give faith, 
where there is sadness I give happiness, where there is despair I give hopes, […]. 
 
Next I offer to the reader the last segment of data on people’s Catholic discourses. This data 
comes not from MxC or AgC, but from a mainstream media source (open-signal television 
channel) that reaches basically all the cities in the country. Like the fragments of Catholic 
messages and prayers above, the next ‘textual pieces’ represent the Catholic discourses that 
surround, and in a sense ‘besiege’ (chapter 8), individuals, and their thoughts and actions in 
their daily lives. ‘A cada quien su santo’ is, up to the present, a television programme 
broadcast by one of the two main private, open-signal television channels in Mexico. The 
title of the programme can be roughly translated into ‘A saint for each person’. It consists of 
single episodes that refer to fictional characters and events that are meant to represent 
instances of real people’s personal or family problems and their solution by means of 
praying to Christian saints or virgins who somehow intervene in the plot and solve the 
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difficulty in question. By the time I collected this data, the channel’s web page (TV Azteca 
2010) introduced the programme as follows: 
 
Faith moves mountains; that is the main premise of the programme ‘A saint for 
every one’ […] Saints are close to people, they are always there, either [as portraits] 
in one’s purse, in a street corner  in a post card and immersed in the everyday 
language. We look for saints to access the divine grace for they are our celestial 
lawyers. […] Devotion in Mexico is tightly linked to the history and identity of 
people, to their contrasts and rites. So, ‘A saint for every one’ shares this warm 
Mexicanity that reflects the roots that get us close to each other and give us identity 
through our beliefs. 
 
Prior to my pilot case study, one of the episodes of ‘A saint for every one’ addressed the 
Virgin of ‘la Candelaria’. The plot of the story consisted of a widowed mother and her two 
sons living in a deprived urban background. One of the sons, Candelario, was alcoholic and 
struggled to stay sober. One day the mother says to Candelario “I know you are a good son, 
but the absence and the ill example of your alcoholic father ruined you”. The mother 
continues “May the Virgin enlighten you and protect you. May she intercede before almighty 
God for you to be out of the wrong path”. But Candelario does not stop drinking, leaves 
home and goes missing. Fifteen years pass by. The afflicted mother talks with a friend. The 
friend advices the mother: “Do not despair, you will find your son soon; if you ask for it to 
the Virgin of ‘la Candelaria’, she will get your son back to you”. The mother confesses “It is 
because I feel I have been such a bad mother”. The friend disagrees and sympathetically 
states, “No, had you been a bad mother your other son would have become bad too and you 
can see he is such a good boy […]. The mother with no hopes replies “yes, that is just how 
life is, some things are good and others are bad” (emphasis added).  This episode and others 
by the same channel are actually not ‘unique’, they compete against their ‘rival 
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 Azteca TV’s main competitor, Mexican private network Televisa, was actually the first channel 
that began to broadcast a similar TV programme ‘The rose of Guadalupe’. “As a family programme 
whose aim is to transmit positive messages full of hopes […] The rose of Guadalupe offers a series of 




If religions are inherently normative, institutional-official Catholicism in Mexico is certainly 
not an exception. But this is not all. Discursively, the official normativeness of Catholic 
discourses in Mexico would be based on systematic elements and here I suggest those I met 
more frequently: (i) a system of dichotomistic values or two moral poles where ‘right’ or 
‘desirable’ choices rest invariably upon one single side: heaven/hell, traditional/liberal, 
good/evil, heaven/earth, love/passion  –which resemble, unsurprisingly, the heaven-hell 
notions spread by the first missionaries in New Spain according to French historian Ricard 
([1933]2000); (ii) legitimation by God/the Virgin/Holy Spirit and their absolute or 
intercessory powers, (iii) a particularly critical and judgements-based set of messages and (iv) 
a corresponding ‘all-embracing’ or ‘integral’ prescriptiveness, which is substantially 
consonant not only with the heavily-critical messages but also with the idea of God’s 
interventionist powers and the assumed universality of social values such as the Catholic 
‘family’. Institutionally, this official normativeness-prescriptiveness would be supported by a 
rigid centralised-authority organisational structure that would certainly assure the consistent 
production and flow of these principles and discourses. 
 
Survey data corroborates the thesis of people challenging (Elder-Vass 2011) official Catholic 
discourses on sexual morals, abortions, euthanasia and homosexuality (De la Torre and 
Gutierrez 2008; Cipriani 2011). However, ‘folk’ Catholic discourses still seem to draw from 
similar dichotomies with exactly the same non-relativity – or the same “either/or logic” in 
Zerubavel’s words (1999: 56-8) – e.g., hatred/love, offence/forgiveness, good/bad. Further 
elements in people’s Catholicism and non-official Catholic discourses do correspond to the 
elements found in official discourses, i.e. references to God as power or creator, references 
to the intercessory powers of Catholic saints and Virgins, as well as references to the family 
as key social institution or “example of people’s success”. Moreover, people’s reported 
beliefs or moral attitudes seem to resemble the official ‘all-embracing’ and ‘non-relativistic’ 
morals, which apparently disapprove of both murdering and not attending work with the 
same intensity. The ‘integral’ normativeness-prescriptiveness of the Catholic Church’s 
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These similarities would represent fairly expected outcomes of the historical conditions 
discussed in the first sections of this chapter. Firstly, colonial Mexico was constituted by a 
deeply religious society where the educational field/s, national identity, ideological 
atmosphere and even political and economic contexts were all heavily permeated by the 
Catholic Church and Catholicism in general, to a degree that we could talk about a quasi-
monopolistic Catholic social influence during the three hundred years of the colonial regime. 
Secondly, Mexico’s independence from Spain (1820s) did not mean independence from 
Catholicism, which remained, figuratively and practically, as the new nation’s ‘official 
religion’. Understandably so, Mexican liberal politicians in the 1850s-1860s passed, not 
without resistance, Enlightenment-inspired secular laws to strip away the Catholic Churches’ 
political-administrative public roles. Nonetheless those liberal politicians and ideologues 
never saw or met alternative Christian theologies spreading across society before, after and 
simultaneous to their political ‘reforms’ –like statesmen, politicians and lay people did see 
and experience during the 16
th
-century reformationist theological-social effervescence in 
Britain and Europe. Mexican 19
th
-century liberal politicians and their Enlightenment-
inspired bills, I argue, barely altered the Catholic Church’s and Catholicism’s grassroots 
cultural influence, religious cosmovision and ideological powers (Zavala, forthcoming). The 
secularisation process in 19
th
 century Mexico was a political secularisation, not an epistemic-
ideological secularisation. The Cristiada and its legitimated-by-God ‘ideology’ (Meyer 1973, 
1993), even if localised in some geographical regions only, is just one example of the 
potentially extreme outcomes of such religious-cultural discourses and their persistent 
ideological force. And, however banal this seems, it is not a coincidence that the two largest 
open-signal television channels in this country include in their weekday broadcast 
programming a series of soap-opera-like programmes that appeal to a ‘devotional’ 
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 Except perhaps for people’s moral criteria related to civil responsibilities and the figure of the state; 
see footnote 127. 
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Mexicanity and so dramatise the ‘divine’ intervention of saints and the Virgin/s in people’s 
everyday lives. 
 
I argue that Catholicism in Mexico has certainly changed but has never ceased to be a 
fundamental component of Mexican society/ies’ ideological-cultural structures (Weber 2003; 
Merton 1938; Waggoner 2009; Cipriani 2011; Sayer 1992, 2000), even if the Catholic 
Church’s face has been backgrounded and even if people now see sexual morals, abortions, 
euthanasia and homosexuality from different (non-Catholic?) ethical stances. It is as a central 
part of these historical contexts and as a key part of the current ideological-cultural 
structures in the country that Catholic discourses flow extensively and intensively and 
although do not determine people’s beliefs, customs and behaviour (Vazquez 1985; Zahino 
1999), they may certainly influence them by predisposing (Elder-Vass 2011) individuals to 
assume ‘strict’, ‘all-embracing’ (Blancarte 1993) and ‘non-relativistic’ moral stances and 
take for granted both dichotomistic religious values (love/passion; heaven/hell; peace/evil) 
and the various types of ‘powers’ (Durkheim 1915) of/by God, the Virgin and Catholic saints 
–assumptions, beliefs and values that enter into varied combinations and account for the 







The ‘secular’ context: sociology in Mexico 
 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to introduce and describe the current underlying 
rationales of the sociological field in Mexico (and Latin America) and the public-university 
ethos as interpreted by both the specialised scholarly literature and the full-time sociology 
lecturers from whom I collected data (Table 2.2, chapter 2). The main conclusion in this 
chapter is that the underlying rationales of Mexico’s sociological field and the university 
ethos do include elements that resemble some of the elements of the Catholicisms and 
Catholic discourses I have addressed in the previous chapters, namely a parallel moral 
sensibility, and prescriptive-teleological ethos as well as an analogous configuration of 
vertical authorities. In order to have a clear picture of these parallels I will first present, 
similarly to the previous chapter, a description of events and individuals directly related to 
the history of sociology in Mexico/Latin America. In this first section I will present evidence 
about the early sociologists, early sociological thought in Mexico, and the suggestion that 
both were not only anchored upon French positivism but may have also been permeated by 
the religious cultural-ideological structures previously addressed. After this review of 
sociology’s historical background I will present qualitative data about the current 
configuration and daily-life ethos of the sociological field, the university institution and the 





I. The beginnings 
 
According to Briceño-Leon and Sonntag (1998:11), sociology in Latin America has been 
driven by two forces since its inception: the search for an identity in a post-colonial context 
and the promotion of progress, development and modernity
134
, or, in short, of “evolution”.  
 
In Mexico, sociology surfaces, or rather ‘arrives’, for the first time in the second half of the 
19th century. The story begins with a Mexican medicine student, Gabino Barreda, who 
arrived in Paris in 1848. There, a fellow national introduced Barreda to the work of August 
Comte. When Barreda is back in Mexico in 1853, Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive 
lies inside his luggage (Zabludovski 2007: 198). Barreda is considered the first ‘messenger’ 
of positivism in Mexico, and the first director of the country’s then newly-established 
‘national public high school’ – Escuela Nacional Preparatoria (ENP) – or, as Gonzalez 
states (2010: 694), “Mexico’s main diffusion centre of positivism”. Barreda’s positivism 
held classic Comtean principles, i.e. freedom and progress. These principles and the 
positivism they were framed in were by then considered, in Zabludovski’s view, as “the only 
possible means for bridging the gap between everyday life and the nation’s […]  aspirations 
for democracy and the new republic” (2007: 202). Zabludovski argues that Barreda, unlike 
Comte, supported liberalism as “the positive path” to the country’s post-independence 
reconstruction, “in contrast to [Catholic] clerical thinking, that attempted to impede 
progress” (Zabludovski 2007:199). Indeed, Mexico’s 19
th
 century secularisation laws I 
presented in chapter 3 constituted the political-ideological context Barreda experienced 
during his positivistic campaign. He decided, as head of the country’s first ‘national public 
high school’, to establish a “scientific education” in order to shape “the moral norms that 
would make life between individuals compatible” (Chazaro 1995: 7). Unsurprisingly, 
Barreda defined morals in opposition to “religious dogmas”, therefore for this positivistic 
scholar, ‘moral’ was the discipline of intellectual and affective faculties driven by the brain 
and his organic and physiological functioning (Chazaro 1995: 8). Andrade (1998) reports 
that the then positivistic social sciences in Mexico were thought as contributing “to 
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transform and even substitute gradually the detrimental factors of the Indo-Iberian 
population’s ‘abnormal’ evolution” (1998:43; emphasis added). This documentary evidence 
suggests that Barreda and other positivistic intellectuals in Mexico
135
, adopted Comtean-
French positivism as an actual substitute of religion and, particularly, of the Catholic Church 
and its morals.  
 
The key question is, could positivistic intellectuals replace entirely Catholic-religious morals 
with “scientific” ones? To what extent would the ‘old Catholic morals’ still prevail in the 
then ideological atmospheres and in these positivistic discourses? In 1867, that is, in the 
same decade when liberal secular laws were passed in the country, Barreda delivers the 
public speech “Civic prayer” before president of Mexico Benito Juarez and other local 
authorities. In the speech’s opening the author appeals to people’s “sacred duty” to reflect on 
Mexico’s independence and reports both the “anarchy that reigns in [individuals’] spirits and 
ideas” and the “sordid politicians” that “disgrace” people’s “spirits and hearts, intelligence 
and morality” (Barreda 1867:1). Then the author reviews with passionate prose the last 
decades of Mexican history, praises the Mexican independence movement, touches upon 
episodes of ancient European history and despises the Catholic clergy for its alliances with 
the Spanish crown and its role in Mexico’s colonial subjugation. In the last paragraphs, 
Barreda exhorts his listeners to be driven by liberty, order and progress just as “the saint 
emblem of our independence” (1867:19), the flag used by independentist armies, 
commended. The physician concludes his “prayer” as follows: 
 
May a total freedom of conscience, an absolute freedom of expression and argument 
spread the light everywhere and make unnecessary and impossible the revolts that 
are not purely spiritual, revolutions that are not intellectual. (1867:19-20)  
 
Some scholars in Mexico would state that the first proto-sociological analysis of Mexican 
society may be attributed to Spanish chroniclers that produced detailed reports about native 
communities during colonial times (Andrade 1998: 78). However, according to Cardoso 
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 E.g., Parra and his psychological variant of positivism in the late 1870s –focused on ‘moral 
diseases’ and their psychological and physiological origin; or Zayas and his phrenological work on the 
physiology of crime during 1880s and 1890s (Chazaro 1995). 
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(2005), Barreda’s “Civic prayer” may be read as the first sociological analysis in, and about, 
Mexico. It is not the aim of this chapter to present a thorough study of Barreda’s work or a 
thorough Foucauldian genealogy of sociology in Mexico. What I do argue is that however 
‘civic’ and based on ‘scientific positivism’ it appeared, Barreda’s ‘prayer’ was permeated by 
the heavily Catholic ideological context of Mexico’s 19
th
 century and its colonial 
background. In the European-French intellectual scene, Durkheim (1915:361) spoke of 
scientists who believed in scientific arguments just as churchgoers believed in religions. 




-century positivists in 
Mexico relied less on empirical research and more on their “assumptions of the positivistic 
creed” (1995:44).  
 
By this time (1890s-1910s) sociology was taught only as a course in Law schools’ 
classrooms (Zabludovski 2007: 202-3) and the public national high-school in Mexico City 
(Hernandez 1990:1Cardoso 2005:189). Antonio Caso, who would afterwards become “the 
great supporter of philosophy and sociology in Mexico” (Mendieta y Nuñez 1978: 653) and 
rector of the National University of Mexico in the 1920s, attended one of these Law schools 
in Mexico City and learnt sociology in a clearly positivistic atmosphere. However, Caso and 
a group of intellectuals
136
 criticised this scientific positivism strongly. According to Andrade 
(1998:38-9), Caso conceived progress not as mechanistic and universal but as unpredictable 
and discontinuous; he supported individual agency and individuals’ contribution to progress. 
Interestingly, in one of his early philosophical essays titled “The existence as economy. 
Essay on the essence of Christianism”, Caso introduced and summed up his reflections as 
 
A synthesis of Christianity based on the moral biography of some great Christians 
[…] a homage to the heroes of the most important history in humanity’s evolution: 
the development of the Christian ideas and feelings through the centuries. (Caso 
[1916] 1989: 13) 
 
In her biographical study of Caso, scholar Krauze (1990) states 
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 The so-called Ateneo de la Juventud, whose members were politicians, artists, writers and 
intellectuals such as Diego Rivera, José Vasconcelos, Alfonso Reyes and others (Zabludovski 
2007:209). 
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Caso professed Christianism. It was the figure of Christ who attracted him the most 
and he loved Him with great zeal. ‘For me,’ he confessed to me in one of our 
interviews, ‘Jesus is the way to solve all the problems’. He had detached Jesus from 
the [Catholic] Church’s dogmas. Christianism for Caso was the Christianism of the 
origins, of the Gospels, especially Saint John’s (1990: 80). 
 
In his academic works Caso would agree with positivist thinkers on the empirical origin of 
knowledge. However, drawing from Henri Bergson’s spiritualist metaphysics
137
 (Hernandez 
1990), he would disagree with positivists on what such an empirical base would comprise
138
. 
Caso reportedly claimed that “the experiences of religious faith and metaphysical intuitions 
are arbitrarily overlooked in the type of experiences positivism considers” (Hernandez 
1990:3; see also Cueva 2009).  
 
I argue that similar to the way Barreda would not only draw from Comtean positivism when 
he wrote, or literally ‘preached’, his ‘prayer’, Caso certainly was not only drawing from 
Bergsonian metaphysics when he explicitly advocated the epistemological relevance of 
‘religious faith’. Barreda, Caso and their two opposite intellectual stances, that is, the ‘anti-
Catholic’ and the ‘pro-humanistic’ (Zabludovski 2007: 218-9) do not exhaust the description 
of sociology’s inception in Mexico, however, they illustrate intellectual main streams whose 
normative and epistemological bases had not completely broken with the country’s, 
primarily Catholic, colonial and post-colonial ideological-cultural discourses.  
 
 
II. Stages of institutionalisation  
 
The first social research centre in the country, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (IIS), was 
established in Mexico National University at Mexico City in 1930. Scholars Loyo, 
Guadarrama and Weissberg (1990) note, in a critical statement, that the first researchers 
working at IIS did not really have enough time to carry out social and sociological research 
for they were involved in “various political actions” or held government posts as well 
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 See Greenberg (1976) for a psychological analysis of the religious influence in Bergson’s 
philosophy via his father’s Jewishness. 
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 In a brief statement Zabludovski states that Caso was “inspired by the ideas” of German 
philosophers Wilhelm Dilthey and Edward Spranger as well (2007:210) 
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(1990:6, 9-11). This was not fortuitous. Andrade (1998) states that IIS’ founders trusted 
social sciences’ capacity to assist in the solution of the “great national problems” (1998:43). 
Scholar Sefchovich (1989) argues that the rhetoric of ‘national problems’ was part of the 
social discourses of ‘national reconstruction’ harnessed by the ideologues of the Mexican 
Revolution and the political party that capitalised on this historical episode. In an interesting 
passage of their chapter, Loyo, Guadarrama and Weissberg (1990) state that the 
establishment of IIS represented “the persistent faith in knowledge’s utility to solve the great 
national problems […] a faith that has its roots in liberalism and particularly in the positivist 
thinking” (1990:5; emphasis added).  
 
Andrade (1998) reports, and Benitez (2008) suggests as well, that it was not until Lucio 
Mendieta y Nuñez was appointed head of the IIS in 1939 that relatively more systematic 
programmes of sociological research were launched. The results of these research activities 
and other sociological texts were published in Revista Mexicana de Sociologia (RMS), the 
first specialist sociology journal in the country reportedly founded by Mendieta y Nuñez in 
1939 as well
139
. Interestingly, Andrade quotes the following definition of society by 
Mendieta y Nuñez: “the set of individuals and aggregates of individuals who live on earth in 
constant and complex material and spiritual interrelations” (quoted by Andrade 1988:50; 
emphasis added). 
 
In his Eurocentric assessment of RMS and its sociological contributions, De la Garza (1989) 
states that the 1939-1950 period is represented by the dominance of the “hermeneutic 
streams” brought to the country by Spanish refugee scholars
140
, who were reportedly familiar 
with German thinkers such as Weber and Heidegger. The “rigorous” philosophical works of 
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 I will argue in chapters 7 and 8 how this type of ‘mono-causal’ statements –in which the 
occurrence of social phenomena in general is attributed to one single agent or entity – are common in 
sociological discourses in Mexico and are, in fact, closely related to Catholic discourses. Both IIS and 
RMS still operate as part of Mexico National University. 
140
 From the Spanish Civil war period in the 1930s. Some of these intellectuals played a part in the 
establishment of La Casa de España in 1938, an academic institutions that later on became El Colegio 
de Mexico. 
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these Spanish scholars joined Mexican scholars’ “vitalist tradition
141
 that started as a reaction 
to positivism” (De la Garza 1989: 116; see also Girola 1995:44). Andrade (1998) and 
Rabotnikof (1995) argue that it was Spanish Scholars who brought sociology’s 
European classics to broader Mexican audiences by means of translations of the Europeans’ 
original works. De la Garza states that whereas Spanish intellectuals in Mexico, analysed 
abstract philosophical topics by “holding discussions without interlocutors [and instead] with 
Comte or Durkheim”, more empirical and positivistic research was carried out by scholars 
like Mendieta y Nuñez (1989: 117-8). In Girola and Olvera’s views (1995:93) Mendieta y 
Nuñez’ research agenda, embedded in the research logics of IIS and RMS, “is related to an 
idea of social science in Mexico as panacea […] as the key to decipher the logic of a society 
that is to be transformed”.  
 
Both the lack of a university sociology degree and sociology’s early appearance in the 19
th
-
century Law schools in Mexico City certainly had some effects. Briceño-Leon and Sonntag 
(1998:15) note that the 1930s-1950s period in Latin American sociology meant a “sociology 
of lawyers”. According to De la Garza (1989) sociology in Mexico by then was practiced by 
lawyers, anthropologists or philosophers, not by ‘sociologists’ in sensu stricto. Both Andrade 
(1998:37) and Girola and Olvera (1995:44) qualify these generations and their work as 
“proto-sociology/ists”. In Mexico, this situation began to be reversed with the foundation of 
Mexico National University’s School of Political and Social Science in 1951-53 (Mendieta y 
Nuñez 1978; Andrade 1998). The first undergraduate programmes offered in this school 
were Social Science, Diplomatic Sciences, Journalism and Political Science
142
. These 
students would attend courses on ‘general sociology’, ‘sociology of Mexico’, ‘sociology of 
religion’, ‘sociology of the family’ and ‘sociology of law’ (Colmenero 2003:44-9) and would 
be conceived, according to Andrade (1998:57), as contributing to  
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 De la Garza does not account for this ‘vitalist tradition’. Fernandez (1991:360) touches upon 
Antonio Caso being part of that stream. Intellectuals in El Ateneo de la Juventud may be counted as 
part of this group too (Zabludovski 2007).  
142
 The foundation of this school motivated the establishment of similar undergraduate programmes in 
universities within Mexico City and other states of the country (Mendieta y Nunez 1978: 665) 
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the improvement of the performance of Mexico’s international relations; the 
formation of a national identity; the supply of neutral information based on ethical 
principles, and the organisation of a more rational, just and equitable Mexican 
society 
 
It was in the 1960s when an undergraduate sociology degree was finally established and 
offered to applicants in Mexico National University and two public universities outside the 
capital city (Loyo, et al. 1990:43). Andrade (1998:36) notices that some scholars, Loyo 
among them, place the start of sociology’s institutionalisation in Mexico precisely in this 
decade and not necessarily when IIS and RMS were established in 1939. In any case, it is 
during the 1960s and 1970s, when reforms in the curricula of Mexico National University’s 
School of Social and Political Science imprinted “a strong leftist orientation” in sociology 
(Mendieta y Nunez 1978:666). Girola and Olvera notice the same change of direction in the 
IIS and RMS (1995:96). Loyo, et al. (1990) state that the Cuban revolution (1953-1959) 
played a key role in this period too and influenced, particularly, the university context, where 
leftist students adopted Marxist and revolutionary radical political discourses (1990: 38). 
From Andrade’s point of view (1995: 146-50) sociological thought in this period was 
influenced not only by Marxist thinking but also by “critical sociology” paradigms and “the 
dependency theory”. The latter developed from the works of Latin American economists 
Raul Prebisch and Felipe Herrera, the former being a key member of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC, or  CEPAL in 
Spanish). The so-called ‘CEPAL’s dependency theory’ influenced university economic 
disciplines first and after the inclusion of the more “social aspects of development” during 
the late 1950s it reportedly became a constant reference in social research (Loyo, et al. 
1990:39). The extent to which both critical sociology and dependency theory really shaped 
sociological discourses and their epistemological configuration and the extent to which these 
two theories rather adapted to the pre-existing ideological conditions of social science and 
the very society of Mexico and Latin America, are questions that I am not going to address 
here, yet imply analytical subtleties that may lead to greater accuracy –or to the reification of 
‘theories’ and ‘schools’ if they are rather unattended.  
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Briceño-Leon and Sonntag (1998), in their reading of Marxism in 1970s-1980s Latin 
America, pay attention to these subtleties. These authors qualify the 1970s-1980s period in 
Latin American sociology as the period of an “ahistorical” and “antihumanist” Marxist-
structuralist sociology where “the structures, the forces superior to actors, determine 
teleologically the social change”
143
 (1998:18). The revival of this version of Marxism was 
linked, these authors state, to May 1968 in France and the election of South American 
communist Salvador Allende as president of Chile in 1970. The evidence I have presented 
previously may point at other causes as well. Perhaps this Marxist revival with its ‘forces 
superior to actors’ (Durkheim 1915) and its ‘teleological’ and ‘ahistorical’ features, even if 
‘anti-humanist’, may be fundamentally linked as well to the aforementioned cultural-
ideological structures and religious contexts –just as Barreda’s anti-Catholic moralist 
positivism and Caso’s humanist sociology (and Christian profile) certainly were. I will return 
to this topic in chapter 8. 
 
 
III. Current sociologies  
 
Two “clearly distinguishable” streams operated in Latin America’s sociologies in the 1990s 
according to Briceño-Leon and Sonntag: a “philosophical and humanistic sociology of a 
nomothetic character” focused on holistic theories, pure research and qualitative methods; 
and a “scientific sociology” based on the analysis of micro phenomena through inductive 
thinking, quantitative methods and utilitarian principles (1998:22). Andrade (1998) states 
that 1990s sociology in Mexico was constituted not necessarily by the rejection of “holistic 
paradigms” such as Marxism, functionalism and structuralism but by “a growing 
diversification of perspectives and multiple communities” that “promote the revision and 
discussion of the foundations and application” of that set of holistic paradigms and “reflect 
about their limitations and possible new approaches” (1998:151). In the same decade 
Mexican scholar Aguilar (1995) analysed sociology in Mexico with a more critical lens. 
Aguilar states that sociological research centres in the country are tacitly led by “traditional 
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 Cf. Andrade (1995: 148-149). For this author Marxism lost its influence by then. 
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and hegemonic” (1995:210-11) research institutions based at Mexico City (see also Gutierrez 
1995:180). Aguilar (1995) also reports a lack of communication between Mexican 
sociologists and their peers overseas and a low level of intellectual exchange which is patent 
in publications where authors reportedly tend to cite authoritative European sociologists (e.g. 
Habermas) or close colleagues only. He also sees in Mexico’s sociology a return to 
normative research linked to a “moral and political philosophy of human rights and political 
freedom”, which would mean “turning back to confuse normative with factual judgements, 
practical recipes with explanations, heart wishes with truths of the intellect” (1995:213-4). 
Critical too, and somewhat Eurocentric and normative, Gimenez (1995:198) reports an 
“insufficient familiarity” with classic sociological knowledge, a “weak epistemological 
culture” (seen also De la Garza 1989) based on “positivistic dreams” and “traumas before the 
hard sciences”, as well as a “clumsiness” in the theoretical handling of empirical data that 
would produce “descriptivist and quantitativist” limited results.  
 
A more recent and comprehensive analysis is Castañeda’s work (2004) on Mexico’s 
“academic sociology” and its relation to the state via a particular university model and a 
likewise singular community of intellectuals. For this author “the Mexican sociological 
tradition” has developed as “a duality of souls”, i.e., as an “empiricism” plagued with 
common-sense and as an “ideological rhetoric” marked by the state’s agenda and the 
“national courses” (2004:206). He explains this as follows. After the Mexican Revolution, 
the audience of Mexican intellectuals was basically the State. Intellectuals were the State’s 
“alter ego” and universities constituted the State’s “moral conscience” (2004:113). This 
State-intellectuals relationship changed after what Castañeda calls “the break” that 
reportedly occurred in the aftermath of the 1968 student protest, or Tlatelolco massacre
144
. 
The State embraced intellectuals anew, this time as “experts” of “technical” knowledge and 
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 The protest-massacre took place during president Diaz Ordaz’ administration (1964-1970). In 
October 1968, a large number of university and high school students gathered in one of the main 
squares of the Tlatelolco area in Mexico City to protest against the government. The place was 
surrounded by members of the Mexican Army, who opened fire at some point from the roofs of the 
apartment buildings nearby. Hundreds of protesters reportedly died by the initial shooting and during 
the subsequent search the army carried out door by door in the adjacent buildings (Zermeño 1994, 
Poniatowska 1999). In statements similar to Castañeda’s (2004), Zermeño (1994) argues that the 
happenings showed a deterioration of the State-university relationship and the weakening of the 
official political ideology and its nationalistic discourse. 
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not as “moral authorities”. The Marxist intellectuals-ideologues from the 1970s turned into 
public commentators and the leading voices of public opinion in the 1990s (2004: 114). 
Sociology as part of that university ethos and intellectual context was obviously not immune. 
Sociology would take for granted the Mexican Revolution’s aims as its raison d'être; the 
former was not only a companion of the Mexican revolution’s agenda, it eventually became 
a dependent of the revolution’s national reconstruction plans. According to Castañeda, this 
‘nationalistic’ sociology would lose its force gradually. By the 1980s critical theory and 
postmodernist ideas, with their “anti-method” air, started to spread in sociology’s classrooms. 
However these fresh theoretical streams would have “disastrous consequences” for students 
were trying to learn about a “[postmodernist] denial of social science’s discourses” without 
really knowing the western/European foundations and backgrounds of these discourses 
(2004:189) –see below sociology lecturer Rita’s personal statements on a similar matter. 
From a somewhat Eurocentric position, Castañeda argues that even in the new sociological 
topics and fields that arose in Mexico’s sociology afterwards – e.g. studies of Weber, 
sociology of work, urban and political sociology – there is still a persistent “love for the 
ideological function” that commits sociology to “notions and discourses that surpass its 
analytical role” (2004:190). In short, in Castañeda’s view, the “Mexican culture”, including 
intellectuals, universities and sociologists, “emancipated itself from the [Catholic] Church, 
not from its king” (2004:112). I would agree, Mexican culture emancipated itself from the 
Catholic Church, yet I would specify further: whereas Mexican culture emancipated from the 
Catholic Church and some of its official discourses, it did not emancipate from people’s 
Catholic discourses and least of all from the partly Catholic ideological-cultural structures I 
discussed in chapter 3. 
 
Although Castañeda takes for granted this secularist rupture between the Catholic Church 
and ‘Mexican culture’, he interestingly touches upon a parallel between the way audiences 
have interpreted and ‘mythologized’ the work of some classic Mexican sociologists and the 
way people approach biblical texts in Mexico. Castañeda uses the case of Gonzalez 
Casanova’s classic sociological book Democracy in Mexico ([1965] 1972). Just like the bible, 
Castañeda suggests, the “truth and meaning” of Democracy in Mexico lies in its “reference to 
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a truth” that “transcends” the content of the book and its logical-methodological 
inconsistencies
145
 and rather lies in its courage to criticise the “absence of democracy” in the 
country, in its setting up of a national-democracy agenda and in the interpretations of the 
book as a forecaster of the Tlatelolco protest/massacre in 1968 (2004:232). In a brief 
paragraph Castañeda also argues that the “identity” of both the religious and sociological 
discourses “depends on its Enlightened [spokespersons], on its priests, on its privileged 
interpreters (2004:233)” (emphasis added). The author does not draw any causal link 
between one discourse and the other. I will. First, though, I will present what the sociology 
lecturers I interviewed reported as their own experiences in the university, sociological and 
social research fields. 
 
Sociology lecturers’ personal experiences. 
 
What I will present below is evidence of what the respondents during the interviews reported 
having experienced in the university, sociological and social research fields and what they 
currently think about these contexts. I include these interview statement in this chapter to 
offer not only an intellectualist historiographical depiction of sociology in Mexico but also a 
picture of the latter’s current tensions, the tacit beliefs and norms that make up its university-
academic identity, the routine practices, the awkward anecdotes and occurrences that some 
specialised authors seem to avoid; in short a description of sociologies in Mexico by the 
people that ‘make’ those sociologies, by the professionals that (partly) construct the 
discipline and keep it alive despite the chronic shortage of funding, the challenge of 
educating hundreds and thousands of students with scant resources and the not-always-
friendly bureaucratic structures and institutions around them.  
 
As the respondents’ statements were greatly diverse, I will group such statements and will 
present them in a series of thematic and individual micro narratives that will go from the 
simple to the complex –the ‘local’ context first, the ‘national’ and ‘international’ contexts 
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 For example Castañeda argues that Gonzalez Casanova used the term ‘democracy’ but did not 
explain the model of democracy he had in mind. 
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afterwards – and from the respondents’ references about the past to their statements about 
the present.  
 
Experiences in/views from Aguascalientes 
  
Respondents’ higher education experiences 
 
AgC-based (MxC-born) sociology lecturer Brigitte told me her first undergraduate-
programme choice was philosophy, not sociology. She attended this programme at a private 
Jesuit university in Mexico City where she “started to get involved with classmates who 
were into political matters and sort of supporters of Theology of Liberation”. Brigitte 
eventually entered a sociology undergraduate programme at a public university in MxC in 
1978 because, she stated, “this thing of the Philosophy of Liberation and studying Marxism 
with my mates; we read Lukács, what a horror! A had a friend who taught me the Capital on 
Saturdays”. Brigitte then paused and described the “environment” in this public university as 
“very Marxist, very orthodox”. She noticed lecturers “were not really critical, they were 
closed, […] inconsistent with what they said and what they did”. When she was about to 
finish her undergraduate sociology programme she realised that her training was not 
necessarily sociological. 
 
I did not get to know sociology because most of my courses were about Marxism. I 
took four workshops on The Capital; a whole semester was for [studying] Gramsci 
and another one for Althusser […] that was the curricula and we had no option  
 
MxC-trained sociologist Michael also described his undergraduate studies as “an orthodox 
Marxist training”. Michael summed it up as “Marxism was about saying ‘no’ to everything: 
not to watch TV, news, not to read the newspaper, not to go to night clubs”. That sociology 
undergraduate curricula, Michael stated, was all about “reading [Louis Bonaparte’s] 
Eighteenth Brumaire, and [the Communist] manifesto”, Michael reported not remembering 
other sociological perspectives as part of his undergraduate studies.  
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The statements by other AgC’s lecturers were analogous. Julia for example remembered that 
she and her classmates at AgC’s university were perceived as Marxists, “you know the 
stereotype of the guy wearing sandals, with beard, long hair and jeans”. Julia then said that 
there was “a bit of this trend” in the school but referred to this perception as a mere 
stereotype. Later during our interview though, Julia stated “you could see I mastered 
Marxism when I was lecturing”, it was because, 
 
when I did my undergraduate [sociology] programme, Marx’s Capital was our bible 
[..] we had to work on it; lecturers were sort of obsessed [teaching Marxism]. So yes, 
Marx was the author who predominated out of all the authors we read.   
 
Edward did not attend a Mexican university for his undergraduate studies
146
; his memories of 
Mexico’s sociological field are not different from Brigitte’s, Michael’s and Julia’s though. 
After enrolling as sociology lecturer in Mexico, Edward said he realised that,  
 
the fundamental perspective in almost all the social science disciplines was Marxism. 
But it was a very primitive Marxism! as an academic put it recently in a meeting. 
[…]. Perhaps they only read the book cover of ‘The Capital’ and not the book as 
such. 
 
Edward recalled as well the occasion when a public university in Mexico summoned 
sociology lecturers from other universities to collect inputs for the opening of an 
undergraduate programme in social science. Edward attended the meeting and referred to it 
as follows: 
 
It [the programme’s proposal] was all about Marx one, Marx two, Marx three, Marx 
four, Marx five, and six; from the beginning to the end it was all about what was 
already known: determination by economic infrastructure on ideological and 
political structures; everything depended on class struggle. 
 
Although Edward touched upon Mexican authors whose Marxist work included what he 
described as original contributions, he concluded Marxism “became a total dogma”. This 
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 He attended a Catholic seminar in Mexico and a Catholic university in Italy afterwards. Even after 
he decided to quit his priestly vocation two years before graduating, he kept attending the university in 
Italy and completed there his studies on social sciences. The reader may find Edward’s further 
biographical data in chapter 5. 
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sociologist then referred to his own work in the establishment of the sociology programme in 
AgC’s university in the 1970s. According to the interviewee, this programme was meant to 
avoid such a biased Marxist trend. Edward and the colleague that designed the first sociology 
undergraduate curricula in AgC University  
 
came from different experiences
147
, we did study Marxism but also other trends that 
were not even known in Mexico by then, for example, structuralism, symbolic 
interactionism, Bourdieu’s theories […] We designed a very plural curricula, with 
courses on Marxism but also […] on Pareto, Durkheim, Weber, and also Parsons  
 
This is consonant with what AgC-based lecturer Rita described. For this lecturer, who 
studied undergraduate sociology in AgC’s university, her undergraduate experiences were 
not necessarily “Marxist”. Rita stated that they studied authors who were not included in 
other universities’ sociology programmes: “Parsons, Merton, Levi-Strauss, Max Weber, 
Durkheim […] along with Marx, Lenin, Engels […] in a sort of balanced curricula”. In a 
statement that resembles Castañeda’s (2004) on the blind or baseless postmodernist-like 
“denial” of social science in sociology classrooms in the 1980s, Rita interestingly stated “I 
remember there were some courses on Marxism, or methodology where there was a strong 
criticism towards everything about positivism”, and then went on: “but here we had not even 
gone through positivism”. In Rita’s view, that criticism towards positivism was issued from a 
“pre-positivist” stance for they “had never met positivism, and we were already criticising it”.  
 
Michael characterised his undergraduate and postgraduate programmes, both in public 
universities located in MxC, as totally different. He told me he realised the lecturers in the 
university where he completed his undergraduate studies “were in an archaic state”. During 
his undergraduate studies, Michael said he was told by the lecturers that sociologists would 
not find jobs, 
 
most of us studied the [undergraduate] programme with the [economic] depression 
on our backs. Our lecturers used the public transport with us and you could not say 
‘this guy makes a lot of money as sociology lecturer, so I want to be like him’. There 
was a frustrating atmosphere […]  
                                                 
147
 Here Edward is referring to his social science studies at the Catholic Italian university and his 
colleague’s studies in similar Catholic institutions.  
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Michael described lecturers from his postgraduate sociology programme in opposite terms; 
those lecturers were “successful […] they published, they travelled abroad, they attended 
conferences; a totally different landscape opened up […]”. Michael also described this public 
university as a place “with a Foucauldian discipline” because, in Michael’s words, it was a 
place “where you conceived yourself as an individual who did not know”. Michael then 
recalled that some of his colleagues used to say “while you are [postgraduate] student you 
are a non-human”. Michael added “if your lecturers are senior and renowned academics  it is 
very hard for you to debate with them”.  
 
 
Authority practices in the past and present 
 
The “main advice” Michael said he received, in terms of how to deal with disagreements 
between tutor and tutoree or colleagues, was “do not confront that person”. Michael stated, 
“I could not argue with my [postgraduate] tutor, it was like ‘you do this, period’ […]. My 
PhD was a political academic training”. Michael told me about the day when he was upset 
after a tutor gave him a low mark in an essay, so he said to his tutor “I will submit a 
complaint form”. Michael said that his tutor replied “if you are intelligent you will not do 
that”. In terms of authority relationships between colleagues and between generations, this 
respondent stated: 
 
Let’s say X is the boss at this university, so we […] have been his students somehow. 
Let’s also say that there is, academically and politically, still a long way to go for 
somebody to stand up in front of this one [X], who controls everything. 
 
Michael then explained as follows: “the senior academics who were our lecturers have voice, 
they have the authority, and there are many of us who are just starting our [academic] careers, 
yet I think there is a glass ceiling”. Michael stopped for a while and said “when I was doing 
my PhD I knew about 20 lecturers, who gradually left [the department] because of conflicts 
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with that one [X]”. Michael then suggested “maybe things are getting more democratic now”, 
and added, 
 
in the regional [research] networks [where] I can find a colleague and we can start a 
research group, but it [the regional network] is not about [saying] ‘hey come here 
and apply my questionnaire’; it is rather a group where we discuss as peers. 
 
Afterwards I asked Michael about the differences between Aguascalientes and Mexico City 
in terms of authoritarian practices, Michael replied:  
 
five years ago I would have thought there were many differences […]. [I would have 
said] ‘those [authoritarian practices] do not happen in Mexico City’. But they do 
happen, under other forms and other codes, yet they do happen […] I think we are 
talking about an authority culture with national scope. 
 
After my question about how to get authority in the academia, Laura told me that, in older 
generations, authority was acquired by holding “moral leadership”, by “having leadership in 
teaching” and by having a long academic career. Then she said that academic authority in 
current generations is granted rather if the person has a doctoral or postdoctoral degree, 
experience as visiting academic, publications and membership to the country’s National 
System of Researchers
148
. Afterwards, in an interesting and somewhat contradictory 
statement, Laura touched upon the authorities in the sociology department and stated that 
whereas some people there have “administrative authority” they lack “moral authority”, and 
it is them whom Laura does not “respect”. What counts for Laura is not the “authority 
position” in the academic structure “but the person that holds that position”. 
 
 
The university and local research contexts. 
 
The respondents referred to very different work-place-related situations using a rather critical 
tone. Perhaps the least critical respondent in this sense was Rita, who described the 
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 Government-funded institutional system ran by Mexico’s council for science and technology. See 
below Joseph’s and Suzanne’s account of this ‘system’. 
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sociology department at AgC’s university as “an elite group”, for they “are a bit more open 
than common people”. This advantageous position is related, from Rita’s perspective, to 
their academic training which “has promoted an open mind-set, a mind-set of respect”. In 
that sense, Rita stated, “I do think we are less bad than society in general”. 
 
Laura, rather critically, referred to two types of researchers working at the university: “open” 
researchers that “research new things” and “very intolerant researchers that do the same type 
of work”. Laura then explained that some of her colleagues once said to her that she was 
wasting her time by doing research on Catholic institutions. Laura recalled these colleagues 
suggested her “to study power, gender, violence” not the Catholic institutions she was 
investigating. In Laura’s view the most intolerant researchers “tend to describe themselves as 
liberal and as more concerned about ‘fundamental’ topics, which bring about changes in 
society”.  
 
Mexico City-born Brigitte and her reported experiences of founding and running a research 
centre in Aguascalientes would be revealing of not only the academic context but also the 
local intellectual context. In 1994, Brigitte and others colleagues founded a centre for 
interdisciplinary social research. At first, she said, “it seemed the research centre was going 
to work”. After some years, Brigitte reportedly realised that the research centre was all about 
her “and a board of males with the sacred-cows [guru] attitude”. “What do you mean by 
‘sacred cow’ attitude?” I asked her. She replied,  
 
It was these people who had a higher level of education than most of the people; 
doctors, government officials […] [who] had this attitude of being enlightened males 
that do read and do know 
 
This respondent said that whereas research in Aguascalientes has “changed a bit partly 
because people from outside [other states in Mexico] have arrived”, she sees “the idea of 
[social] research” there being about ‘handbooks’, about what the handbooks say; so the 
research steps are one, then two and so on […]”. She then went on “I do not know if [by 
using handbooks] they really think they are very good researchers or if they do it as a way to 
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protect themselves because of their insecurities. Anyway” she concluded, “… the level of 
research overall is very low”. 
Social science and research in Mexico. 
 
Next I present a representative selection of the respondents’ statements related to the 
country’s performance in social research and social science in general. Although many of the 
following statements are focused on ‘generation of social theory’– as my initial research 
proposal suggested
149
 – they are revealing in terms of Mexican social scientists’ perception 
of their professional field overall. Brigitte, for example, said she thinks social scientists in 
Mexico “review the theory instead of generating it”; they “try to paste theory into data while 
doing analysis, and the result is horrible”. Edward’s comments on theory production in 
Mexico were somewhat different. He talked about a theoretical production that is “limited to 
middle range theories”. In terms of specific sociological fields in Mexico, he said:  
 
for example, some researchers of religion, not all of them though, do produce 
theoretical knowledge in that particular area; the same in cultural studies, or cultural 
ethnic groups. But I think there is not much about general theories 
 
For Edward this is related to people apparently “not daring to produce or show what they do”. 
This idea was touched upon by Julia as well. She stated that there is no theory generation in 
Mexico and this situation has to do with “our cultural education […] we are very immersed 
into this idea of being humble” (see next chapter for my follow-up of this answer). After this 
Julia stated that whereas AgC’s university does support researchers and generation of 
theories, “the State and its policies do not”.  
 
In Michael’s view, the state’s council for science and technology represents the main 
funding body in the country: “with no funding from them you can do nothing”. After my 
rather Eurocentric comment on the apparent “poor analysis” in sociological research in 
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 The generation, or lack of generation, of sociological theories in Mexico and how the Catholic 
ideology was linked to such phenomenon were my initial research object and research question. After 
data collection and initial data analysis exercises, and after realising that my empirical evidence was 
enough as to address sociology as a whole, I changed my research object and started to work on the 
topic the reader can now read in this disseratation. 
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Mexico, Michael replied saying that there would be a “serious problem” in the country in 
this sense. In his view, this problem arises because social scientists “get demands from 
everywhere for contributing to social policies”. Mexico’s Council for science and technology, 
Michael said, “has five or six high-priority topics: water, energy, medication, food, poverty”, 
which are researched by corresponding networks of scientists. Michael then said he became 
part of the network of poverty, and then referred to a situation he thinks is key to understand 
social research in the country  
 
The idea of the network is about a large group of researchers looking for solutions to 
the country’s problems […].There is pressure there because at the end you have to 
say how the problem is going to be solved. Before the scientist used to say ‘this is 
wrong’, now the scientist has to say how to fix the problem too. 
 
In statements which portray a particular research rationale that is consonant with some of 
the authors I have presented above (Castañeda 2004, Briceño-Leon and Sonntag 1998; 
Aguilar 1995; Loyo, et al. 1990), Michael said the following about the “labour studies” 
research field: 
 
I think we do research having an ideal of the world, a political ideal and that biases 
or interferes with our gaze. I was reading Bauman the other day and then I realised  
that, in labour studies, we are getting to a point of asking ourselves ‘ok, what should 
drive our scientific observations?’ […] Labour studies are usually carried out with 
an ideal model of waged work […] however it seems the precarious work model is 
there and yet we base our criticism on a model [waged work], an ought-to-be model. 
So when you read the descriptions by Bauman you say ‘right, that is how the labour 
world is’, but the question is ‘what do I say after describing that world?’. 
 
Research topic choices in social research, from Laura’s perspective, depend on the 
researcher asking herself questions such as “what is fashionable? […] who is going to pay 
me? What do they [funders] want to see?”, As a result, Laura continued, “you see the list of 
external institutions that fund research, then you find ‘gender’ [as a topic] so you say ‘ok I 
will research gender’. Laura described these as “perverse aspects” that arise because of the 
“political agendas, where political topics are more important than social topics”. Keeping a 
critical tone, and after my question on the academic publishing business in Mexico, Laura 
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said there is a pressure for publishing and then went on, “whereas there are fifteen journals 
published in United Kingdom, there is only one in Mexico”. She then stated 
 
another perversity is that if it [the publication] is not [written] in English it does not 
count [as publication abroad]. Look at American academics, it is an offence [for 
them] if English is not spoken in conferences. So if you do not speak English you are 
not visible for publishing, for people to listen to you. Why is a Latin American 
forced to speak English and an American is not forced to speak Spanish? 
 
I present below further statements by Laura and other lecturers on their views about the 
international social science and research field. 
 
The international field 
 
“Would there be resistance from the Spanish-speaking researcher to learn English?” I asked 
Laura. “Yes there is resistance, but it is also a resistance about saying ‘why? Why do they 
rule the world?’” Laura went on and stated that an academic text written in English is not a 
guarantee of quality. From Laura’s view, some of those texts “are true crap”. Laura 
continued, 
 
the case of American researchers is a true…; it is ignominious, [they complain 
saying] ‘how it is that they [Spanish-speaking researchers] do not speak English?!’ 
[…] I find that truly annoying 
 
Unlike Laura, Michael stated he rather takes for granted the convenience of speaking English 
for research purposes. Similarly, Brigitte commented on people’s cultural difficulties to learn 
English and later on told me she had just submitted a draft to an English-written journal. 
Brigitte’s statements on the relations between the western and Mexican academies were 
critical though. She stated, “we have to read many [Western] theorists, I mean I had to read 
Giddens, […] but when will Giddens read us? Never”.  
 
In Michael’s view, academic dialogues with sociologists based at other countries takes place 
usually between Latin American and Spanish researchers. As for his publications abroad 
Edward referred to them as minimal and rather as ‘invitations’. He said he thinks the greatest 
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barriers for publishing abroad is language as “publishing in English is not easy at all”, and 
the result “is that [our] publications are done by invitation” via the researchers’ “social 
capital” or “networks”. In terms of quality of research Edward stated that there are 
researchers in Mexico who work with the same “rigour” as researchers in Europe, and then 
added:  
 
The difference I find is that it is the majority of researchers in Europe who work 
seriously. I do know the other type of people in Great Britain, in United States, or 
Italy, people who is there doing minimum work. Unfortunately those people in 
Mexico are the majority  
 
From Edward’s perspective the priority assigned to “bureaucratic” and “research issues” in 
Great Britain and in Mexico is different, for “the way of seeing research abroad is different, 
less emphasis is placed on bureaucratic issues and more on research”, whereas in Mexico the 
emphasis is “more bureaucratic than academic”. 
 
 
Experiences in/views from Mexico City. 
 
MxC’s university-based lecturers Norma and Angela referred, separately and critically, to a 
distinction which I think is worth presenting from the outset
150
. In Norma’s view, it is not in 
the department of sociology where she has found intellectual companionship in her interests 
in theory and sociology of science. Norma stated she found her colleagues at one of the MxC 
university’s research centres more interested in these areas. Norma then continued and said, 
“there is an abysmal difference between the university’s research centres and the 
departments, in all the disciplines”. After this – and using a metaphor similar to the 
dichotomies I presented in chapter 3 – Norma stated: 
  
I had better [working] conditions as a PhD student in the research centre than the 
conditions lecturers in the school have […] in the sense of access to a computer, 
borrowing books from the library […] the differences are from heaven to earth. 
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 My interviews with MxC-based sociologists were aimed at exploring the same topics I addressed 
in the interviews with AgC sociologists. In practice this was hard to accomplish, given the shorter 
length of my interviews in MxC, related mostly to the interviewee’s tighter schedules. 
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The above are similar to Angela’s statements. By the end of our interview, this lecturer 
advised me to interview researchers outside the department, since the latter would not give 
me “a picture of research in the country”. Angela stated the picture I would get from the 
school “is going to be terrifying, horrible”. Although the aim of this chapter is to portray the 
country, its academic environment and research fields as experienced and reported by the 
sociology lecturers, I will include occasionally remarks and commentaries from ‘outsider’ 





After asking MxC’s university-trained lecturer Peter about his undergraduate studies he told 
me that his sociology programme was focused only on theory, “everything [was] very 
abstract”. He then told me about an anthropologist who taught him about qualitative research 
and how this changed his understanding of social research dramatically. The anthropologist, 
Peter said, “told me ‘sociologists do surveys; anthropologists research people, do 
ethnography’”.   
 
Peter’s colleague Angela stated, “I choose sociology for the same reasons as others, thinking 
you could build a better world”; after a couple of sentences she re-stated “I think my interest 
in sociology comes from there, from trying to understand what is going on [in society], 
trying to build a better life”. In a somewhat similar statement, MxC’s university-graduate 
Gregory explained to me the reasons why he decided to study sociology. “It was because I 
was very close to the social problems of my region and because of the influence of my father, 
who was a humanist”. Gregory said that in the second half of the 1960s, once enrolled as a 
sociology student in MxC’s university
151
, his sociological vocation “was reinforced” by his 
participation in the 1968 student protests in Mexico City
152
 and because, Gregory added,  
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 The university Gregory has worked at since he graduated. 
152
 Gregory is referring here to the protests related to the fatal events that took place in Tlatelolco on 
October 1968 –see footnote 144. 
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I had to face some problems in my community as leader of the peasants. Those 
situations made me see a world that you cannot see from here, from the university; 
what I call the necessities of life. 
Joseph, a sociologist graduated from MxC’s university and a lecturer in this institution since 
then, stated “when I started my undergraduate studies in the 1960s the school was very 
Marxist”. He then referred briefly to his participation in the 1968 student movement as well. 
Joseph’s colleague Suzanne, who completed her undergraduate sociology programme in the 
late 1970s, roughly ten years after Gregory and Joseph, described the then school atmosphere 
as “the beginning of the debates about women as a sociological topic. Gramsci’s translated 
work, Suzanne stated, “was just arriving too”. Those years according to Suzanne represented 
“an openness” in terms of topics and trends as they went from “a very technical, structural-
functionalist, positivistic training to a broader [training] from a Marxist perspective”. Then 
Suzanne added  
 
some say that period corresponds to Marxist dogmatism; I do not think so, at least it 
was not so in all cases, because we went through functionalism, structural-
functionalism […]. As a student you had other options.  
 
Norma, sociology student graduated from MxC’s university in the first half of the 1990s, 
stated that she considered studying sociology at a private university. In Norma’s words that 
university was “a sort of toy university” though, a university “for posh people, not really 
serious”. Then, in a rather opposite account to that of Suzanne, Norma stated she received a 
“totally” Marxist education. “When I got here [MxC’s university] the idea of sociology was 
all about a means for political practice, very linked to Marxism, of course”. Then Norma 
described her studies as  
 
very deficient training in some aspects, barely sociological actually. They taught 
Marxism, which is crucial for the development of social thought and it is always a 
reference in sociology, but it is not sociology. 
 
After this Norma stated that despite such a strong emphasis on Marxism, and despite her not 
finding convincing the idea that sociology “had to be necessarily linked to practice”, her 
studies in sociology at MxC’s university “opened up” her “views on the [world’s] problems”, 
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I thank this university for my exposure to the Marxist discourse and to an alternative 
view of the world really changed me; it opened up for me a more realistic version of 
what this country is. […] This university trained me in a hard sense, an ethical 
[sense], not just academic, which was deficient. […] It gave me this very clear idea 
about the country being deeply unjust, deeply unjust, because the distribution of 
wealth is insane, it is polarised, it is misogynist… 
 
 
Power notions and authority practices  
 
Striving for coherence between one’s political position and one’s academic practices “is not 
convenient for the dominant groups in [public] universities”, said Gregory. After some 
statements about him giving conferences in religious private universities, Gregory told me 
about his views and scepticism on these universities as follows: 
 
They are elitist, […], many of the youngsters attend courses there because they have 
nothing else to do, because they just want a degree to continue the chain of 
domination that comes from their parents, who have the best jobs; so they do 
networking to keep that world […]  a world of domination, of negotiating job posts 
to get to the top of power 
 
Speaking critically about her own work place, Angela stated MxC’s university “believes the 
only research [in the country] is done by MxC’s university and that is very, very serious”. So 
“would you say there is a sort of a MxC’s university-centrism?” I asked her. She agreed. “Is 
this related to the centralisation of authority practices in society at large? I then asked. “Of 
course”, Angela replied, “here everything crosses the centre, even research [-related matters] 
crosses the centre of the university”. According to Angela people in Mexico “do not know 
how to live democratically […] we have a country which is still authoritarian, based not on 
the experts’ authority but on the authoritarian’s authority”. Angela went on, 
 
Mexico does not have that [democracy] tradition, does not have that tradition 
anywhere, including the academia. You can see that in this university and its totally 
centralised and vertical structure
153
 
                                                 
153
 A researcher from one of MxC university’s social research centres, whom I interviewed as well, 
stated on the same matter: “MxC university is a very hierarchical university, very hierarchical, 
overwhelmingly hierarchical, those authority interplays are reflected in the [difference in] salary 
levels, in the institutional power logics, in the categories of researchers; it [the university] is very 
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When I asked Peter directly whether he, as a lecturer, was an authority in the classroom, he 
replied, 
 
Yes I am an authority figure. For example, one day I asked my students to go to a 
conference where I was going to present something. One of the students said ‘you 
just want to have quorum’, I said ‘no, […], I want you to go so you listen to my 
colleagues and if you do not go I am going to fail you in the course’. Some students 
complained to the school’s office. The head of the department asked me what was 
going on, I said ‘they do not want to do the [assigned] activity’. So, yes you have to 
be an authority  
 
More specific and extensive comments on lecturers’ authority came from Norma. Next I 
present a careful summary. Similar to the authority “centralisation” reported by Angela in 
the university, Norma commented on the university’s “traditional” and “hierarchical” 
teaching style saying that “the lecturer is the one who gives lectures, teaches” whereas 
students listen to lecturers and learn. “In that sense MxC’s university is very hierarchical” 
said Norma, and then continued “I do not necessarily criticise that”. She explained as follows:  
 
This thing of pretending that I do not have authority over the students is, for me, a 
very easy discourse, very fake. I think symbolic violence can be exerted in many 
forms and it does not go away just because we say to the students ‘let’s here all learn 
from all of us, and call me by my first name’.  
 
In Norma’s view, there has to be a “principle of acknowledgement” which she described as 
“an acknowledgement from the students about the lecturer being there because he knows 
things the students do not […]. Otherwise the lecturer would not have anything to offer”. For 
Norma, if the lecturer is “not more competent” than his students “why would he have to be 
your lecturer?”.  She also stated  
 
if you do not grant authority [to the lecturer], the course would worth nothing. I am 
not saying I do not believe in my students but I want them to acknowledge that I 
can… for example, they once told me ‘no, you are wrong’, but I have the authority, 
the epistemic authority, the reasons, the knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                          
gerontocratic as well, it is a university that values how many years you have been in the institution, 
[…] let’s say that in a viva voce doctoral examination one’s participation [as examiner] depends on 
the year one entered the institution. I am usually the youngest so I am the last who speaks and you 
may even not participate, because the other [senior or emeritus] examiners are there” 
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After I suggested the idea of “sharing of authority”, Norma replied 
 
Look, I am very open, for example, when my students say something I find right I 
say ‘you are totally right’, […] ‘that is a very interesting question’ […]. I am not 
sure if that is sharing the authority, the authority is still in me,…[…] There is an 
asymmetry there, and to say it does not exists is […]. I mean, to say that I share the 
authority with them [wondering herself]… No, I acknowledge their opinions […] 
and I have no problems to say ‘oops that I do not know’. But I do not know if that is 
sharing the authority. 
 
 
Theoretical and empirical research 
 
After listening to Rachel’s experiences as an academic social activist, I asked her whether a 
social-activist profile was a common characteristic among her colleagues. Rachel replied:  
 
I do not know, I do not remember. There is a lecturer who is very active […] and has 
received many awards because of her activism but I feel she goes too far from the 
level of commitment one must have. The rest I do not know, I think my colleagues 
are too theoretical. As a sociologist, I consider necessary the sociologists’ 
involvement in social [extra-academic] groups, not just studying the classic books or 
others’ [research] results. 
 
During our interview, I told Rachel’s colleague Angela that I had often heard the idea of 
there being a separation between theoretical and empirical research in the school and social 
research in Mexico in general. Angela agreed and then added that such separation “happens a 
lot” and it “is the worst mistake in this school”. The empirically oriented researchers, from 
Angela’s perspective, “do what Bourdieu calls ‘mere empiricism’”.  
 
Joseph defined “empirical” research as “getting in touch with social problems, and bringing 
from there conclusions that generate new ways to interpret a concept, a principle”. Joseph 
referred to this involvement in reality as a priority. Yet he also advocated the usefulness of 
theory and theorising in research, which he explicitly defined as “finding the principles, the 
laws, the categories that represent the processes and are expressed in a general language, a 
universal language”. On the other hand, this lecturer also referred to students and lecturers 
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avoiding empirical research, and doing instead “speculations”, which he related to a “habit of 
intellectualism” that consists of “repeating discourses, so”, he continued, “you just have to 
write an essay elegantly, by speculating about Plato’s concept of liberty for example. So in 
one night you produce fifteen or twenty pages and call it research”. In Joseph’s view the 
reasons of why students and lecturers do not go to the field and research reality, and do 
instead speculations or “grope” others’ theories, is both an evident lack of funding for field 
trips and a series of “bureaucratic” applications and administrative procedures lecturers have 
to go through to get their field trips approved and, if possible, funded. 
 
Norma stated she never conducted empirical research, and then said “I respect people who 
do it though”. Right after this and in a critical tone, she stated “but even Bourdieu says that 
the best intentions can also produce bad sociology and that is truth”. In Norma’s words, the 
level of theoretical knowledge in the school is “bad, bad” in the sense that the staff’s 
knowledge is not updated and “the community is not really interested in that”. Norma went 
on and said that there is “a discourse” in the school that “diminishes the importance of 
theory”. Norma also stated that she was critically told by colleagues “what is the point of 
your philosophical disquisitions when there is so much poverty in the country?” Norma 
concluded that lecturers in the school “are inclined towards empirical research”, and some of 
them “ignore theory, and if they know about it it is only about Marxist theory, outdated 
Marxist theory, not Wallerstein’s Marxism, for example.”  
 
 
The sociologists’ community 
 
In a review of conference proceedings published by a group of colleagues, Joseph referred 
briefly to the lack of a community of sociologists as such in the school. During our interview 
I asked him about this and his views on the matter. In a statement similar to Angela’s 
assertion on the lack of academic ‘democratic’ practices, Joseph stated that sociologists,  
 
are very anti-social, we do not know how to cohabitate, we barely trust each other. If 
the authority [head of department/school] summons us to a meeting to discuss work 
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issues, only ten out of one hundred staff members attend the meeting. […] Some 
lecturers […] do not look forward to create a community. 
 
From Joseph’s point of view, a probable cause is that lecturers “are very disappointed of the 
very structures, the very institutions”, they “do not believe in them”. Yet this would be only 
an “internal distrust” as Joseph sees his colleagues getting involved in activities with 
colleagues from other universities. Joseph then touched upon a more sensitive topic: salary 
and unethical work practices. “We have a low salary” said Joseph, “but if we prove that we 
are productive, we get salary incentives”. He continued: 
 
some [lecturers] cheat, they may publish an article with the title ‘biography’, then 
another article with the title ‘life history’ and another one with ‘case study’, so I just 
have to change the first paragraph and then I have three different publications. That 
has generated a productivity that is only apparent. […].  
 
Joseph went on: “I may have a heavy work load with several courses, but I can say, ‘let’s put 
the students from these two courses together so I lecture only once’”. For this lecturer “that 
is an immoral act”. After my explicit question, and despite his lengthy account on the matter, 
Joseph accepted that these work practices are rather “exceptions” among his colleagues. 
Joseph’s colleague Suzanne referred to the same salary-incentives scheme mentioned by 
Joseph. She referred to it as “a world of problems” and as “a sort of new credentialism”. In 
Suzanne’s words, “if you get the credentials they give you points [which mean] a salary 
increase […] of fifty, sixty or up to one hundred ten per cent over your monthly salary” 
 
Doing research and publishing research results is another source of “points”. The problem 
with such source, in Suzanne’s view, is that teaching by lecturers becomes “subjected” to the 
lecturers’ research interests. “I may research workers in this factory so I assign to my 
students a paper that is related to that research topic”. And that for Suzanne implies “ethical 
issues”, which she implicitly related to authorship matters. After she described the practice 
of academic criticism in the school as “academic cannibalism”, Suzanne stated the following, 
about the school’s cliques and the criteria for academic awards 
 
They have serious problems in that sense […] there are groups, orientations, political 
stances […] so the people who will be favoured will be those who belong to that 
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group and are closer to the [school’s] administration, even if they have no academic 
merits 
 
Norma’s statements about the academic staff were probably the most optimistic. Despite her 
criticism of ‘bad’ and outdated empirical and theoretical researchers, this lecturer said that 
“the [sociologists’] community is getting more professional”. In Norma’s view, many 
lecturers with no academic interest or training were hired in the 1970s, yet “that generation is 
retiring now” and today “you get no chance [in academia] if you have no interest, training 




Social sciences and research in Mexico and abroad 
 
Speaking about the country’s educational field in general, Suzanne stated that “many 
streams” that “dominate” this field in the country “are implicitly conservative”. According to 
Suzanne, “that thinking does not assume itself as conservative but it is. It harms in 
educational terms”. Such streams,  
 
are based on this discourse about ‘coming from a Marxist background and then 
overcoming it and then overcoming structural functionalism and creating a new 
vision that is superior to the former’ blablabla 
 
However, despite this “supposedly overcoming of Marxism, of structural functionalism, they 
are still positivistic”, Suzanne stated. This is evident for her because  
 
some people, for example, cite some authors and not others, so if you leave aside 
Marxism it is very clear, isn’t it? [Those people say] ‘why read it [Marxism] if it is 
out of fashion and has been overcome’ 
 
This implicit preference for Marxist perspectives was rather explicit in Gregory, who  
described himself as Marxist and one of his published books as “leftist, even from the cover”. 
In a critical statement he also referred to some colleagues as “office-worker-Marxist, instead 
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of fighter-Marxist” because “when it comes to criticise or protest, they step aside”. After this, 
Gregory added 
 
you have to write with bases, with foundations, convinced of what you write and 
being consistent with what you write. Some people follow me even if they do not 
know me because they can see I have kept my political-ideological position, instead 
of putting it aside, as many authors and researchers have done  
 
For Gregory this coherence between a person’s political profile and her intellectual position 
is crucial and tells about a person’s level of professional commitment. Interestingly, during 
our interview Angela critically touched upon the same matter and stated  
 
the Latin American thought is too politicised […] there is no difference between 
sociological thought and political thought; it is very value-laden […] the Latin 
American thought mixes the [political and sociological] fields up. […] the fields are 
stuck to each other 
 
After more questions on different topics, and while talking about classic authors becoming 
authority figures in Mexico, Angela speculated on Mexican and European researchers as 
follows, 
 
I am going to say something I am not sure about. It seems that the European social 
scientist does know he is thinking on his own; whereas we, here in Mexico, have to 
use back up, we feel ourselves underdeveloped or weaker so we need support from 
them [the authority figures], so we can say ‘I’m thinking this and for you to see it is 
true, Weber is here backing me up’; the European social scientists does not need to 
say that. 
 
During our talk on his first publications Joseph stated that it is usual to find social science 
publications based more on “discourse” than on “research, and that”, he went on, 
 
“is a mistake in social science. Our research is about what other researchers in the 
first world do […]. We would have to generate theories that explain and allow us to 
overcome conditions of poverty, domination, etcetera 
 
When Peter referred to his research work on indigenous communities, he explained: 
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We focused on the Canadian [native population] to understand what is going on in 
Mexico. I thought ‘we have to see what other [countries] are doing with their 
indigenous [people]’. I did not want to go to Guatemala, because its San Carlos 
academy was not good, besides I knew what they do with indigenous [people] there, 
they kill them. So […] we went to Canada  
 
Peter stated that he realised that the indigenous, as research subject, “is more interesting for 
them [Canadian academics] than for people [in academia] here.” Then Peter referred to his 
impressions of the Spanish researchers he met once in Spain, and whom he asked for a 
review of one of his books:  
 
they are specialised on single topics, they are specialists on childhood, or this or that. 
So, if you talk to them about a general social subject they know nothing. By then I 
realised that the advantage we have here [in Mexico] is that our explanations are 
more totalitarian
154
, more general. We are [also] advanced in the methodological 
field, in how we represent and process knowledge. We end up teaching Spanish 
researchers! 
 
While talking about exporting the scientific knowledge generated in the country, Norma 
touched upon ‘doing philosophy in Spanish’. “Why not to publish philosophy in English?” I 
asked her. 
 
It is a matter of culture, […] academic culture […] For example, […] philosophers 
are very into building rigorous knowledge, but in the sense of doing it in Spanish; 
the language is very important. They have this IberoAmerican network and they 
have many contacts among them, of course their references to European and Anglo-
Saxon authors is constant 
 
I then told Norma about my interview with the editor of the journal the sociology department 
publishes. I told Norma about the editor’s comment on the journal’s choice of not publishing 
articles written in English on the grounds of a defence of the Spanish language
155
. “Would 
philosophers prefer not to publish in English because of the same motive?” I asked Norma, 
she replied 
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 This is the literal adjective the interviewee used (‘explicaciones más totalitarias…’) 
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 Editor’s statement: “The aim of the [sociology department’s] journal does not include publishing 
[articles] in English, because we are rather thinking about the Latin American production and we also 
want the [Spanish] language somehow; somehow to defend the language. We are aware that the 
largest audience would be the native-English speakers, and that is why we publish abstracts and 
keywords in English […] But we want to defend [Spanish] and not to assume everything has to be 
published in English, so English speakers who want to publish [in the journal] would have to translate 
[their work] to Spanish”.  
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It is not really a defence […] It is about doing philosophy using a language which 
has consequences, let’s say, epistemic consequences […] If a language opens up the 
world for you, as Wittgenstein would say, then doing philosophy in a particular 
language has consequences about how you see the world. […] It is not about being 





Other than Rita’s brief allusions to Parsons, Merton, Levi-Strauss, Weber and Durkheim and 
Suzanne’s comments on functionalism and structural-functionalism, the respondents did not 
refer to ‘critical sociology’, ‘dependency theory’
156
 (Andrade 1998; Loyo, et al. 1990) or 
‘German hermeneutics’ (De la Garza 1989) as school ‘memories’ or decisive elements in 
their educational backgrounds. On the other hand, the respondents’ statements on their 
Marxist backgrounds were frequent. Brigitte, Michael, Julia and Edward in AgC all referred 
to the prevalence of Marxism in sociology programmes of Mexican public universities 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Rita, however, described his undergraduate-sociology 
background rather as a balance between Marxist perspectives and positivism, functionalism, 
structural-functionalism. In Mexico City, explicit statements on Marxist backgrounds came 
only from Norma, who, as a student graduated in the 1990s, described her school 
experiences as “totally” Marxist. Gregory, who graduated in 1960s, did not comment further 
on his Marxist undergraduate studies, yet his explicit Marxist profile fits into the statements 
above. Similarly, whereas Suzanne stated her undergraduate studies represented for her an 
“openness” upon sociological strands, her implicit preference for Marxist perspectives would 
represent Suzanne’s most decisive learning experiences. Joseph’s case is somewhat similar: 
although he did not explicitly describe his university training as Marxist, he stated that the 
school was indeed ‘very Marxist’ in the 1960s. It is fair to recall as well the absence of 
explicit allusions to Marxist sociological backgrounds during my interviews with Rita, Peter 
and Angela in MxC. Data on this particular topic cannot support the view of Marxism as the 
only sociological trend in Mexico since the 1960s to the 1990s. However, data does indicate 
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 See also Davis (1992) and his account of why dependency theory and world-system theories in 
Mexico “never took hold the way they did in other countries” (1992:396). 
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that Marxism, during that period, constituted for the majority of respondents one of the most 
influential, if not the most influential, sociological trend they interacted with and therefore a 
constant and influential element in the respondent’s intellectual development
157
. However, 
the force of such a Marxist trend in Aguascalientes’ educational context seems, from the 
Aguascalientes-based respondents’ perspectives, less extensive and less intense.  
 
The personal statements above seem rather to support Briceño-Leon and Sonntag’s (1998) 
idea of two streams of sociology in Latin America (a holistic, nomothetic, qualitative 
sociology and a scientific, quantitative, pro-utility micro sociology) and Castañeda’s more 
normative statement on the ‘duality of souls’ in Mexico’s sociology (common sense 
empiricism and ideological rhetorics). I argue that despite the ‘problems’ and ‘malfunctions’ 
of the university, social research and sociology fields as reported by the interviewees, and 
beyond the ‘duality of souls’ that seems to persist, the underlying logics or rationales of 
these fields seem to be consistent and solid. The literature suggests it and the personal 
statements previously presented corroborate it: the sociological and social research fields in 
Mexico, whether Marxist, positivistic or otherwise, seem to be based on a clearly 
prescriptive-interventionist rationale, where ‘ought-to-be’ models (Michael) are reportedly 
key constituents of the very research process. These models and the prescriptive-
interventionist logics, or the various teleologies, that underpin them are not casual or 
fortuitous. They are a suitable companion for the type of sociology Castañeda (2004) reports, 
one in which the state’s ‘national problems’ agenda becomes eventually the ultimate priority 
of sociologists and a compelling call for prescriptive and interventionist sociological 
thinking.  
 
I want to address now a series of additional elements that Castañeda rather overlooks. In an 
environment where individuals constantly issue, and interact with, normative statements and 
prescriptive thinking, the ‘classroom epistemic authority’ defended by Norma and explicitly 
referred to by Peter would be a necessary companion, for norms and prescriptions would 
have to be issued from an authority position whose legitimacy is stable and visible enough. 
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 See as well the case of the ‘Marxist’ sociology lecturer in ‘Pilot Case Study’ section, chapter 2. 
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Along with these types of authorities, the ‘moral authority’ that Laura first discarded and 
afterwards reported as ‘respectable’, would provide further strength to this particular 
university ethos and sociological rationales. Similar to the ‘ought-to-be’ models and 
prescriptive-interventionist rationales they operate with, these ‘authorities’ are not an 
accidental outcome. They constitute what one would expect from both the type of “hard 
ethical-sense training” Norma reported having received in her undergraduate studies and also 
the “political academic training” Michael pointed out as part of his postgraduate studies. 
This “political/ethical” university training is perfectly consonant with both what Angela 
normatively reports (similarly to Castañeda) as an ‘inappropriate’ mix of political and 
academic thought and Gregory instead considers as a ‘necessary’ fusion of academic and 
“political-ideological” stances. 
 
In such a heavily political, normative and moral/ethical environment it is not surprising to 
find sociology lecturers issuing harsh criticism towards their peers and their workplace. At 
first this criticism may seem irrelevant and rather common to all workplaces regardless of 
prescriptive-interventionist sociologies, yet I want to highlight two findings. Firstly, such 
criticism seem to be partly based on morally-sensitive judgements, for instance Joseph’s 
statements on “immoral” teaching practices and Suzanne’s report of “ethical issues” in some 
university courses. Secondly, this particular atmosphere of moral criticism seems to be based 
on systematic dichotomistic asymmetries as well. These are asymmetries where a clear-cut, 
non-relativistic separation between ‘the right’ or ‘the adequate’ and ‘the wrong’ or 
‘inadequate’ is evident. They are found, for example, in Norma’s statements on the 
‘abysmal’ and ‘heaven-to-earth’ differences between departments and research centres in the 
university; in Angela’s speculative assessment of Mexican social scientists needing the 
classic-sociologists’ back up that European social scientists ‘do not need’; in Michael’s 
statement about the ‘archaic state’ of his undergraduate-studies university, compared to the 
‘success’ of his postgraduate-studies lecturers; in Laura’s, Norma’s and the Mexico City 
editor’s preference of Spanish ‘over’ English language; in Peter’s idea of Spanish 
researchers being specialists on single subjects as opposed to generalists; or in Gregory’s 
classification of ‘fighter’ versus ‘office-worker’ Marxists. 
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At this point more specific questions on the research topic start to emerge. As for material-
organisational aspects, what is the relation between the centralised-authority structure of the 
Catholic Church presented in the previous chapter and the vertical, rigid and centralised 
authority system in the academia reported by the interviewees? In terms of Mexican/Latin 
American historical and contemporary ‘epistemic cultures’, what is the relation, if any, 
between the ‘all-embracing’ prescriptiveness-normativeness in ‘institutional-official’ and 
‘folk’ Catholic discourses and both sociology’s prescriptive-interventionist rationales and its 
peculiarly moral ethos –and  moralist backgrounds (e.g. Barreda 1867; Caso [1916] 1989)? 
Are prescriptiveness and interventionism related only to the demands from the state (Michael; 
Castañeda 2004) and the funding bodies reported by Laura? There is obviously a relation of 
‘metaphorical similarity’ between the earth-heaven dichotomies presented in chapter 3 and 
MxC lecturer Norma’s use of the same dichotomy in her descriptions of university 
departments and research centres. Now, could there be further relations between those 
persistent dichotomistic-asymmetric values in Catholic discourses (e.g. earth-heaven, love-
passion, heaven-hell) and the discursive (non-relativistic) dichotomistic asymmetries in the 
critical-moral statements by the interviewees on various elements of the sociological and 
academic fields? Furthermore, if Marxism turned into such an influential paradigm, could it 
have had links to Catholicism via, perhaps, ‘biblical’ approaches to sociological literature 
and/or priest-like Enlightened sociologists – or ‘moral authorities’ (Laura) – that Castañeda 
(2004) would suggest?  
In order to answer these questions and similar ones, I will present the comments, suggestions 
and reactions of the aforementioned sociology lecturers on these very matters and related 
topics. But first I will present to the reader, as I did in this chapter, more empirical data I 
collected during my interviews with sociology lecturers. The data I will present next can be 




Sociology lecturers’ Catholicisms and their views on 
religion and the Catholic Church 
 
 
In this empirically rich chapter I present evidence of three key elements: 1) the sociology 
lecturers’ religious backgrounds, 2) the lecturers’ current religious stances and 3) the 
lecturers’ current views and perspectives on the religious fields and the Catholic Church. I 
will point the differences and similarities between the religious backgrounds of AgC and 
MxC lecturers and will put forward two main conclusions: all the sociology lecturers 
interviewed in this research do have a religious background and all the sociology lecturers do 
hold currently certain religious beliefs and practices that do not seem to be totally detached 
from the religious practices they, mostly in their families, schools and community contexts, 
carried out in the past. The data and conclusion in this chapter are also a key introduction to 
what I will present in chapter 6, that is, the lecturers’ comments about, and replies to, the 
Catholicism-sociology thesis this dissertation focuses on.  
 
Exploring lecturers’ religiosity in general was not an easy task during the interviews. My 
research topic was being perceived as possibly (or actually) clashing with the lecturers’ 
“ethical and professional” stances –as a lecturer during the pilot study stated (chapter 2). 
During most of the interviews I found myself having to choose between being blunt and 
direct with regard to the interviewee’s religiosity, and perhaps losing rapport for further 
questions and interviews, or taking a more passive approach and not insisting on the topics I 
could sense the interviewee felt uncomfortable talking about
158
. Next I present the results of 
these enquiries. In order to keep continuity between the second half of the previous chapter 
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and this one, in the sections below I will present data from AgC sociology lecturers and will 
then continue with the data from MxC lecturers. In the first section I will present three 
specific biographical topics and an analytical commentary. After this, and prior to the final 
conclusions, I will analyse the lecturers’ current religiosity and their standpoints on religion 
and Catholicism. 
 
I. Past Catholicisms 
 
The Catholic-family background 
 
Interviews with sociologists were not extensive enough to get exhaustive evidence on the 
Catholic practices of the interviewees’ forebears. But some statements by the interviewees 
provide us with evidence of Catholic practices carried out by several generations before. In 
AgC Laura, for example, stated that she studied in the same Catholic school as the three 
previous generations in her family did. Laura’s work mate Brigitte referred to her mother’s 
mother (Mexican) asking her son in law (Brigitte’s French father) to convert to Catholicism 
and to baptise her future grandsons and granddaughters as conditions of marrying her 
daughter. During our interview, Julia remembered her rosary-praying sessions with her 
grandmother. Michael recalled praying a prayer his grandmother taught to him and Edward 
recalled the stories about “the devil” he was told by his mother’s “old aunts”. In MxC,  
Angela stated that her mother let her and her twin sister, teenagers by then, decide on their 
own whether to keep being Catholic or not: “[T]he only thing she asked us was to keep 
attending Sunday mass so my grandmother would not get upset”. 
 
In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s– decades that roughly correspond to the interviewees’ 
childhood periods – the percentage of the Catholic population in Mexico represented 98.2%, 
96.65% and 96.2% of the total population respectively (INEGI 2005). The idea of 
sociologists growing up in families that had maintained their Catholic practices, at least for 
one previous generation, is therefore not surprising. But these family cases are not instances 
of an homogeneous Catholicism (chapter 3). The level of Catholic observance and the type 
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of Catholic practices varied across individual cases and were reported by some respondents 
as relatively diverse within their own families. One of the most heterodox cases in AgC was 
Brigitte’s. As hinted above, this lecturer was raised by a late-converted Catholic father who 
grew up in a household formed by a Protestant mother and a Catholic father, who had agreed 
to raise their sons as Catholics and their daughters as Protestants –eventually, their kids were 
neither Catholics or protestants. Brigitte’s father converted to Catholicism as a condition of 
marrying Brigitte’s mother, who was described by Brigitte as “coming from a typical family 
[…] very Catholic”. Brigitte described her father as very critical of the Catholic Church and 
usually telling jokes about Catholic priests. In Brigitte’s view, her family context was 
relatively “tense”, although “Catholic” in terms of religious practices, for his father attended 
Sunday Catholic mass and reportedly prayed with his daughters and sons as well.  
 
Rita’s case is similar to Brigitte’s in terms of their parent’s different approaches to 
Catholicism. Rita stated that her father was critical of priests. On the other hand she 
described her mother as “very respectful” towards the Church and its practices. Rita 
explained to me how her father’s critical attitude helped her to develop a critical attitude 
towards the institution of the Catholic Church. After my question about whether her family 
used to attend religious celebrations, Rita replied somewhat elusively: 
  
Just a few times, I mean, The Romeria
159
, …because, well, my father was a taxi 
driver, […] so my father participated in the parade with the taxi cabs procession. I 
liked that a lot. My father invited us or we just went to see it. […] When we went to 
Mexico City, we visited the Virgin of Guadalupe’s cathedral, and sometimes we 
went to San Juan to visit the temple too
160
, just as tourists though  
 
Then she added “let’s say it was not usual in our family to go walking to San Juan or to go to 
the pilgrimages or religious holidays”. I then ask her “What did you use to think when you 
attended mass with your parents, when you are sitting there listening to the priest?” Rita 
replied as follows 
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 Catholic celebration that takes place in AgC’s downtown. It is organised every year by 
Aguascalientes’ bishopric as homage to the city’s patron saint: the Virgin of Assumption. 
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 Rita is referring here to Our Lady of San Juan de los Lagos, whose figure may be found in the city 
of San Juan, in Jalisco state. Large groups of Catholics – about 7 millions according to an online 
source (Ferguson 2009) – visit this temple every year. 
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I have gone through different stages in terms of religion; in my childhood stage I 
was very critical, I would say I was critical at a very early age; [critical] about the 
religious institution
161
 though; my father had also a very critical perspective […] he 
said he sometimes saw priests having a night out or hanging out with women, things 
like that. So my father in particular was very critical of priests. I was rather critical 
of nuns. […] yet I did not question my obligation to go to mass. In fact yes, we went 
out to church every Sunday, [we went there] as a having a walk though (emphasis 
added). 
 
Julia and Michael did not refer to their fathers’ stances on Catholicism, however they did 
refer to their mothers and the religious activities both carried out. Julia for example told me 
about the questions that came to her mind when she used to listen to gospels during masses. 
She then stated that it was her mother who helped her to clarify gospel-related doubts. Julia 
also mentioned that she liked to sing the hymns and songs in mass because of her mother, 
who liked singing in the church as well. Julia reported having learnt how to pray the rosary 
at a very early age and being taught by her mother. She said she kept ‘leading’ rosary 
praying sessions as she grew older, especially during funerals. Julia remembered as well 
praying the rosary with her grandmother every November 2nd, in the cemetery during the 
Dia de los Muertos celebrations. 
 
Michael stated “my mother was very religious and we attended the group ‘Christian 
Renovation of the Holy Spirit’”, where, according to Michael, collective praying and singing 
also took place. After moving
 
to Mexico City, when Michael was about to attend secondary 
school, he and his mother reportedly began to look for similar Catholic groups to attend in 
the capital city. According to the interviewee, they found the “Holy Spirit Missionaries” 
group and attended together its meetings until Michael completed high school.  
 
Michael’s colleague Laura stated that her family “was not very Catholic, or rather nominal 
Catholic not really practitioners”. She described her father as being “very detached [from the 
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 Sociology lecturers and other interviewees used the words “religious” or “religion” frequently. 
Some times it was relatively evident they were rather referring to the term “Catholic” or “Catholic 
Church/Catholicism” –as in this statement by Rita. The interviewees’ replacement of the concept of 
Catholicism with the term “religion/religious” is indicative of both avoidance of the term 
“Catholicism/Catholic” as such and an implicit reference to Catholicism not as “a religion” but “the 
religion”. 
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Church], very detached”. Edward, on the other hand, remembered his parents as “very 
religious”. Edward stated that he had relatives who were priests and were keen on suggesting 
him to study at the seminary -he also recalled his sister attending a school administered by 
Catholic nuns. Interestingly, when I asked Edward about his practice of praying during 
childhood, he said  
 
My mother’s old aunts used to tell me that the devil was around and that if I prayed 
‘the magnificat’ the devil would stay one block away from us; so I prayed at nights, 
and I remember clearly the image of the devil standing up […] one block away from 
my house […] I also remember the guardian angel taking care of me, so I also 
prayed to my guardian angel 
 
In MxC, Joseph’s case is similar to Brigitte’s and Rita’s. Joseph explained to me his father’s 
religiosity, somewhat obscurely, as follows: 
 
My father participated in the Mexican revolution [in the 1910s]; plus the people in 
the state I used to live
162
 are not very religious; so there was a rejection of the 
clergy’s abuses
163
. There was a big Jesus Christ figure in our home and my father 
used to say ‘if you need a god you want to communicate with or implore for 
protection and goodness, there you have it [the Jesus Christ figure], you do not have 
to go to the temple’. 
 
Joseph stated that his mother, on the other hand, “did think it was necessary to have temples 
for God, as well as to pray before images there, and give thanks at the end of the year”. 
Joseph recalled himself as being raised “in two worlds”. Then he said, “When I got to 
university in the [nineteen] sixties, the school
164
 was very Marxist, so my father’s idea of 
being unrelated to the Catholic Church was reinforced”. Joseph’s colleague Gregory referred 
to both his mother and father as ‘distant’ from the Catholic Church: 
 
My father was a free thinker, very liberal; he did not believe in saints, he rather 
believed in something supreme he had faith in, not as in the Catholic tradition about 
that god, but as in a power beyond us that is present. He was a free thinker in that 
sense. He did not believe in aberrant dogmatism. My father said that in order to 
believe something or have faith in something you do not need to go to pray [to the 
church]. My mother, because of the influence of my father, got distant from the 
church too 
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 Joseph’s current workplace, MxC’s university 
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MxC-lecturer Rachel referred to her father exactly in the same terms, “a free thinker”, who 
used to have “arguments with priests because of the priests’ closed-mindedness”, whereas 
her father was “more open, more analytical”. On the other hand, Rachel stated she and her 
siblings were baptised, completed first communion, and fulfilled “all the rites” of official 
Catholicism. 
 
We were not forced to go to mass, or to confess, so we did grew up in a Christian 
context, but we had freedom to choose [...] Yes we went to church, but it was not an 
obligation. We liked to go rather because we shared time with my father, he bought 
candies for us and we played in the park 
 
In brief statements Angela stated that her mother, Catholic, made her and her sister 
 
pray before going to bed, we prayed something I do not remember; I do not 
remember because…let say there was a lot of religious instruction
165
; let’s say we 
had habits. 
 
Peter described his mother and his sister as “fanatic and fundamentalist” Catholics. Peter 
stated his mother “found a refuge in religion”. Afterwards during our interview, he said it 
was not “God’s omnipresence” that he feared but “the devil”, as “that was the threat my 
mother used to say: ‘If you misbehave the devil will come’” 
 
The statements by MxC lecturer Norma resemble the statements by AgC lecturer Laura. 
Norma described her family as nominally Catholic, not practitioners. Norma stated the rites 
were important for her family, e.g. getting married at church, baptise kids, “but it did not go 
further”. With a slightly careless tone, Norma stated: 
 
It was not at home, but at the school where I received a Catholic education. We did 
not pay attention to Catholicism at home […] my parents sent us to Sunday mass so 
they could take a nap 
 
What I want to stress in this section is that even in the ‘most heterodox’ or ‘distant Catholic’ 
family cases, e.g., Brigitte’s or Gregory’s, there seems to be a reproduction of some Catholic 
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habits and rituals, such as praying, completing baptisms and attending Sunday mass. Except 
for Brigitte’s and Rachel’s cases, whose families include parental figures raised within other 
type of Christian families, all the sociology  lecturers I interviewed  grew up in households 
were parents, and their ascendants, were Catholics. Moreover, all the sociology lecturers I 
interviewed grew up in families where Catholic rituals were practised to greater or lesser 
extents. Before addressing the sociologists’ adult-life religiosity, I will present further 
evidence on the Catholic institution addressed in the last quotation above. 
 
 
The Catholic-school background 
 
All the sociology lecturers I interviewed in AgC, except for Julia, attended Catholic schools 
to complete primary, secondary and/or high school levels. Whereas MxC sociologists 
Gregory, Joseph, Peter, Angela and Rachel attended public or private non-Catholic schools, 
their work mates Suzanne and Norma, as lecturers in AgC, attended Catholic schools as well. 
The reader may find details of these school experiences in the following paragraphs. 
 
Rita attended a Catholic school run by nuns in AgC. She completed the first two years of 
primary school there and then switched to a public school.  Rita stated her mother saw the 
Catholic school as “a place for a good education”. The first comment Rita made when I 
asked her about her memories from the Catholic school, was:  
 
I remember very unpleasant situations […]  since my early childhood I noticed how 
nuns [in the school] made the difference between poor and rich people […] I did not 
like that atmosphere. 
 
When I asked Rita about the curricula-related differences she could see, retrospectively, 
between the Catholic and the public school she attended, she said that one of those 
differences was about “everything related to values formation”. Right after this she explained:  
 
I remember we had to confess [in the Catholic school], we had to go to mass the first 
Friday of every month, had to sing, and all those things that have to do with religion; 
besides they tried to make everything silent, which I hated 
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Rita completed her first-communion ritual while attending this school. She stated that the 
nuns explained to them that first communion meant “to be close to god”. After saying this 
Rita stressed “but I do not attach great importance to that”.  Then she told me her experience 
about getting grounded at school during rosary praying because she told a joke to one of her 
classmates. “I was not really misbehaving, so I did not like that ritual of…of religious 
practices”. In Rita’s view, her experiences in that Catholic school made her perceive the 
Catholic Church as “self-interested”.  
 
Rita’s colleague Laura completed nursery, primary and secondary education in a school ran 
by the Company of Mary Order. When I asked Laura about what she remembered the most 
from this school, she replied “well, it is something common in Aguascalientes’ context”. 
Afterwards, she stated that there were in that school both “very liberal” and “very 
conservative” nuns. The interviewee then said “I was very interested in trying to understand 
the world I was living in; probably that was because of these [liberal and conservative] 
contrasts I was part of”. After Laura told me about other experiences in the Catholic school, 
she stated that the religious order in charge of that school “is not that conservative […] they 
are like Jesuits”. From her point of view, those nuns were actually vanguardistas, 
“revolutionary nuns” who insisted on the value of education for women. Laura then 
described how nuns used to encourage debates “precisely about the social and the religious, 
[nuns asked us] ‘what do you think about that parable, and that one?; it was very Jesuit: see, 
judge, act” –the same ‘formula’ mentioned by a priest preaching in AgC (chapter 3). Laura 
also stated that she was never taught about “Christian base communities”
166
 but she now 
thinks “it was in the hidden curricula”. The interviewee referred afterwards to a series of 
negative aspects in the school, such as “the separation between boys and girls” or “the 
distinction between intelligent students, less intelligent and dumb students. […] They 
stigmatised you. It was elitist”. With a similar emphasis, Laura referred as well to  
“conservative nuns” with “pre-Concilium”
 167
 ideas of charity, who, according to Laura, used 
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 The interviewee used the term ‘comunidades ecclesial de base’, which translates literally to “basic 
ecclesial communities”. 
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 Previous to the “II Vatican Council” which took place in the 1960s. 
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to say “let’s go and find poor kids to give them food”, as if those kids, Laura complained, 
“belonged to a different category […] it was  plain charity”. 
 
Laura’s colleague Brigitte attended a Catholic-nuns school as well. In that school Brigitte 
completed nursery, primary school, secondary school and high school levels. She stated that 
the usual Catholic practices she and her classmates carried out in the school consisted of 
communion every first Friday of the month, non-compulsory daily mass, and confession. 
Brigitte mentioned as well that prior to her attendance to university, she lived temporarily 
with a group of women in a Christian base community. She also “attended retreats with the 
‘nuns and brothers of silence’” and “was into that for a while”. Interestingly, Brigitte stated: 
“I studied in a Catholic school, from nursery to high school, so I ended up sympathising with 
people involved in theology issues”. As an undergraduate student in Mexico City, Brigitte 
reportedly began to socialise with pro-theology of Liberation classmates who were former 
Dominican friars and were involved in social activism. Brigitte refers to her first approaches 
to sociology coming precisely from her pro-theology of Liberation friends: “we read Lukács 
[…] I had a friend who taught me the Capital on Saturdays” (see full quote in chapter 4, 
section III). Reflecting on this, Brigitte stated afterwards: “I was one of the typical [cases] 
who converted into Marxism from Catholicism”. After this I asked her whether this 
conversion was a sort of “trend”. She replied “I do think so, there was a [trend][…] I would 
say it was my generation and the previous generation”. Then Brigitte told me about how she 
initially saw a “diametrically opposed world” in her undergraduate studies and how 
eventually she realised that lecturers were as “orthodox” as the teachers in her Catholic 
school. 
 
After telling me about his attendance to both Catholic and public primary schools, Michael 
stated, “I was deeply religious when I was in high school”. Michael went on and explained: 
“when I just started [undergraduate] sociology I was very scared of what I was going to face, 




When I started the [sociology] programme a process of transformation occurred. It 
was a very violent rupture with the idea of religion, because I could say it [religion] 
was what centred and supported my life […]  
 
Edward’s ‘Catholic-school’ background is certainly different
168
. He began to attend a 
Catholic seminary at the age of thirteen, after half a year of attending a public secondary 
school. Edward reported having relatives who were priests and two of them insisting often 
on him either attending the seminary or being a missionary. Edward stated that his decision 
to attend the Catholic seminary was not a “conscious” or thought-through decision. He spent 
eight years in that seminary and seven years in an Italian Catholic university. In the latter he 
studied theology for 4 years and then social science. Two years before completing his studies 
in Italy Edward decided to resign from his priestly career, but he was allowed to continue his 
studies. As a result of this background Edward has particular anecdotes not about the 
Catholic school in Mexico –as several of his work mates –but about the very priestly 
education in Mexico and in Italy. Edward described the Mexican seminary as “very 
traditional, very closed” and “very traditionalist in terms of teaching too”. The Second 
Vatican Council had just finished when Edward arrived in Italy and those, Edward stated, 
“were other waves; my experience in Italy was very different, it was a very wide, complete 
openness, […] not a common experience for a seminarist”. Edward described one of the 
most evident differences as “being able to go out” from the students’ residence to the 
university. He explained to me that in Mexico’s seminaries “you studied and lived in the 
same premises, so you had only sporadic contact with reality”. Edward told me that one day 
he and one of his mates decided to go out and buy a drink, Edward immediately headed to 
the director’s office. His mate asked him “why are you going there?”, Edward replied 
casually “because we are supposed to ask for authorisation first, aren’t we?”. Edward 
reported that in Italy he experienced “open-mindedness […] in terms of discipline and 
thought”. He stressed as well that the atmosphere in the Catholic universities in Rome was 
very liberal and open
169
.  
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Cases like Edward were not found among the MxC-based sociology lecturers I interviewed. 
Catholic-education elements were not totally absent there though. Whereas Rachel attended 
a reportedly “secular” school managed by an “Evangelical board”, Norma and Suzanne 
attended Catholic schools. Norma attended two Catholic schools until her first year of 
secondary school. The first school was administered by “Mexican nuns”, and Norma 
attended it for a couple of years. She then transferred to another Catholic school whose staff 
members were, in Norma’s words, “American Catholic priests”. Norma recalled her 
experiences from the first Catholic school and stated:  
 
The impression I got is very polarised, it is about people who are there because it is 
their vocation, so they really care for the others; and about people who are just 
frustrated as they are there not because it is their vocation, so they have a contained 
rage. I remember very bad nuns and priests; on the other hand I remember very kind 
people.  
 
When I asked Norma whether she could remember any difference between the school 
managed by Mexican nuns and the school run by American priests, she replied:  
 
Yes, there were many differences, cultural differences rather than religious. Mexican 
Catholicism is very different, it is more about rituals, about the forms […] Nuns for 
example insisted on us not chewing the host and things like that. 
 
Norma stated that she would not say American priests were “less rigid”, they rather  
 
insisted on deeper things […] and on us acting in specific ways based on a series of 
principles; theirs was less linked to these ideas of guilt, or hell or sin, which is very 
Mexican; they said ‘this is so because it represents what is right, what is good. 
 
Norma’s colleague Suzanne introduced to me her educational background as follows: 
 
I studied here [in MxC], my education is basically…ok, first in a private school, 
Catholic, with religious practices; and after that in a public school, where there was 
obviously a great difference. 
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The first thing Suzanne remembered from her experiences in the Catholic school was the 
“religious practices […] they made us pray, they organised services every first Friday of 
each month, so there was a mass and communion”. Suzanne said that mass and communion 
were voluntary. “They [school staff] did not force us. [Although] there was obviously an 
introjection of situations
170
 there it was not overwhelming for me as a child, I did it with joy”. 
Later Suzanne told me a story about the “school’s coupons”, small pieces of paper with 
moral proverbs
171
 students received as rewards for good marks. The teachers though, 
Suzanne stated, claimed back the coupons or asked the students to hide them every time 
there was a check-up visit from the Ministry of Education. After this Suzanne asked herself, 
“right, so what happened when I moved to the public school?”, and went on “it is a really 
radical change!”. In Suzanne’s view there was a change in the teacher-student relation. 
Whereas this relation in the Catholic school was more personal and kind, it was rather distant 
in the public school. In Suzanne’s words, the discipline in the Catholic school was more 
about “self-discipline, [also] more about appearances, like having to wear ironed clothes, a 
tidy uniform, clean shoes; it was more about presence”. Whereas the public school, Suzanne 
stated, “was more rigorous in terms of thinking”, something that “is now lost”. 
 
When I asked MxC-based lecturer Rachel about whether the schools she attended were 
religious, Rachel replied. “Interestingly, no, those schools were not religious, the school I 
attended […] had a board whose members were Evangelicals, but the school was secular 
[…]”. She went on,  
 
I had school mates who were Evangelicals, Protestants, Catholic, Agnostics, sons of 
intellectuals with no religion. We learn how to respect each other, we minded our 
own religions, our own beliefs. 
 
I asked Rachel whether she would say the dynamic in this Evangelical-secular school would 
have been different to a Catholic school’s? “I would say so”, replied Rachel, “in Catholic 
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schools the first thing you do is praying, even before sitting down. It was not like that in my 
school”. After this, though, she stated: 
  
There were even two different religious masses for primary, secondary or high 
school graduations. One mass was for the Catholic students and one mass was for 
the Evangelicals. We attended both masses so we could socialise with our mates. 
 
Peter on the other hand told me about a series of anecdotes related not to Catholic school, but 
to two types of Catholic ‘training’: Catechism and ‘retreats’. Peter described his Catechism 
lessons as “very fierce, in the sense of being too repetitive […] we had to memorise 
everything, the sins, the commandments; there were exams too”. Peter stated he did not 
dislike praying during Catechism, but considered it “meaningless and repetitive”. Openly 
and casually, Peter added: “I spent all the fucking primary school doing spiritual exercises 




Sociologists’ priest-related memories 
 
During my interviews with sociologists I also explored the interviewees’ memories about the 
figure of the priest. In AgC, whereas Laura stated that she did not have specific memories of 
priests – since Catholicism for her was more about nuns and a “feminine face”–, Julia, 
interestingly, remembered priests as people who used “to have the knowledge, who knew a 
lot, somebody you had to respect; it was not a divinity, it was earthly, special though”. Julia 
also told me about her father’s mother and how she, as a good-will gesture, helped seminary 
students by washing their clothes on weekends. Then Julia stated that these past/family 
experiences made her think about priests as “special, as they are feeding our spirit, they are 
the mediators between the earthly and the divine”. In Julia’s current opinion, both people and 
priests themselves are changing their attitudes, for priests understand that “it is not good for 
them to be up there in the ivory tower”. Julia referred to disagreeing with the traditional way 
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of looking at priests as authorities placed “above other professionals’ authority”, such as 
lawyers or psychologists.  
  
I think people [now] look at priests as equals, as an authority that handles some 
information, so we either listen to them or we listen to them less, depending on the 
situation we are in. 
 
Brigitte stated that her experiences with priests “were not that traumatic”. What she 
remembered was the reprehensive answer she got from a priest after she told to him about 
dating a boy and asked him for his advice. “He said something like ‘where have you been 
educated girl?!’, something like that”. After this Brigitte stopped for a couple of seconds and 
then said “I was going to say that was the last time I asked for advice to a priest, but it was 
not. When I hung out with the theology-of-liberation priests I approached them too” 
 
Former Catholic-seminary student Edward stated his childhood memories of priest were not 
really clear, but “in general”, he said, “the figure of the priest in the town was something 
important”. Explicitly joking, Edward told me the story about a priest who broadcasted 
various messages and opera music through a set of speakers in his downtown: “I had no idea 
that was opera music, by then I thought those female voices were the priest’s wives”. 
 
Michael stated his memories of priests consist of “figures mostly appealing”. Michael 
recalled one priest in particular “tall, very fat and with a long beard designed almost 
deliberately to be a priest”. Right after this, Michael said  
 
I remember another priest, from the time I attended a chorus, he was completely 
different, a priest from the coast, curly hair, dark skin, who cursed. Yet in terms of 
authority the heaviest
172
 was the bearded one. 
 
In MxC, after his frank statement about annoying Catholic retreats, Peter told me the story of 
the priest he befriended in his neighbourhood when he was a teenager. First, though, Peter 
stated  
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I had no reactions towards priests; they were alien to me. I thought priests were 
always surrounded by widows and sanctimonious women […] I saw an excessive 
reverence from those women towards the priest. 
 
It was after this when Peter told me the following:   
 
As you can see I did not reject the idea of the priest. At some point I wanted to be a 
priest, because I had this friend who was a priest. […] I saw him knocking at the 
neighbours’ doors. He was collecting money to organise Christmas celebrations in 
the parish […].  
 
In the interviewee’s view, the priest “was a very intelligent guy”. Peter said he ended up 
helping the priest organising Christmas celebrations. He described the man as “a missionary, 
not just a priest. He used to show me pictures of his missions. […] He did Theology of 
Liberation”. Peter then told me that after meeting this priest he started to meet other priests. 
However, Peter stressed “I did not get involved in the institutional aspect of Catholicism. I 
was interested in the social activism side that I saw in this priest”. Peter then said he used to 
have discussion with a Protestant classmate in high school. “I used to reply to his arguments 
from a Catholic viewpoint. Those discussions were very interesting”. 
 
Norma remembered a couple of priests in particular, “one very bad and one very good”. She 
recalled one of them punishing her brother’s misbehaviour and another priest, the school 
head, “as a very kind-hearted person”. Norma’s colleague Angela, on the other hand, 
recalled Catholic priests as “authority figures”. She stated that the figure of the priest fed her 
resistance towards “authoritarian authority” figures, “especially male”. Joseph reported 
similar experiences with a couple of differences:  
 
I found priests’ clothes striking, the clothes were not common; they made me think 
priests were not like the rest of people. I found a lot of ostentation in those clothes 
[…]. I also understood that was something inaccessible 
 
Similar to Brigitte’s anecdote on confessing before a priest, Joseph told me about his 
experience with a priest during his first communion.  
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When I attended my first communion I felt some rejection because whereas the 
education I received in my house was fraternal in the sense of [being told] ‘do not 
put your feet on the table because you will bring dirt and that will affect all of us’ 






Here I want to be careful and not to generalise the particularities in the series of biographical 
micro narratives I presented above. Data above suggests the sociology lecturers come from 
different types of Catholic families. On the one hand, there are what might be called 
‘extreme’ cases such as Edward’s in AgC and Peter’s in MxC. The former described his 
parents as “very religious” and reported having more than one relative that was a priest; the 
latter described his mother as “fanatical and fundamentalist”. Edward’s long experiences in 
Catholic seminaries and Peter’s meaningful relationship with a missionary priest and 
frequent “spiritual retreats” are relevant in this sense too. In terms of ‘intensity’ of Catholic 
observance perhaps Julia’s and Michael’s cases come after Edward’s and Peter’s. Julia and 
Michael did not explicitly refer to an ‘extreme’ Catholic background, yet Julia’s constant 
allusions to rosary praying, to her mother as ‘facilitator’ of gospel passages and to her 
grandmother washing clothes of seminarists seem to be indicators of a family with a very 
close contact with Catholicism and its rituals. Michael’s and his mothers’ attendance to 
Catholic groups suggest a similar, if not the same, level of family closeness to Catholicism 
and Catholic discourses. Laura from AgC and Norma from MxC referred to their parents’ 
Catholicism in the same terms, i.e., ‘nominal, not practising’ Catholics. A mix of both 
‘closeness to’ and ‘distance from’ Catholicism seems to be part of Rita’s, Brigitte’s, Rachel’s 
and Joseph’s family backgrounds. It is revealing that in these four cases – except for 
Rachel’s – it was the father figure who was the one reported as “distant” or “critical”, 
whereas the mother sides were described as “closer” to the ideas and rituals of Catholicism. 
Data on Angela’s and Suzanne’s background is not enough to qualify the level or intensity of 
Catholic practices in their families, yet there is enough data to state that these sociology 
lecturers did grow up in practising Catholic families that interacted with Catholic institutions 
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and discourses as well. Gregory’s statements on his father being a “free-thinker” and his 
mother “being distant from the [Catholic] Church too” may represent the greatest distance 
from Catholicism among the thirteen sociology lecturers I interviewed. However, it is 
interesting that Gregory reported attending Catholic ceremonies occasionally. By the end of 
this chapter I will discuss the implications that these diverse yet practising Catholic 
backgrounds have if they are compared against the lecturers’ views of Catholicism and 
religion in Mexico overall. 
 
 
II. Present Catholicisms 
 
During our first interview AgC lecturer Rita stated “I have always had a more individual or 
more family[-centred] faith, not close to the ecclesiastical institution”. Later on she stated 
that she and her family are currently Catholic, “we do go to church on Sundays”. Rita also 
explained to me that she finds some Catholic homilies “more adequate to what one wants to 
hear” yet she dislikes “discrimination towards homosexuals” and “the traditional way of 
looking at women” in priests’ homilies. The interviewee reported looking rather for Sunday-
mass homilies in which she can find “messages that strengthen respect to others [and relate 
to] taking decision in everyday life; how to respect people, appreciate people, help, give 
support”. Rita said homilies of this kind “enrich one’s spirit”. She referred to the Catholic 
Church and priests helping vulnerable people as something desirable. Afterwards she stated 
“I try to help poor people that are nearer to me”. However, Rita said she does not like to give 
donations to the Catholic Church as an institution, “I am a free thinker in that sense”. 
 
AgC lecturer Laura described herself as “a Catholic with a very distant practice”. 
Interestingly, when I asked Laura whether she got bored attending Sunday mass when she 
was a child, she replied: “yes I did, like all kids […] like any kid, it is boring for my kids too; 
the solution is half an hour mass”. Whereas this statement does not refer directly to Laura’s 
present Catholicism, it does suggest the Catholic practices she currently carries out with her 
family. Laura’s colleague Brigitte seemed, on the other hand, to disagree on her children 
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attending Catholic schools. “My daughter”, she said, “sticks to attending a Catholic school, 
despite me offering her other options; I enrolled her in another school but she wants to go 
back to her Catholic school”. In terms of her own religious stance, Brigitte stated “I lived, 
sort of close to the [Catholic] Church until I finished high school because I attended a 
Catholic school and so on. After that I had no contact with the Church” 
 
In AgC too, Michael’s, Julia’s and Edward’s statements on their current personal religiosity 
were shorter yet somewhat more explicit. Whereas Michael openly explained “I describe 
myself as non-religious and maybe even anti-religious”, Julia stated “I recognise myself as 
Catholic, not totally observant; great believer though”. Former Catholic-seminary student 
Edward referred to his current religiosity saying “I do not deny I am Catholic, heterodox 
though, yet Catholic”.  
 
In MxC, sociology lecturer Suzanne, who attended a Catholic school and whose experiences 
there are presented above, did not touch upon her religious current profile and I decided not 
to ask such a question after listening to the interviewee’s critical comments on Catholic 
schools and Catholic conservativeness. Whereas Rachel did not offer any personal statement 
about her own religiosity – and I decided, again, not to ask possibly ‘unpleasant’ direct 
questions about it – she stated that all her siblings are Catholic: “all of them have baptised 
their kids, follow all the Church’s rites; some of them attend mass”. As for her and her 
family, Rachel stated that she got married to, 
 
a very very Catholic man, therefore we and our kids never missed Sunday mass; my 
kids were part of the [parish’s] chorus; they attended retreats; they organised the 
retreats afterwards.  
 
Gregory stated that he has not been in a church since he turned twelve, except for the times 




when you are in a church you feel [it is] a space to be with yourself, [and to feel] 
spiritual peace […] I’m not the only one who says so, many people say the same, 
that one feels in churches an appropriate atmosphere for spiritual peace […] it has 
nothing to do with religion, it is just spiritual 
 
As stated above, Joseph reported growing up in a half-Catholic and half-atheist house hold. 
During our interview Joseph stated, rather impersonally, that the “need to hold 
communication” with a god, 
 
keeps arising in conflictive moments […]. Although when things are ok we also say 
‘thank you’; thank you to whom though? Whom is generous and grants us goods, 
love?  
 
The interviewee went on with his reflection and then added in a more personal tone: 
 
I am still married to my wife after 37 years, and when I see some of my friends 
having two or three marriages I think we have to be thankful; thankful to who? I do 
not know, thankful to life, to what is called God, I do not know. I mean, we 
acknowledge there is an explanation we cannot materialise and it sometimes fits 
with what is called God.  
 
Then in a statement that slightly resembles the last line of Gregory’s statement above, Joseph 
stated: 
  
But I do not attend temples or participate in Catholic organisations, no way. That 
was something I learned from my father about the [Catholic] Church, which is 
different from religion 
 
After saying that his Catechism lessons caused him “uncertainty and anguish”, Peter pointed 
out that “one ends up abhorring religion, so one follows a more individual religion”. Later on 
during the interview Peter also stated that he likes the Lord’s prayer as “it’s very beneficial”. 
In a joking yet genuine account, this interviewee also told me that when he does applications 
for research funds, he thinks and says “in the name of the father…there goes my application”, 
and then asks god to help him by saying “[God:] if I get the funding I [can] study these 
things and then I will let you know how they are doing”. In MxC too, Angela described her 
current religious stance briefly:  
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My sister and I started to question religion when we were teenagers. I broke away 
from religion and I am currently atheist […] Today my relationship with religion is 
from a strictly sociological perspective 
 
As for Norma, she stated she and her siblings are now “not religious”. As I did during my 
interview with Suzanne and others, I decided not to ask further questions to Norma about her  
current religious position in order to reduce the possibilities of losing rapport with her. 
 
 
III. Current views on religion and the Catholic Church 
 
During our interviews, sociology lecturers held diverse and divergent viewpoints towards 
Catholicism and the Catholic Church. These viewpoints were relatively easier to address 
because most of the times they did not entail direct mentions about the interviewee’s 
individual-family life and were rather issued as the interviewee’s ‘sociological’ or 
‘professional’ commentary on the matter. Further evidence of the lecturers’ current religious 
profile may be inferred from these views though. Next I present these views in order to offer 
both a fuller description of the lecturers’ current religious profiles and an additional 
background of qualitative data the reader may draw from to interpret the following chapters 
and chapter 6 in particular. 
 
During our two interviews, Laura provided a mix of critical and purely analytical statements 
on the Catholic Church and some of its elements. She said first that the Catholic Church is a 
very complex topic, “it has many inner strands, is not homogeneous at all, [and] it is a 
Church that is changing despite its hierarchy”. On Aguascalientes’ Catholic Church Laura 
claimed that one may find “both conservative and liberal messages”. Laura concluded that 
the most frequent type of discourse in Aguascalientes diocese is the conservative. This 
lecturer also referred to the Catholic Church in Mexico in general and stated that it still holds 
a social and political influence which “you could imagine the Catholic church [having] 
during the colony, in the 19
th
 century”. Consonant with the conservative and liberal 
distinction she made about Aguascalientes’ diocese, she classified the Catholic Church in 
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Mexico as, on the one hand, a “traditional church” which “is about charity, [about saying] ‘I 
give to you, I am a protective father, but in return you owe me everything’”; and on the other 
hand a more “liberal” Church. About the latter she interestingly stated 
 
I have hopes for the [Catholic Church’s] more liberal strands, not necessarily 
theology of liberation, but basic [ecclesial] communities
173
 for example, with 
adaptations to a new age and society’s potentials […]. I trust that Church more, the 
Church that makes mature and responsible men out of its churchgoers 
 
Laura’s colleague Julia said that there is “a diversity in religious terms”
174
 in Aguascalientes 
as “we can find Catholic, Christian and non-Christian religions and religious movements”. In 
Julia’s view, there have been people practising other religions since the 1950s, “but they 
were marginalised”. Julia also stated that she does “not defend” the Catholic Church “all the 
time”, she tries to be “objective […] not fanatical”. She said there are “comments” from the 
Catholic Church that she thinks are “helpful”, whereas there are other comments she 
disagrees with. She then explained to me that she does not want,  
 
to say that everybody is good or everybody is bad […] there are some good people 
in the sense that they help churchgoers and there are others who just want personal 
benefits, as in all institutions 
 
After this Julia mentioned the concept of “moral norms” and the latter not corresponding to 
“today’s society”. 
 
I understand that societies evolve and change, I do not think those values are lost 
though. I rather think people prioritise them differently. However, I do think things 
are, say, getting relaxed 
 
As Julia and Laura, sociology lecturer Edward reportedly conceives Aguascalientes and 
Mexico’s religious contexts as “diverse” too
175
. Edward also stated, in a critical tone, that 
“the scheme of authoritarianism” may be found in Aguascalientes’ Catholic context. 
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 Or ‘Christian base communities’ 
174
 See my discussion about some Mexican authors (e.g. De la Torre and Gutierrez, 2008) insisting 
also on Mexico’s “religious diversity” (chapter 3)  
175
 This was an implicit idea by Edward during our interview. The diversity argument was rather 
explicit in a conference by Edward which I attended in AgC. 
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Critically as well, he added that “the Catholic Church in Aguascalientes preaches only about 
strictly religious things or sexual morals; social issues are not discussed”. In another similar 
statement Edward complained about the absence of the Catholic Church in “social life” and 
the Church’s “social doctrine” being overlooked.  
 
In Rita’s view the “religious discourse” in Aguascalientes has changed. This lecturer 
reported that Catholic homilies used to focus on “basically ecclesial [topics], things linked to 
saints, to the Church, miracles, things that were distant from daily life”. Rita then said that 
this situation “has improved” in the sense that the discourses and messages from 
Aguascalientes’ bishopric have “got closer to daily-life issues”. The interviewee then 
referred to her disliking of priests’ “discrimination towards homosexuals” and their 
“traditional way of looking at women”. After this critical comment though, Rita also said 
that there are “more honest actors” in the Church, whose “message is more appropriate, 
better, more adequate to what one wants to hear”.  
 
Brigitte described the Catholic Church in Aguascalientes as a type of Church she thought 
“no longer existed”. She referred to it as an “old” Church she “remembered from her school 
days […], a very old and very institutional Catholic Church”. In terms of the Catholic 
Church in the country overall Brigitte stated that it is “a microcosm of the larger society”, as 
one can find “leftist, rightist, conservative, perverse, honest people”, that is, “the same 
diversity one can find in the context the Church operates. She also described the Church as a 
formal organization with two main characteristics: highly hierarchical, and based on “unity-
maintenance”, which means “it has to be Catholic, apostolic and Roman”. Explicitly critical, 
Brigitte also stated that the Catholic Church in Mexico is  
 
akin to the maintenance of authoritarianism in Mexico. I think our political culture 
and our religious culture have sustained this national culture which makes us to be in 
the state we are, very asphyxiating 
 
In AgC too and critically as well, Michael referred to the Catholic Church as  
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terribly conservative, it is a power that stops progress. I would describe it in those 
terms, it is a power, a space for repression. I would not dare to find positive elements 
in it 
 
Michael suggested the Catholic Church helps some people “to have meaning in their lives”; 
however the Catholic Church is also  
 
the institutionalization or personification of the impossibility to think, of [the 
impossibility of ] giving freedom to people, with models of [social] exclusion
176
 and 
as corrupt or more corrupt than society 
 
In MxC, Norma stated that the greater Catholic Church’s influence in Mexico has been 
detrimental to other churches and that is one of the reasons why she on the one hand agrees 
with the “freedom of religion”, yet on the other hand thinks religion “has to be kept in the 
private context”. About the “real” Catholicism practised by Catholics in Mexico, Laura 
stated:  
 
they [Catholics] are very pragmatic in terms of [Catholicism driving] their daily-life 
[…]; they think they are entitled to do anything and then go to Church and confess 
and that is it. People are very pragmatic […], [for instance] drug-traffickers are able 
to kill twenty people and then go to church and donate money.  
 
When I touched upon the topic of differences between Catholicism in Mexico City and other 
regions in Mexico such as the Bajio
177,
 Norma stated Catholicism in the latter “is more 
militant, entangled with the political life, with everything”. By contrast, Norma referred to 
Mexico City’s religious and social atmosphere as  
 
radically different […], Mexico City is more leftist; the level of education here is 
higher; people are better informed; the divisions between the private and the 
public are clearer […] abortions are allowed here; gay marriage is legal; there 
is a series of things which would be unthinkable in other regions in the country 
unthinkable! 
 
                                                 
176
 Literal translation. The interviewee did not expand on this idea. 
177
 A geographical and cultural region located  in the centre of the country, comprising roughly the 
states of Queretaro, Michoacan, Jalisco and Guanajuato. 
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Norma’s colleague Rachel, referred to the impossibility to “separate” the Catholic Church 
from “the influence it has had in people’s way of thinking and acting”. In Rachel’s view this 
influence has brought clear disadvantages. 
 
Just look at the [living] conditions of women, Catholic indigenous women […]. 
They have to receive all the kids God sends to them, so a thirty years old woman has 
nine children, and she is even a grandmother […] that woman is going to die before 
she is forty years old and will leave all her kids around; the man will marry another 
woman afterwards and he will have ten kids anew. It is a disgrace. 
 
After distinguishing between conservative and more flexible priests, Rachel also stated that 
the Catholic Church’s “official discourse” does not  
 
take into account people’s rights, specially women’s; they punish abortion, not 
paedophiles
178
; girls and boys are abused; they [priests] get women pregnant, and 
still they criticise others 
 
Gregory’s first statements about religion and Catholicism were critical. He stated he sees 
religion “interfering in many aspects” of social reality. In a rather sarcastic tone, he recalled 
George W. Bush’s discourses on the Iraq war and how “God had inspired Bush to take those 
[war-related] decisions on Iraq”. With a subtle switch of tone in his voice, he then referred to 
“santeria” and her importance in Cuba. Later on Gregory would adopt again an explicitly 
critical position with regard to private Catholic universities. “I do not like to go to private or 
religious universities” stated the interviewee, “but I have to go and I do learn from those 
worlds, I mean…” Gregory explained, “if there are people in this [public university] school 
who lack conscience, are rightist and have no critical reasoning, what can you expect from a 
private elitist university?” 
 
Before telling me the story of the priest he befriended in MxC, Peter referred to people’s 
fears being caused by Catholicism as “there are still god-devil, heaven-hell schemes” that 
drive people’s behaviour. “We rule our lives” Peter argued, “based on the good and the evil”. 
                                                 
178
 Cases of paedophilia among Catholic priests in different countries were a common topic in the 
media a couple of months before I conducted my interviews in MxC (e.g., Willey 2010, The Guardian 
2010) 
 175 
He also stated that it was the Spanish colonisers who brought Catholicism as a “fear factor” 
in society
179
. Unlike Peter, Joseph did not refer to the Church as a source of fears in society; 
his perspective was not less critical though. As Rachel did, Joseph addressed the reported 
cases of paedophile priests as follows 
 
When I knew about what the [reported paedophile] priests did, I thought it was a 
totally immoral act; it was an abuse. A clean
180
, enthusiastic young guy looking for 
support and then a priest abusing him because of [the priest’s] level of power, the 
level of authority force… I think that was totally contradictory: the institution that 
preaches about morals being so immoral 
 
Angela, a self-described atheist, stated that her mother being a Spanish refugee from 
Franco’s regime made her eventually associate “the Church” with ideas of “dictatorship, the 
army” and, above all, with “authoritarianism” and “totalitarianism”. Later on during our 
interview, Angela stated briefly that the “Catholic tradition”, given its particular history, is 





As it was expected when I designed the research’s methodological frame, two lecturers did 
address AgC’s and MxC’s ‘oppositional’ religious contexts. AgC lecturer Brigitte and MxC 
lecturer Norma referred to, on the one hand, Aguascalientes’ context as ‘conservative’ and 
‘militant’ and, on the other hand, Mexico City’s context as less conservative, ‘leftist’ and 
more ‘liberal’ if not ‘less Catholic’
181
. The moderate criticism against the Catholic Church 
issued from AgC lecturers compared to the criticism by MxC lecturers might suggest that 
this dichotomistic distinction is accurate. For instance, in AgC Edward criticised the Catholic 
Church for its absence in ‘social issues’ and Edward’s colleague Rita criticised specific 
Catholic discourses only, i.e. the Church’s messages on homosexuality and female 
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 This statement is certainly related to Peter’s critical view about Spanish researchers being “less 
advanced” –chapter 5. 
180
 Literal translation. 
181
 Interestingly, ‘insiders’ in Aguascalientes (i.e., Julia, Laura and Edward) rather insisted on the idea 
of Aguascalientes as a ‘diverse’ religious context –probably as an indirect counter-defence that has 
been aware of the conservativeness-related criticism in the past. 
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stereotypes. The type of criticism against the Catholic Church among Mexico City 
sociologists was more systematic and extensive. For Norma, Rachel, Gregory, Suzanne, 
Peter and Joseph, Catholicism in Mexico is related to undesirable and ‘pragmatic’ – or 
morally inconsistent – conservative practices and thoughts by people in the country in 
general. Now, do lecturers’ religious backgrounds and religious profiles fit into these 
‘conservative/militant AgC’ versus ‘liberal/atheist MxC’ dichotomistic categories? 
 
Edward’s (AgC) and Peter’s (MxC) statements on their Catholic family practices suggest 
that both sociologists were particularly close to Catholicism and established, at least during 
their childhood and early and late adolescence, close contact with this religion, with some of 
its institutional representatives (mostly figures of priests) and with its ‘official-institutional’ 
and ‘folk’ discourses (chapter 3). Interestingly the occurrence of this type of background, at 
least in the cases under study, seems not determined by their geographical location, as 
‘extreme’ religious backgrounds would be expected from AgC-born lecturers only. This 
might suggest that the type of family Catholicism is more related to socio-economic 
membership than to strictly geographical criteria, since Peter referred to the fact of growing 
up in a “poor family” and Edward referred to the “little rural town” where he grew up –in 
suggesting this I do not seek to draw a necessary relationship between ‘poverty’ and ‘rural 
towns’ but merely point at their simultaneous presence in my data set. 
 
AgC lecturer Laura,  who described her family as ‘nominal, not practising’ just as MxC 
lecturer Norma did, stated that her classmates in the Catholic primary school she attended 
were rather “homogeneous” and came from the same “class”. Norma, who attended Catholic 
private schools as well, described her family as a “traditional middle class family”. As in 
Edward’s and Peter’s cases, Laura’s and Norma’s similar backgrounds in religious and 
socio-economic terms might suggest again that the type or level of ‘Catholic observance’ 
may be less related to geographical location and more to class membership, family-income 
levels, and community/institutional networks . Therefore the probability of finding 
sociologists with a ‘non practising’ Catholic background in AgC compared to MxC will vary 
less because of the putative conservativeness of AgC and the reported liberalism of MxC and 
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more because of AgC’s and MxC’s different proportions and configurations of low, middle 
and high class/income families and what would be the corresponding networks and type of 
social institutions around them. I must add that ‘distant-Catholicism’ cases such as Gregory’s 
were not found in Aguascalientes. However, if we follow what I suggest in these lines there 
would be no reasons to deny the possibility of ‘distant-Catholicism’ backgrounds being 
found in AgC too.  
 
Having addressed this matter, my interpretations of the data presented in this chapter, 
suggest as well that whereas not all sociology lecturers keep currently the same intensity of 
Catholic observance and the same level of contact with Catholic discourses as they once did, 
their ruptures with past Catholic practices and discourses do not seem total but partial. These 
partial ruptures are relatively clearer in AgC lecturers’ statements. Edward, for instance, 
disagrees with the Catholic Church’s absence in social issues, but suggests implicitly the 
usefulness of the ‘Catholic social doctrine’. Laura criticises the Catholic Church and specific 
discourses such as ‘plain charity’, but still describes herself as ‘Catholic with distance’, takes 
her kids to Catholic mass and holds ‘hopes’ for the more ‘liberal’, ‘Christian-base-
community’ streams within the Catholic Church . Rita is rather oppositional to ‘the religious 
institution’, its discourses on homosexuality, traditional female stereotypes and the practice 
of donations to the Church. Yet she also keeps attending mass; considers this practice an 
‘obligation’; likes homilies about ‘how to respect people’; and helps ‘poor people’ that are 
‘closer to her’. Julia disagrees with the idea of priests as ‘authority figures’ superior to 
lawyers and the like, but describes herself explicitly as a non-observant yet ‘great Catholic 
believer’. In MxC lecturers’ statements ‘partial ruptures with Catholicism’ are not 
necessarily explicit but can be inferred as well. For instance, Rachel’s critical statements on 
the Catholic Church and priests that ‘get women pregnant’ on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, her statements about getting married to a ‘very, very Catholic man’ and their kids 
participating in Catholic chorus and retreats, is evidence of both ruptures and non-ruptures 
with Catholic discourses and rituals. Peter reported both ‘abhorring’ Catholicism but also 
following ‘a more individual religion’. He also seems to (still) entertain in his mind the idea 
of a God whom he reportedly asks for help to get research funding. Alluding to a similar 
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belief, Joseph reported his father rejecting attendance in Catholic temples, but described him 
as sympathetic to the practice of ‘communicating’ and ‘imploring to God’– practices that had 
to take place at home, in front of a ‘Jesus Christ figure’. The ruptures and non-ruptures or 
‘continuations’ in Joseph’s father Catholic practices seem to be consonant with those in his 
son. Whereas Joseph rejects attendance to Catholic temples, he reported himself being 
‘thankful’ to ‘something’, to ‘an explanation we cannot materialise’, for the ‘goods’ and 
‘love’ received. This is also similar to the case of ‘distant’ Gregory and his father, whom the 
former described as being reluctant to believe in ‘saints’, and ‘that god’, but a believer 
nonetheless, a believer in a ‘power beyond us’. And this is another finding I want to 
highlight.  
 
The statements by lecturers indicate the practice of believing in the Catholic Church, in its 
‘institutional’ face, saints, discourses on homosexuality among other elements, is 
systematically criticised and personally rejected by the majority of lecturers. Yet the 
evidence also suggests that the respondents, not only in AgC but also in MxC, are believers 
nonetheless, believers in ‘something’, ‘a non-material explanation’ according to MxC 
lecturer Joseph, or ‘a power beyond us’ in so-reported Gregory’s father’s words, or in ‘God’ 
as such, as Peter explicitly mentioned. The act of ‘believing’ remains. And, following Joseph, 
what seems to remain as well is the same type of object of belief: ‘an entity’, that may not be 
‘that (official-institutional) God’, but still (i) ‘explains’ reality, (ii) hands out ‘goods and 
love’, (iii) cannot be ‘materialised’ –as it would lie ‘beyond us’, just like Gregory recalled, 
and (iv) has the power to intervene in social phenomena, e.g. funding application processes 
according to Peter. Are these characteristics of sociology lecturer’s religious beliefs similar 
to those of official and ‘folk’ Catholic discourses in chapter 3 –the family as ‘cell of society’, 
God’s/the Virgin’s powers, etc? Sociology lecturers clearly did not refer to the family as a 
cell of society but some of them alluded, implicitly or explicitly, to God’s powers or a God-
like entity’s powers (Durkheim 1915).  
 
Before closing this section I want to point out two additional ‘discursive’ findings which I 
noted in chapter 4 as well: (i) the lecturers’ morally-sensitive judgements and (ii) the 
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dichotomistic asymmetries, this time in their appraisals and commentaries about the Catholic 
Church and religion overall. Explicit ‘moral judgements’ by lecturers on the Catholic Church 
are plainly evident in Joseph’s complaint about ‘how immoral’ the ‘institution that preaches 
on morals’ is; or in Norma’s complaint about hypothetical drug traffickers committing 
murders and then donating money, improperly, to the Catholic Church. Similarly, 
dichotomistic asymmetries are evident not only in some of the respondent’s perceptions on 
the religious differences between AgC and MxC, but also in Laura’s appraisal of ‘very 
liberal’ and ‘very conservative’ nuns; or in Julia's assertion on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people in the 
Catholic Church –here the respondent shows evident caution in assigning the good/bad 
labels to the appropriate amount of people (i.e. not “everybody” is good or bad), but does not 
show reluctance to use the labels per se. Further asymmetries are found in Edward’s 
statement on ‘conservative’ and ‘traditionalist’ Mexican Catholic seminars versus the 
‘liberal’ and ‘open’ religious atmosphere in Italian Catholic universities; or in Norma’s 
‘polarised impression’ of  ‘bad nuns and priests’ and ‘very kind people’ in the Catholic 
school she attended.  
 
In the ‘secular university’ and ‘secular public education’ contexts portrayed by some 
lecturers ––and, indeed, in many secular-university contexts abroad– criticism towards the 
Catholic Church would be an unsurprising message. Whether such a set of critical statements 
is justifiable or valid, is not a point I will discuss. What I claim is relevant is the consistency 
that such a type of ‘criticism’ or ‘judging’– i.e., ‘morally sensitive’ and based on non-





The explicit accounts by sociology lecturers and my inferences from those accounts suggest 
a series of ideas that are not surprising, but rather consistent with the historical saliency, 
contemporary presence and ideological-structuring role of the various Catholicisms in 
Mexico I presented previously. Firstly, if Catholicisms in Mexico have the extension, 
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intensity and force that I illustrated in chapter 3, it is not surprising that MxC lecturers did 
not grew up in an entirely areligious atmosphere but actually in the same or very similar 
Catholic family environments that their peers in AgC did. This finding suggests that 
although the categories ‘conservative/Catholic AgC’ and ‘liberal/atheist MxC’ are useful 
divisions that represent social perceptions they do not represent accurately the reported 
religious backgrounds of the sociology lecturers I studied in this research. Secondly, having 
specified the variable intensity of Catholic observance in individual cases and their family 
contexts, the more striking conclusion in this sense is that all the sociology lecturers grew up 
as members of practising Catholic families, where both ‘official-institutional’ and ‘folk’ 
Catholic discourses circulated and were instilled to diverse degrees. And this finding leads to 
my last point. The ruptures between the sociology lecturers’ current religious stances on the 
one hand, and, on the other, their Catholic backgrounds, past observance of Catholic rites 
and past interactions with Catholic discourses, are only partial. Some lecturers still attend 
Sunday Catholic masses and those who are not currently observant of Catholic rites seem 
still observant of Catholic beliefs, e.g., beliefs in an omnipotent God. Are these partial 
ruptures related to the ‘morally-sensitive’ judgements and dichotomistic asymmetries 
constantly found in both (official and folk) Catholic discourses (chapter 3) and lecturers’ 
statements on various social phenomena (chapter 4 and sections above)? I will discuss in the 
next chapter the plausibility of this and other possible Catholicism-sociology relations, as 








Sociologists’ responses to the research question. 
 
 
In the first part of this chapter I present the sociology lecturers’ replies, opinions and 
reactions to my interview questions about the possible or actual influences of Catholicism 
upon sociology in Mexico –in terms of parallel authority structures, Marxism-Catholicism 
links, and values-related influences. In the second part of the chapter I will categorise these 
replies as ranging from secular-oppositional stances to secular-sympathetic positions. I will 
also describe the replies in general as ‘Mannheimian’ (Bloor 1976), i.e., based on a 
normative understanding of knowledge and scientific knowledge and the risks of 
‘desecrating’ such knowledge with ‘religious pollutants’. Going beyond these assumptions, I 
will argue that, based on the evidence presented in chapter 5, the lecturers’ particular replies 
about the continuity of Catholic values in sociology lecturers’ ethics is entirely plausible and 
suggests as well the possibility of Catholic values’ non-relative and dichotomistic bases 
being echoed also in the sociology lecturers’ dichotomistic-asymmetric moral and evaluative 
(non-sociological) opinions and statements on everyday-life phenomena. 
 
Next I will present the lecturers’ responses as close to the original interview transcriptions as 
possible in order to offer to the reader not only an account of the lecturers’ ‘sociological’ 
comments but also a glimpse of their personal reactions to the very research objective. As in 
the previous chapters, I will group the lecturers’ replies into individual micro narratives that 




I. Aguascalientes sociology lecturers’ replies 
 
Laura, who attended Catholic primary and secondary schools run by nuns (chapter 5), stated 
that Catholic nuns overall have an important role in education, health and community work 
in Mexico. In terms of the education they provide, Laura stated: 
 
How many women have gone through this education [provided by nuns]? How do 
nuns determine future people’s choices? How does what they imprint on us build-up 
our lives? In order to know this, I researched them 
 
In Laura’s view: 
 
Catholic schools mark you in many ways, some ways are positive and some negative 
[…] I have talked to my former school classmates and [we have talked about] nuns 
leaving an imprint on you, like discipline and the capacity to order ideas 
 
Sensing what I saw as the respondent’s openness to talk about the topic I then asked her, 
“Was there anything you were told in these Catholic schools which made you have special 
interests on social phenomena?”. Laura replied “probably, although I do not remember 
clearly […] there must have been something though”. With a less-personal phrasing, I asked 
her again “Would there be a link between people coming from a Catholic-school background 
and them choosing sociology as university degree?” Laura disagreed, she told me that out of 
the ninety female classmates she had in the Catholic schools, it was only her who studied 
sociology. However she added: “in the Catholic discourse you find this idea of service 
frequently, so people do not study sociology but social work”
182
. I insisted and asked Laura 
about the idea of service in her colleagues at the sociology department. She replied briefly “I 
do not see it [emphasis on service] clearly, the reasons why we [sociologists] are here are 
different”. I then tried to switch topics and focus on Laura’s opinion about the possible 
(Weberian) influence of Catholicism in the researchers’ ‘codes of ethics’. To this Laura 
replied:  
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 She explained to me the work of one of her master students who was reportedly “locating the 
religious elements, not just Catholic but also Christian” among undergraduate social work students 
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I think that in Aguascalientes context and in Mexico’s mocho
183
 context, the Catholic 
scheme and the scheme of social values are very similar, you cannot draw great 
differences; we are actually talking about very similar things, with re-interpretations, 
with nuances […]The religious and the socio ethical [in Mexico] are very similar to 
each other. In my case I think it is the same story. 
 
One week later, in our second interview, Laura seemed slightly more sympathetic to the 
possibility of Catholicism influencing sociologists and social researchers in general. By then 
she explicitly said “many of our values, and our beliefs that are apparently lay, have origins 
or are linked to the religious”. Then Laura referred to some social researchers not 
researching religion yet having a religious point of view that shapes their interpretations. As 
an example Laura referred to a poster on Aguascalientes’ gangs that was presented by an 
undergraduate student in a conference organised by the university one week before:  
 
The gangs [according to the poster’s author] were the cause of all the evils and kids 
joined gangs because the fathers’ authority was not controlling enough; hey, that and 
the [Aguascalientes] bishop’s version [of gangs] are the same! 
 
Laura then went on and said “the student who authored the poster does not perceive that 
there is a religious discourse that permeates her apparent scientific objectivity”, and then 
added “That is what I think is serious”. At the end of our last interview I told Laura about the 
difficulties I was having in getting the respondents talking about my research topic. 
Referring to her own research work, Laura replied: 
 
No, I have thought about it [Catholicism and sociology] because of a fundamental 
reason: I chose to study nuns. So if I am not clear about my own religious 
determinants I will end up hating or loving what I research. And that has been one of 
the hardest things to do in my professional academic activities: try to keep a distance 
as a native 
 
After this Laura stated that most of the researchers in “all areas” present themselves as free 
of religious determinants. But those religious determinants would be there and, according to 
Laura, “mediate your views” as “there is a lot in our unconscious”. Laura then stressed that 
“it is foolish, it is naïve to think that there is nothing there. We are naïve, period”. After this, 
the interviewee stated that these “free-of-religious-determinants” positions are “related to the 
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 ‘Fanatical’ or ‘extremely conservative’. 
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idea of secularity we have in Mexico”, which makes researchers avoid speaking about their 
religious profiles under risk of being taken as “less serious”. After the interviewee’s explicit 
acknowledgement of Catholicism shaping sociology somehow, I ventured into further 
questions. The next situation I asked Laura about was the possibility of the Catholic 
discourse having to do with society’s conceptions of ‘untouchable’ authority figures and the 
way people approach, or not, authority figures in Mexico’s academia. After my question 
Laura asked “you mean as in the case of dogmas?”. I nodded and she stated, 
 
I think there would be many possibilities in that sense. And it would not be only part 
of the Catholic world but the Christian world too […]so, yes there is clearly a 
vertical scheme of authority and [a scheme of] obedience to the discourse, it is 
possible yes, I had not thought about it 
  
However, Laura suggested afterwards a different cultural determinant as an alternative 
explanation for unchallenged authority figures in the academia –‘the foreign’, a historical 
construct that holds validity and authority per se for the sake of coming from abroad.  
 
In our first interview, after my question about her family background, AgC lecturer Rita told 
me about her parents’ backgrounds and stated: 
 
I think both my father and mother were hard workers. My father always had two 
jobs. My mother at home was very dedicated too. In general I think work is one of 
the things, one of the values I keep and try to instil in my sons […] Unlike my 
parents, I do like my kids having a job 
  
In our second interview I brought up again the topic of ‘hard work’ as an important value in 
Rita’s family and then asked Rita further questions on this. By then, though, she rather 
disagreed on my interpretation of her previous statements and rejected the value of work as 
part of her family practices. “It is not that we consider work as an important value in our 
lives”, the interviewee stated. After this she touched upon a Weberian explanation I actually 
did have in my mind yet did not speak about in the interview: “Let’s say it is not like in the 
Protestant ethic [by Weber], where we have to work to go to heaven, no, it has nothing to do 
with that at all”. 
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Even more intrigued I then tried to address the same topic from a non personal angle anew. I 
told Rita about my readings of the city’s coat of arms, local newspapers and a co-edited 
publication by the AgC sociology department. In these three different sources, I said, there 
were explicit mentions of the value of hard work as part of the city’s identity and the 
people’s practices. This time I said explicitly to the interviewee that I was interested in 
whether this hard-work value in Aguascalientes’ context could be linked to a parallel 
Catholic discourse on “hard work”. After this I paused to encourage Rita to intervene. After 
getting no answer from the respondent, I decided not to risk my rapport with her and asked 
no further questions related to Catholicism’s influences. Although I could not get Rita’s 
explicit thoughts on my thesis, her critical answers on adjacent topics – i.e., her references to 
“unpleasant” experiences in Catholic schools (chapter 5); her explicit comments on not 
granting “too much importance” to the idea of God; her open criticism towards some aspects 
of the Catholic Church; her disagreement about a Weberian ‘hard work’ value operating in 
her family – and her reaction, or lack of, to my direct suggestion of a link between the city’s 
‘hard work’ value and Catholic discourses, may likely represent the ‘secular attitude’ Rita’s 
colleague Laura explained to me as a common feature in researchers (above). 
 
When I asked Rita’s colleague Julia about the apparent lack of theoretical production in the 
country, she replied, “I think it has to do with our cultural education. I think we are very 
immersed into this idea of being humble, of not [being] self-praising, but let others speak” 
(chapter 4). Intrigued by this answer, I asked Julia whether this cultural ‘humbleness’ would 
be related to the country’s religious discourses. Her answer was “Yes […] Yes”. I then 
ventured further saying “it seems religious discourses could be related to the way we 
conceive authority figures in academia too”. To this Julia replied: 
 
I totally agree, […] in this state we are very determined by the religious; up to recent 
times this state was 99.99 percent Catholic, So I think it [Catholicism] is part of the 
cultural formation people receive since they are kids; this official religion, that has 
everything very structured, whose discourses are directly related to how we should 
act, what we should do, what is right and wrong. It determines us, [in the sense of] 
how to be a good father, a good son, a good employee, so you get to do things the 
way you have to do them. So yes the religious aspect in this state is very determinant, 
since we are kids.   
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But things are changing from Julia’s perspective. “The advantage” she sees now is that “after 
the globalisation process Aguascalientes went through, everything has been transformed”. 
As a result Julia sees a beneficial religious diversity in the country that has brought openness 
and tolerance. Later on, after touching upon a Weberian understanding of religion as possible 
promoter of particular social values and after recalling the respondent’s remarks on 
Catholicism determining how to be a ‘good’ father, son and employee, I told Julia I had 
collected evidence that indicated the religious and cultural local discourses constantly 
stressed ideas of the “ethically right” or “ethically good” things and people in society. 
“Would you say you can find traces of these ideas in your colleagues’ work?” I asked her. 
She replied, 
 
It would be illogical to think there are no such traces. I would say ‘yes’, I would not 
know what type of traces those would be though, I have not thought about it. […] 
Indeed here in the Aguascalientes there is a lot [of emphasis] on these ideas of the 
right things and the good people. So we [as researchers] are into this and may 
reproduce the same scheme without being conscious about it 
 
Lecturer Edward’s responses to my thesis were affirmative, but relatively cautious. One of 
the first topics that arose during our first interview was Marxism in Mexico. After Edward 
mentioned the idea of a “primitive” version of Marxism circulating in the country (chapter 4) 
I asked him whether Marxism’s reported adaptation into a dogmatic social theory in Mexico 
had to do, precisely, with the historical saliency of Catholicism in the country and its 
perceived religious conservativeness. Edward replied stating that Mexican universities and 
their Marxist theories were seen as revolutionaries and supporters of rebellions and 
guerrillas that were aimed at fighting against conservatism and religious dogmatism. “But 
what I used to say to my students is that if we go deeper, that [Marxism] was a belief, 
Marxism was a Church”. Edward went on: 
 
If you read the biographies of Marxists like photographer Tina Modotti, you can see 
she had to ask the [Communist] party for authorisation to have a boyfriend, and he 
had to be an adequate boyfriend, not a bourgeois. And that happens only in religious 
congregations. You find those extremes in a very conservative church, like the 
Marxist Church  
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Then Edward concluded  
 
I had not thought about it [dogmatic Marxism as consequence of conservative 
religious atmosphere], yet it may be; this intellectual submission in one field and the 
other may be the same, eventually those are beliefs without reflection  
  
As I did with the other respondents, I asked Edward about the possibility of a connection 
between researchers’ personal ethics and Catholic moral precepts. Edward replied: 
 
Yes, of course, they [researchers] grew up in this religious environment and we 
learnt from it and formed our moral criteria [from it]. When you are an adult you 
may change your ethics code a bit, but I would say those are just a few cases 
 
By the end of our last interview I, rather roughly, summarised Marshall Sahlins’ suggestion 
about the concept of ‘human need’ being derived from Adam and Eve’s Christian myth and 
persisting as a ‘longue duree’ underlying notion in classic economics and current social 
sciences (chapter 1). Edward disagreed with the proposal stating the concept of human need 
was rather Protestant. Yet he admitted the possibility of both the operation of Weberian 
“non-intended” effects of religion and, not an idea but, a specific “scheme” of ideas being 
taken from religious discourses and shaping people’s non-religious thought. After I shared 
with him my first initial thoughts on the possibility of dichotomistic sociological discourses 
being somehow shaped by corresponding dualistic Catholic discourses, Edward said “yes I 
agree, that is precisely what I call a ‘scheme’ […] I think it is possible”  
 
MxC-born sociologists Brigitte, who reported both attendance at Catholic schools up to the 
high school level and attendance at a public university where she received a Marxist training 
(chapters 4 and 5), stated that moving from a Catholic-school environment to a Marxist one 
meant for her, at the beginning, a total break up: 
 
At that moment I thought it [Marxism] was another world, diametrically opposed [to 
Catholicism] in many things; that is why it was so attractive, it was the denial of 
what I had been taught 
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Then, in a similar comment to that of Edward, Brigitte reported a realization that Marxists in 
her university were rather “orthodox”, “close-minded” and “uncritical, inconsistent between 
what they said and did”. After this I asked Brigitte about the types of “religious attitudes” 
she could say her local colleagues enacted in the department. She replied critically, 
comparing her colleagues to the academics she met in Mexico City,  
 
I think there is, in general, a very evident schizophrenia in Mexico City: one thing is 
what you research and a different thing is what you live as person. Here in the 
[AgC’s university] department and in the research group I am part of, I think there is 
this [attitude] of ‘I’m religious, so what?’ and [an attitude of] ‘the religious matters 
and I will show it’ […] In Mexico City I did not know anybody with a religion”  
 
I then asked Brigitte about Aguascalientes’ society discourse on the ‘good people’ and the 
‘morally-correct’ and whether she could see some traces of this discourse in the work of her 
local colleagues, for example in the way they used certain methodologies or chose research 
topics. She replied cautiously: 
 
I am not sure. I am going to put it different: intolerance extends to the methodologies 
[…] So when it comes to research [they complain saying] ‘you are not doing it like it 
should be; you cannot do it; you do not know’ […]. It is a very moralist attitude […]  
in the sense of […] what they think [it should be], their values, all those rules; and 
there is no room for others.  
 
Trying to clarify Brigitte’s position on the matter I asked her further questions. The 
interviewee stated that some of her colleagues think she “does not do things” the way she 
“should do”, so “there is this attitude about them knowing, them doing things right, […] 
making things well”. Brigitte, however, did not comment further on the idea of these 
attitudes being shaped by particular religious or Catholic elements.  
 
Michael was also critical of his workplace and colleagues. In similar terms to those of 
Brigitte, Michael stated Aguascalientes’ society and academia were not necessarily 
conservative but “traditionalist”. When I asked him whether this “traditionalism” would be 
related to the ideological and religious local discourses, his answer, unlike Brigitte’s, was, 
“without doubt”. After this and other questions, Michael stated Marxism and Catholicism, 
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both as paradigms that sought social transformations, “fit together”. Later on Michael 
referred to the remarkable extent to which his undergraduate studies turned out to be Marxist 
and orthodox. “We [students] said ‘no’ to everything […] the message was atrocious, ‘do not 
see the news, do not read the newspaper’”. Referring to this Marxist context and Catholicism 
in general, Michael stated: “what was dramatic, indeed, was coming from a doctrine and 
going to another”. I will return to these reported parallels in chapters 7 and 8. 
 
 
II. Mexico City sociology lecturers’ replies.  
 
During our interview in MxC Norma accepted that science is non-aseptic. “For a long time” 
she stated,  
 
this idea of the neutrality of science prevailed. Science could solve controversies 
because it was neutral and objective […] Afterwards sociology of science said the 
foundations of science are never totally aseptic 
 
Interestingly, Norma then explained the undesirability of such non-aseptic foundations:  
 
The consequences have been very negative […] pharmaceutical [companies] do 
science seeking profits […] the science that is done in these regions is frequently 
linked to interests that are not necessarily academic, that gives science a different 
character; plus this idea of the politicisation of science 
 
Understandably so, when I introduced to Norma the Catholicism-sociology thesis and then 
asked her about her impressions of it, she replied: 
 
I think in those cases it is impossible to generalise […] From my experience in this 
university I would say people are atheist or agnostic […] I do not know any 
sociologist that would defend his religiosity or that defends Catholic values openly. 
Probably in other regions of the country it is not necessarily so. From my experience, 
[I say that] it [Catholicism] is not part of [Sociology]. 
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And right after this, without me suggesting it, Norma touched upon Marxism and stated a 
series of direct connections AgC lecturers had pointed out as well, yet in strikingly opposite 
terms:  
 
I would say that it is a different type of millenarism that plays a role [in sociology]; a 
different type of salvation. For example when Marxism was a religion, it played 
exactly the same functions […] in the sense of everything, the association of men, of 
the good and the evil, of salvation, of a millenarist decision, everything, everything. 
 
I then insisted and said that even in “atheist” researchers there would be a possibility of 
finding traces of such Catholicism, though “diluted” and “historically mediated”, since the 
Catholic Church might be interpreted as one of the few social institutions operating in the 
country uninterruptedly since colonial times and having a major cultural role. Norma’s reply 
to this comment was,  
 
Listen, I agree on that, and I do not doubt that culture in [the country in] general is 
so. But you have to take into account that this is a country that underwent two wars 
of religion to separate the Church and the State
184
 […] And, for example, in this 





Norma concluded “I defend by all means the laity [secularity] of public education” and 
further rejected my research thesis by adding that Mexicans’ Catholicism is merely “ritual, it 
has nothing to do with the way they [Catholics] behave”. 
 
My interview with Rachel was brief given the tight schedule of the interviewee. As a result I 
did not have time enough to explore Rachel’s viewpoints on my research topic. Yet, some of 
Rachel’s statements are particularly relevant in this sense. For instance, on her primary-
school background and the role of religion in public education in Mexico, she stated 
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 Perhaps Norma refers here to the series of armed conflicts between liberal (secularist) and 
conservative political cliques in the 19
th
-century, post-independence period that I discussed in chapter 
3. 
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 See the “Constitutional article 3” in the Methodology chapter. 
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The primary school I attended […] is a school whose board is formed by 
Evangelicals. It was a totally lay school though, they never told us anything about 
religion, they never invited us to read religious texts, never
186
. I think it is a perfect 
model for a lay school 
 
It is possible to infer from the statements above that Rachel would probably hold a similar 
‘secularist’ position to that of Norma’s about the Catholicism-Sociology thesis –a position 
implicitly taken by AgC lecturer Rita too and somewhat criticised by Rita’s colleague Laura 
(above). 
 
Right after our interview started, MxC lecturer Suzanne asked me politely about my 
interviews. I used this opportunity to say that sometimes it was difficult to debate with the 
interviewees about my research topic, especially after some of them brandished the argument 
of public education in Mexico being ‘legally’ secular. I told to Suzanne that I was trying to 
analyse, indeed, the extent to which sociology, as a discipline in public universities, was 
really ‘secular’. “You mean [not secular in terms of] the positions, in the way you choose 
some theories and not others?” asked Suzanne back. “Yes” I said to encourage further 
comments by the interviewee. Suzanne went on: 
 
[And not secular] in the way of arguing and teaching?…Without any doubt, of 
course. Frequently it is absolutely unconscious. I think that is reflected too in a 
conservative position with regard to the use of theory. I think it [Catholicism] is 
there when you use certain theory or become part of a certain thought stream, or 
when you start to assume a series of interpretations with regard to the very concept 
of history […] different interpretations with regard to sociology itself, to 
methodologies, to the ‘why’ and ‘what for’ of sociology. So, yes somehow it 
[Catholicism] is present [in positions] that do not assume themselves as conservative. 
 
After telling me the story of his Catholic missionary priest friend (chapter 5), I asked MxC 
lecturer Peter whether he would say lecturers in the classroom reproduce the authority model 
of priests in temples. “Of course” he replied.  
 
The priest is a preacher and the lecturer is the same. I am, as a lecturer, a 
manipulator of the group. Yes, I think there is a transposition from the priest’s 
authoritarianism, for example this authority figures [in the department] that nobody 
challenges.  
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 Cf. This interviewee’s statement on her attendance to both Evangelical and Catholic masses 
organised by this school (chapter 5, “The Catholic-school background” section)  
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Peter concluded “I think there is an inspiring model, a reference model”. Afterwards, 
however, he implicitly denied Catholicism as his own model of authority and then suggested 
alternative sources: “In my case I took that model from my lecturers in anthropology […] 
My other reference model is my psychoanalyst, who is anti-Catholic”. Yet again, in an 
implicit complaint about the formal ways of addressing authority figures in the academia, 
Peter re-stated the link between such approaches to authorities and the ‘Catholic Church’: 
 
I address the head of the department and the head of the school as equals: ‘what’s up 
dude?’. Whereas the family and the [Catholic] Church encouraged you to address 
people respectfully. 
 
When I said to Peter that some interviewees rejected the Catholicism-sociology link on the 
grounds of the legally-secular character of their academic work, Peter replied  
 
I see two things, yes indeed, institutions are secular, but sociologists are Guadalupan 
Marxists. What does that mean? It means they get married in the church, or you can 
find them in Sunday mass, that is, they are not consistent between what they think 
and what they believe 
 
During our interview, I suggested to Peter’s colleague Gregory the possibility of Marxism 
becoming a dogma in Mexico because we were already “a country of believers”. Not 
necessarily convinced he said “yes” first and then said that Marxism achieved popularity in 
Mexico because of the “anti-Yankee feeling people have in Mexico even if they do not speak 
it out”. I could not collect further statements from this interviewee on my research topic, 
however, I could ask him about the concept of “Guadalupan Marxist” which, I said, I had 
heard from a couple of lecturers. In a different, perhaps less critical tone to the one he had 
used to refer to Catholic universities and religion in general (chapter5 ), Gregory stated that 
Guadalupan Marxism had “started with the University workers’ union”, and then he 
explained to me:  
 
I participated in the union’s foundation in November 1972; it was [called] 
Guadalupan Marxism because one of the things the union accomplished was to make 
the university to set December 12th as a holiday, so workers could go in procession 
to the [Virgin of Guadalupe] temple 
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In MxC as well, Joseph explicitly stated that his sociology studies were unrelated to religion. 
Although I could not ask Joseph further questions about my research topic, his statement 
about “setting a considerable distance from the Church” when he started to attend university 
and his emphatic statement on him not attending Catholic temples and not participating in 
Catholic organisations (chapter 5, “Present Catholicisms” section) indicate that Joseph might 
hold a secular personal position with regard to Sociology and Catholicism. During our 
interview Angela reported holding a similar position. Yet, unlike my interview with Joseph, 
my interview with Angela was more productive on this particular topic. Angela explicitly 
stated that she studies,  
 
how all societies have, like Durkheim says, a religious attitude, very secularised 
though. You can see it [religious attitudes] in the rites, in many things that are not 
necessarily religious, but lay, secular. 
 
I then suggested that the “skeleton” of societies such as Mexico’s might not be secular but 
still religious. Angela reiterated, “yes, the skeleton of societies is highly religious”. After this 
I asked the interviewee her opinion on whether people’s habits and concepts on authority 
could be partly shaped by Catholic discourses. Angela said “it could be; there is still this 
relationship between Catholicism and authorities”. Later during the interview we talked 
about what seemed to be some Mexican academics’ habit of referring to classic sociologists 
as authoritative sociological arguments per se. “I want to know” I began to say, “whether 
those ways of approaching classic sociologists are related to…”. Then Angela completed my 
sentence “to the figure of the priest […] yes our classic authors are like priests […] the 
symbol of the priest”. Angela continued, “you can play with these symbols [in your research], 
with these representations; you will see, the school for example is a ritual, is a world of 
rituals”. After I briefly told Angela about some interviewees’ answers being grounded in the 
constitutionally-secular status of public education in the country, she replied: 
 
That is very interesting. We are all sociologists but ignore sociology, because all the 
classic sociologists […] have talked about religion, they have addressed it as a topic 
for sociological reflection […] I do not know what the answers are in other countries 
but in this school it is surprising and disappointing that they [interviewees] say to 
you things like that. That is to ignore sociology […]. I agree, education in Mexico is 
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[constitutionally] secular, of course it is secular, but what does that have to do with 





In the following lines I will group the lecturers’ individual replies into more concise types of 
positions and themes –in these I will occasionally include the data I have presented in 
chapter 5 as well. 
 
Lecturers’ opinions on the influences of Catholicism in society in general were actually 
consistent. For instance, Julia’s statements on Catholicism in Aguascalientes determining the 
criteria for the ‘good’ son/father/employee and ‘what is right and wrong’ are strikingly 
similar to MxC lecturer Peter’s statements about the prevalence of ‘god-devil, heaven-hell 
schemes’ that drive ‘people’s behaviour’ and ‘the good-the evil’ distinctions that ‘rule’ 
people’s ‘lives’ (chapter 5). These reported links between Catholicism/Catholic discourses 
and ‘people’s behaviour’ or their ‘criteria’ of right and wrong do correspond to, and are 
basically summed up by, Laura’s explicit statements on the scheme of ‘social values’ in 
Mexico being “very similar” to the Catholic scheme of moral values –and her personal case 
being “the same story”.  
 
Although focused only on ‘detrimental’ consequences, Rachel’s statement about the 
‘impossibility to separate’ the Catholic Church from the rather ‘negative’ influence it has had 
in ‘people’s way of thinking and acting’ (chapter 5) are actually consonant with the 
assertions of the four lecturers above. Suzanne’s statements on the relation between 
Catholicism and ‘conservative’ thinking, fits neatly as well into Rachel’s explicitly critical 
statement. A similar parallel can be drawn from Michael’s statement on the relation between 
‘traditionalism’ in Aguascalientes’ social context and corresponding ideological and 
religious discourses. Both the statements about ‘negative’ effects and the somewhat more 
neutral statements on the scheme of moral values (‘right/wrong’; ‘the good/the evil’) being 
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similar to the ‘scheme of Catholic values’ are entirely consonant with Angela’s opinion on 
the operation of a broader ‘religious configuration’ in secular societies in general.  
 
Lecturers’ views on the possible effects of Catholicism in sociology were mostly cautious 
and rather brief, oppositional or absent. Laura, for example, agrees about the prevalence of a 
Catholic idea of ‘service’
187
 but restricts it to ‘social work’ practitioners. She agrees as well 
on a parallel relation between dogmas and vertical authority figures in the Catholic Church 
and corresponding elements in academia, but for Laura this is just a possibility. On a similar 
topic, Peter’s position was clearer though: there is a ‘transposition’ from the priestly model 
of authority to the lecturer’s authority in the classroom, which is a relation whose possibility 
Angela explicitly suggested as well.  
 
In a series of longer responses Edward agreed on the possibility of a link between 
Catholicism and sociology via ‘schemes of ideas’, e.g. dichotomies, and not specific ideas 
per se –a proposition that is, indeed, totally consonant with Julia’s statements on the Catholic 
right-wrong criteria, and Peter’s ideas on the Catholic god-devil and heaven-hell ‘schemes’ 
driving people’s lives. Perhaps related to this ‘scheme of ideas’ too is Edward’s assertion 
about researchers’ ethics codes being formed out of the Catholic ‘environment’ and changing 
this religious imprint only in a ‘few cases’. Indeed, an example of such a scheme of values 
might be the ‘hard work’ family value Rita personally expressed in unambiguous statements 
and afterwards denied.  
 
Another possible relation, explicitly noted by Edward and Michael, and thoroughly, yet 
indirectly, stated by Norma as well, is the case of Marxism not only as an “orthodox”, 
“primitive” or “dogmatic” paradigm (chapter 4) but also as “a church” or “a religion” in 
Mexico. What does this exactly mean for these respondents? Edward sees both Marxism 
constituting ‘a belief’ similar to those in an organised religion and Marxist ‘strict authority 
practices’ similar to those of ‘religious congregations’. More critically, he also sees 
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 Which may certainly constitute a ‘companion’ of corresponding Catholic moral values or a 
Catholic moral value as such. 
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‘intellectual submission’ and ‘beliefs without reflection’ in both Marxism and Catholicism. 
Michael sees both institutions as ‘doctrines’ based on ‘orthodox’ discourses and seeking 
‘social transformations’. Although Norma does not see links between Catholicism and 
Marxism, she interestingly described the latter as ‘a religion’ too, that even ‘served the same 
functions’ as Catholicism in the sense of ‘the good and the evil’ as well as ‘salvation’. Here 
Brigitte’s statements on Marxism are also important. Whereas Brigitte initially perceived 
Marxism as ‘diametrically opposed’ to Catholicism, she then perceived a familiar 
‘orthodoxy’ as well. 
 
Now, is what the sociologists stated in terms of possible or actual relations between 
Catholicism and sociology/Marxism consistent enough as to be the bases of a more detailed 
and specific analysis? Next I will analyse the lecturers’ replies by contrasting them with the 
empirical evidence presented in previous chapters. 
 
 
III. Lecturers’ responses compared to evidence 
 
All the replies I have reported above are relevant and meaningful in empirical and individual 
terms. These replies are perfectly consistent with the lecturers’ critical positions towards the 
Catholic Church (chapter 5) and some lecturers’ open defence of ‘secular education’ and the 
constitutional secularism that prevails, at least discoursively, in the country –normative-
epistemic paradigms of secularism (Casanova 2009) which emerge from a particular and 
justified, although not necessarily accurate (chapter 3),  interpretation of secularisation in 
Mexico as a full political-cultural-ideological separation between Catholicism and the 
Mexican state, and Mexican state institutions including public universities. Rather 
unsurprisingly, most of these replies seem to rest upon the assumption that Catholicism does, 
or may, have ‘negative’ effects in people’s ‘thinking’ and acting’ and does, or may, have 
detrimental consequences (e.g. conservativeness, traditionalism, authoritarianism) in 
sociology and sociologists as well. This assumption, I argue, suggests two further findings. 
Firstly, it reveals the heavy influence that the Western secular/ist scientific paradigm/s 
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(Calhoun et al. 2011; Casanova 2009, 2011; Bremer 2008) have in these lecturers and in the 
conceiving and operation of the academic/scientific communities they belong to. Secondly, it 
also suggests the assumption and prevalence of a Mannheimian sociology-of-scientific-
knowledge perspective in which the ‘social elements’ or ‘social factors’ in science and 
scientific knowledge are regarded not as inherent constituents but as unwelcome pollutants
188
 
(Bloor 1976; Douglas 2002). Given the evidence that I have presented in chapter 3 in terms 
of the major historical relevance of Catholicism and the current pervasiveness of ‘official-
institutional’ and ‘folk’ Catholic discourses in this country, the question is then: can the 
lecturers’ “Mannheimian” (normative) accounts and comments be complemented by a non-
Mannheimian interpretation of science that does not assume the pollutant character of ‘the 
social’, e.g., Catholicism and Catholic discourses, but its intrinsic ‘contributions’ to the 
formation of scientific knowledge –regardless of the ‘negative’, ‘positive’ or ‘neutral’ 
qualities of those contributions? I will offer such a complementary analysis in the next 
paragraphs. This analysis will be based on the evidence that I presented in chapter 5 and, 
occasionally, on some of the theoretical statements and empirical findings in chapters 3 and 
4 as well. 
 
In his Weberian ‘thesis’ Merton (1938) stated, regarding science in 17th century England, 
that  
 
the mere fact that an individual is nominally a Catholic or a Protestant has no 
bearing upon his attitude toward science. Only in so far as his thought and behaviour 
is actuated and directed by their respective values does his religious affiliation 
become significant. (1938: 479) 
 
If sociology lecturers’ ruptures with Catholicism are only partial and their current religious 
profiles may be described as ‘non-practising believers’ – e.g., believers of a God/entity and 
its explanatory/intercessory powers (chapter 5) – do they ‘believe’ in Catholic moral values 
as well –as Laura and Edward suggested explicitly and Julia, Peter, Michael, and Suzanne 
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Catholic notions of purity/impurity shape the conceiving of (pure) ‘secular science’ models in this 
society and others? 
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partly confirmed? Or, even if they do not ‘believe’ in those values, would they base their 
‘thoughts and behaviour’ (Merton 1938) on them anyway? Not only Edward’s explicit 
statement on the matter but also his complaint about the Catholic social teachings being left 
aside by the Catholic Church, and his own ‘extreme’ Catholic background suggest Edward 
currently holds moral values that not entirely yet partly correspond to those of Catholicism. 
But what about the sociology lecturers that did not attend Catholic seminaries, yet grew up in 
likewise Catholic practising families? Laura unambiguously accepted that her moral values 
correspond to Catholic values. Interestingly, she also stated that her school training seemed 
to be tacitly based on the Catholic formula ‘seeing, judging and acting’. In Rita’s case the 
parallel between her moral values and the Catholic discourses is not explicit yet it would be 
clear too. From the outset Rita stated one of the differences between the Catholic and the 
public schools she attended was ‘everything related to values formation’. Although this may 
represent only minimal evidence, her statements on attending Catholic mass are, I think, 
more conclusive. She finds convenient the ‘messages’ by priests about ‘strengthening respect 
to others’, ‘respecting people’, ‘appreciating people’, ‘helping’ and ‘giving support’. 
Moreover, when I asked Rita whether she would draw from these principles to lead her 
relations with her current university students, she replied: 
 
Yes maybe, I sometimes feel that my students are like my sons, I mean this is my job, 
so in that sense I try to do it as best as I can, [and also] help people to gain 
knowledge on their own […] Unlike other lecturers who are very greedy with their 
knowledge, I am not, I try to share with my students all I have, so I borrow them my 
books, materials, everything 
 
This is a strikingly similar answer to that from the assistant editor of the sociology journal in 
MxC’s university I interviewed. This assistant editor stated that she participated in the 
“Christian youth movements” that were related to “one of the streams of Theology of 
Liberation”. After this, she reported having experienced “the following of Christ” through 
her activities of evangelisation in deprived communities in the country. Then, without me 
asking, she said,  
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I do not participate in those communities anymore. But I do think that in my job I do 
have this [Christian] human value
189
, I do think I have it, so I try to give my best to 
people. I do not participate in any Catholic group now though 
 
Back to sociology lecturers in AgC, less explicit yet evident, is Julia’s case too. Her 
statements on ‘things getting relaxed’ in terms of Catholic social values might indicate that 
she agrees with people ‘prioritising’ those values in a different way; yet this statement also 
portrays a respondent that is still holding Catholic social values themselves as criteria to 
assess the extent to which ‘things’ are ‘relaxed’. Julia’s explicit statement on people in AgC 
being determined by the Catholic criteria of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ does strengthen this 
inference. 
 
Whereas Michael’s rupture with the Catholic Church seems to consist of a breaking-up with 
the institution and its ‘repression’ (chapter 5), there are probabilities of the once ‘very-
religious’ Michael holding notions about what ‘the right’ is (Julia, Peter) that seem to be 
directly connected to the Catholic notions on what is morally or ‘ethically’ right. For 
instance, in our interview, Michael criticised the corruption within the Catholic Church: it 
“plays on ethical issues”
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, he stated. Where did Michael get his criteria to judge ‘ethical 
issues’ from? After observing Catholic rituals and attending Catholic groups weekly during 
his childhood and early teenage hood, did Michael acquire a totally new set of social values 
from the university and his sociology courses? It is possible. However, lecturer Edward 
would say that the personal ‘erasing’ or ‘oblivion’ of Catholic values would happen in just a 
few individuals, including social researchers. 
 
From Norma’s perspective in MxC, those ‘new social values’ do come from the university or 
the public higher education community. Norma reported receiving training of an ‘ethical’ 
type at the university, where she reportedly learnt about Mexico being ‘deeply unjust’ and 
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 Literal translation. The interviewee referred to a single ‘human value’ (‘valor humano’), she did 
not expand on this though. 
190
 Michael told me one of his wife’s nieces was baptised twice by the same priest. The first baptism 
took place after the girl was given a fatal medical diagnosis; the second baptism happened after the 
girl recovered. Michael reported the priest charging the girl’s parents twice for his services. Michael’s 
literal words were: “those ways of corruption are unacceptable. I do think religious beliefs should be 
taken seriously, right? […] I cannot conceive the religious practice being sold, because your are 
playing on ethical issues” 
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‘wealth’ being inadequately distributed (chapter 4). But, are these statements not very similar 
to those of the donation box in MxC’s bus station, where a text exhorts people to donate 
money for a Catholic shelter for ‘kids and teenagers’ who ‘suffer the moral, social and 
economic disequilibrium of the current world’ (chapter 3)? Whether the university as social 
institution reproduces and instils in students moral notions that are parallel, or not, to 
Catholic discourses is a question that I cannot answer here exhaustively. However, the data I 
presented in chapter 3 about the historical saliency and ideological role of Catholic 
discourses in Mexico and the evidence I presented in chapter 4 about both the traces of 
Catholic/Christian thinking in the country’s early sociological discourses and the current 
prescriptive-interventionist sociological rationales in Mexico, does suggest that sociology 
and the university in Mexico would not produce, despite their secular legal status, social 
values that run against those of the Catholic Church –except clearly for those on sexual 
morals, euthanasia and abortions (chapter 3). Both Catholic Church and universities would 
share a particular set of common discourses, with different justifications yet similar value-
frames, on the overcoming of poverty and injustice.  
 
Yet it can still be argued that cases such as Norma’s might be one of those few cases where 
the ‘erasing’ (Edward) of Catholic values did take place. Interestingly, Norma reported 
during our interview that the teachers in the Catholic schools she attended insisted before 
students on specific ‘ways of acting’ based on ‘a series of principles’ –her American-priests 
school insisted on principles of ‘what is right’, ‘what is good’, her Mexican Catholic-nuns 
school did it on principles or ‘ideas’ of ‘guilt’, ‘hell’ or ‘sin’. In the same sense, what is 
interesting and further revealing is this lecturer’s critical comment about drug traffickers 
killing people and, improperly, giving donations to the Church afterwards; or her literal 
complaint about husbands not fulfilling the monogamy principle and so cheating on their 
wives
191
. What is more, in these two discursive instances of the lecturer’s moral position – as 
in most of the critical statements by sociology lecturers in chapters 4 – there is not a 
relativistic approach to the judging of drug traffickers’ donations and unfaithful husbands, at 
                                                 
191
 After complaining about drug traffickers’ donations, Norma criticised as well men who, once 
married by the Church, cheat on their wives “every time they can”, which is, Norma said clearly upset, 
“a daily-life thing here”. 
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least not implicitly or explicitly evident during our interview. What was evident during my 
interview with this sociology lecturer and others were (i) reports of lecturers being told by 
relatives about Catholic dichotomistic metaphors such as ‘the angel’ and ‘the devil’ in 
Edward’s case or about ‘the devil’ in Peter’s case; and (ii) reports of lecturers being told at 
Catholic school about both ‘sin’ and ‘hell’ and what is ‘right’ and ‘good’, as in Norma’s case. 
This evidence suggest that some or most of the moral values that sociology lecturers hold 
would not only be fundamentally linked to their Catholic backgrounds –e.g. relatively-
observant Catholic families, Catholic schools, experiences with priests, etc – but would also 
lie upon a dichotomistic-asymmetric base, where relativistic judgements hardly have a place, 
since social phenomena would be judged according to simple right-wrong, good-bad 
‘schemes’ –see above, for instance, Edward’s dichotomistic judgements of ‘traditional’ and 
‘enclosed’ Mexican Catholic seminaries and ‘liberal’ and ‘open’ religious atmospheres in 
Italy; Laura’s critical statements on ‘liberal/revolutionary’ and ‘conservative’ nuns (chapter 
5); or Gregory’s ‘fighter’ and ‘office-worker’ Marxists (chapter 4). I do not think these are 
‘schemes’ I have forced my data to show. Firstly, these are the type of ‘dualistic schemes’ 
that Edward, after my suggestion, accepted as possible reproductions by scholars from 
Catholicism. Secondly, these are exactly the same moral-values dichotomistic schemes that 
Julia and Peter explicitly reported as coming from Catholic discourses and ‘determining 





Sociology lecturers suggested or agreed on a series of resemblances between Catholicism 
and sociology as well as on possible or actual influences from the former on the latter in 
terms of i) ‘vertical authorities’ structures (Angela, Laura, Peter), ii) priest-like authority 
models (Angela, Peter; see also Castañeda 2004), iii) dichotomistic ‘schemes’ of ideas or 
good-bad criteria (Edward, Julia, Peter) and iv) Catholic and moral values (Laura, Edward). 
In terms of the similarities between Catholicism and Marxism, lecturers pointed out their 
parallel ‘strict/dogmatic’ authority practices (Edward; Brigitte), their shared emphasis on 
 202 
‘social transformations’ (Michael) and shared ‘salvation’ notions and ‘good/evil’ distinctions 
(Norma). If the Catholic values-sociologists’ moral values relation is contrasted with the 
evidence provided by the lecturers’ themselves, this relation seems to stand as an actual 
influence of Catholicism/Catholic discourses upon sociologists’ reported personal stances. 
The evidence I have discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 also suggests that this values-related 
relation may involve as well certain influences between the systematic dichotomies and non-
relativistic system of values in Catholic discourses (chapter 3) and the likewise dichotomistic 
and non-relativistic statements, ideas and opinions of sociology lecturers (chapters 4 and 5). 
Another interesting parallel or actual influence is related to the suggestion about a ‘Catholic’ 
(priestly/vertical) model of authority being somehow used or enacted (or ‘transposed’, in 
Peter’s words) by sociologists, and contributing, by extension, to ‘orthodox/dogmatic’ 
sociological streams such as Marxism in Mexico and the hierarchical authority structures in 
universities in general.  
 
But even if we escalate these parallels into actual influences and so take for granted Catholic 
discourses’ influences upon the sociology lecturers’ scheme of moral values or their 
authority interactions, what do these findings mean for ‘sociological texts’ per se  (chapter 2)? 
Do university sociology lectures or actual sociology publications authored by the academics 
above reflect and materialise the suggested parallels and influences? What can these texts tell 
us? In the following chapter I present an analysis of the lecturers’ sociological texts where 










In this chapter I will de-construct ‘texts’ (Fairclough 2003; Mason 2002). I will also de-
construct, and then re-construct sociological ‘discourses’ (Foucault 2002; Elder-Vass 2011) 
and, in a sense, I will ‘confer sameness’ (Douglas 1986). I will present and analyse sociology 
lecturers’ ‘texts’ - both published and unpublished academic papers and manuscripts as well 
as transcripts from voice recordings of university lectures and workshops- and will discuss 
their most frequent discursive features, or ‘discursive assumptions’ (Fairclough 2003; 
Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Mulkay 1993) as empirical evidence of the current ‘sociological 
discourses’ in Mexico, that is, as evidence of the most abstract rules of what can be said or 
not in the sociological field (Foucault 2002; Elder-Vass 2011).  In addition to this, I will 
simultaneously offer to the reader a picture of what I argue are the resemblances between 
Catholic and sociological discourses
192
, that is, their parallel prescriptive and normative 
bases, equivalent styles of critical thinking and stances, similar dichotomistic logics and 
analogous ‘power-over’ and ‘mono-causal’ views of certain social entities and social 
phenomena in general –see Figure 7.1 below.   
 
Some of the discursive characteristics I will identify and discuss in this chapter (Section III. 
‘Interpretative analysis’) will unavoidably appear as rather ubiquitous elements in any set of 
sociological/social science discourses flowing or produced in any region of the world. For 
instance, the ‘dichotomies’ and the ‘critical statements’ I will refer to in the following 
sections may be taken as building-blocks of any sociological account insofar as dichotomies 
may appear as the most basic cognitive classification at hand and criticism, in all its types 
                                                 
192
 Douglas asserts that ‘sameness’ or ‘similarity’ is not an inherent property of things to be 
discovered but an outcome we construct based on a surrounding “coherent scheme” (1986:59). I do 
acknowledge that the resemblances I will note in the following chapters are not findings I ‘discovered’, 
but similarities I have constructed based on both the ‘coherent theoretical scheme’ I discussed and 
presented in chapter 1 and the own accounts of the sociology lecturers I interviewed. 
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(social, cultural, explicit, implicit, radical, soft, pluralistic, etc), is invariably produced as a 
rather expected and highly-valued contribution of the sociological discipline. Firstly, I want 
to state that, except for my general concept of ‘prescriptiveness’ that the reader will find next, 
I will specify such discursive features in order to demonstrate their distinctiveness. For 
instance, I will describe sociological discourses in AgC and MxC not as ‘normative’ but as 
tacitly normative, or not as ‘critical’ but as socially and politically critical –with brief or 
minimal criticism aimed at theoretical or methodological issues. Secondly, and more 
importantly, I want to stress again one of the critical-realist arguments I noted in chapter 2. 
In brief, having the same ‘outcome’ here (e.g. Latin America) and there (e.g. Northern 
Europe) – e.g., normativeness, critical thinking, etc – does not mean the same ‘causes’ are at 
work here and there. In other words, I do not want to suggest that the ‘discursive features’ 
and the sociological ‘discourse/s’ I will present in section III, if found in other 
sociological/knowledge fields outside Mexico, must be necessarily explained by Christian or 
religious discourses too
193
. As said in chapter 2 from a critical-realist view (Sayer 1992, 
2000), causal accounts of social phenomena have to address the historical and contemporary 
contexts, particular conditions and the mechanisms linked to those conditions. And precisely 
this necessary ‘contextualization’ of causal accounts takes us to my next introductory 
statement. I would like to suggest that the readers, if possible, keep in mind, when they go 
through the sections of this chapter, what I have pointed out in chapter 3 about the historical 
(colonial, post-independence, post-revolution) and present intensity and extension of 
Catholicism in the society/ies I am analysing. I will then properly signal what I argue are the 
resemblances between the Catholic discourses I discussed in chapter 3 and the sociological 
‘features’ and discourses that I will present in this chapter. I will discuss at length in chapter 
8 the manners in which these two apparently oppositional discourses, usually viewed from 
science-versus-religion standpoints (e.g., chapter 6), do not only resemble each other but are 
causally related as well. 
 
 
                                                 
193
 Nonetheless, the extent to which religious discourses shape sociological/social science discourses 
outside Mexico/Latin America, e.g. Asian sociologies, or even ‘Western’ social sciences, remains as 
an interesting research object (Durkheim 1915; Sahlins 1996; Milbank 2006; Cannell 2005, 2006). 
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I. Sampling of texts and types of qualitative analyses. 
 
Fairclough (2003) states that his critical discourse analysis “can be productively applied to a 
sample of research material rather than large bodies of text” (2003:6). Indeed, sampling is 
not irrelevant in qualitative research (Mason 2002: 120-127). Having adequate texts-
sampling criteria in this research is fundamental for there is a possibility of biasing the 
selection of sociological texts and so choosing a priori only those texts that would more 
likely prove the Catholicism-sociology epistemological relations I am looking for. Sampling 
criteria also comes in handy in this research since the total number of publications by AgC 
and MxC sociology lecturers would roughly comprise one hundred texts
194
 –and unpublished 
academic manuscripts would constitute a further set of analysable texts as well.  
 
My first sampling criterion was ‘year of publication’. I analysed texts published after year 
2000, as this research is concerned more about the sociology lecturers’ current statements 
and discourses than on their gradual development –although the latter is certainly no less 
interesting and will be occasionally addressed. From a broad historical perspective, one 
decade might not convey enough significance, however a data set constituted by texts from 
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 That is roughly thirty eight published texts by Aguascalientes sociologists and sixty two texts by 
Mexico City sociologists. This set would contain texts with 3,000 to 100,000 word-counts. A 
conservative estimate of the total words that could be analysed from this ‘universe’ would amount to 
19 doctoral dissertations with a 80,000-words length.   
Catholic discourses 























Mono-causal and power-over views 
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the last ten years may well be considered theoretically and analytically relevant in terms of 
sociological discourses in Mexico today. Texts from before 2000 were included in cases 
where the most recent publications by the lecturers were inaccessible or minimal in 
quantitative terms. The second sampling criterion I used was ‘individual representativeness’. 
I focused on analysing at least half of the texts published by each lecturer in such a way as to 
have a ‘soft’ representativeness of the lecturers’ individual work and avoid studying a 
minimum number of texts that could be meaningless in terms of sociological ‘discourses’
195
. 
The final sampling criterion was ‘randomness’. I planned on analysing texts that I would 
select randomly from the set of post-2000 texts which would represent half of the author’s 
sociological production. In practice, this criterion could not be fulfilled in all the individual 
cases though. Whereas the texts I could collect per sociology lecturer represented, in most of 
the cases, more than half of the author’s production and therefore I was able to choose 
randomly from those individual sets, there were some individual sets of texts which I could 
not trace fully
196
. Another reason was the lack of access to the texts I knew the lecturer had 
published
197
. These practical difficulties aside, I analysed a set of 69 texts that comprises 
from 3 to 8 texts by each lecturer – see the last part of appendix 7.1 for minimal 
bibliographical references
198
. Sixty four texts are published materials –i.e., books, research 
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 This sampling criterion may be defined as the combination of two of Mason’s criteria: statistical 
representativeness and illustrative/evocative sampling (2002:125-126). Whereas this ‘individual 
representativeness’ criteria might not portray the complete range of sociological themes researched by 
each lecturer, it provides a fair and indeed representative illustration of their sociological discourses 
overall –I suggest so even if we ponder the abstract and empirical troubles in defining the “total 
population” (Mason 2002: 126) or ‘universe of discourses’ in each lecturer, in AgC and MxC and in 
Mexico in general. 
196
 The main reason was the lack of a list with the total published texts by each lecturer. Lecturers' 
curriculum vitae were of exceptional help, but the number of texts referred to there was frequently 
limited. Some of the lecturers did give me access to their published texts, in most of the cases this did 
not occur though. I must admit as well that I felt particularly uncomfortable asking lecturers for their 
publications, especially after I did perceive their uneasiness with the research topic. I did not want the 
lecturers to feel ‘scrutinised’ and I frequently ended up not asking them directly for access to their 
texts. 
197
 Some of these published texts were conference proceedings with only temporary electronic access 
or texts published in local journals or media with no electronic access or physically irretrievable. 
198
 As I mentioned in the methodology chapter I do acknowledge that the anonymity of respondents is 
indirectly compromised by making explicit references to the content of their published works. 
However, I cannot offer an analysis of sociological discourses and their links to Catholicism without 
drawing from the sociological literature published by the respondents themselves. I will only offer 
minimal bibliographical references in appendix 7.1 though and in doing so I hope to decrease the 
possibilities of full-identity disclosures –complete bibliographical references would be disclosed upon 
request; consultation with the authors would follow the requests. 
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articles, essays, commentaries or conference proceedings
199
 and five texts are conference 




The analyses of these texts included a series of gradual stages that correspond to Mason’s 
three types of data reading: literal, interpretive and reflective (2002:148-150). The first 
analysis was basically a literal reading to identify the most frequent explicit ideas and 
statements within and across the texts. Frequent ideas in single texts were targeted regardless 
of their specific location within the text –either in the introduction, discussion/analysis or 
conclusions. Frequent ideas across texts were located too, regardless of the texts’ main 
themes. This reading constituted a first elementary approach to the lecturers’ publications 
and may be described as well as an elementary content-analysis exercise (Silverman 1993: 
59). The second stage consisted of further analyses or ‘interpretive readings’ that yielded 
more ‘frequent ideas’ and the initial codes or categories by which sets of frequent ideas and 
statements were grouped. Similarities and minor differences between AgC and MxC texts 
started to appear in this stage. The third stage consisted of further interpretive and reflective 
readings that produced an account of the ‘sociological discourses’ in AgC and MxC. This 
last stage would constitute a discourse-analysis exercise, focused particularly on “discourse-
specific assumptions” (Fairclough 2003: 58) implicit in the sociologists’ observable 
sentences (Elder-Vass 2011: Foucault 2002).  
 
 
II. Literal analysis 
 
The full report of this analysis may be found in appendix 7.1. In this section I only want to 
highlight that the sociological texts I analysed contain a predictable thematic variation by 
single author/lecturer –e.g. Edward’s texts addressing organizational culture, corruption, 
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 It includes a couple of unpublished papers. 
200
 With regard to transcripts from lectures and presentations/workshops by lecturers, there was no 
sampling criteria as such, but rather a more practical ‘selection’, as the lectures and seminars that were 
recorded and transcribed are only those I could attend during my field work in AgC and MxC, 
certainly limited in number. These selections depended on my interviews schedule, but other than that 
my practical criterion was ‘randomness’. 
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religion, and other sociological topics– and, obviously, a greater thematic diversity by the 
group of lecturers in AgC and MxC –e.g. texts from MxC ranging from theoretical essays, to 
articles on racism, sociology of childhood, Mexico’s educational field, etc. Alongside these 
thematic diversities I found as well relatively constant ideas and types of statements (i) 
across single texts and across group of texts by individual sociology lecturers, and (ii) across 
sets of texts by groups of lecturers. Recurring ideas in texts by AgC lecturers are, for 
instance, ‘authority’ (Laura), ‘beliefs’, (Edward), ‘domination’ (Michael). Frequent ideas in 
texts by MxC lecturers are, for example, ‘laws’ (Rachel), or ‘social problems’ (Suzanne). 
Constant ideas by groups in AgC were ‘diversity’ (Laura, Rita) or ‘power’ (Michael, 
Edward). Constant ‘group ideas’ as such were not really found in the texts collected in MxC 
–except perhaps for the concept ‘neoliberalism’ in texts by Gregory and Suzanne (see also 
Abend 2006, cited in section below) . Instead a systematic type of statement was frequently 
found in MxC texts: strikingly critical statements, some of them made from Marxist 
standpoints. For instance, Gregory’s criticism of “capitalism as the dominant production 
mode” (2002:46) and his statements on health and illnesses in society being “caused by the 
ways society organises itself to produce and reproduce, that is, the dominant mode of 
production: capitalism”
 201
 (1999c: 9). Further evidence of critical statements was found in 
Peter’s texts, for instance, his literal statement: “I am convinced that Mexican society, 
especially in urban areas, is terribly racist and discriminatory” (2003: 257); or, “the most 
dramatic expression of human cruelty is with no doubt represented by German Nazism” 
(1997:141). The reader can find the full quotes in appendix 7.1. 
 
In short, the results of my ‘literal analysis’ are indicative of a multi-discursive sociological 
field in terms of both explicit ‘topics’ and explicit/implicit ‘themes’. There is, for instance, a 
series of ‘religions/Catholicism’ sociological topics by Laura, Julia and Edward or a broad 
normative ‘education’ theme by Suzanne, Joseph and Gregory. Whereas these sociological 
topics and themes provide glimpses of the sociological field in Mexico, I rather focused, as I 
have stated previously, on identifying and analysing the more general and abstract 
sociological “discourses”. 
                                                 
201
 Literal translation 
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III. Interpretative analyses 
 
After my literal/content analysis I moved on to a stage where a series of categories or codes 
(Mason 2002: 153; Silverman 1993:37) was elaborated by focusing on the whole set of texts 
by AgC and MxC sociology lecturers, rather than on single (thematic) groups. The evidence 
in these analyses is constituted by both explicit/observable ideas and sentences as well as 
implicit statements or ‘assumptions’ (Fairclough 2003: 55, 58). Based on this analysis I 
argue that sociological discourses in Mexico can be adequately characterised by a series of 
‘discursive features’. The data suggest that the sociological texts by both AgC and MxC 
lecturers do draw systematically from (1) a tacit normativeness,  (2) dichotomistic logics, 
and (3) social-political criticism, which are constantly, yet not always, combined with (a) 
prescriptiveness, (b) power-over notions and (c) mono-causal statements. Whereas the use of 
a ‘prescriptive’ logic was not particularly extensive in AgC’s texts overall, this feature was 
definitely more intense and extended in MxC texts. And whereas ‘mono-causality’ and 
‘power-over’ statements were recurrent in texts from AgC, their frequency decreases, only 
slightly, in texts from MxC. By reporting these differences in ‘usage’, I do not want to 
suggest that the six discursive characteristics I will refer to next are isolated and independent 
discursive ‘components’ sociology lecturers choose discretely. As I will discuss below, these 
features are mutually dependent and so represent the sociological “discourses” (Elder-Vass 
2011; Foucault 2002) that constitute, and are constituted by, the lecturers’ texts – irrespective 
of the finer sociological ‘arguments’, ‘themes’, ‘theses’ and ‘viewpoints’ and ‘theoretical 
frames’ these texts address explicitly. Having noted this mutual dependence, I will present 
and discuss each feature next and will note the parallels with the Catholic discourses I have 




In chapter 4 I have already presented evidence of the prescriptive-interventionist rationales 
that may be found behind, or below, the sociological (university/academic) fields in Mexico. 
The sociological texts ‘produced’ by the sociology lecturers who are part of this research 
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indicate that this ‘prescriptiveness’ is not only a ‘backstage’ element but also a visible 
feature of sociological texts per se. 
 
Statements with ‘prescriptive thinking’ were slightly more frequent in the texts from MxC 
than those from AgC. But except for some minor differences in ‘frequency of prescriptions’ 
across authors, explicit prescriptive statements were constantly found across the entire set of 
texts. They ranged from relatively specific ‘instructions’ to solve particular problems to 
general ‘suggestions’ for ‘better scenarios’. For example, at the end of his book chapter on 
‘Churches’ in Aguascalientes, Edward touches upon the idea of religious diversity and at the 
end concludes that “religious actors would have to be encouraged to go from tolerance of 
diversity to the richness of plurality” (2009b:189). During her presentation on ‘children’s 
perception of corruption’
202
, Julia stated the ultimate aim of the research project she was 
referring to was “to generate strategies where a new culture of anti-corruption is given to 
kids, in order to re-educate them in terms of values”
203
 (2010a). In their book chapter on 
Aguascalientes’ urban development Brigitte, Julia and the third colleague who authored the 
text concluded at the end: 
 
[T]here are two fundamental elements that have to be solved in the neighbourhood
204
: 
a) the availability of public spaces for culture, recreation and sports for teenagers 
and young people, and b) the elimination of drug-selling [...]. If there is something 
we must do, it is to create and renew spaces for culture, recreation and sports for 
young people (2007: 236) 
 
In MxC, Suzanne states, in her book on education, that “all levels of education, from basic 
[school] to university, must recover the humanist view for the education of new generations” 
(2006: 13). After this, the author states that “modernisation” in education “cannot be carried 
out without education being valued and encouraged in daily life work, with incentives such 
as fair salaries, democratic union relations […]” (2006: 43). After this Suzanne argues again: 
 
                                                 
202
 As part of a research conference organised by AgC university. 
203
 Literal translation 
204
 The neighbourhood the authors analysed and presented in the text. 
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Education is a profoundly human process and we need indeed to be efficient and 
productive. However, productivity would have to be considered as the 
consummation of men, of their rights; work is a conquest of man and if you do it 
[work] for love, it allows the affirmation of our human nature (2006:91) 
 
In another text, Suzanne openly states that the aim of social sciences and humanities is  
 
to discuss and analyse national priorities, social needs, values configuration, 
individuals’ culture, their participation in the country's life and the country's plans in 
political, economic and sociocultural terms (1998: 54) 
 
In MxC too, Rachel concludes her dissertation on family-violence stating: 
 
We, women who have attained greater independence and freedom, have to let others 
know the rights we have as human beings, the fights that have taken place to gain 
equality; we have to keep working to educate men and women […] We have to teach 
these rights in elementary school and universities, in our networks and offices, in 
hospitals, wherever there are discriminatory attitudes against women, but above all 
in the family (2000: 196) 
 
In his analysis of information technologies in libraries, Peter recommends that “library 
science should meet the demands and the complex needs of the new times; therefore it 
requires non traditional forms and settings (2002: 285)”. After this Peter also argues that: 
“society needs new ways of relationships, [new ways of] economy and labour [contractual] 
relationships” (2002: 290). More interestingly, in his text about ‘native communities in 
Canada’, Peter states that “the re-valuation of nature is a cultural need that has to be 
practised by all the inhabitants of the world” (2003: 268; emphasis added
205
) –in terms of 
‘universalisms’, I also find greatly interesting the statements of a speaker in an academic 
event I attended in MxC during my field work. The speaker was a member of a panel 
organised to present and ‘honour’ the work of a Mexican ‘classic’ sociologist (Pablo 
Gonzalez Casanova, 1922-). When the speaker praised the relevance of the Mexican 
sociologist’s theorisations, he also cited, as a “compliment”, Foucault and what the French 
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 In this and the following quotes from sociology lecturers’ texts, I will emphasise some words using  
an italic-letter format; those italics will signal my own emphasis unless otherwise stated. 
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scholar had reportedly said about the work of this Mexican sociologist: “Foucault says he 




Back to the lecturers’ texts, in the introduction of one of his books, Gregory states from the 
outset “this book […] arises from an interest to contribute to the solution of the country's 
socioeconomic problems” (2006: 17)”. Joseph, during his presentation on sociology teaching 
in Mexico, argued unambiguously that  
 
In its practical dimension, the sociological profession has an eminently social end 
and responsibility, as it is destined to study facts, phenomena or problems, in order 
to find the conditions and appropriate means to make human intervention more 
efficient, proposing actions in a conscious and motivated way (2003: 198) 
 
Briceño-Leon and Sonntag (1998), quoted in chapter 4, state that Latin America sociology 
has been involved in the ‘promotion of progress and development’ since its inception in 
these regions. During one of our interviews, sociology lecturer Michael stated that the 
research funding from the Mexican government is usually granted on condition that the 
researchers not only identify ‘social problems’ but also say ‘how to solve them’ (chapter 4). 
If Latin American/Mexican sociology, as a knowledge field, is prescriptive-interventionist 
per se and if the state figure is one of the main external drivers of these prescriptions and 
interventions, might the prescriptive statements I presented above have yet another 
complementary discursive ‘reinforcement’? In chapter 4 I noted that the sociological field’s 
prescriptive-interventionist ‘rationales’ do resemble the prescriptiveness found in 
‘institutional-official’ and ‘folk’ Catholic discourses’ (chapter 3). The evidence above 
suggests that the ‘all-embracing’ or ‘integral’ prescriptiveness of Catholic discourses is 
equivalent to the multi-thematic prescriptiveness of sociological discourses and is basically 
identical to some of the lecturers’ ‘integral’ prescriptiveness, e.g., Peter’s ‘re-valuation of 
nature by all the inhabitants of the world’
207
 (or the so-reported ‘universalist and 
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 I could not trace the source where the panellist originally took this quote from. It is, however, not 
too problematic to state that Foucault was not necessarily praising Gonzalez Casanova when he 
uttered these adjectives. It is the panellist’s use of these descriptors as worthy what I want to highlight 
in this passage. 
207
 See also chapter 4 and Peter’s critical remarks on Spanish researchers being “less advanced” 
compared to Mexican researchers because, Peter stated, the latter do know about “a general social 
subject” and so their “explanations” are “more totalitarian, more general” (emphasis added).  
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prescriptive’ sociological oeuvre of Gonzalez Casanova).  I will discuss in chapter 8 whether 
these prescriptiveness-related resemblances between Catholic and sociological discourses are, 
indeed, causally related and whether the former might be one of those additional ‘drivers’ of 





In his comparative analysis of peer-reviewed sociological articles published in Mexico and 
United Sates, Abend (2006) found that whereas only ten percent of the sociological articles 
published in United States
208
 contained what could be classified as “value judgements” 
(2006:22-4), eighty percent of the Mexican-articles sample contained this type of 
statements
209
. In this sense, Abend’s findings are equivalent to mine. In both AgC and MxC 
texts, and with an even greater frequency to that of ‘prescriptive statements’, a particular 
type of critical statements was constantly found in lecturers’ texts. These statements 
contained explicit criticism towards a series of political and social issues. A few exceptions 
aside
210
, similar critical ideas, remarks or commentaries focusing rather on scholarly 
literature as such (e.g., other scholars’ theoretical theses
211
, empirical findings, 
methodological proposals) were brief if not absent in the texts overall. Although a few of 
these statements (e.g. Gregory’s) are clearly based on critical Marxist tenets, most of them 
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 Abend’s sample (2006:4) includes 60 articles total, published between 1995 and 2001, i.e.,  30 
articles from 2 peer-reviewed Mexican sociology journals and 30 articles from 2 peer-reviewed 
sociology journals issued in United States.  
209
 As an example, Abend (2006:23) cites one of the ‘Mexican’ articles as follows “Salas-Porras’s 
(2000) article on Mexican entrepreneurs’ participation in electoral politics is full of trenchant censures 
of former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the then incumbent Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional. […] her (2000:77, 80) very approach to her main object of inquiry, the relationship 
between entrepreneurs and electoral politics, is by no means neutral” 
210
 For instance, the text where Edward (2009c)  discusses the sociological and anthropological 
literature on ‘culture’, ‘ideology’, as well as ‘sociology of knowledge’ and ‘social theories’ and then 
develops a culturalist ‘theory of social action’. Most of Angela’s texts are further examples as well. 
She discusses, for instance, the theoretical work by Durkheim (1989) and Schutz (2002). In these texts, 
however, these theorists and their work are ‘presented’, almost paraphrased, and not necessarily 
‘criticised’. 
211
 Again, Abend’s findings are comparable to mine. Abend states that the authors of the articles that 
constitute his ‘Mexican’ sample “have a very different understanding of the concept of theory. None 
of their theories is ‘tested’ by and related to the data in the U.S. [-articles] sense, and none of the 
articles explicitly say that theories ought to be tested by the data” (2006: 6) 
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do not appear explicitly embedded in any ‘critical-sociology’ paradigm. Either as part of the 
texts’ introductions, analyses, references or conclusions, these critical statements ranged 
from ‘mild’ to ‘strong’ judgements and alluded to different socio-political phenomena. 
  
Some of the statements presented above illustrate this type of criticism, e.g., Suzanne’s 
criticism of (capitalist) ‘productivity’ and ‘efficiency’ criteria in the educational domain. 
Further evidence is found, for example, in AgC lecturer Rita. While Rita illustrates the social 
context prior to her analysis of bolero songs
212
, she also describes the former critically as a 
historical period “where local customs have barely a space in a cosmo-vision charged with 
utilitarianism and immediatism” (2007b:121). No criticism of the scholarly work cited by the 
lecturer was found in the text. In her text on Aguascalientes’ community development 
Brigitte states in terms of housing-related issues: “There is no proposal from the authorities, 
what they do is give temporary solutions and cede to the pressure of lobbyists or the real 
estate business” (2006a: 10). Although in this text Brigitte refers briefly in two lines to an 
author whose work focuses on ‘public spaces’, she does not conclude by making critical 
remarks on this literature but rather by referring critically to local authorities: “If the city 
council does not take appropriate measures to soften the cost of [urban] growth, the future 
will not be promising” (2006a:11). In his book on female participation in multilevel business, 
Michael cites, and seems to agree with, a series of authors who address “the poor or null 
appreciation of women’s contribution to social and economic sectors of societies” (2005: 34). 
Later on in the same text Michael states “precarious work is like a cancer that sickens a large 
part of the work life” (2005: 97). During his seminar presentation about corruption in 
Mexico Edward stated the research he was part of was “aimed at fighting corruption in more 
efficient ways than those used so far in the country" (2009d: 414). Criticism of scholarly 
literature on corruption or other adjacent topics was not part of this text/presentation either. 
 
In MxC, whereas in her article on ‘scientific controversies’ Norma (2010) briefly criticises 
what she called the “minimal”
213
 and “radical versions”
214
 of “social epistemology”
215
 (2010: 
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 A type of slow-tempo music by single performers or groups. 
213
 According to the author, those strands that only stress the role of “social institutions” in “the 
division and organization of cognition” (2010: 126).   
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126), she seems rather to focus her attention on discussing whether “science” is “losing 
autonomy” and “being politicised” (2010:136) and so includes in her final conclusions 
explicit criticism towards, for example, economic and political “agents” which “do not 
respect the time required for scientific research” (2010:137).  
 
Gregory’s (openly Marxist) critical statements are explicit too. For instance, in his book on 
research methodology, he opens up the chapter on ‘selection of research topic’ by stating the 
following: 
 
Research choices in organizations are driven by the intellectual and political interests 
of leaders; just a few times the choices are based in an adequate prioritising leading 
to planning and programming of activities for social improvements. Research in 
research institutes is based sometimes on the researchers’ useless curiosity aimed at 
enhancing their profiles […] (2006:58-9) 
 
In this chapter, there are no references to further literature. In other chapters of the same 
book, there are some references to other (Marxist) scholars’ methodological strategies. The 
author, however, does not discuss those authors and their strategies but rather quotes them to 
support his views. 
 
Critical statements by Peter related to racism and discrimination have been presented above 
(section II). Further examples by the same lecturer are found in his text (1997) on indigenous 
population in Mexico and the EZLN army
216
. In the texts’ introductory sections the author 
draws from some historians’ accounts of the “indigenous genocide” of Mexico’s and United 
States’ native population. Peter’s text does not really discuss these accounts or other 
scholarly/sociological debates (e.g., about ‘violence’, ‘criminal behaviour’, etc.) but rather 
focuses on portraying the detrimental conditions of ethnic minorities in the country as the 
context the EZLN emerged from. The first lines of his final conclusions read: 
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 Those that hold that the “cognitive subject” is actually represented by the “epistemic community” 
and not the individual (2010: 126). 
215
 Without expanding further on this, Norma criticizes these two versions since both “overlook what 
is proposed outside sociology of science and so lack an adequate theory of society” which would have 
to offer “elements that account for the social conditions that have to be met for knowledge and 
scientific knowledge to exist” (2010: 126).   
216
 Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional – guerrilla-like army composed mainly of indigenous 
populations; rose up in southern Mexico (Chiapas state) in 1994. 
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Racism is a process that starts with prejudice; and discrimination, likewise, is the 
social expression of economic exploitation and political domination; and together 
they form an aberrant trinomial
217
 (1997: 167) 
 
In a sociological field whose functioning and very contributions are described as greatly 
dependent of the state’s agenda (chapter 4; Castañeda 2004), socio-political criticism (or 
‘mild-to-strong’ socio-political judgements) along with ‘prescriptiveness’ (section above),  
fit almost perfectly –either as anti- or pro-state agendas. Once the role of the state and what 
seems is Mexican sociology’s very nature are accounted for in the production of this ‘socio-
politically critical’ sociology, may we include an additional discursive influence? In chapter 
3 I quoted a series of critical messages by priests during Sunday-Mass homilies –e.g., ‘an 
ignorant Catholic is a Protestant for sure’; ‘I am just warning you that you are doing evil’. I 
also presented further evidence of the Catholic discourses’ critical tone in ‘official’ religious 
documents from MxC, e.g., in ‘handbooks’ about ‘The two best proofs of the Protestantism’s 
falsehood’, or ‘Television, the negative and the positive’. As I noted in that chapter, this 
discursive style seemed to be adequately summarised by a priest who literally stated that “the 
methodology” of the Catholic Church, i.e. its “see, judge, act”, still “remains”. Moreover, I 
also presented evidence that suggest that these, or very similar, ‘critical judgements’ may be 
also found in ‘folk’ Catholic discourses, e.g., MxC’s donation box for a Catholic shelter and 
its message on ‘the moral, social and economic disequilibrium of the current world’. If 
official and folk Catholic discourses ‘judge’ events, individuals and phenomena in general in 
such a ‘critical’ way and have the structural (cultural-ideological) presence that I have 
discussed, could they perhaps be related to the social-political criticism I have presented 
evidence of in this section? Laura, for instance, reported that her own Catholic schools’ 
curricula was based on this ‘see, judge, act’ formula (chapter 5). I will argue at length in 
chapter 8 the ways on which this and further evidence indicate that certain ‘models of critical 
thinking’ underpinned by Catholicism are echoed in sociological discourses.  
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When Abend (2006) discusses, from what clearly seems a Westernised standpoint
218
, the 
rather ‘lack of ethical neutrality’ across his sample of Mexican sociological articles, he also 
notes that the concept of “neoliberalism” in these articles is frequently addressed not as a 
merely “economic doctrine” but as “an economic doctrine […] that is conceptually incorrect 
and morally deplorable” (2006:24). Another category I propose here to describe my sample 
of sociological texts – tacit normativeness – would likely explain those ‘moral appraisals’ of 
neoliberalism that Abend reports. The tacit normativeness I found in the texts I analysed 
appeared directly linked to the ‘prescriptiveness’ and ‘socio-political criticism’ I presented 
above and is certainly more complex than the two previous ‘features’ as it is based more on 
unspoken assumptions than on explicit ideas. By ‘tacit normativeness’ I mean evidence of 
assessments or judgments of events, persons or actions that rests on what seems to be 
unspecified ‘ideal standards’, or ‘ways things/people ought to be’, that are implicitly 
portrayed as right or morally legitimate per se. This ‘normativeness’ is also a discursive 
feature that one of the sociology lecturers clearly touched upon during our interview
219
. Next 
I will present further evidence. 
  
Although not as frequently as in other lecturers, Laura’s normative statements based on 
‘ideal’ scenarios seem somehow to lurk in her texts. For example, in her book chapter on 
cloistered nuns Laura concludes: “the community [of cloistered nuns] becomes the new 
family, [which is] a social bond necessary for any human being”
 
(2007: 327). In another text, 
Laura describes a ‘Catholic association’ and reports its members holding “strong links of 
friendship and solidarity but with minimal democracy in the interior.” (2005:139). One of 
Julia’s first statements during her conference presentation on Marian Spiritualism referred to 
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 In his conclusions Abend admits that his comparative analysis “sides with the U.S. [articles’] 
epistemological approach” (2006: 28) 
219
 I quoted that statement by Michael in chapter 4; next a shorter version: “I think we do research 
having an ideal of the world, a political ideal […]. We are getting to a point of asking ourselves ‘ok, 
what should drive our scientific observations? […]  Because labour studies are being done with an 
ideal model of waged work […] however, it seems the precarious-work model is there and we base 
our criticism on a model, an ought-to-be model” (emphasis added). Although clearly explicit, Rachel’s 
emphases on ‘legal frameworks’, ‘laws’ and ‘human rights’ are also revealing –see MxC texts section 
in this chapter’s appendix.  
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Aguascalientes as “a purely Catholic state”. After this, Julia added, “but the centrality or 
homogeneity of Catholic religion has evolved little by little; now there is more religious 
diversity”. This is indeed related to the frequent scholarly portrayal of Mexico’s religious 
field as diverse, which I discussed in chapter 3 (‘People’s Catholicism’ section). What I 
argue here is that it seems Laura’s and Julia’s statements are based not on ideas of ‘family’, 
‘democracy’, ‘evolution’ and ‘religious diversity’ but on the what they regard as the ‘ideal 
representations’ of such phenomena. Whereas all these ideas would be part of any 
sociological discourse in and outside Mexico, they nonetheless appear in these texts as 
‘norms’ that are taken for granted and not discussed further.  
 
In her introduction to a co-edited book about Aguascalientes’ society, Brigitte states that “it 
is necessary to strengthen institutions that guarantee liberty, solidarity and capacity to 
communicate with each other” (2009a: 10). In the final lines of this text she also states that 
the very aim of the book she is introducing is  
 
to contribute to the reflection and dialogue about how we can live together, as equal 
and different [individuals], in a city that should open itself to diversity, by building-
up solidarity links and communication in such a way as to strengthen a true 
democracy (2009a: 15) 
 
In her text about community development, the same lecturer states,  
 
processes of development and urbanisation broke traditional, social and cultural 
practices that have not been transformed or substituted by patterns which guarantee a 
good quality of life and people's integral development (2006a:3) 
 
No definitions or discussions about “liberty”, “solidarity”, “true democracy”, “quality of 
life” and “integral development” were found in these texts. Similarly, in his book on female 
empowerment, Michael introduces his work as follows 
 
We tried, from the academy, to contribute to a world with less violence. Our work is 
not only a critical report but a reflection on the forms women use to fight against 
economic violence (2008: 10) 
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In his text on Catholicism and Pentecostalism, and their relationships to poverty, Edward 
writes about ‘believer’s prayers’ in a critical style, addressing and ‘normativising’ the notion 
of justice – which is, again, not discussed further: 
 
The idea of justice is absent in pilgrim’s prayers […]. From this type of religious 
perspective, having goods or not depends on God’s will. And whereas one seems to 
please the divine will to get goods, the same does not happen in terms of the goods’ 
just distribution, [because] justice is not asked and inequality seems as normal as to 
be ignored (2009a: 161) 
 
Less political yet likewise normative, Rita states the following in her text on bolero music: 
“Now more than ever, the commercial value of bolero is a very serious obstacle to 
appreciate the symbolic and cultural value of this type of music” (2003:346). This text does 
not include accounts of why music’s “symbolic and cultural values” are or should be more 
beneficial than its “commercial values”.  
 
As discussed above, in her article on ‘scientific controversies’, Norma criticises some strands 
of social epistemology for their lack of “elements that account for the social conditions that 
have to be met for knowledge and scientific knowledge to exist” (2010a: 126). Later on in the 
same text, Norma states, from a normative-prescriptive-critical stance, that the “time” 
allocated to research 
 
must be determined by means of programmes of the science system
220
 and not by 
economic and/or political interests […] We have to make sure that research and 
public debates are carried out in such a way as to respect the temporality that 
research requires […]. (2010a:137) 
 
Parallel to these ‘normativised’ account of scientific knowledge and ‘temporality of 
research’, Norma also suggests, implicitly, an ‘ideal/idealised’ portrayal of ‘politics’ when 
she asserts that “[t]o do science is not to do politics either. Science does not take decisions. 
That is the work of the political system” (2010a: 136). Normative (and prescriptive) 
statements are also found in Suzanne’s texts. In her book on education in Mexico, she states  
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 Literal translation. 
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the political and ideological fight
221
 in all levels of education and [in all] universities 
must be aimed at the formulation of a social project, where exploitation is reduced, 
more people are involved and our national identity is strengthened (2006: 12).   
 
The reasons why these three specific goals should be encouraged are not further discussed by 
the author. In his conference paper on sociology in Mexico, Joseph interestingly states that 
sociology “affects indirectly all society with the highest humanitarian sense, wellbeing and 
happiness” (2003:198). No further discussion of why the author appeals to these three 
concepts, or ‘norms’, is found in the text. 
 
Sociology lecturers certainly seem to differ in terms of what should be an ideal scenario in 
society in general and sociology in particular, and it is not my intention to analyse the 
ultimate goals of every individual sociologist in AgC and MxC. However what sociologists 
in this research seem to converge upon is not only the frequent socio-political ‘tone’ of their 
prescriptions and criticism (previous sections) but also on the corresponding idea that their 
research and academic work contributes, or rather should contribute, to fulfil a social-
political ideal or to materialise a social-political teleology –either by strengthening 
democracy, increasing religious diversity, contributing to a world with less violence, keeping 
the ‘autonomy’ of science or promoting wellbeing and happiness. In most of the texts 
collected these socio-political ideals/teleologies appear as self-evident and seemingly require 
no further sociological discussion. 
 
In chapter 4 I quoted scholar Aguilar (1995) and his critical (and indeed normative) 
statements about sociology in Mexico and its “turning back” to “normative” instead of  
“factual” judgements and “practical recipes” instead of “explanations” (1995:213-4). Once 
the inherent normativeness of sociology/ies in Mexico is acknowledged and not necessarily 
censured but rather taken as an ‘internal driver’ in its own right, may we ask whether this 
rather tacit normativeness is somehow related to the official-institutional Catholic 
discourses’ systematic normativeness presented in chapter 3 (e.g., constant references to 
‘God as supreme value’, ‘the sacrament of marriage’, ‘sanctity of life’, ‘the family as cell of 
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society’)? Or is it perhaps more related to the likewise normative ‘folk’ Catholic discourses 
in which, for example, prayers for parents may include ‘16 commandments’ and an 
imaginary kid saying to his/her parents ‘teach me how to improve when we are alone and not 
in front of others’ (chapter 3)? Taken out of the religious context I have analysed in chapter 3, 
these may certainly appear as odd questions. However, if there is evidence both of 
Catholicisms’ cultural-ideological centrality and of a continuity between the lecturers’ 
Catholic backgrounds and their current moral values (chapter 6), there are therefore clear 
suggestions that these continuities (partial ruptures) may be also related to the sociology 






In chapters 4 and 5 I presented and discussed several of the sociologists’ critical statements 
about Mexico’s sociological field, their workplace, colleagues, the Catholic Church and their 
accounts of their Catholic-school memories appear to rest on asymmetric dichotomies or 
asymmetric-dichotomistic judgements as well. In my analysis of sociological texts 
asymmetric dichotomies were found, again. The asymmetric dichotomies I found appeared 
alongside a series of symmetric dichotomies. The latter would be rather part of the expected 
vocabulary of any sociological account. For instance Laura’s usual remark on “rural” and 
“urban” communities” (2009); Rita’s statements about migration “from rural to city areas” 
(2007); Michael frequent ideas about going from “the traditional” to “the modern” (2008) 
society. These rather standard symmetric dichotomies, or sociological dualisms, were 
remarkably constant in the texts I analysed. However, in this section I will focus on 
asymmetric dichotomies and, particularly, the rather ubiquitous asymmetric dichotomistic 
logics in these texts.  
 
This type of dichotomistic thinking ranged from instances that imply a ‘mild separation’ 
between a two-elements frame to dichotomistic references that entail a ‘rupture’ between 
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two elements and/or an explicit sense of ‘one-sidedness’.  For instance a ‘mild-separation’ 
dichotomistic logic was found in Laura’s statements (2005) about Catholicism in Mexico 
and the cultural symbols related to the Virgin of Guadalupe: 
 
those symbols [Virgin of Guadalupe imagery] have been re-signified and have been 
separated gradually from Catholicism, and have been taken to other spaces, as an 
evidence of the loss of ultimate meaning that religion held and cannot offer anymore 
in a theological and general sense (2005:45) 
 
In this statement the ‘win-lose’ and ‘before-after’ situations the author is referring to seem to 
be arranged over a clearly dichotomistic view of reality where a social phenomenon is 
separated from what is taken as its ‘counterpart’. A similar, this time explicit, case of 
dichotomistic thinking was found in one of Peter’s texts, where he uses dichotomies as both 
his ‘data’ and his own ‘conclusions’. On the issue of racism, Peter first states that 
“depending on the ideology, there are differences that establish the belief on pure and impure 
races, or superior and inferior races.” (1997:141). After this he explains that “processes of 
social exclusion are linked to dichotomistic criteria: good, bad; inferior, superior; black, 
white; indian, creole; rich, poor; work, exploitation” (1997: 144). Then, using one of those 
dichotomies, Peter concludes: “racism in Chiapas has multiple forms, the first may be 
framed in the dichotomy indian-creole […]”(1997: 156).  
 
Further ‘separations’ are evident in one of Gregory’s texts, in which this author states, from 
an abstract yet clear stance, that “the drive for development is the existence of antagonistic 
poles that are found in relative unity and permanent fight (social classes for example)” 
(2006:52) –social classes which Marxist Gregory predictably terms ‘the bourgeoisie’ and 
‘the proletariat’ in other texts. Using a similar, dichotomistic logic and different content, 
Brigitte and Julia state in one of their co-authored texts on urban growth that  
 
the establishment of Inegi
222
 represented a watershed in the history of the city, that 
[…] marked the start of a social change with relevant social, cultural, economic and 
political implications” (2007:211) 
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 Mexico’s National Institute of ‘Statistics, Geography and Informatics’ –organisation in charge of 
national censuses and other statistical data-generation/storage/management macro projects. 
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What I think is relevant in the sentence above is not whether Inegi represented a watershed 
or not, but the fact that the authors seem to distinguish and conceive ‘before-Inegi’ and 
‘after-Inegi’ social reality/ies as two different and basically irreconcilable ‘times’. Similarly, 
in one of her theoretical texts Angela distinguishes from the outset: “two opposite traditions: 
the empiricist, which includes the positivist […] and the hermeneutic” (2001:199). This 
opposition is the criterion Angela draws from to organise and present her ideas in the text. In 
another theoretical text, this lecturer presents the idea of “the crisis of the natural model” by 
citing Giddens and Bernstein:  
 
In ‘The new rules of the sociological method’, Giddens – as well as Bernstein in 
‘The re-structuring of social and political theory’ – declare the end of the so called 
‘orthodox consensus’ (2001: 212) 
 
Then Angela confirms the ‘natural-model-crisis’ thesis and states:  
 
After the natural model crisis, this is, after the rejection of the idea of theoretically 
neutral observations and laws being no more the supreme ideal of scientific research 
[…], the problems about the meaning of action became highly relevant in 1970s-
1980s’ social theory (2001: 212) 
 
Apparently based on Giddens and Bernstein, Angela eventually seems to support an 
interpretation of social theory development based on a clear-cut before-after distinction. This 
logic is similar to the type of ‘rupture’ a reviewer finds in a book co-authored by Angela
223
 
and other colleagues, who discuss the development of a ‘first’ and a ‘second’ modernity. The 
reviewer argues that the authors imply that second modernity “erased” first modernity or that 
first modernity did not survive and was totally replaced by second modernity “as in an 
irreversible change” (‘Review of Angela et al.’ 2005: 453). Actually, some of the 
oppositions above could be actually termed ‘ontological dichotomies’, although this term 
would perhaps be too broad for some of the examples I present here. 
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 The reviewer uses the term “epistemological rupture”, borrowed from Althusser. 
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‘One-sided’, and rather explicit, dichotomies were also found in the lecturers’ texts. In these 
dichotomies the attention, conformity or antagonism of the authors seems clearly to stand on 
one single side of the dichotomistic frame/reference set by the authors. Peter’s ‘indian-
creole’ ideas and conclusions (above) are an example of this category. In his book chapter on 
everyday life, Edward distinguishes between “great collective” agents and “ordinary 
individuals”. After this, he states everyday-life actions  
 
“are not carried out by the great collective social subjects (social classes, heroes, 
great villains, politicians, women, indigenous) but by ordinary individuals, men and 
women” (2007:15) 
 
Suzanne (2006:63-64), in a combination of (Marxist) critical thinking and dichotomistic 
reasoning, argues that private business, unlike public universities and institutions, “train their 
own staff and, based on their interests and ideology, invest part of their capital in private 
schools, so profits become the main concern”. After this she states that in “private schools”, 
unlike public schools, having “innovative curricula depends on the demand of the capital and 
the reproduction and respect of the dominant ideology”. When Peter recalls Canada’s 
indigenous population selling souvenirs for tourists, he wonders about the meaning of those 
souvenirs as symbols, and then he, critically and sympathetically, states 
 
The question is relevant since the problem with ethnic minorities is more or less the 
same all over the world, that is, a subaltern culture versus a dominant culture within 
the limits of the nation
224
 (2003: 275) 
 
In chapter 6 I argued that sociology lecturers’ dichotomistic-asymmetric (non-sociological) 
‘judgements’ are constant and systematic and do seem to be related to the stock of 
(dichotomistic) Catholic values which sociology lecturers’ were socialised into. The idea of 
Catholic dichotomistic values finding an echo in lecturers dichotomistic judgements is also 
supported by some of the lecturers’ explicit suggestions on the values of researchers, 
academics and people in general being fundamentally linked to the ‘Catholic scheme of 
values’. During data collection I came across a volume on social science published in MxC, 
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co-authored by Mexican scholars based at different universities in the country. One of the 




Let’s say, metaphorically, that sciences are from earth, not from heaven or hell; but 
[let’s say] those earthly creatures that do science can reach heaven or hell. Thus, 
dualism is a limit that sciences have to admit […] all sociological thought that 
ignores the celestial or diabolic possibilities of actors, deserves to be called 
naturalistic, and that which takes for granted those possibilities may be called 
culturalist (Hernandez 1999:501) 
 
The sociological fragment above contains, just like the texts cited in this section, clear 
instances of what I called ‘dichotomistic logics’. An additional element here is the explicit 
earth/heaven-hell dichotomy which seems to be the ‘guiding metaphor’ in the author’s 
distinction between “naturalistic” and “culturalist” sociological thought. The question is: are 
the AgC and MxC lecturers’ sociological asymmetries presented above somehow being 
‘guided’ as well by the dichotomistic-asymmetric ‘scheme’ of lecturers’ Catholic (or 
Catholic-like) moral values and/or by the systematic dichotomistic messages found in the 
country’s historical and contemporary Catholic discourses –e.g., the heaven/hell, 






As the last quotation from Peter’s text above suggests, another category I constructed to 
characterise my sample of sociological texts is based on the lecturers’ constant statements 
about ‘power’, ‘impositions’, ‘dominance’, ‘hegemony’, ‘influence’, and implicit ‘denials’ 
or ‘underestimation’ of individual agency –some of them spotted since my ‘literal analysis’ 
(section II above). I called this group of ideas “power-over” notions (Hearn 2008, 2012). 
Instances of power-over statements in the data set were relatively constant and ranged from 
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 This author is not part of the AgC or MxC sociology departments I investigated. I include him in 
this section for he is also a Mexican sociologist and the passage I quote from him is a peculiarly literal 
example of the Catholicism-sociology parallels I want to draw in this chapter. See further citations 
from Hernandez’ work in chapter 4’s first sections. 
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soft and implicit references to individuals’ or groups’ ‘minimum agency’ to explicit and 
critical statements on ‘dominance’ and ‘exploitation’ –see also Abend
226
 (2006). Similar to 
the ‘tacit normativeness’ found in the texts and except for those statements clearly based on 
Marxists stances, these ‘power-over’ references were not necessarily discussed and framed 
in specific theories or paradigms but rather used as taken-for-granted depictions of reality, 
whose meaning was meant to be self-evident. 
 
In AgC, examples of rather ‘soft’ power-over thinking may be found in Laura’s texts. For 
instance her statements on Catholic associations “being used” by the Catholic Church; or the 
effects of religious diversity “forcing” the Catholic Church to adopt marketing strategies 
(2005:44). Slightly more explicit are Laura’s statements about Saturday-Catechism in 
Mexico as “ideological spaces of fight against the socialist education imposed by the 
Mexican government (2005:44).  
 
As cited in the ‘literal analysis’ section, Julia’s ideas on hegemony/hegemonic elements were 
frequent. Sometimes those ideas were mixed with references to a reduced self-agency, as 
follows:  
 
[Aguascalientes’] [s]ociety did not trust non-Catholic people because they were 
considered as deviants; […], for all women had to have null or minimum agency and 
could not be part of a religion that was not the hegemonic [Catholic] one. (2009:197) 
 
When Rita introduces her text on local radio industry, she states “when the Mexican 
revolution was over, a control over the radio broadcasting was exerted; this [control] made 
people move away” (2007a: 89). In her book chapter on boleros and female stereotypes, Rita 
refers to women “being discriminated” and to “an ideology of dominance of a gender over 
another” (2007b:162). On women’s social conditions too, Michael states:  
 
The condition of woman  implies a segregation that affects possibilities of work and 
income […] multilevel-selling companies take advantage of [women’s] historically 
imposed condition in taking care of the family and the household (2006:12).  
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"dominant classes" […]; "dominant power" […]; "dominant groups" […]; "dominant sectors" […]”. 
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About “work force” in general, Michael states that it “was defeated in the 1980s, now 
corporations and business seek non-conflictive places, cheap, skilled and docile labour 
force” (2006:19). Michael states too that “new ways of work bring colonisation of time, 
where work invades more spaces and relations (2006:21). In her dissertation, MxC-based 
sociologist Rachel argues “family violence is explained by the dominance and power 
relationships males have exerted over females for a long time” (2000: 3). In the same text 
Rachel states that “violence occurs in a process of interpersonal or inter-group conflict where 
somebody wins and somebody else loses” (2000: 77) – and then states that  
 
aggressive or violent  conduct is exerted over those who are inferior; when the latter 
are subjected to power their inferior position is reinforced […]. Thus individual wills 
are subjected to a social order that imposes or represses them. The person that 
establishes that order has power and in order to keep it, violence is exerted through 
force (2000: 77- 78). 
 
As part of his book on writing and oral-presentations skills for students and graduates, 
Gregory argues that  
 
“a person’s reality is conditioned by her specific historical context. The socio-
cultural environment that prevails in the family and school context, often restrains 
the development of communication skills” (2004:19) 
 
Then he states that “the educational system constrains or does not encourage 
communication” (2004:21). After this he argues “the traditional teaching-learning system” is 
reproduced in “the passivity of students”, hence, “the mechanical transference of knowledge 
leads to the submission of individuals, as the latter become mere data-receivers” (2004:27). 
In one of his texts Peters explains “dynamic” and “static” relationships in “concept maps” 
and illustrates the former as follows:  
 
Whereas static relationships determine hierarchical relationships, dynamic 
relationships defy them [...]. For example, whereas the individual will be always 
subordinated to the State and its social codes (static relations), the interaction 
between some sectors of the government and social subjects or civic groups varies 
[…] (2009:42).  
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Suzanne argues critically that teaching students how to think “may mean danger for some 
groups and people because it would pose a threat for traditional forms of authoritarianism 
and power” (2006:63). Then, more explicitly and drawing from dichotomies as well, 
Suzanne states that economic crises in “dependent” countries as well as technological 
development of “industrialised countries” and “fights for international hegemony” have led 
to “domination [from industrialised countries] over dependent countries” (2006:143).  
 
In the previous section I have suggested the possibility of lecturers’ sociological 
asymmetries being related to the asymmetric dichotomies found in Catholic discourses and 
to the corresponding non-relativistic dichotomistic (Catholic) values that do seem to be part 
of lecturers’ personal moral criteria. If the ‘power-over’ notions above do rest upon 
‘asymmetric dichotomies’ – in which ‘powerful entities’ on one side are conceived as 
winning over or controlling asymmetrically ‘powerless individuals’ on the other side –, are 
they also related to Catholic discourses in the terms suggested previously? Furthermore, if 
Durkheim (1915:361) noticed that scholars ‘believe’ in their scientific evidence just as 
religious believers believe in their Gods and rites’ efficiency
227
, and if the data in this 
research suggest that AgC and MxC sociology lecturers’ current beliefs do include a 
God/God-like entity that wields omnipotent ‘power’ (chapter 4), do these personal beliefs 
somehow reinforce the power qualities that lecturers attribute systematically to certain 
‘entities’ and individuals in their sociological texts? From a rigid secularist standpoint this 
question, I admit, is odd and even awkward. Nonetheless, if we place this question within 
both the pervasive religious context I have frequently referred to and the lecturers’ religious 
backgrounds I have analysed, the question about whether the lecturers’ own religious beliefs 
– together with the persistent remarks about God as ‘power’ or ‘creator’ and the Virgin/Holy 
Spirit’s ‘intercessory powers’ in Catholic discourses – influence their sociological power-
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A series of statements with implicit ideas of social phenomena being triggered off by one 
single cause was another relatively frequent characteristic in lecturers’ texts. Some of these 
statements were indeed found within passages that included power-over notions as well. 
Although this mono-causality would be indeed an ordinary ‘complexity-reduction’ rhetorical 
resource in scientific discourses, what I found further revealing is that statements that would 
suggest further reason/s or causes were not found in, or alluded by, these texts.  
 
Non-mono-causal statements – references to events being caused by more than one force, 
entity or circumstance – were found in many passages , for instance Rachel’s statement 
(peculiarly critical and normative, by the way) on “Mexican society’s deterioration” being 
caused by a lack of an integral development programme; lack of credibility in the political 
and justice system; growing unemployment; impunity; people's fear to report violent acts; 
collective and individual moral harm; increasing of poverty and lack of public safety 
(2000:1-2). However, I found, in both key and secondary passages, relatively constant 
references to social events being attributed to actions or failures by one single individual, 
institution or entity. For example, In one of his books, Gregory opens up a chapter stating 
“modern life generates barriers that inhibit communication at home, the school, the 
workplace etcetera”, and “this reality”, he continues,  
 
emerges mostly because of the implementation of the neo-liberal model in the 
educational field. The model trains individuals to satisfy the labour market’s 
expectations (2004: 29 –italics added) 
 
Rita states, in her previously-quoted book chapter on bolero music: 
 
this modernity has gotten into the individual sphere; it has allowed, among other 
things, the reduction of mortality rates, increasing in life expectancy, demographic 
growth, more competition in labour markets, increasing of schooling levels, birth 
control, etc ( 2007b: 121 –italics added) 
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Despite being somewhat vague, one of Brigitte’s statements on diversity in Aguascalientes is 
revealing too: 
 
Today, Aguascalientes’ inhabitants experience a diversity of people they did not 
cohabitate with in the same territory
228
, before the big changes brought by global 
economy” (2009b: 115 –italics added) 
 
Similar evidence was found in Michael’s secondary reference to modernity in 19
th
 century 
small towns “being brought by” multilevel selling companies (2008:99).  In terms of citing 
other authors who in turn refer to mono-causal notions, Norma’s text on Critical theory is 
also revealing. In this publication the lecturer seems to state categorically that Marxism 
“inherited from Hegelian thought” –and apparently ‘only’ from it – concepts such as “totality, 
dialectics, consciousness and reason”. Furthermore, right after this, Norma states “those 
concepts had been suppressed by the economic-like thought of the II International’s leaders” 
(1999: 239 –emphasis added). Similarly, whereas Peter states that the Canadian constitution 
acknowledges the rights of indigenous population since the 1970s, he explicitly argues the 
same legal acknowledgement “did not occur in Mexico, where [Mexico’s] president Salinas 
reformed some articles in 1992, so the decision was from the top and not from the bottom 
up” (2003:259 –italics added).  
 
In chapter 1 I presented Durkheim’s theses (1915) about the “religious origin” of the 
concepts of power/force and the (Aristotelian-Kantian) category of ‘causality’. Although I 
disagree with Durkheim’s analytical search for ‘chronological origins’, I would ask whether 
both 1) the lecturers’ beliefs in God/God’s powers and 2) the systematic references to those 
and other divine ‘powers’ (e.g., the Virgin’s) in Catholic discourses in society at large 
somehow shape the lecturers’ mono-causal sociological views and statements –e.g., the 
concepts of ‘modernity’, ‘neoliberalism’, ‘global economy’ and their apparently 
omnipotent/omnipresent qualities and effects? I will discuss in the next chapter whether 
Catholic discourses in Mexico are offering a particular model of causality (and power) that 
shapes the ‘mono-causal’ sociological statements above. 
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As I said previously, the sociology lecturers draw systematically not only from one or two of 
the ‘features’ I have presented above but from the ‘group’ of features, forming thematically-
diverse (individual) sociologies with a very particular collective mark, which cannot be 
reduced to the six characteristics I have presented but does include them systematically. This 
group of features, their emergent properties, and their collective operation represent, I argue, 
the sociological discourses flowing in AgC and MxC or the ‘rules about what can be said 
and what should not be said’ (Elder-Vass 2011) in this particular field. I support this 
conclusion not only because of the extensive (across texts) and intensive (within texts) use of 
the features, but also because except for Gregory and perhaps Suzanne – whose texts are 
based on Marxist standpoints – the prescriptiveness, social-political criticism, normativeness 
and power-over notions in the sociology lecturers above do not appear explicitly grounded in 
sociological paradigms such as the often-mentioned critical sociology of the Frankfurt school 
(e.g. Forchtner 2011) or some version of ‘public sociology’ (e.g. Burawoy 2005). Data in 
chapter 4 shows that, other than their Marxist education, sociology lecturers did not go 
through any relevant intellectual training based on these sociological paradigms. The lack of 
explicit references to critical or public sociology in the lecturers’ texts corroborates the idea 
that the group of features I have suggested constitute a rather ‘naturalised’ set of sociological 
“discourses” (Foucault 2002; Elder-Vass 2011).  
 
Without a doubt, these distinctive sociological discourses are causally related to the 
government’s demands (to ‘contribute to social policies’ and ‘fix problems’) that Michael 
reported and Castañeda (2004) summed up in his thesis about sociology in Mexico taking for 
granted  as its raison d'être the ideological needs of the Mexican state (chapter 4). In a 
discipline that has been taught and practised in a society for half a century or more, these 
prescriptive-interventionist rationales – along with their predictable normativeness and 
criticism – have certainly become a series of discursive ‘internal drivers’ in their own right 
which clearly seem to encourage likewise critical power-over views and mono-causal 
interpretations of social phenomena. But, once the roles of the State and the very intrinsic 
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(institutional) rationale and ‘nature’ of sociology/ies in Mexico are acknowledged as forces 
that do shape sociological discourses, what is the role, if any, of 1) Mexico’s historical 
(colonial, post-independence, post-revolution) Catholicism, 2) current Catholic discourses in 
both ‘official-institutional’ and ‘folk’ versions and 3) lecturers’ Catholic backgrounds? As I 
stated above, this is not an odd question.  
 
Except for some individual cases –e.g., Peter’s and Gonzalez Casanova’s ‘universalist 
prescriptiveness’ and Hernandez’ (1999) ‘heaven-hell sociological dualisms’– the 
prescriptiveness, criticism, normativeness and dichotomistic logics in sociological discourses 
are not strictly identical to the prescriptiveness, criticism, normativeness and dichotomistic 
values found in Catholic discourses. For instance, whereas most of the Catholic discourses’ 
critical statements that I have presented in chapter 3 seem to be aimed at Protestantism, 
‘pagans’ and ‘sex sins’, the criticism in sociological discourses challenges rather different 
phenomena. However, regardless of its themes, this criticism and the rest of discursive 
features I have noted above, are perfectly equivalent in one discourse and the other, as if one 
really echoed the underlying structure of the other. If the Catholic discourses have had the 
historical (colonial, post-independence, contemporary) and exclusive (quasi-monopolistic) 
role and cultural-ideological presence that I have constantly insisted on, and if sociology 
lecturers, despite their understandable secular stances and variations across individual cases, 
seem currently to hold not only Catholic-like moral values but also both similar non-
relativistic reasoning as well as beliefs in God or a God-like entity and his/its actual powers, 
could these discursive resemblances represent actual instances of ‘epistemological’ 
influences of Catholic discourses upon sociological discourses? If so, do these influences 
from one discourse to the other occur directly via Durkheim’s (1915) ‘imitative rites’? Or are 
these influences rather mediated by ‘social institutions’ with ‘cognitive properties’ that 
Durkheim (1915) did not look at but Douglas (1986), for instance, did address? I will offer 
next a causal account of what I call the ‘neglected epistemological influences’ of Catholic 




Catholic and sociological discourses: the causal links 
 
 
In the following paragraphs I will offer an ‘updated’ Durkheimian account of the causal links 
between the parallel discursive features in Catholic and sociological discourses I have 
discussed previously. I will first group the ‘features’ of sociological discourses I proposed in 
chapter 7 –prescriptiveness, etc– into a series of more manageable ‘discursive pairs’ where 
inferences are clearer and safer to draw from. I will construct my account of these ‘causal 
links’ based on Douglas’ thesis (1986) about ‘institutions’ making individuals’ thoughts –e.g., 
their ‘classifications’ (chapter 1). Thus, my account will include a series of ‘bridge 
institutions’ which, I argue, act as ‘transmitters’ of Catholic discourses. Some of these 
‘bridge institutions’ are readily recognizable material entities such as ‘Catholic schools’ and 
‘Catholic families/Catholic family practices’. Another ‘bridge institution’ I will discuss may 
be described as rather Weberian, as less visible than the latter, as religious – not necessarily 
Catholic – in a certain sense and as a crucial ‘model’ in the lecturers’ current academic 
practices. Going beyond Douglas’ thesis, I will argue that these ‘bridge institutions’ do not 
merely echo ‘official-institutional’ and ‘folk’ Catholic discourses separately but also reflect 
the society’s partly-Catholic ideological-cultural structures and all together, the ensemble of 
bridge institutions along with the society’s ideological-cultural structures, turn Catholic 
discourses and their apparently parochial flow into a subtle, almost imperceptible yet intense 
and extensive ‘discursive offensive’
229
 –with no comparable rival in the religious-cultural 
arena. However, departing from Douglas’ deterministic views (Coser 1988b:88; Latour 
1988:384), I will argue that these institutional and structural Catholic discourses and their 
emergent ‘epistemological’ charge do not determine sociological discourses (including 
Marxism) but do predispose sociology lecturers (Elder-Vass 2011) to adopt the discursive 
characteristics I analysed in chapter 7.  I will at the end address the case of Marxism in 
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 I am deliberately using the term ‘discursive offensive’ as a martial metaphor that can convey 
graphically the complex operation and emergent powers of otherwise neglected Catholic discourses in 
this country.  
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Mexico as a perfect example of the discursive echoing/offensives I will account for in the 
next sections.  
 
In order to depict the relevant institutions, structures and conditions in my causal critical-
realist account I will, as I did in the previous chapter, draw from the data presented in 
chapters 3 and 4, (contextual-structural analyses) and from the particular events and 
statements reported in chapters 5 and 6 (interpretive analyses). Next I will start by 
accounting for the pair of most frequent discursive characteristic I introduced in chapter 7.  
 
 
I. Normative and dichotomistic logics 
 
Although my data indicates a striking parallel and potential causal links between Catholic 
discourses’ all-embracing or ‘integral’ prescriptiveness (Blancarte 1996; chapter 3) and the 
instances of both ‘universalist prescriptiveness-normativeness’ in lecturer Peter’s texts and 
the putative ‘universalist and prescriptive’ sociology of Mexican classic sociologist 
Gonzalez Casanova, here I rather focus on the type of normativeness that I found more 
frequently in the set of sociological texts.  As I said previously, many of the dichotomistic 
statements and passages presented in chapter 7, just as most of the Catholic-discourse 
fragments analysed in chapter 3, include asymmetric statements– e.g., Brigitte’s separation 
between ‘before-Inegi’ and ‘after-Inegi’ where crucial social changes would occur only in 
the after-Inegi ‘side’; Angela’s ‘first’ and ‘second’ modernities, which even a reviewer finds 
suggesting that the latter ‘erased’ and replaced the former; Suzanne’s pro-capitalist 
(detrimental) private schools versus non-capitalist (beneficial) public schools, etc. Just as 
Suzanne’s analytical distinction above clearly indicates, I argue that it is in these 
dichotomistic asymmetries – most of them non-relativistic too, or based on ‘either/or logics’ 
(Zerubavel 1999), just as those in Catholic discourses – where one can find one of the main 
bases of the sociological texts’ normativeness. For instance, when Norma states that ‘to do 
science is not to do politics’, is she not assuming a ‘normative notion’ that rests upon a non-
relativistic asymmetric frame where politics and science are naturally oppositional and where 
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(‘bad’) politics on one side ‘contaminate’ (‘good’) science on the other side? Similarly, when 
Rita states that the ‘commercial value’ of boleros is a ‘serious obstacle’ to appreciate this 
genre’s ‘cultural value’, is she not taking for granted a non-relativistic dichotomistic frame, 
firstly, to assume normatively an ideal scenario where ‘cultural values’ should intrinsically 
precede ‘commercial values’, and, secondly, to judge so the current state of boleros? 
 
I am not suggesting that the non-relativistic/dichotomistic normativeness in sociological 
discourses is exclusively related to Catholic discourses. As I stated in chapter 7, the 
normativeness in Mexico’s sociological discourses has been documented by other authors 
and may be described as an inherent characteristic of the sociological practice in this country, 
substantially reinforced by the state’s direct (conditioned funding) and indirect (ideological) 
demands to contribute to the country’s development (chapter 4; Castañeda 2004). Whether 
the state’s demands for normativeness include dichotomistic-asymmetric frameworks, is a 
question this research is not really meant to answer. What I do argue is that sociological 
discourses’ non-relativistic normativeness not only resembles Catholic discourses, but also 
that the latter shapes the former. 
 
In chapter 1 I noted the possibility of classifications and principles of justice being 
elaborated and diffused, just as Douglas argues (1986), by institutions. This is a thesis 
Cipriani (2011) would probably confirm as for the case of ‘religious values’ diffused through 
specific institutions in Italy. What I argued in chapter 1 from a theoretical point of view is 
that the institutions diffusing these elements (classifications, e.g., dichotomies; and values, 
e.g. non-relativistic principles of justice) may not be the official Catholic institutions (e.g. 
‘the church’, ‘bishops’, ‘clergy’), which most of the sociology lecturers criticised heavily 
(chapter 5), but what I call ‘bridge institutions’, e.g. the family and its Catholic practices 
(Cipriani 2011). As I reported in chapter 6, all the sociology lecturers I met do come from 
family backgrounds where observance of Catholic rituals – and therefore close contact with 
Catholic discourses like those I analysed in chapter 3 – did take place to varied extents. For 
example, it is in this type of family contexts where Peter remembers being told by his mother 
to behave or else ‘the devil’ would get to him; and where Edward was also told by his 
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relatives about ‘the devil’ and was then advised to pray to his ‘angel’. Similarly, Julia 
referred to ‘praying the rosary’ with her mother and liking it –the reader may find interesting 
that one of the main prayers in the Catholic rosary, i.e. the Lord’s prayer, does contain the 
dichotomy earth-heaven
230
 that Hernandez (1999) uses in his account of ‘sociological 
dualisms’ (chapter 7, ‘Dichotomistic logics’ section). Angela did not refer to devils and 
angels or praying the rosary but, indeed, to ‘praying before going to bed’. Here I am not 
trying to imply that Catholic prayers during childhood ‘determine’ sociology lecturers’ 
thoughts in adulthood. Neither do I want to over-state the influence of Catholic prayers and 
their normative and dichotomistic contents –even when identical metaphors have an explicit 
‘sociological usage’ as in Hernandez’ (1999) passage above. I am merely suggesting that 
dichotomistic values and their corresponding non-relativistic base –or ‘either/or logic’ 
(Zerubavel 1999:56) – either in prayers, parental religious advice, and/or family religious 
rituals, were a relatively systematic part of the family discourses sociology lecturers were 
socialised into. Now, we could easily overlook and reject entirely the potential influence of 
these particular values and logics if we only look at family Catholic practices. However, the 
latter was not the only ‘bridge institution’ a significant number of sociology lecturers 
interacted with systematically. 
 
Most of the sociology lecturers in AgC, and a couple of lecturers in MxC, did attend 
Catholic schools and reportedly obtained from them particular memories and lessons 
(chapter 5; section I). In terms of dichotomistic-normative logics flowing from/within these 
Catholic schools some of the lecturers’ statements are greatly revealing. For instance 
Norma’s memories on both ‘very good’ and ‘very bad’ primary school priest-teachers who 
reportedly ‘insisted’ on both ‘what is right, what is good’ and ‘ideas of guilt, or hell or sin’; 
Rita and her explicit memories of Catholic school as ‘everything related to values formation’ 
and, interestingly, her report about nuns making a constant distinction between ‘rich’ and 
‘poor’ students. I propose to look at, and grant relevance to, the reinforcing role the Catholic-
school institution certainly had in terms of instilling (Douglas 1986) in sociology lecturers 
the non-relativistic values/logics their own families also ‘produced’ and ‘offered’ to them.   
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 Our Father who art in heaven, […] Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven […] 
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And yet Catholic family practices and Catholic schools are not the only ‘bridge institutions’ 
lecturers received normative and dichotomistic messages from.   Some of the sociology 
lecturers – e.g. Edward, Peter, Brigitte – also had additional, sometimes very close, contact 
with a particular type of Catholic official representative: priests. Joseph, for instance recalled 
how a talk with a priest meant for him the idea that, precisely as in a non-relativistic 
normative frame, ‘everything was prohibitive’. ‘Do not kill, do not do that’ were the priests’ 
non-relativistic statements Joseph reported (chapter 5; section I). Interestingly too, when 
Julia recalled her memories of priests, she used yet another dichotomistic metaphor –
“mediators between the earthly and the divine”– as if the figure of the priest was in itself 
evocative of such asymmetry. At this point the reader may want to recall as well the homilies 
and messages by priest I have presented in chapter 3, and their frequent dichotomistic and 
non-relativistic references – e.g. (good) love versus (evil) passion – as likely examples of the 
systematic discourses sociology lecturers once heard, and perhaps did ‘learn’, from the 
Catholic priests they had consistent or sporadic relations with. 
 
I argue that sociology lecturers interacted enough with the bridge institutions above 
(Catholic family practices, Catholic schools, Catholic priests) as to have received from them 
– just like Edward and Laura suggested and Peter, Julia and others confirmed directly and 
indirectly (chapter 6) – not only any set of random moral principles but rather a basic ‘stock’ 
of non-relativistic dichotomistic moral values (Cf. Merton 1938) as well as the 
corresponding bases of dichotomistic and non-relativistic reasoning (Zerubavel 1999). These 
values and reasoning would not deliver any epistemological effect over sociological 
discourses whatsoever if we isolate them and take them as elements of casual discursive 
interactions and random religious practices. This stock of non-relativistic values and 
corresponding dichotomistic reasoning that lecturers once heard from or learnt in not only 
one but three different bridge institutions does have the force to shape currently the lecturers’ 
sociological texts and discourses because such values/reasoning find an echo in the country’s 
greater cultural-ideological structures (Weber 2003; Merton 1938; Sayer 1992, 2000). It is as 
part of these structures that Catholicism and Catholic discourses have played a fundamental 
role in the past and currently have a more subtle yet pervasive presence in the country’s 
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cultural domain –e.g., just as in open-signal and non-religious television channels that 
broadcast soap-opera-like programmes where characters ask favours from the Virgin and 
‘almighty God’ and stress, in non-relativistic terms indeed, how some things in life ‘are good 
and others are bad’ (chapter 3, section III). These, partly Catholic, cultural and ideological 
structures actually depend on the Catholic Church and its official discourses but also on the 
very ‘bridge institutions’ sociology lecturers interacted with, and to some extent constructed 
as well. Combined together they – structures, bridge institutions, and the Church itself 
(however criticised) – subtly and almost imperceptibly ‘bombard’ the lecturer with 
statements charged with non-relativistic normativeness and dichotomistic logics. This 
structural-institutional ‘discursive strikes’, however overlooked by the lecturers themselves, 
may activate the normativeness and dichotomistic logics once ‘met’ or ‘learnt’ by lecturers 
in the past, and may eventually shape the lecturers’ sociological arguments and their 
sociological normativeness and dichotomistic logics not by ‘determining’ them but by 
predisposing (Elder-Vass 2011) the lecturers to adopt equivalent non-relativistic normative 
stances, just as the structural ensemble of institutions around them do (Douglas 1986).  
 
Moreover, these stances have further consequences in the dichotomistic-asymmetric logics 
of sociological discourses overall. They may additionally reinforce the systematic use of 
non-normative dichotomistic logics in sociological discourses. Sayer (1992:62; 2000), 
apparently based on Douglas (1986; chapter 1), states that there is a reinforcing “leakage of 
meaning” in sets of parallel dichotomistic concepts (e.g., thought-action, mental-material, 
mind-body) where the first element in each dichotomy (e.g. ‘thought’) not only reinforces its 
opposite (‘action’) but the other pairs’ first elements as well (‘mental’, ‘mind’) and by, 
extension, the whole set of dichotomies. I argue that a similar extended reinforcement takes 
place between sociological discourses’ normative non-relativistic dichotomies and the series 
of non-normative asymmetric dichotomies. Both underpin each other. If Catholic discourses 
shape sociological discourses’ dichotomistic-asymmetric normativeness in the way I have 
suggested above, therefore, Catholic discourses predispose, by extension, sociological 
discourses’ non-normative asymmetries and dichotomistic logics in general.  
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In this causal account I do want to highlight the role of both structures (Weber 2003; Merton 
1938; Sayer 1992, 2000) and institutions (Douglas 1986), the mutually dependent relations 
between them and, more importantly, the lecturers’ common yet distinctive and active 
experiences and interactions with the latter (chapter 5). Whereas the state would play a more 
obvious, visible and ‘academically acceptable’ role in sociology’s normativeness (Aguilar 
1995; Castañeda 2004), this is the manner in which, I argue, Catholic discourses also 
reinforce, through the cultural-ideological domain and by means of ‘bridge institutions’, the 
adoption of non-relativistic normative stances by sociologists and their sociological 
discourses. Now, by referring to the same type of ‘cultural-ideological structures’, ‘bridge 
institutions’ and ‘discursive predispositions’ I have discussed here, I will offer next an 
account of another pair of ‘discursive features’. 
 
 
II. Social-political criticism and prescriptiveness 
 
The sociological prescriptiveness, and corresponding socio-political criticism, encouraged by 
the state and conceived as one of the inherent constituents of sociology in Mexico, are not 
oppositional to the prescriptiveness and criticism of Catholic discourses. The latter are not 
part of the ‘methodological tools’ and ‘academic resources’ lecturers and scientists 
acknowledge, but are, I argue, ‘discursive-ideological companions’ operating, again, from 
the background, from the country’s very cultural-ideological structures and some of the 
bridge institutions discussed above. As I said previously, these discursive-ideological 
companions would not determine sociological discourses, but would predispose these 
discourses to echo corresponding stances/instances of social-political criticism and 
prescriptiveness.  
 
My data does suggest that Catholic discourses’ criticism and all-embracing prescriptiveness 
would, in some cases, not only be working from the country’s abstract and elusive 
ideological-cultural structures. The criticism and prescriptiveness I found in Catholic 
discourses are elements that some sociology lecturers themselves reported as part of their 
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education or their personal backgrounds. Laura, for example, explicitly pointed out the see-
judge-act method and the Christian-base-community logic in her Catholic school’s ‘hidden 
curricula’. Peter, for instance, openly reports that he was ‘interested in the social activism 
side’ he ‘saw’ in his missionary-priest friend; a statement similar to Brigitte’s about her 
friendship with activist ex-Dominican-friars she used to study Marx and Lukas with (chapter 
5; section I). As in the section above I argue that some sociology lecturers had enough 
interaction with (Catholic) ‘bridge institutions’ as to receive or learn from them certain 
‘models’ of how the social world should work and what to do accordingly. Whereas most of 
the lecturers now readily refute several of the Catholic ‘official’ views on how the world 
should work (chapter 5; section III) – i.e., they reject Catholic discourses’ criticism and 
prescriptiveness – they do not seem to refrain themselves from adopting strikingly similar 
discursive positions and issuing parallel sociological discourses. In this sense, one of the few 
differences between AgC and MxC sociological texts might be revealing. Whereas MxC 
lecturers held, in general a more oppositional stance towards the Catholic Church and 
Catholic discourses overall, they are the authors, on the other hand, of what appears as more 
prescriptive sociological discourses, as if they were, in fact, substituting priests and clergy 
and so were issuing different thematic discourses yet with the same heavily-prescriptive base. 
Is this also related to the heavy presence of Marxism in the educational background of 
lecturers trained in MxC? If one of the lecturers sees Marxism serving the “same functions” 
(chapter 6, section II) as those of religion, perhaps the causal links between Catholicism and 
Marxism in Mexico are more evident than MxC secular sociology lecturers would be willing 
to admit. I will return to the Catholicism-Marxism link in a section below. 
 
In brief, the social-political criticism and prescriptiveness of the sociological discourses 
presented in this research are influenced by Catholic discourses operating from, and flowing 
between, both the country’s ideological structures in the background and from the personal 
experiences and interactions of sociology lecturers with particular (Catholic) bridge 
institutions, i.e., Catholic schools and, again, priests. It is by means of this emergent 
ensemble of structures, institutions and individuals’ practices, that Catholic discourses do not 
determine but predispose sociology practitioners to take for granted the necessity of 
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political-social criticism and prescriptiveness and use/produce those ‘discursive features’ 
systematically   –features that are complimentary to the university’s ideological functions 
(Castañeda 2004), and what appears as Mexican sociology’s critical-prescriptive ‘nature’ and 
its intrinsic teleologies (chapters 4 and 7).   
 
Now, in the previous sections I have argued that Catholic discourses shape sociological 
discourses by predisposing them to adopt (1) non-relativistic dichotomistic normative 
stances (values) and further non-normative dichotomistic logics, and (2) social-political 
criticism and prescriptiveness. These predispositions would be the consequence of Catholic 
discourses being diffused variously yet persistently through ‘bridge institutions’. These 
visible ‘bridge institutions’ – Catholic family practices, Catholic schools, Catholic priests – 
are constituted by, and constitute, the cultural-ideological structures I have depicted in 
chapter 3 and both structures and institutions and their emergent properties turn this, 
apparently irrelevant (localised, individualised, random) ‘echoing’ of Catholic discourses 
into an actual ‘discursive offensive’. But what if, despite the evidence that indicates the 
contrary, the ‘partial ruptures’ between Catholic backgrounds and lecturers’ moral values 
(chapter 6) are, in fact, total and irreconcilable ruptures –or are at least kept in a strictly 
private sphere that does not ‘leak into’ the lecturers’ sociological practices and arguments? 
What if sociology lecturers and discourses have really built an ‘ideological shield’ around 
them that prevents them from being affected by such a structural and institutional set of 
discursive forces? 
 
I will suggest next another ‘authoritative’ institution that may act as an additional ‘bridge’ 
between Catholic and sociological discourses and so may deliver very similar predispositions 
to those discussed above. Unlike the institutions suggested so far, which some readers may 
understandably interpret as part of the lecturers’ past and therefore as irrelevant explanans, 
the next institution is not part of the lecturers’ distant background. Next I will discuss an 
institution that is part of the lecturers’ reported ‘present’; an ubiquitous institution that the 
lecturers engage with, construct actively in their everyday lives and shapes the lecturers’ 
academic practices and discourses. After describing this institution and its role, I will then 
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offer an account of the resemblances and causal links between Catholic and sociological 
discourses’ notions of power and causality. 
 
 
III. Asymmetric-epistemic authority institution. 
 
As I reported in chapter 4, ‘authority’ was a constant topic in my interviews with sociology 
lecturers. The reader may want to recall Norma’s interesting statements on her “epistemic 
authority” before students and furthermore, her literal account of this authority as ‘an 
asymmetry’ that reportedly equates to her having the epistemic authority that her student do 
not have and she would not ‘share’ with them. Norma would not be the only lecturer holding 
and constructing an asymmetric ‘epistemic-authority’ position in the university context. In 
AgC, Michael openly stated during one of our interviews, 
 
I would say, as a confession, that there are moments when it is annoying to debate 
with students, it is a structure we [lecturers] have […] it is as if it [debating with 
students] would not make sense, I mean, the student does not have the authority to 
discuss with the lecturer (emphasis added). 
 
When I asked Peter directly whether he would be an authority figure in the classroom, this 
lecturer unambiguously replied, “Yes, I am an authority figure”. After my explicit question 
about this topic, a part-time social science lecturer I interviewed in MxC stated that 
university students do need ‘an authority figure’ to learn in the classroom, and he added: “I 
see this not only in my students, but [as a] more generalised [occurrence]” . Interestingly, 
when I asked an undergraduate sociology student in AgC about whether she was OK with 
online university courses, she pointed at a difficulty, “I mean, what if we do not feel like 
working?” Then, the student, rather casually, stated “there should be an [physically present] 
authority, shouldn’t there?”. This figure, from the interviewee’s perspective, would make 
sure students complete the work assigned online.  
 
The asymmetric epistemic-authority frame I am describing here would not only represent 
lecturers-students interactions but also, as the MxC part-time lecturer suggested, further 
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relationships. This is, for instance, the authority asymmetry behind Michael’s statement 
about ‘the boss’ that ‘controls everything’ in one of the sociological sub-fields in Mexico 
(chapter 4); and behind Angela’s critical statements on the heavily ‘centralised’ authority 
practices in MxC’s university carried out by ‘the authoritarians’ authority’. Referring to the 
country overall Brigitte touched upon the ‘asphyxiating authoritarianism’ in Mexican society. 
Michael explicitly stated that this type of authority practices would constitute a ‘culture with 
national scope’. Edward went even further and suggested a generalised ‘submission to 
dogmas’ in the country and in its academic field in particular. This ‘model’ or ‘culture’ of 
authority is not strictly homogeneous and has been historically challenged (Zavala, 
forthcoming) but I want to stress at this point is the reported intensity and extension of this 
‘authoritarian culture’, its corresponding asymmetric-authority frames and its corresponding 
representative in the educational/university field as a certain model of ‘asymmetric epistemic 
authority’ between lecturers and students and among lecturers, researchers and academic 
staff in general. I argue that this is precisely the type of ‘cultural model of authority’ I 
theoretically suggested in chapter 1 –based on Weber (1978) and Smith (2000)– as one of the 
institutions (Douglas 1986) that may link religious/Catholic discourses with 
scientific/sociological ones. This ‘model’ is Weber’s ‘charismatic authority’ after it is 
‘routinised’ and so, just as Weber indicated, does become an institution (1978:1121), which, 
in Mexico’s case, is frequently used, practised and openly acknowledged. Now, how exactly 
is this related to Catholicism and Catholic discourses?  
 
I find appealing Weber’s thesis on the early Christian Church as one of the historical origins 
of the transformation of charismatic authority into an institution per se (1978: 1134-1141). 
Although Weber notes part of the answer I want to offer, I am not particularly interested, as I 
have discussed in chapter 2, in institutions’ chronological origins. What I am interested in is 
the discourses and practices, and further institutions, that shape this ‘cultural model of 
(asymmetric epistemic) authority’ in Mexico and what this ‘model’ or ‘institution’ does 
accordingly. Back to the question above, Brigitte openly argued (chapter 5, section III) that 
both the country’s ‘political culture’ and ‘religious culture’, and the Catholic Church 
particularly, ‘have sustained’ what she described as an ‘asphyxiating’ authoritarianism in 
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Mexico. Peter also shared with me a similar view. He, for instance, stated that the 
Catholicism brought by Spanish conquistadores became a “fear factor in society” (chapter 5, 
section III). More importantly, after my direct question, Peter agreed on a more specific 
element: the figure of the priest as a ‘model’ for lecturers’ authority (chapter 6, section II). 
Actually, Peter did not only answer my question about the priest-lecturer authority link 
affirmatively, he stated further that ‘there is a transposition’ from ‘the priest’s 
authoritarianism’ to authority figures in the university. The priest is a ‘preacher’, Peter stated, 
‘and the lecturer is the same’. The priestly institution then, in Peter’s words, is ‘an inspiring 
model, a reference model’. Angela did not report an ‘authority transposition’ from one figure 
to the other but explicitly stated the likely relationship between ‘authoritative sociologists’ 
and ‘the authority symbol of the priest’ in Mexico. ‘Yes’ Angela said, ‘our classic 
[authoritative] authors are like priests’. Moreover, scholar Castañeda (2004) touches, 
interestingly, upon the idea of both religion and sociology in the country depending “on its 
Enlightened [spokespersons], on its priests, on its privileged interpreters” (2004:233). 
 
Both the lecturers’ statements and the scholarly literature in the paragraph above suggest that 
the Catholic culture and the priests’ authority model in particular do seem to shape (i) 
society’s authority practices and, by extension, the authority practices in (ii) higher education 
institutions and (iii) those between students-lecturers and academics in general. I am not only 
relying on scholars’ interpretations to assert this (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984). My data from 
biographical questions to sociology lecturers (chapter 5) and my interpretative analyses 
further suggest that sociology lecturers’ interactions with priests were relatively frequent, 
even in cases where the lecturer did not attend Catholic schools. In some of these cases, the 
interaction lecturers held with priests in the past involved a conscious recognition of the 
priest as role model, e.g. Peter and his appreciation of his priest-friend’s ‘social activism’, or 
Brigitte’s explicit statement about the occasion when she asked her ‘activist’ friend, former 
Dominican priest, for ‘advice’. In some individual cases such meaningful interactions 
between particular priests and lecturers have not really ceased, as in the case of Rita and her 




There are cases as well where lecturers did not report any significant contact with priests or 
Catholicism in general, e.g., Gregory. This lecturer’s reported unfamiliarity with Catholic 
institutions might be only nominal though. In our interview, Gregory reported his 
involvement in social-activism movements and, interestingly, referred to himself as ‘leader’ 
in one of those episodes
231
. Gregory stated his early involvement in social activism was 
encouraged by his father, who constituted a role model for Gregory, i.e., ‘a humanist, a 
person who always worked for social justice’. Gregory’s father grew up in a Catholic 
background and was reported by Gregory as a person that ‘did not believe in saints’ but 
rather ‘in something supreme he had faith on’, in ‘a power beyond us that is present’ (chapter 
5). Here, again, we meet ‘partial’ and not ‘total’ ruptures between official 
Catholicism/Catholic discourses and people’s religious discourses. Having in mind these 
partial ruptures, I also suggest looking at the ideological-cultural structures around Gregory’s 
and his father’s social-justice activism and then spot in this bigger picture both the historical 
and contemporary Catholicisms I have insisted on previously.  
 
Sociology lecturers follow in practice a model of (‘asymmetric-epistemic’) authority which 
is neither given nor self-sustained but is constantly shaped and legitimised by both the 
cultural domain and corresponding historical, stronger models of authority. Here, again, 
Mexico’s state, as well as its political apparatus, cliques and ‘leaders’ are an undeniable 
shaping force and role models. Sociologists’ and the Mexican university’s own heritage of 
activism contribute as well
232
. But authority models cannot be reduced to those from/by the 
state or university/sociology itself, not in a society whose colonial, post-colonial and 
contemporary (Catholic) religiosity has heavily permeated structures, institutions and 
individuals’ discourses and practices in the way I have discussed in previous chapters. In 
Douglas’ view (1986) a mere ‘convention’ becomes an ‘institution’ if the reasons given to 
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 “Leader of the peasants” during protest movements in his hometown (chapter 4) 
232
 The reader may want to recall the beginnings of sociology in the country or its initial stages of 
institutionalisation and, for instance, what I cited from scholars Girola and Olvera (1995:93) about the 
pioneer sociological research by Mendieta y Nuñez in the 1940s-1950s which is reportedly “related to 
an idea of social science in Mexico as panacea […] as the key to decipher the logic of a society that is 
to be transformed”. 
 246 
questions about the existence of that convention refer eventually to the surrounding 
cosmology and so when the newly formed institution has finally found a “fit with the nature 
of the universe” (Douglas 1986: 46).  Gregory’s and his father’s adoption of a “leadership”, 
or a model/institution of ‘activism’ and ‘social justice’, takes place, makes sense and works 
not only because of the observable circumstances (a peasant community’s deprived 
conditions and its reasonable demands), family altruism and sociological activism
233
, but also 
because that type of leadership ‘fits’ (Douglas 1986) into the greater Catholic cosmological 
context and its salvationist (normative, prescriptive, interventionist) discourses. I therefore 
argue that sociology lecturers adopt cultural ‘models’ (Weber 1978; Smith 2000) or 
‘institutions’ (Douglas 1986) of epistemic-asymmetric authority that are partly  underpinned 
by Catholicism’s cosmology, its models of centralised asymmetric authority (Foucault 2007), 
and, particularly, the priestly model of salvationist-interventionist authority.    
 
Now, it is not only that the model/institution of (asymmetric-epistemic) authority adopted by 
sociology lecturers and generalised in the academic contexts is ‘cosmologically’ 
underpinned (Douglas 1986) by Catholicism and Catholic discourses. I also propose looking 
at this authority institution as another ‘bridge’ between Catholic discourses and sociological 
discourses. In the paragraphs above I discussed both the ‘discursive echoing’ and ‘discursive 
offensive’ by/from rather visible (Catholic) ‘bridge institutions’ and the country’s 
ideological-cultural structures. Using this explanatory frame I also discussed the resulting 
predispositions in sociology lecturers to adopt normative, prescriptive and critical stances 
and dichotomistic views of social phenomena. The model of epistemic authority, i.e., the 
second type of ‘bridge institution’ I propose here, delivers the same discursive 
predispositions, with a difference. The family and its Catholic practices
234
, Catholic schools 
and Catholic priests act as direct transmitters of Catholic discourses since their contact with 
the latter is necessary for the very existence of the institution. ‘Asymmetric-epistemic 
authority institutions’ and their enactments by sociology lecturers do not require contact with 
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 An interesting research question here is whether this sociological/university ‘heritage of activism’ 
has links with the Catholic Church’s colonial legacies in the educational field (Vazquez 1985; chapter 
2, section I) and the Catholic Church’s current charitable enterprises? 
234
 Here I distinguish between ‘the family’ and ‘the family practices carried out according to 
Catholicism’. It is the latter which I am referring to in this statement. 
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Catholic discourses but do echo, in a sense, certain characteristics of those discourses and do 
mirror the discursive practices of the Catholic institution (priestly authority) whose model 
they partly borrow. I will explain this next. 
 
If Catholic discourses and priests ‘see judge and act’ (chapter 3, section IV; chapter 5, 
section I), sociology lecturers may not necessarily ‘act’, but ‘judge’ as well and would do so 
mostly based on the non-relativistic normative logics I addressed previously. The ‘judging’ 
in Catholic discourses/priests, as I have discussed in chapter 3, would belong to a specific 
type, one based on non-relativistic dichotomistic normativeness and all-embracing or 





 (and Gonzalez Casanova’s sociology as suggested by a speaker in an 
academic event), I did not find explicit instances of ‘all-embracing judging’ or ‘integralist’ 
normativeness in the sociological texts I analysed. I did find, however, constant non-
relativistic normativeness and criticism or non-relativistic ‘judgments’. If we follow Douglas 
(1986) and then state that institutions deliver classifications and principles of justice, it is 
perfectly reasonable to state that institutions offer ‘styles of judging’ to individuals –styles 
which would directly depend on Douglas’ ‘parameters of justice’ but also on further 
institutionally-spread values, e.g., non-relativistic religious values (see also Cipriani 2011). 
Furthermore, this judging becomes predictably the perfect ‘fellow traveller’ of social-
political criticism and prescriptiveness. That is, if according to the original (priestly) model 
of authority the socially-expected task is to ‘see’, then ‘judge’ and then ‘act’, the sociology 
lecturer would analyse (‘see’) phenomena by literally judging them and then would criticise 
and prescribe sociological solutions as a way of ‘acting’. Even if the model of priestly 
authority is not based on that seeing-judging-acting stated by a priest in AgC and mentioned 
by one of the sociology lecturers, I have offered in chapter 3 what I think is enough evidence 
about the prescriptiveness and interventionist stances systematically found in statements by 
the Catholic clergy, priests’ homilies and ‘folk’ Catholic discourses in general. 
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 On the ‘re-valuation of nature by all the inhabitants of the world’. 
236
 His work on a holistic “theory of social action” which would account for a “new totality” (2009c:2) 
and appears based on cultural-studies literature, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, games theory, Geertz’ 
‘culture as meaning’ and a ‘semiotic’ approach to the concept of culture. 
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I have discussed above the ways in which these discursive features would be predisposed by 
the bridge institutions – family Catholic practices, Catholic schools and Catholic priests– 
sociology lecturers did have contact with in the past and would be directly shaped by the 
state’s – and sociology’s – explicit demands of normative-prescriptive-interventionist 
scientific knowledge. Lecturers’ adoption of the model of authority I discuss here operates as 
yet another ‘bridge institution’ that may not be a ‘Catholic institution’ as such yet mirrors the 
‘priestly authority’ institution and, along with the other ‘bridge institutions’ and the 
country’s (partly Catholic) cultural-ideological structures, eventually shapes lecturers’ 
sociological arguments. The above, though, are not the only cognitive properties of 
sociology lecturers’ authority models.  
 
 
IV. Power-over notions and mono-causality. 
 
Unlike the two pairs of discursive features discussed previously, mono-causality and power-
over ideas may not necessarily follow from normative, critical and prescriptive standpoints 
for it is perfectly reasonable, from a strictly rational/cognitivist point of view, to expect 
multi-causality and ‘power-to’ notions (Hearn 2008, 2012) out of heavily normative, 
prescriptive and critical sociological thinking. However, mono-causality and power-over 
notions are intrinsically related to a feature discussed above: dichotomistic and non-
relativistic logics. Instances of such logics are Rachel’s statements on ‘family violence’ as 
the ‘power males exert over females’ or ‘violence’ as a ‘conduct exerted over those who are 
inferiors’; Peter’s statements on a ‘subaltern culture versus a dominant culture’; or Suzanne’s 
statements about an ‘international hegemony’ and ‘domination over dependent countries’. 
Here the underlying dichotomistic/non-relativistic reasoning is clear. Firstly, there would 
only be two opposed types of ‘entities’ (males/females; superior/inferior individuals; 
subaltern/dominant cultures; hegemonic/dominated countries). Secondly, one of those 
entities would precede, dominate or control the other in what are implicitly reported as 
‘absolute/non relativistic’ relationships, frames or arrangements. Now, in these dichotomistic, 
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asymmetric and non-relativistic power-over statements, mono-causality is not necessary but 
does emerge easily as a rather expected logical accompaniment. Thus from Rachel’s 
dichotomistic and asymmetric power-over views of social reality, it makes perfect sense to 
say that it is ‘this modernity’ here the asymmetric power that causes ‘the reduction of 
mortality rates, increasing in expectancy life’ and so on there. Similarly, from what seems 
Gregory’s non-relativistic and dichotomistic power-over logics, it also make sense to state 
that ‘the neo-liberal model’ as such is the powerful entity that ‘trains’ apparently powerless 
individuals ‘to satisfy the labour market’. In Peter’s dichotomistic and non-relativistic 
power-over reasoning, it makes perfect sense to state, mono-causally, that the 1992 
constitutional reform in Mexico was carried out after a presidential decision which unfolded 
‘from the top and not from the bottom up’. It is the same case in Norma, who amid this 
pervasiveness of asymmetric-dichotomistic power-over logics, understandably spots and 
cites from other authors, the idea that ‘Marxist concepts’ (e.g. ‘consciousness’, ‘reason’) 
were, literally, ‘suppressed by’ not only ‘the II International’s leaders’, but, even more 
specifically or mono-causally, ‘by the economic-like thought of the II International’s 
leaders’. My point here is that mono-causality and power-over notions are mutually-
reinforcing references whose meanings ‘leak’ (Sayer 1992, 2000; Douglas 1986), rather 
effortlessly and accurately, into the dichotomistic/non-relativistic logics I have previously 
addressed and so gain further discursive strength and extended presence. 
  
Now, the power-over and mono-causal notions I have referred to above (e.g. Peter’s rather 
typical statement on President Salinas reforming the constitution by a top-down  and not a 
bottom-up decision) are certainly part of the ‘common-sense’ logics that surrounds sociology 
lecturers, at least those in this country. Common-sense is actually addressed and criticised by 
Castañeda (2004: 206) as one of the elements that permeates “empiricist sociology” in 




What is it that makes us [sociologists] distinctive from others who ask questions 
about social reality? We distinguish ourselves precisely because we have got from 
the discipline a conceptual scaffolding that allows us to see things others do not. […] 
What happens in this [MxC] school?... I think there is a confusion of ordinary 
language with sociological language. Researchers are mixing them up. 
 
This is not all. Right after stating the above, Angela went further and, interestingly, gave the 
following example: 
 
For example they [sociologists] do research on power and businessmen, but they 
understand power as lay people, they do not understand power from, let’s say, 
Foucault’s perspective or Weber’s domination, which do not have the same semantic 
content as that of common people. 
  
Angela’s statements do not only confirm the use of common-sense in sociological discourses 
but also touch, interestingly, upon common-sense power notions. Sociology lecturers are 
surely ‘bombarded’ by social discourses out-there that do contain systematic mono-causality 
and power-over messages. For instance, the ‘historical episode’ that followed the discovery 
of America and most kids learn at  school in Mexico –and many adults echo in everyday 
talks – usually boils down to a popular ‘common-sense’ (dichotomistic) narrative: the 
[‘mono-caused’ and utterly ‘power-over’] Conquista of Mexico by Spain
237
. This is 
obviously not the only common-sense power-over/mono-causal discourse that surrounds 
sociology lecturers in Mexico. What I argue is that Catholic discourses’ power and causality 
notions surround sociology lecturers as well and eventually breach into their empiricist and 
common-sense sociologies. I see three non-mutually exclusive ways this discursive breach 
takes place. 
 
Ideas of God’s ‘infinite’ power, God’s will, God as creator, the Virgin’s/saints’ intercessory 
powers as well as the reported belief, rather generalised, of a God that provides, are all 
discursive instances that I have presented in chapter 3 as frequent and ubiquitous elements of 
both official and folk Catholic discourses. This set of particular ideas and statements, 
stemming from these religious discourses and so flowing across the society’s religious-
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 ‘Official’ primary school history textbooks (e.g., Secretaria de Educacion Publica 2010) refer 
invariably to the ‘conquista’ of ‘Meso America’ by ‘Spanish conquistadores’. 
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cultural spaces, shape, I argue, common-sense notions of power and causality. This is so 
because these apparently ‘parochial’ Catholic messages are echoed and further augmented in 
a cultural domain in which there is an absence of alternative religious discourses and 
institutions with a comparable historical ideological strength. The outcome of such a steady, 
intense, extensive and exclusive supply of Catholic discourses, practices and their ‘power-
over’ and ‘mono-causality’ messages can be seen in practice in the Cristero war I referred to 
in chapter 3. Catholicism’s ideological strength and its power/causality references are, in a 
sense, put to work in this 20
th
-century historical episode. As scholar Meyer (1993) would 
state, the result is a group of Catholic individuals accepting, and indeed materialising in 
actual warfare, the idea that “the legitimacy of established powers” and “even the anti-
Christ’s authority” came from God, for “not even a tree’s leaf can move without God’s will” 
(1993: 286). Whereas these and other similar power/causality statements stand far from the 
sociological field in Mexico, they are not far from the common-sense that sociology lecturers 
in a daily basis meet outside (and perhaps inside as well) their academic workplace. In brief, 
I argue that Catholic discourses’ notions of power-over and mono-causality shape common-
sense and then enter, as common-sense ideas, into sociological discourses in general and the 
so-called ‘empiricist sociology’ in particular. 
 
Additionally, lecturers may be ‘besieged’, more or less subtly, by mono-causality and power-
over notions emerging from their own personal religious backgrounds and religious beliefs. 
Gregory’s statements on his father’s religiosity are revealing in this sense. As I have reported 
in chapter 5, Marxist lecturer Gregory described his father as he would probably describe his 
colleagues too, ‘a free thinker’ a ‘very liberal’ individual. After this, though, Gregory 
reported that his father did not believe in ‘that God’ or in ‘saints’ but in ‘something supreme’, 
‘a power beyond us’. Moreover, some sociology lecturers explicitly referred to their beliefs 
in God and implicitly referred to what God’s power would/can do, that is, God as ‘an 
explanation we cannot materialise’ and hands out ‘goods’ and ‘love’ from Joseph’s view, or 
as an entity that does exist and has the power to intervene in social reality (e.g. applications 
for research funding) in Peter’s opinion
238
. If we isolate these statements and see them as 
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 It is also revealing Michael’s explicit account of the Catholic Church as “a power” (chapter 5). 
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casual phrases by ‘secular social scientists’, we would end up overlooking the ideological-
cultural contexts I have tried to illustrate and draw from repeatedly. These statements by 
Gregory, Joseph and Peter are not, I argue, casual and irrelevant statements, but statements 
that are perfect representatives of Mexican society/ies’ main religious beliefs. Gregory’s 
father, Joseph and Peter are actually echoing, with some (secularist) reserves, what the 
greater religious and cultural contexts hold in terms of God’s power and ideas of what God 
does/can do with that power. At this point, however, I (and others) might say ‘so what?’ 
Sociological discourses would be used/produced by humans who unavoidably possess a 
minimum of religious beliefs and that fact would not mean they mix those beliefs up with 
their scientific work. My data and inferences, as I have shown above, indicate the opposite.  
 
Both the historical and contemporary flow of religious messages and their divine 
power/causality references impact society’s common sense and enter sociological (empiricist) 
discourses as common-sense power-over and common-sense mono-causality. And yet these 
common-sense references and their epistemological charge may not only enter, on their own, 
sociological discourses but also enter flanked by not necessarily the very God-related beliefs 
of the authors, but by the underlying power-over and mono-causality logics underpinning 
these beliefs, forming thus a peculiarly solid and “contagious” (Durkheim 1915) pattern of 
thought (or pattern/model of causality and power), which is not really dependent on 
Durkheimian religious ‘imitative rites’ but on the structural and institutional ‘discursive 
offensives’ which I have depicted in this and previous sections. Eventually, the divine-power 
‘bombs’ from Catholic discourses, reinforced by the underlying logic of the lecturers’ God-
related beliefs, ‘land’ in sociological discourses and influence them by predisposing lecturers 
to adopt and produce strikingly corresponding power-over notions and interpretations of 
social reality where phenomena tend to be interpreted as caused by one single entity with an 
abstract and ‘transcendental’ identity and omnipotent capacities, e.g. “global economy”. 
“modernity”, “neoliberalism”.  
 
The ‘power/causality discursive predispositions’ that I propose here may be confirmed as 
well by a particular cluster of theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the field of 
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psychology. In his psychological theory of “causal processing” White (1989) distinguishes 
between “automatic” (unconscious) and “controlled” (conscious) causal thinking. According 
to the author, automatic causal thinking “utilizes existing beliefs about causal powers in 
perceptions of causal connections” (1989:438). Research done with infants, White argues, 
indicates that these beliefs presuppose a “transfer of (causal) properties” (1989:439) from 
one situation perceived by the individual to another similar situation. White then states that 
conscious causal thinking may be directly shaped by both the individual’s “practical 
concerns”, e.g., personal interests, and also by “the applicability of an existing causal belief”, 
that is, that “the only things that a person can identify as causes are things that that person 
already believes can be causes” (1989:445). Fugelsang and Thompson (2000) tested White’s 
‘causal processing’ hypotheses and found evidence that suggest that individuals do pay 
attention to covariation between phenomena (e.g. lung cancer and smoking) in order to 
establish causal explanations and do so specially if they think the phenomena include a 
“believable” candidate cause, and, by contrast, “when the candidate [cause] is unbelievable, 
evidence supporting a causal link may be downplayed because it fails to confirm the initial 
belief” (2000:20). After a couple of years and further experiments
239
 with samples of adult 
population, the same authors (2003) connected White’s ‘automatic’ and ‘controlled’ type of 
‘causal processing’ and stated that “the recruitment [or acquisition] of causal beliefs” by the 
individual “may occur unconsciously” and that “these [acquired] beliefs constrain the 
deliberate analytic processes needed to evaluate the empirical evidence that was provided” 
(2003:812) to the individuals in the experiment. White (1989) and Fugelsang and Thompson 
(2000, 2003) did not analyse ‘religious beliefs’ as such. White defined beliefs as knowledge 
of phenomena arising from the individual’s past “perceptions” and “familiarity” with certain 
phenomena (1989:438). Fugelsang and Thompson (2000:19) operationalised the concept of 
‘beliefs’ in their experiments as the most frequent answers by a pilot sample of individuals 
that selected plausible causal scenarios out of a list of different phenomena (e.g., depleted 
fish caused by insecticides; allergic reactions caused by homework). These two authors, 
however, make a crucial sociological remark in another publication (2003); they conclude 
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 Fugelsang and Thompson’s empirical evidence also indicates that “the [individual’s] belief that 
two events are causally related produces the belief that they covary” (2000:29) 
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that a promising research avenue may focus on the “cross-cultural differences” among 
individuals’ causal beliefs as the latter are “constructed within the cultural constraints of the 
social environment” (2003:813).  
 
It is perhaps not too risky to attribute to ‘religious beliefs’, that is, to personally significant 
and highly emotional ideas, an equivalent role to the one the authors attributed to the 
certainly less personal and less emotional ‘beliefs’ they analysed –e.g., past perceptions, 
familiarity, not-personal assumptions. Now, if Fugelsang and Thompson (2003) find 
evidence of an ‘unconscious recruitment’ of causal beliefs which ‘constrain deliberate 
analytic processes’ (2003:812), and if White (1989) argued that ‘unconscious causal 
thinking’ does involve the ‘transfer of causal properties’ between similar contexts,  I then 
argue that the personally significant and highly emotional ideas of God’s powers/capacities 
in sociology lecturers, may then play a significant role in the lecturers’ ‘automatic’ 
(common-sense) causal processing  (White 1989) and, therefore, in their sociological 
‘analytic processes’ (Fugelsang and Thompson 2003) as well. The psychological literature I 
am citing in these paragraphs may be further interpreted as consonant with Sayer’s ‘leakage 
of meaning’ (1992, 2000) and Douglas’ ‘politically charged’ conventions-analogies (1986), 
in terms of the transferability or ‘contagion’ (Durkheim 1915) of cognitive patterns and 
discursive features. The data I have presented and analysed in these chapters does not 
suggest that religious beliefs are ‘transferred’ verbatim to the sociological causal models I 
have referred to above. However, the psychological, sociological and anthropological 
literature above, as well as the data I have presented, do suggest that sociology lecturers’ 
religious beliefs in God’s powers or God’s capacities (‘supreme’, asymmetric, omnipresent, 
omnipotent) may be playing a subtle, not-exclusive yet crucial role in the attribution of 
particular causal/power properties to certain social institutions and social phenomena, e.g., 
‘modernity’, ‘globalisation’ and ‘presidential figures’, and their apparently ‘supreme’, 
asymmetric and omnipotent capacities to shape social reality. 
 
Furthermore, this set of God-related beliefs found not only in ‘official’ and ‘folk’ Catholic ; 
discourses but also in the very personal beliefs of sociology lecturers, do shape sociological 
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discourses not only because they breach through society’s greater common-sense patterns 
but also because, as I have argued before, they do fit into the very asymmetric-dichotomistic 
logics of lecturers’ non-sociological and sociological judgements and statements. I have 
previously discussed the influence (predisposition) of Catholic discourses upon both 
sociological discourses’ normative dichotomistic thinking and, by extension, sociological 
discourses’ non-normative dichotomistic reasoning . By logical extension, power-over 
notions and mono-causality, insofar as framed on, or dependent of, asymmetric-
dichotomistic logics, would be reinforced by Catholic discourses in a similar manner. This 
extended reinforcement from Catholic discourses would be actually additional to the 
epistemological effects by both common-sense ideas on divine power/will I have suggested 
and the very beliefs in God reported by lecturers.  
 
And yet there is another shaping force I want to address. Perhaps Durkheim’s ‘imitative 
rites’ are, after all, a relevant link. My data suggests, though, that it is not the ‘religious rite’ 
that may play a role, but more ‘profane rituals’ performed in the daily lives of sociology 
lecturers, that is, the practices of asymmetric (epistemic) authority explicitly reported by 
Norma and Michael and indirectly mentioned by most of the sociologists as their experiences 
in/with a ‘centralised’ and ‘hierarchical’ university field (chapter 4). These practices, or 
rather this institution (Weber 1978;  Douglas 1986), which mirrors Catholicism’s (priestly) 
patterns of authority and so predisposes sociology lecturers to adopt dichotomistic 
logics/judgements and non-relativistic normative, critical and prescriptive sociological 
stances, actually entail the enactment of power asymmetries in real life. When lecturers like 
Norma hold, deliberately, epistemic authority before students in classrooms or when social 
researchers get actively involved in research communities where there is ‘a boss’ that 
‘controls everything’, they are actually closing and reinforcing the cognitive circuit of 
power-over thinking and mono-causality. These are sociological discourses, or parts of, 
partly reinforced by practices and vice versa: sociology lecturers do what they think about, 
and they think about what they do, and then produce sociological discourses accordingly. In 
other words, they generate what Barry Barnes (1988) calls a power-related ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’ (see also Mackenzie 1998: 58; and Hearn 2012:86-7). 
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In chapter 1 I argued that, in principle, a cultural model of authority may constitute a bridge 
institution whose emergence would depend on the use of “binary rhetorics” as scholar Smith 
(2000) proposes, and would as well ‘produce’ (binary) classifications, as Douglas (1986) 
would likely assert. I state that this asymmetric-epistemic authority model may not just 
depend on binary rhetorics and produce binary classifications but does represent materially 
those binary classifications by enacting in practice the power-over dichotomies that, thus far, 
I have reported as part of cognitive-discursive instances. In a sense, the ‘practice of’ power-
over dichotomies by individuals would close the circuit and produce a set of asymmetric 
practices and dichotomistic discourses strongly connected to each other. This accounts for 
the discursive coherence of Mexico’s a sociological field/s, which some scholars may 
describe as ‘epistemologically weak’ – e.g. De la Garza (1989); Gimenez  (1995) – but I 
rather characterise as perfectly  consistent with the social discourses and practices of 
Mexican society –Catholicism included! The case of Marxism in Mexico is a perfect 
example of the discursive interplays I have accounted for above. 
 
 
V. Marxism and Catholicism 
 
In chapter 4 I concluded that whereas Marxism cannot be described as the only sociological 
school in Mexico from the 1960s to the 1990s, it was reportedly one of the more extended 
sociological paradigms and a decisive theoretical frame in the sociology lecturers’ 
intellectual development. This is not a coincidence and Catholic discourses, I argue, had to 
do with this. Sociology lecturers Edward and Michael stated that Marxism, indeed, became 
“a church” or “a doctrine” in Mexico (chapter 6) for this sociological paradigm and its 
supporters in Mexico held “beliefs without reflection” as well as an “orthodoxy” and a 
fundamental concern for “social transformations” that were strikingly similar to the beliefs, 
orthodoxy and interventionism of Mexico’s Catholic Church and Catholicism. Norma 
rejected the idea of Marxism having links with Catholicism in Mexico; however, she actually 
stated that Marxism in this country “served the same functions” as Catholicism in terms of 
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“the good and the evil” and “salvation”. Although I am not interested in discussing whether 
Marxism and Catholicism in this country are orthodox, non-reflexive or detrimentally 
interventionist, I do agree with the lecturers’ characterisation of Marxism as a 
‘church/doctrine’. In my account, however, the similarities between Marxism and 
Catholicism go beyond mere resemblances.  
 
In this section I will argue that Catholicism and Catholic discourses did shape Marxism in 
Mexico in two ways. Firstly, Marxism appealed with a peculiar force to sociology 
practitioners in Mexico because it was a paradigm whose surface discourse was novel and 
suitable for the then tense socio-political context of the first half of the 20
th
 century in 
Mexico and Latin America
240
 but also because its underlying discursive structure (Parsons 
1979; Boli 1981) actually fit into the changing discursive templates (normativeness, 
prescriptiveness, salvationist discourses, ontological dichotomies) laid and reinforced by 
Catholic discourses in the country since colonial times. Secondly, once introduced in Mexico, 
Marxism adopted, by means of the institutional-structural discursive mechanisms I have 
noted above, most of the characteristics of the Catholic discourses I have repeatedly 
discussed here. 
 
In chapter 4 I presented Brigitte’s statements about her abrupt transition from Catholicism to 
Marxism. This, according to the lecturer, was a trend in her generation and the previous 
generation as well. Brigitte’s first impressions of Marxism reportedly meant for this lecturer, 
and likely for many others, a ‘diametrically opposed world’. It could not be otherwise if, as 
Michael recalls (chapter 4), students had to read ‘Louis Bonaparte’s Eighteenth Brumaire’ or 
if undergraduate sociology curricula also included, as Norma stated during our interview, 
reading authors such as Vladimir Lenin. This ‘opposed world’ was also pointed out by 
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 Mexico experienced a series of major events such as the ‘Mexican revolution’ in 1910s; political 
and economic instability afterwards; the Cristero war in the late 1920s; a sudden upsurge of a socialist 
political (especially educational) trend in the state apparatus in the late 1930s; the collateral, rather 
macro economic, effects of the I and II World Wars, and a shocking protest-massacre of students and 
protesters in the late 1960s –somewhat similar but not necessarily linked to the May 1968 protests in 
France (see also chapter 4, section III). Dictatorships in South American countries such as Uruguay, 
Chile and Argentina (Thorp 1998) during the second half of the 20
th
 century are also examples of the 
tense and volatile times in Latin American societies. 
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Edward who explained to me that Marxism in Mexican universities was related to the idea of 
revolutions and guerrillas launching (more figurative than actual) attacks on society’s 
conservatism , religious conservatism included (chapter 4). That popular ‘Mexican Marxism’ 
was radical, anti-authoritarian and radically ‘secularist’. However this Mexican Marxism 
may have been closer to Catholicism than Marxist and secular sociologists believed, or still 
believe. And that closeness to Catholicism, I argue, accounts for its appeal to ‘generations’ 
of sociology students, lecturers and practitioners. 
 
In his analysis of the ideological forces and “symbolic environments” that shape “modern 
economies” –reportedly one of his last publications– Parsons (1979) focuses on Western 
Christianity and argues that there is “a notable resemblance” between “the ‘scenario’ of 
Marxism and the basic pattern of Christianity” (1979:441) –see also Erich Fromm’s Marxist 
exegesis (1961) for a similar yet distinctive view
241
 and Boli’s (1981) interpretation of 
Marxism as a ‘modern’ theology. In Parsons’ view although Marxism is a paradigm that 
focuses on earthly instead of transcendental matters, its “scenario” includes elements that are 
equivalent to the Christian paradigm. Whereas the ‘evil’ is represented by the figure of the 
sin in the Christian scheme, a parallel ‘evil’ element is represented in Marxism by the forces 
of capitalist production and the “state of alienation” of both “capitalistic men” and those 
members of the proletariat who have “not yet been awakened to class consciousness” (1979: 
442). Just as it is in Christianity, this state of affairs in Marxism is meant to be transformed 
not by a “second coming of Christ” but by a likewise ‘salvationist’ revolution led by the 
awakened proletariat and conducive to a rather heaven-like “state of communism” 
(1979:442-3). Parsons also notes what he literally calls a “sharp dichotomy” that may be 
found in both the Christian and Marxist contexts, “the saved and the damned”. Just as 
believers who have not experienced the “mission of Christ” are not meant to have access to 
heaven, members of the Marxist proletariat –and perhaps bourgeoisie too– who have not yet 
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 In his exegetic analysis of Marx’s work and his concept of socialism, Fromm (1961) gives a more 
radical interpretation of the ideological influences upon Marx. He argues first that Marx’s utopian 
socialism actually echoes the Old Testament’s “Messianic hope” and Greek and Roman “humanism” 
and then concludes that Marxism and “other forms of socialism” became the very “heirs of prophetic 
Messianism, Christian Chiliastic sectarianism, thirteenth-century Thomism, Renaissance Utopianism, 
and eighteenth-century enlightenment” (1961:68) 
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acquired “class consciousness” cannot be saved by the communist heaven build by the freed 
proletariat (1979:443)
242
. Boli (1981) also notes how Marx elaborated the view of a 
proletariat ‘technological progress’ as a ‘secular’ path to liberation that nonetheless 
‘retained’ the dichotomistic good-versus-evil struggle customary in Christianism and 
Western thought (1981: 511).  
 
Although my view of social phenomena is not that of Parsonian clear-cut systems and 
subsystems and although Catholicism and Marxism in Mexico do not obviously correspond, 
entirely, to the Marxism and the Christianity Parsons, Fromm and Boli analysed, I do agree 
with the parallels these authors draws between Marxism and Christianity. What Parsons 
argued in terms of the ‘salvationism’ in Christianity and Marxism and what Boli suggested 
as the theological bases of Marxism, are two complementary ways to illustrate the links I 
have drawn between Catholic discourses’ normative prescriptiveness and interventionism 
and the equivalent ‘teleological’  rationales (chapter 4) and statements (chapter 7) in 
sociological discourses in Mexico. I argue that Marxism in Mexico was appealing and turned 
into a popular sociological paradigm precisely because it matched Catholic discourses’ 
normativeness, prescriptiveness and interventionism. If, as I have argued above, Catholic 
discourses predispose sociology lecturers to adopt particular stances that have 
epistemological impact, Marxism in Mexico is precisely an example: Catholic discourses 
successfully predisposed –via the structural and institutional echoes and offensives I have 
previously accounted for– sociology lecturers and students to adopt and embrace Marxism’s 
interventionist frame and teleological charge.  
 
These discursive (epistemological) features were not the only ones that Catholicism and 
Catholic discourses underpin and Marxism in Mexico, in a sense, ‘exploited’. Dichotomistic 
logics appear in the stage, again. Parsons’ (1979) ‘the saved-the damned sharp dichotomy’ 
and Boli’s (1981) good-versus-evil may have not been the only dichotomistic discursive 
references flowing from/within Marxism in Mexico. After Edward reported his experiences 
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 Referring to ascetic Protestantism in particular, Parsons also argues that the Christian concept of 
suffering may find continuity, or “resonance”, in the Marxist concept of “labour” as exploitation 
(1979:446-7) 
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as curriculum advisor in a university that had designed a sociology programme which 
included ‘Marx one’ up to ‘Marx six’ courses (chapter 4, section III), this lecturer also told 
me about a conference he attended, where the speaker, a Mexican Marxist scholar, 
reportedly stated that 
 
in the university context, the authorities represented the bourgeois and the lecturers 
were the proletariat, and, in the household, men were the bourgeois and women and 
kids were the proletariat, just because it had to fit (emphasis added).  
 
Indeed, dichotomies such as the above had to fit with the Marxist bourgeois-proletariat core 
frame, but, beyond this sociological/academic Marxism in the university, they also ‘fit’ 
within the dichotomistic logics of Catholic discourses flowing pervasively between/from the 
society’s cultural-ideological structures, the Catholic Church itself and other less obvious 
‘bridge institutions’. These Catholic discourses, I argue, ‘prepared’ sociology lecturers, 
students and practitioners to identify easily those Marxist dichotomistic-asymmetric 
references and adopt them –and perhaps ‘believe’ in them as well. And this (epistemological) 
correspondence takes me to the third Mexican Marxism-Catholicism parallel I want to draw. 
 





-century Enlightenment, and 19
th
-century Marxism-socialism may be found in 
their shared idea of the state/politics as a field that “cannot be divorced” from “spiritual” or 
“moral values” (1961: 66). In chapter 4 I presented one of Michael’s statements about his 
‘Marxist’ experiences in the undergraduate sociology programme he attended. Marxism by 
then, Michael stated, “was about saying ‘no’ to everything: not to watch TV, news, not to 
read the newspaper, not to go to night clubs”. In Michael’s view Marxism was therefore 
‘orthodox’. Now, Michael’s statement here is strikingly similar to both Joseph’s statement 
about the priest that advised him ‘do not kill, do not do that’, as if ‘everything was 
prohibitive’ (chapter 5 and section above) and to the series of non-relativistic normative and 
prescriptive messages in the Catholic discourses I presented in chapter 3. If, as I have 
constantly repeated, there is a continuity between (official and folk) Catholic ethics and AgC 
and MxC lecturers’ personal set of non-relativistic ‘moral values’ and if there is, therefore, a 
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clear indication that Catholic discourses predispose lecturers to adopt a non-relativistic type 
of sociological normativeness, then Marxism is, again, an actual example. Whether as heir of 
Fromm’s ‘13
th
-century Christian thought’ or not, Catholic discourses in Mexico were one of 
the external ideological forces which, rather indirectly through the structural-institutional 
discursive mechanisms I have discussed, made Mexican Marxist sociologists ready to adopt 





The last ‘predisposition’ I want to propose is related to the ‘power-over’ and ‘mono-causal’ 
references I have also discussed above. Parsons (1979) states that Western Marxism was 
based on the idea of an utopian society where “any form of coercion or alienation [such as] 
[t]he state as the symbol of coercive authority […] will ‘wither away’” (1979:441). As I 
presented in chapter 4, when Edward in AgC referred to the ‘Marx-one-up-to-Marx-six’ 
courses in a university’s curricula, he also said that the programme in question contained ‘all 
about what was already known’ from a Marxist perspective, that is, the occurrence of a 
‘determination by economic infrastructure on ideological and political structures’ and 
‘everything depending on class struggle’. Further power-over (‘determination’) and mono-
causal statements (‘everything depending on class struggle’) were found not only in the 
sociology lecturers’ references to their past experiences with Marxism/Marxists, but also in 
openly Marxist lecturers such as Gregory and his sociological arguments, e.g., his statements, 
presented in chapter 7, about the ‘mechanical transference of knowledge’ in ‘the traditional 
teaching-learning system’ leading to ‘the submission of individuals’; or ‘modern life’ ending 
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 During my field work in MxC, I attended an undergraduate research workshop led by Marxist 
lecturer Gregory. At some point during the workshop this lecturer told the students a personal 
anecdote that was meant to illustrate the practical issues researchers have to solve while doing 
research in the field. Gregory so reported that he was once introduced, by people he had worked with, 
to a popular female performer in the country. The performer, after realising Gregory was a researcher 
and had written a book on life stories, reportedly asked him to write her biography. Gregory explained 
to the students he had to decline the performer’s offer as he was not interested. Then he stated “My 
concept of beauty is not that of [female performer’s name], she is even vulgar for me, honestly. […] It 
is not the femininity one would like to see […] she might have physical beauty but not spiritual or 
cultural beauty […] as sociologist you have to be tolerant though” (emphasis added). The reader may 
want to recall the likewise non-relativistic dichotomistic values mentioned by priests in AgC (chapter 




up ‘inhibiting communication at home’; or his statement (not presented previously) on 
‘outcomes of scientific research’ being ‘impregnated by the dominant classes’ ideology’ 
(2006: 23). If Western and Mexican Marxism rest partly upon a series of power-over and 
mono-causal interpretations of social reality, Catholic discourses and their mono-causal and 
power-over references, i.e., God’s absolute powers, God as creator, or the Virgin’s 
intercessory powers, did definitely play a role in the spread of Marxism in Mexico and its 
particular causal/power discursive bases.  
 
This role, as I have stated earlier, is directly related to the ‘transferability’ (White 1968; 
Fugelsang and Thompson 2000, 2003), the ‘contagion’ (Durkheim 1915) or the ‘leakage’ 
(Sayer 1992, 2000; Douglas 1986) not of the idea of divine will, but of the underlying 
power-over logics and mono-causality frames which flow structurally and institutionally in 
Catholic discourses and are then echoed by sociology lecturers –who do believe in a God 
that ‘explains’ reality and hands out ‘goods and love’ (Joseph) or has the power to intervene 
in social reality and events such as research funding applications (Peter). Such a combined 
role of both Catholic discourses and personal beliefs, echoed and augmented by the 
institutional-structural arrangements I have previously illustrated, made Mexican sociologists 
particularly receptive to similar causal/power models and therefore predispose/d Mexican 
sociologists to adopt Marxist deterministic views of social phenomena, for example, the 
Marxist view of the bourgeoisie’s dominance (‘morally wrong’ indeed) over the proletariat.  
Even if the original western Marxism is read as being rather free from power-over and 
mono-causal assertions, the ‘Mexican Marxism’ I have referred to here, as the lecturers 
themselves pointed and their own sociological texts indicate, was not. Catholic discourses 
and beliefs, therefore, not only predispose/d Mexican sociologists to adopt Marxism’s 
original economic determinism, but also predisposed, or in a sense ‘prepared’, Mexican 
Marxists to develop further power-over and mono-causal discourses in which the 
omnipotence of God, along with more earthly clerical models of ‘asphyxiating’ (Brigitte) 
authority,  breached into Mexican Marxism’s statements and claims about both parallel 
omnipresent/omnipotent social entities – e.g. neoliberalism – and corresponding coercive 
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social realities –e.g., Gregory’s and Suzanne’s Marxist view of the wicked omnipotence of 
the ‘neoliberal model’ (chapter 7, sections II and III). 
 
Waggoner (2009) states that Marx eventually reduced religion to an epiphenomenon 
determined by socio-economic conditions and utilised by the state in its ideological control. 
In a sense, Marxist academics in Mexico aimed at ‘expelling’ the religious out of society 
(Edward), yet they – and possibly other Marxist academics in other Latin American regions 
– on the other hand ended up drawing from the same religious discursive structure and 
religious underlying rationales in such a way that they produced a parallel ‘salvationist’ 
(Parsons 1979), ‘theological’ (Boli 1981) and  ‘messianic’ (Fromm 1951) discourse or, as 
lecturers Edward and Michael noted, another ‘church’ or another ‘doctrine’ –with perfectly 




VI. Causal links in brief. 
 
My methodology consisted of two apparently opposite case studies (sociological discourses 
in/by AgC lecturers and sociological discourses in/by MxC lecturers) that would, in theory, 
deliver opposite findings. Eventually, the opposition between the findings was not 
conclusive. Except perhaps for some rather minor differences – more prescriptiveness and 
less mono-causality in MxC than in AgC – all the six discursive features I have discussed 
above can be systematically found in both MxC and AgC university sociological fields. 
These sociological discourses, which cannot be reduced to the set of six features but do 
emerge from them, are shaped not only by the Mexican state’s explicit (funding-related) and 
implicit (ideological) demands and by what seems is the Mexican sociology/ies’ own 
teleological rationales but also by the Catholic discourses I have repeatedly addressed above. 
  
Despite a couple of individual cases suggesting the opposite – e.g., Peter’s ‘universalist 
prescriptiveness’, Hernandez’ (1999) explicit use of Catholic dichotomies – what I argue is 
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that Catholic discourses do not determine sociological discourses by making them reproduce 
exactly the same discursive (epistemological) characteristics. Catholic discourses may not 
even ‘determine’, in any sense, sociological discourses. Catholic discourses, however, 
predispose sociological discourses and sociology lecturers to adopt equivalent 
epistemological stances – normative, prescriptive, critical, non-relativistic, power-over and 
mono-causal – by means of ‘bridge institutions’ – Catholic family practices, Catholic school, 
Catholic priest, priestly authority/academic ‘epistemic’ authority – whose ‘echoes’ of 
Catholic discourses turn into an actual ‘discursive offensive’ when those bridge institutions – 
along with the ‘official’ Catholic Church as well – invariably get combined with the partly 
‘Catholic’ cultural-ideological structures that surround lecturers, students, universities and 
Mexican society/ies overall. I argue that Catholicism has a central role in these structures not 
only because it operated as the only religious-cultural institution (with economic and 
political attributions as well) in colonial Mexico (1500s-1800s) but also because its 
ideological powers and central cultural roles (Poggi 2001; Zavala forthcoming) were barely 
contested by independence movements (1810s) and by the state’s adoption of secularist laws 
in the 1850s-1860s. Catholicism in Mexico, despite the ‘religious-diversity’ arguments of 
some Mexican scholars, remains today as a religion that represents 83% of the country’s 
population and still has no major religious rival within the ideological horizon of  Mexican 
society/ies.  
 
Having accounted for this structural element in my explanation of ‘causal links’, I want to 
emphasise that (i) the ‘epistemic-authority’ institution enacted by lecturers in the academic 
context, as well as (ii) the lecturers’ Catholic-like non-relativistic values and (iii) God-related 
beliefs, deserve a special mention. The lecturers’ “epistemic authority” is not a ‘Catholic 
institution’ as such yet mirrors greater authority patterns, including those in Catholicism and 
those exerted by Catholic priests in particular. As a consequence of this intentional or 
unintentional mirroring, sociology lecturers end up issuing discourses that follow the same 
mainstream authority institutions and their types of discourses –Catholic-like non-relativistic 
‘judging’, normativeness and prescriptiveness included. Furthermore, when sociology 
lecturers enact these asymmetric-authority models they are, in fact, materialising the power-
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over instances they write about in their sociological discourses and so reinforce further this 
discursive component and its corresponding ‘mono-causality’ (or centralised power) logics.  
 
Additional to this, the ‘discursive offensive’ via the structural-institutional ensemble noted 
above, also finds, in terms of power-over and mono-causality, an influential ‘ally’ in what 
the data indicates are the very sociology lecturers’ current beliefs in God’s powers and, 
namely, in the asymmetric and non-relativistic models of (unidirectional, deterministic) 
causality and (supreme, omnipotent) power that underlie these beliefs. Moreover, the non-
relativity and asymmetry of these particular models as well as the inherent normativeness-
prescriptiveness of sociological discourses, find further reinforcement, of a moral kind, in 
what does appear as the lecturers’ Catholic, or Catholic-like, stock of non-relativistic moral 
values once instilled by the ‘bridge institutions’ they interacted with in the past and currently 
bolstered by the very cultural-ideological structures of society. This series of discursive 
predispositions I have discussed here can be found neatly in the ‘Mexican Marxism’ reported 
by the sociology lecturers themselves, that is, in a sociological paradigm whose ‘successful’ 
introduction and, reported ‘orthodox’ development in Mexico was subtly yet effectively 
shaped by Catholicism and the structural-institutional discursive echoes/offensives I have 
accounted for.  
 
The reader may find these series of causal links illustrated roughly in Figure 8.1 below –
based on Sayer’s (2000) critical-realist model of causation. This graphic is meant to illustrate 
the structural and institutional mechanisms accounted for, their epistemological effects 
(predispositions) and the conditions (or non-epistemological effects) by which those effects 
occur. My illustration is neither meant to distinguish an exact sequence by which these 
complex phenomena and their final epistemological impacts take place nor to convey an 
impression of fragmented and static social elements; it is rather intended to offer to the 
reader a visual of a general causal framework in which the various observable and 
unobservable entities previously discussed –structures, institutions and individuals– and their 




 and thus produce emergent effects over the sociological 
discourses dissected in chapter 7.  
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 The graphic, for instance, may also include arrows connecting Mexican Marxism back to the 
proposed causal “conditions”, e.g., lecturers’ values and beliefs in God, or even back to the society’s 
‘cultural-ideological structures’,  in order to suggest the possible effects of Marxism as sociological 
paradigm over the lecturers’ religiosity and society’s cultural domain – which are certainly different 
research subjects/objects to those discussed in this dissertation. 
 
STRUCTURE: Partly Catholic cultural-ideological structures 
MECHANISM: 
Contact with  
‘bridge institutions’ 
CONDITIONS / NON-EPIST. EFFECTS: 
Lecturers’ enactment of  





EPISTEMOLOGICAL EFFECTS:  
Predispositions towards 
* Non-relativistic normativeness and criticism 
* Dichotomistic and asymmetric power/causality models 
* Dichotomistic logics 









Discursive echoes  







Although I have previously stated that I share the critical-realist principle of the partial 
scientific knowledge we can gain from an ontologically stratified, and necessarily complex, 
social reality, (chapter 2), I must mention a series of limitations in my research findings. My 
findings about the cultural-ideological structures in Mexico are limited since my analyses of 
historical and contemporary Catholicism as well as the country’s cultural history certainly 
did not include all the events, phenomena, institutions and agents that figure in the whole 
spectrum of academic sources –historical and sociological. Similarly, I cannot claim in this 
research to have completed a thorough registry of absolutely every single text, practice and 
(macro and micro) phenomena related to sociology in Mexico and Latin America. However, 
the fact that the data collected in two apparently differing contexts (AgC and MxC) did not 
deliver the expected opposing findings, and rather portrays two sociological and two 
religious fields holding only minor differences, is methodologically, empirically and 
theoretically significant. Having similar findings from two ‘theoretically’ opposite 
local/regional contexts, does provide a solid empirical base for inferring with confidence that 
the findings above do represent the range of discourses that flow, and the relevant 
phenomena that occurs, not only in these locations but also in other local/regional religious 
and sociological fields across Mexican society/ies –and possibly in other Latin American 
societies as well. 
 
My account of the causal links between Catholic and sociological discourses in the chapter 
above is certainly an approximation to the underlying causal mechanisms between 
Catholicism and sociology in Mexico. Yet, even as an approximation, it may complete the 
empirical and explanatory puzzles that were left untouched by Milbank (2006), Sahlins 
(1996) and Cannell (2005, 2006). These authors carefully analysed the epistemological 
similarities between theological/religious knowledge and social sciences and then, mostly 
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theoretically and through genealogical approaches, advanced various theses about the 
epistemological ‘influence’ (Evans and Evans 2008) of (Western) Christianity over (Western) 
social science. These authors, however, did not account for how this influence develops and 
eventually takes place, for how theological/religious knowledge lands in social science and 
ends up being echoed by secular social thinkers and scientists. My account of how 
Catholicism in Mexico shapes sociology cannot certainly be used to fill such an explanatory 
gap in these three authors’ works, since the religious and social science contexts I analysed 
carry not only a socio-geographical specificity but also socio-historical particularities and, as 
I have illustrated in chapters 3 and 4, both may resemble, but also stand rather far from, the 
specificities of Western religious and scientific contexts (Sayer 1992:108; Asad 1983, 1993). 
However, my account may offer the bases of possible answers if we broaden and refine our 
understanding of religion and the ‘porosity’ of social sciences, e.g., sociology, in the ways I 
have suggested.  I will unpack next the key explanatory elements in my account and will 
connect them back to the relevant literature in order to offer such a broader and refined 
perspective. 
 
My research findings do suggest that the Catholic and sociological discourses I have 
dissected here confirm Durkheim’s theses (chapter 1, section III), with a series of key 
reservations though. A century ago Durkheim studied the so-called ‘categories of thought’ 
and, just as Aristotle and Kant did (Schmauss 2004), he aimed at finding their very origins –
exactly the same analytical target the reader may find in Milbank (2006), Sahlins (1996) and 
Cannell (2005, 2006) and other mainstream Western scholars and their 
archaeological/genealogical approaches, e.g. Foucault 2003, 2005. With such an ambitious 
target, Durkheim (1915) put forward his apparently awkward (Lukes 1973:448; Schmauss 
2004:123) set of religion/society-knowledge-science theses –that there is a ‘genealogical’ 
relation between religious thought, that is society’s thoughts, and people’s ‘lay’ thinking or 
‘categories of thought’ and this relation can be extended further so that there is also a 
genealogical relation between religious and scientific logics. This proposal would be rather 
forgotten, perhaps deliberately neglected, by mainstream scholars and so was eclipsed or 
possibly ‘replaced’ by his society-knowledge thesis (Durkheim and Mauss [1903] 1963), a 
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thesis that lacks the religious element and therefore seems to be more acceptable in secularist 
(Casanova 2009; Calhoun et al. 2011) mainstream scientific discourses. It may be said that 
unintended exceptions to this neglecting or eclipsing can be found in Milbank (2006), 
Sahlins (1996) and Cannell (2005, 2006), who, I argue, corroborated to some extent, and 
rather implicitly, what Durkheim (1915) had declared in terms of the religious origins of 
scientific classifications, notions of power/force and causality models. I cannot state, 
however, that the epistemological features or ‘scientific logics’ I found in sociological 
discourses in AgC and MxC (e.g., dichotomistic logics, power-over notions and mono-
causality and their corresponding non-relativistic normativeness, criticism and frequent 
prescriptiveness) are originated in/by Catholic discourses. What I do state is that religion, 
Catholicism in this case, does shape, that is predispose (Elder-Vass 2011), sociology’s 
epistemological bases in subtle, almost imperceptible, yet remarkably effective ways. 
 
Durkheim (1915) might have stated that this shaping process would occur because Catholic 
rituals (Rawls 2005) would provide a ‘mould’ to connect elements of social reality with each 
other and because it would provide as well an impersonal and diffused notion of force that 
would turn into a prototype for sociology’s concepts of power/force. He might have 
suggested as well that Catholic rituals, given their centrality and reflection of Mexican 
society per se, would include the imperative enactment of ‘necessary connections’ that 
would, on the one hand, allow for the Mexican society’s reproduction and, on the other hand, 
would be taken further as prime examples of how to conceive further causes and 
corresponding effects in social reality. Perhaps my account of causal links (Sayer 1992, 2000) 
between Catholicism and sociology is less ritualistic and it is, definitely, less deterministic.  
My causal account includes the ritualistic enactments of certain ‘authority models’, but it 
also includes Catholic discourses flowing across institutions and carrying specific discursive 
constituents (dichotomistic logics, causality and power notions included) that are echoed by 
a series of particular bridge institutions which, once combined with the society’s cultural-
ideological structures, turn those echoes into subtle yet pervasive discursive offensives. My 
account thus might seem to over-stress ‘structured’ social action and a series of sociological 
entities acting upon the individual and leaving no room for individual agency. It is from 
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Douglas that I take the idea of institutions working in the reduction and processing of 
complexity (knowledge, information) and the idea of institutions echoing ‘patterns of 
thought’. However, unlike Douglas seems to do at times, I would not go as far as to state that 
an institution equates to “a machine for thinking and decision-making” that operates in 
“automatic pilot” (1986:63) mode –see also Coser (1988b) and Latour (1988). The ‘bridge 
institutions’ I have accounted for are not ‘automatic machines’ and do not determine 
sociological discourses in Mexico. Firstly, a few sociology lecturers and their multi-causal, 
socially-politically uncritical and not-prescriptive sociological discourses indicate that this 
ruptures from institutional mainstream patterns of thought may and do occur. Secondly, even 
if these ruptures do not take place and patterns of thought remain rather untouched and 
echoed, almost verbatim, by certain (bridge) institutions, their epistemological effects cannot 
be overstated. My research findings indicate that sociology lecturers do ‘use’ the social 
discourses around them –including Catholic discourses– yet ‘transform’ them and so produce 
emergent social science/sociological discourses while simultaneously being not ‘rigidly 
determined’ but ‘subtly predisposed’ (Elder-Vass 2011) by those discourses. 
 
I would like now to extend and refine the ‘patterns of thought’ that Douglas (1986) discussed 
as institutional properties. I argue that individuals may draw not only from the 
‘classifications’ and ‘parameters of justice’ offered or echoed by institutions but also from 
the ‘causalisations’ and ‘religious/moral values’ likewise made and offered. In chapter 1 I 
presented the theoretical possibility of causality models or conceptualisations of causality 
being interpreted as higher-complexity classifications where certain elements (cause/s, 
effect/s, mechanism/s) had to be distinguished and then arranged, or classified, into an 
intelligible frame. My research findings do suggest that these higher-complexity 
classifications, or ‘causalisations’, do flow among institutions as distinctive discursive 
constituents and are eventually offered to the final users, sociology lecturers in this case. The 
process does not necessarily involve Durkheim’s strictly religious-ritualistic principle of ‘the 
like produces the like’ (1915) but discursive echoes/offensives, structural-institutional 
ensembles and, as for the case of ‘causalisations’, what the psychological literature may call 
the intrinsic ‘transferability’ of causality patterns (White 1989; Fugelsang and Thompson 
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2000, 2003)  and sociological and anthropological literature may generically refer as 
‘contagious’ or ‘mutually reinforcing’ patterns of thinking  (Durkheim 1915; Douglas 1986; 
Sayer 1992, 2000; Zerubavel 1999) 
 
The idea of institutionally-transmitted ‘religious/moral values’ (see also Cipriani 2011) is 
merely an extension of Douglas’ idea (1986) about the institutionally-transmitted principle of 
justice. Here, though, I want to refine further this concept and its explanatory role. Since 
Weber’s (2003) classic analysis of Western capitalism and the Protestant (Calvinist) ethic, 
the idea about religious values having certain ideological efficiency and long-term oblique 
practical effects became a relatively well known argument. Merton (1938; chapter 1) applied 
this thesis to the British-science context and thus offered an account of how the (non-
dichotomistic) Puritan values of post-Reformation British society underpinned the 
atmosphere conducive to the rise of British science during the 17
th
 century. In my account, 
Catholic values (e.g., heaven/hell; love/passion; god/devil; right/wrong) do have a crucial 
role as well, however, their role is not necessarily as building blocks of, say, ‘pro-
scientific’(or ‘pro-sociology’) ideological atmospheres which then ‘encourage’ scientific 
thought and practices from the distance and obliquely. My findings demonstrate that 
religious values may additionally be conceived as cognitive devices per se, that is, as 
contagious classificatory models (Durkheim 1915; Douglas 1986; Zerubavel 1999) which do 
flow outside their apparently ‘parochial-religious’ grounds and become not only criteria for 
anchoring social interactions in predictable ethical frameworks but also patterns for 
‘classifying the world’ and its various constituents. These ‘values-classifications’ may 
merely impact common-sense or religious beliefs and thoughts. But, in contexts such as 
Mexican society/ies, and either as part of common-sense or on their own, religious ‘values-
classifications’, additionally predispose, not exclusively yet effectively, sociological 
discourses’ adoption of equivalent classificatory logics (e.g. dichotomistic) by means of the 
mechanisms previously accounted for. Next I will address another ‘condition’ I included in 
my account –perhaps the oddest one from a secularist perspective. 
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In one of his publications Yearley (2005) reviews the various contributions to the area of 
social studies of science and so identifies the debates that in this multidisciplinary field have 
focused on “beliefs” and “interests” and their “mutually supportive” (2005:41-3) relation as 
drivers of scientific knowledge enterprises. The beliefs Yearley addresses, though, are not 
those that may be called religious. ‘Religious beliefs’, as Evans and Evans (2008) show, 
have been consistently conceived in scientific/academic contexts as inherently, and 
‘naturally’, opposed to scientific reason. In this sense my research findings are neither 
extensive nor conclusive, yet do suggest that there may be indeed a complex relationship 
between some religious beliefs and some aspects of ‘scientific logics’. A century ago, 
Durkheim (1915) noticed that the scientist believes in his/her scientific data just as the 
believer believes in religious rites and their efficiency –the former, according to Durkheim 
only “introduces more method” (1915:361). I cannot state that lecturers’ God-related beliefs 
cause, say, a discursive ‘sublimation of energies’ which are then translated straight into the 
lecturers’ sociological statements about social power and causality . However, there is 
evidence in my data set that does indicate that there is a finer, subtler, non-deterministic and 
complex interaction between religious models of causality/power as embedded in societies’ 
and individuals’ beliefs in an omnipotent and omnipresent God and those individuals’ 
scientific conceptions of power-over and mono-causality. Pushing this argument further I 
also argue that, based on what I have discussed in the paragraph above and previous 
chapters
245
, it is possible to read religious ‘values-classifications’ as religious beliefs as well, 
and so include in my account both beliefs in heaven/hell, love/passion, god/devil –which 
may carry in themselves further notions of ‘coerciveness’, ‘discipline’, ‘control’ and 
‘oppression’, e.g., Sahlins (1996: 404-7)– and individuals’ beliefs in God as a ‘supreme’ 
omnipotent entity. Having thus specified the relevant religious beliefs in this research, I can 
confidently state that clear-cut separations between ‘religious beliefs’ and ‘scientific reason’ 
as naturally antagonistic ‘systems of truth’ rather underestimate the intricate, almost 
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 The reader may remember one of the surveys whose results I drew on in chapter 3. IMPLAN’s 
report (2004) indicates that the questions “Do you believe in hell?” and “Do you believe in heaven?” 
were answered affirmatively by 63% and 89% of the respondents that participated in the survey in 
Aguascalientes. 
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imperceptible interplays that, in specific contexts within 21
st
-century societies, may actually 
take place between both ‘religious and ‘scientific beliefs’ .  
 
I want now to expand on the theoretical contributions of another Weberian element in my 
account, i.e., authority and the practice of ‘epistemic-asymmetric’ authority in the academic-
sociological fields I researched. Unlike Weber
246
 (1978), I am not attributing the origin of 
this epistemic-asymmetric authority to the ‘Catholic Church’ that arrived and developed in 
Mexico since the 16
th
 century –unlike Weber (and Durkheim), and as I have explained 
previously, I am not interested in the search of ‘chronological origins’. What I do argue is 
that the Catholic Church’s model of centralised, vertical and asymmetric ‘moral authority’, 
and particularly Catholicism’s priestly model of authority in Mexico, do represent influential 
yet neglected tacit role models which partly, and symbolically, legitimise the sociology 
practitioners’ acts of ‘epistemic authority’ in classrooms and universities (Zavala, 
forthcoming). In Douglas’ terms (1986:45-53), such an authority institution would find part 
of its ‘cosmological foundation’ in Mexican Catholicism and its authority models. Both help 
in the construction of that ‘epistemic’ authority’s halo of ‘naturalness’. Furthermore, what I 
want to emphasise is not this merely abstract and intangible ‘symbolical legitimisation’ of 
‘academic authorities’ by transcendental and earthly Catholic-authority models. I also want 
to insist on the cognitive function of these authority models and therefore stress their 
epistemological effects. It is by means of the sociology lecturers’ enactments of this authority 
institution/model that certain epistemological features of Catholic discourses are echoed and 
eventually predispose sociology lecturers, because (i) the model partly mirrors in its own the 
heavily normative and prescriptive (value-related indeed) discourses of what might be 
described as its ‘original religious matrix’ (Poggi 2001; Weber 1978) or rather one of its 
culturally-heavier and more extensive model ‘partners’; (ii) because the enactment of the 
model adds to the other bridge institutions (Douglas 1986) and cultural-ideological structures 
(Weber 2003, Merton 1938) and so delivers ‘emergent’ (Sayer 1992, 2000) discursive 
echoes and offensives that eventually reach and shape sociological discourses; and (iii) 
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 Who attributed the origin of the charismatic authority to the institutionalisation of the Roman 
Catholic Church (1978: 1134-1141). 
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because the enactment of the very institution/model actually materialises power asymmetries 
in ‘real life’ and so closes the cognitive circuit in terms of power-over thinking, generating a 
power-related self-fulfilled prophecy (Barnes 1988) which, according to this research and 
my findings, spreads its dichotomistic and non-relativistic logics across sociology 
practitioners’ scientific discourses. And this leads me to one of my last final conclusions.  
 
I agree with both Poggi’s (2001) definition of religion as one of the main representatives of 
‘ideological power’ and its material embodiment in organised and institutionalised 
‘churches’, and with Hearn’s (2012) view of religions as arenas for power interplays and as 
patterns of beliefs, ideas and practices fundamentally grounded on references to divine or 
supernatural powers. However, despite my research not being designed to offer a novel 
definition of religion, I want to offer an alternative sociological reading of societies where 
religions are not necessarily, or not only, mirrors upon which societies’ structures and 
patterns of organisation are reflected
247
, but where these non-linear and complex ‘reflections’ 
also happen in a different, perhaps opposite, direction. That is, a view of 21
st
-century 
‘secular’ societies where certain dimensions of social reality –‘scientific reason’, the 
sociological field and sociological knowledge in this case– constitute the mirrors where both 
organised churches –however despised or neglected– and, more importantly, religious 
discourses –however overlooked or taken for granted– are partly reflected upon. I accept that 
by claiming a change in the direction of the ‘reflexion’, I am opening the gate to troubling 
views that directly challenge secularist (and western-centric) views of social and religious 
modern realities (Asad 1983, 1993). If so, one of my dissertation’s main objectives would be 
accomplished. I argue that even in so-called ‘secular’ contemporary societies, religions may 
be alternatively conceived as constituting plastic discourses (Asad 1993; Foucault 2003, 
Fairclough 2003; Elder-Vass 2011; Casanova 2011) which are not only embedded in 
organised ‘churches’ (Poggi 2001) but are flowing imperceptibly and pervasively across both 
society’s ideological-cultural dimensions (Weber 2003, Merton 1938; Waggoner 2009; 
Cipriani 2011) and religious, non-religious, material and non-material institutions (Weber 
1978; Douglas 1986; Smith 2000) and thus actively constitute a diffused (Cipriani 2001, 
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 An anthropological view of religions that is also put forward by Douglas (1986:57) 
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2003, 2011), subtle or soft yet particularly efficient ideological power (Asad 1993; Poggi 
2001; Hearn 2012) which, in certain contexts and under certain historical conditions, has the 
capacity to shape not only people’s ‘common-sense logics’ and political (Poggi 2001) and 
economic phenomena (Weber 2003) but, additionally, the epistemological bases of scientific 
discourses (Durkheim 1915; Sahlins 1996; Milbank 2006; Cannell 2005, 2006), such as 
sociology lecturers’ non-relativistic, normative and prescriptive ‘scientific logics’, and their 
very sociological conceptions of power and causality!  
 
My last final conclusion is rather a question. If the causal account I have offered in the 
previous lines explains Catholicism and sociology in Mexico, what about the ‘West/s’ and 
‘Western science’? In a recent BBC science documentary (What happened before the big 
bang? 2010) the narrator begins by referring to our notions of “cause-effect” as a “simple yet 
powerful idea” that allows the human mind and, physicist in particular, to “stray from the 
present […] [and] boldly stride into the future and confidently travel back in time”. The 
narrator then presents Michio Kaku, a theoretical physicist who was born, raised and 
educated in the United States. Kaku states in front of the camera how “preposterous” the idea 
of a universe created out of nothing is –the big bang theory does not tell the whole story, he 
claims. Kaku goes on and then introduces his own account based on the distinction between 
‘two types of nothingness’
248
. More physicists, who have worked on alternative pre-big bang 
theories, are then presented and interviewed
249
. By the end of the documentary, the narrator 
goes back to Kaku, who states the following 
 
My parents were Buddhists. In Buddhism there is no beginning, there is no end, 
there is just nirvana. But as a child I also went to Sunday school where we learned 
that there was an instant where God said “Let there be light”. So I have had these 
two mutually contradicting paradigms in my head. Well, now we can meld these two 
paradigms together into a pleasing whole. Yes there was a genesis, yes there was a 
big bang, and it happens all the time.  
 
                                                 
248
 An “absolute nothing”, which the scientists defines as “no equations, no space, no time, [an] 
absence of anything that the human mind can conceive of”, and “the vacuum”, which is, Kaku says 
“nothing but the absence of matter”. 
249
 Andrei Linde, Param Singh, Lee Smolin, Neil Turok, Laura Mersini-Houghton. 
 276 
However subtle, soft or imperceptible this epistemological influence might have developed, 
may I ask whether Kaku’s Buddhist family practices and Christian lessons at Sunday school 
as well as the Christian and Buddhist religious “paradigms” –or ‘contagious causality 
models’ – of the creation of the universe he reportedly learnt within the United States’ socio-
religious contexts, shaped eventually his ‘western’ pre-big bang theory, its underlying causal 
frame and its two different types of ‘nothingness’? I admit how absurd, and politically-
incorrect, this question may appear to scientists and secularist minds. I do think, however, 
that this and similar questions are entirely pertinent and may be perfectly applied to other 
Western scientists and social scientists –and so address, for instance, the latter’s genealogical, 
and at times compulsive, searches of ‘chronological origins’. Such research questions are, I 
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Appendix 3.2  
 
Mexico City’s Northern Bus Station. Virgin of Guadalupe. September 2010 
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Literal analysis of sociological texts.  
 
This appendix is part of chapter 7. It comprises the main results from the content-analysis of 
texts by both AgC and MxC sociology lecturers. In order to portray fairly both the lecturers’ 
individual work and the more general sociological themes and topics, I will first refer to 
individual texts and then to ideas/statements by groups of authors. First though, I must 
acknowledge that the respondents’ anonymity can be compromised in this appendix –as in 
chapter 7 in general. Whereas I cannot proceed properly without making reference to the 
respondents and their sociological texts, I will offer only partial (minimal) bibliographical 
references of the works cited here in order to decrease the possibilities of a full identity 





Despite the AgC sociology department having only two main “research areas” in official 
terms
250
, most of the themes found in the sampled texts were unsurprisingly diverse from 
both individual and collective points of view. Rita’s texts, for instance, are focused on varied 
aspects of culture such as folk music (2003) and corruption (2010). Laura’s texts focus on 
religion in general (2010) and Catholicism in particular (2005, 2006, 2007). Julia’s texts 
focus on topics such as corruption in primary school children (2010a) and minority Christian 
religious groups (2010b). Brigitte’s latest texts cover topics such as local urban development 
(2007) and urban immigrants’ experiences (2009b). Edward’s texts are varied too, it ranges 
from organizational culture (2002), and the religious field in Mexico (2001, 2009a, 2009b), 
to social action theories (2009c, 2010). Michael’s texts about labour studies cover topics 
such as female labour in multilevel companies (2005, 2006), and graduates labour market 
(2010). There are, obviously, commonalities across the lecturers’ individual publications. 
For example, I found a relatively constant type of statements along Rita’s texts, regardless 
their location and the texts’ main topics. These statements may be described as ‘narrative-
style’ statements, constituted by a chronological arrangement of names of places, persons 
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 The administrative base of research activities in Mexico’s higher education institutions follows the 
Ministry of Education’s regulations on the matter. So, in theory, (discipline-specific) university 
departments, centres or schools are composed by (thematic-specific) “academic bodies” and a set of 
“research lines” by academic body.  
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and dates, for example, Rita’s review of the history of bolero
251
 songs in Latin America, 
where she goes through the “golden”, “pink” and “black” ‘ages of boleros’ and mentions 
popular bolero singers, bands and some of the countries, cities and years they develop or 
recorded some of their most famous songs (2003); or Rita’s description of the first radio 
station in Aguascalientes (2007a), where she includes names of key businessmen, important 
dates, famous singers and bands as well as personal anecdotes on the radio industry by local 
respondents. A relatively frequent idea in Laura’s texts is ‘authority’, as in the structure of 
authority or ‘hierarchical authority’ some Catholic groups have (2005) or as in the authority 
and legitimacy members of those groups hold (2006) or the bishopric’s authority to grant 
permission to female religious orders to be established (2009) or how some results from a 
survey on beliefs in Aguascalientes
252
 are related to figures of ‘parental male authority’ 
(2010). Models and taxonomies were also frequent in Laura’s works, either as conclusive 
statements, i.e. a variety of Greimas’ actantial model
253
 to explain and conclude about the 
work and structure of Catholic Groups (2005, 2006); or as descriptors, e.g. types of female 
members within the Catholic Church, types of systematic activities in female religious orders 
(2007), or models of female religious orders (2009). A set of relatively constant ideas in 
Julia’s texts was (i) ‘the homogeneous/homogeneity’, e.g. the past homogeneous population 
in Aguascalientes (2009), the evolving homogeneity of the Catholic Church (2010b); and (ii) 
‘the hegemonic/hegemony’, e.g. the ‘past hegemony’ of the Catholic Church, or the 
continuous perception of the Catholic church as hegemonic (2009) or ‘the hegemonic culture 
of those who have power’ (2010c).  A complex notion of ‘distance/distancing’ appears more 
or less constant in Brigitte’s texts. In one of her co-authored text on urban/community 
development, Brigitte et al. write about the “differentiation and distancing among 
households inhabited by social groups that do not meet each other and do not cohabit” and 
thus fragment the city and make it inhabitable (2007:214). In the introduction she wrote to a 
book she co-edited with Julia, Brigitte states that a useful concept discussed in the volume is 
the notion of “distance” between social agents and social institutions (2009a:11) and the 
need of the concept of distance Parsons, Touraine and Manheim theorised about. In her 
chapter published in the same book, Brigitte refers to individuals’ “capacity of distancing 
themselves and elaborating alternative life styles”; right after this she states the interviews 
they got data from helped the respondents to “do an exercise of distancing and assessing of 
their migration experience”. In a third consecutive statement, Brigitte said they found 
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 A type of slow-tempo music by single performers or groups.   
252
 Here she refers to the same survey (IMO 2009) I quoted in chapter 3. Laura, in fact, kindly gave 
me access to the results of the survey. 
253
 Laura does not cite or quote Greimas, but both another scholar who Laura presents as the author of 
the model, and Edward, her colleague, who is presented by Laura as the author of an adaptation of 
“Gimenez Montiel’s model”. 
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“different levels of distancing in respondents” (2009b:122). Another concept that seemed to 
entertain Brigitte’s thoughts especially in her publications before 2000 is the concept of 
‘democracy’
254
. A glimpse of this can be found in Brigitte (2009a) where she presents this 
co-edited volume as a collective effort “to strengthen a true democracy” (2009a:15). 
“Equity” seems or seemed to be a relatively constant idea in Brigitte too. She wrote about 
“equity relations” between men and women in an article published in 2006, where she 
concludes that it is not about men and women being equals but about holding equity between 
them (2006b: 59). Earlier in a 1999 commentary Brigitte stated “justice and equity” would 
provide “the dignity” for Mexico to enter “the 21
st
 century’s global village” (1999:26). 
‘Beliefs’ is a notion Edward constantly refers to, this concept is an understandable base for 
his paper on the relationship between beliefs and actions (2010)
255
; or his book chapter about 
Pentecostal and Catholic beliefs and practices and their relationships to poverty (2009c). 
However, Edward also refers to this concept in other texts such as his article on 
organisational culture, where he cites three authors that refer to ‘beliefs’ as part of culture in 
societies or culture in organisations (2002: 16-17, 23). There Edward reflects further about 
the relationships between shared meanings, beliefs, social values and culture (2002: 26, 28). 
In his seminar paper on corruption and culture (2009d), Edward associates the concept of 
culture to the concept of social action “through the concept of beliefs”. After this he states 
that culture as meanings is both meaning-producer and action-determining “when the 
meaning becomes a belief” (2009d: 414). At the end of this text, Edward states corruption “is 
part of our beliefs” (2009d:417). 
 
From a collective point of view I found as well a set of relatively frequent ideas addressed 
almost invariably by two or more sociologists. For example ideas on ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ –or ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ individuals, circumstances, institutions- that can 
be found in the texts by Rita, Laura and Michael. In Rita’s texts there are frequent instances 
of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’  as concepts used to explain or describe either bolero songs or 
their social context (Rita 2003), the local radio industry (Rita 2007a), or the type of gender 
roles bolero songs reinforce in Rita’s view (2007b). I found in Laura’s texts frequent 
mentions on “modernity” as well, e.g. the Catholic Church getting modern or modernity 
driving competition among religions (Laura 2005) or Laura’s quotes from scholar Blancarte 
who touches upon religion in Mexico developing in a modern context, and a quote from 
Parker who characterises societies as modern o rather ‘hemimodern’(Laura 2006). Apart 
from his ‘labour studies’ research interests, Michael seems to address systematically notions 
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 Texts with this concept are not part of these analyses: Brigitte’s PhD dissertation and a series of 
papers related to it and theoretical articles she published afterwards in the 1990s.  
255
 Where he states that knowledge may become a belief/beliefs and that it is the latter and not just the 
former what drives social actions.  
 297 
of ‘tradition’ in his works. For example, in the book he published from his doctoral 
dissertation, Michael states the “traditional modality of human work has changed rapidly” 
(2006:11), later on he states “there is a discourse aimed at protecting and preserving the 
family as a traditional structure” (2006:81). In the same book there are references to 
‘modernity’ too, e.g. unemployment in the “modern world” (2006: 22) or “risk” in societies 
being “a modern characteristic” (2006:28). In his book published in 2008, Michael refers to 
the same concept in terms of multilevel companies “bringing modernity” to small towns in 
late 19th century (2008:99). This statement was actually found in both the book chapter 




Another often-mentioned concept by a group of lecturers is ‘diversity’. Laura addressed 
more or less constantly this concept, e.g., diversity in folk religious representations, diversity 
of the Mexican Catholicism, diversity of non-Catholic minorities in Mexico (2005); or a 
diversified religious market (2006); or the ‘diverse society’ where female religious 
congregations have contributed to form a social identity (2009a; 2009b). Julia mentions 
diversity often too, e.g., the ‘diverse’ religious practices of one of Julia’s research subjects –  
a woman that converted from Catholicism to ‘Marian Trinitarian Spiritualism’ in 
Aguascalientes; or ‘the mix of diverse religious traditions’ by today’s social actors; or the 
whole paragraph where she discusses the concept of religious diversity as such, all the above 
found in her book chapter (2009). Julia also refers to the ‘incipient religious diversity’ in 
Mexico (2010b). In Julia’s texts, sometimes the concept of diversity comes with parallel 
concepts:  
 
This [religious] diversity shows clearly that there is not a single religion determining 
all the actions of subjects, but that everyday life is driven by different religious 
elements. Such plurality, supports the identification with other religions” (Julia 
2009:213 –emphasis added) 
 
Another relatively frequent concept or family of concepts, in some of AgC lecturers is 
‘power’. Notions of power and domination were understandably frequent in Michael’s work 
on female empowerment (2008), where one may count 22 instances of the word 
‘domination’ and a similar number for the word ‘power’, for example Michael’s statement 
on “the family as survival strategy or the factor that structures the worst forms of 
domination” (2008:18). These ideas and the idea of empowerment as such were also frequent 
in those texts were power or empowerment were not main topics. In his early article (2005) 
on multilevel selling, Michael mentions the idea of “people becoming able to face power” 
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 With minor changes, the whole paragraph or passage where the statement is located –related to the 
history of ‘multilevel business’ in United States– is reproduced in Michael 2005, 2006, and 2008. 
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(2005: 193). In his unpublished paper on female work Michael addresses “asymmetries of 
power” in men-women relationships (2009/2010:4); asymmetries of power in the household 
(2009/2010:5); women’s “soft way of taking over power” (2009/2010:21); and some women 
“not breaking away violently with traditional schemes of domination” (2009/2010:22). In his 
book, published from his doctoral dissertation, Michael states there are “social structures that 
determine, culturally and based on a domination order, the allocation of spaces for men and 
women” (2006:53). There too Michael wonders about the reasons why women earn less 
income than men and then he states “the answers makes us to look at the power, domination 
and meaning relationships that exist in the social space” (2006:106). Edward, whose research 
interests are different to Michael’s, writes frequently about ‘power’ as well, either with his 
own words or by citing other authors. For instance, in the last paragraphs of his article on 
‘organisational culture’, Edward highlights “the relationship between culture and power, 
particularly the resistance from the working class” (2002:21). In the same text Edward 
addresses another author’s “Marxist concept of ideology which emphasises the relationship 
between ideology and power” (2002:24). After this Edward cites yet another author’s ideas 
on “changes in organizations […] interests, conflicts and power” (2002:29). In his 2001 book 
chapter, Edward refers to Bourdieu and “his concept of symbolic power” (2001:11). In his 
analysis of Catholic and protestant practices, Edward writes about “the [Christian] saints’ 
power and knowledge” as well as Jesus’ “power to heal” that are taken for granted by 
believers (2009a: 158). References to power are numerous in Edwards’ book on social action. 
There Edward reviews Geertz’s “analysis on charisma and symbolic power” (2009c:38). He 
also tells the story of French revolution’s supporters and how they sought “power alliances” 
with Napoleon and how they were betrayed by “the political power” afterwards
257
. 
(2009c:54). Edward states too that there has to be a distinction between “power of the State” 
and “State’s apparatus” in the Marxist theory of the State (60). In another section in the same 
text Edward writes about the ‘cultural studies’ field and cites an author that states cultural 
studies “focus on everything that is meaningful, usually related to power relationships” (81); 
then Edward wonders whether any study of power relationships could be considered 
‘cultural studies’ (84). In subsequent lines, Edward refers to Bourdieu’s book ‘Reproduction’ 
and describes it as the text where Bourdieu “defines the concept of symbolic violence as the 
power to impose meanings in a legitimate way, disguising the power relationships at the 
base” (102). Finally in his seminar paper on ‘beliefs’ Edward cites Berger and Luckmann 
and their reported ideas on how “the power in society includes the power to determine 
crucial processes of socialisation, and therefore, the power to produce reality” (2010:10 –
emphasis in original).  
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 This story is included in a section where Edward addresses “the sociology of knowledge and the 
theory of ideology developed by Marxism” (2009c:54). 
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MxC texts 
In terms of themes, texts by MxC lecturers were diverse as well in both individual and 
collective sense. For example Norma’s texts range from a review of the founders of Critical 
Theory (1999), to an analysis of Durkheim’s concept of culture (2002), a review of 
“reductionist projects” on causality and explanation (2005), more reviews of sociologies of 
culture (2009) as well as an analysis of technological-scientific public controversies (2010). 
Angela’s texts focus on theory and different authors such as Durkheim (1989), Weber (2001) 
and Schutz (2002) and Suzanne’s texts focus mostly on education practices in Mexico (1993, 
1998, 2003a, 200g). Rachel’s texts address sociology of gender (2000, 2010) and childhood 
(2007). Peter’s publications include the themes of racism, indigenous groups, (1997) social 
identity (2003) and social research methodology (2007, 2008, 2009). Joseph’s sampled texts 
contain topics such as sociology in Mexico, and education (2003, 2006a). Gregory’s texts, 
mostly based on an openly-Marxist stance, are as different as ‘illness in capitalist societies’ 
(1999c), theory and research (1999b) and the life stories of a death-sentenced man (2005).  
 
Amid these diverse set of individual research interests, topics and themes, I found discursive 
similarities across the texts of each sociologist, apart of the texts’ themes. For example, most 
of Norma’s texts were aimed, almost exclusively at presenting or summarising the work of 
classic or contemporary sociologists. In her book chapter on ‘critical theory’,  Norma goes 
briefly over Adorno’s mass culture (1999:242), Korsch’s idea of society as a totality (243) 
and Adorno and Horkheimer’s “universalisation of instrumental rationality”
258
 (247). In her 
article on Durkheim Norma mixes summaries of Durkheim’s theorisations on culture with a 
series of critique of those theorisations, e.g. criticism of Durkheim’s dualistic understanding 
of everyday practices and culture (2002:100). In her 2005 article Norma goes over the work 
of Davidson, Fodor, Weber, Durkheim, Maturana and Luhmann. In her book published in 
2009, Norma presents the work of Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, Bellah, Whutnow, Alexander, 
Archer and Habermas. In the journal where Norma published an article on scientific 
controversies (2010), she published another text about a colleague; the text is a presentation 
of the colleague’s work
259
. In terms of ideas per se, the most frequent term I found in 
Rachel’s texts was ‘law/s’. For example, in her master dissertation on family violence
260
, 
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 Actually one can find references to ideas of ‘universes/universalisation’ not just in this text, but 
also in Norma’s article on Durkheim’s concept of culture, where she mentions Bruner and Durkheim’s 
hypothesis on “narratives” as a “universal cognitive structure”. A similar notion was found in 
Norma’s article on beliefs, minds and systems (2005), there Norma draws from the concept of 
“autopoietic systems” and refers to them as “totalities” (2005: 86). The frequency of these ideas was 
not outstanding though.  
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 A researcher based at another department within MxC’s university; one of Norma’s doctoral tutors.  
260
 Rachel’s master dissertation – submitted when Rachel was in her late 40s-early 50s – is not part of 
a sociology degree but a ‘pedagogy’ programme (Chapter 2, table 2). Therefore the ideas in that text 
cannot be taken as originated in, and representing, a strictly sociological discipline. What I claim 
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Rachel states from the outset that “there are laws that do not take into account the protection 
of all members of the family” (2000:2). In the next page Rachel states family violence is 
explained by ‘the power’ men have imposed over women and children by drawing support 
“from ecclesiastical and common law” (2000:3). In the second chapter Rachel goes over the 
definitions of violence and family violence in Mexico’s ‘penal codes’. In her article 
published in 2007 Rachel addresses the topic of ‘migrant children’s ‘rights’; in this article’s 
abstract Rachel sates there is a lack of “constitutional guarantees” in Mexico in general. In 
this text, Rachel mixes her emphasis on ‘laws’ with particularly critical statements; she states 
for example that November 20
th
 2004 marked the “15
th
 anniversary of the children’s rights 
convention” and so she, sarcastically, suggests to “celebrate” that anniversary by tagging all 
the children with “their names and [the words] violence, rape, hunger, injustice, robbery, 
kidnap, mutilation, exploitation, incest, work, pornography, omission, silence, impunity 
[…]” (2007:6). Interestingly, when I attended an undergraduate lecture/workshop on 
sociology of gender that was given by Rachel, there I listened to her going through the 
Mexican constitution’s individual rights and encouraging students to discuss the importance 
of them. I met Rachel after the lecture and asked her about her emphasis on the ‘legal 
framework’ or ‘rights’ in her course, and she replied: “because it [law/rights] is ignored and 
it is fundamental, everything has a legal reference”. Then she told me how many of the 
students’ dissertations she has examined lack “legal frameworks”. 
 
There is one word Suzanne wrote four times in the abstract of her 1993 article: ‘problems’, 
e.g. “problems between teaching and research”, “educational problems”. In this article 
Suzanne uses the term further as in: “diverse problems from the inefficiency of the national 
educational system”, or “problems of higher education” (1993:2); the problems of the 
training of lecturers (1999: 3); “problems-needs” on research activities, and research 
policies’ prioritisation “of what is taken as national problems” (1999:6). Moreover there is a 
passage where Suzanne defines research activities as “bringing up problems, looking at 
reality with different eyes, reflecting about it and trying to transform it” (14). 
Understandably so, Suzanne concludes in that article about the need to discuss “the problems 
academics face in their everyday activities” and the relations between the academic’s 
research and “the most urgent problems of the nation” (1993:17). Further references to 
‘problems’ were found in Suzanne’s book on education: “poverty as the most critical 
problem in the world” (2006:19); “the central problems which is the setting of criteria to 
fund higher education” (89); or the “financial problems which affect Latin America” (144). 
References to a “neoliberal economic model” or a “neoliberal economic policy” are 
                                                                                                                                          
though is that the ideas in that dissertation constitute reliable evidence of Rachel’s current sociological 
thinking, explicit or assumed.  
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relatively frequent in Suzanne’s texts as well. In her book (2006) about education practices 
in Mexico she addresses the concept in negative or critical terms (2006: 19, 27, 45, 28, 86, 
95). This style may be found too in the book she co-authored with Gregory (1998). There she 
refers to the educational field “seen from the neoliberal perspective of groups that have 
economic and political power” (1998:13); or the “backwardness produced by the 
establishment of the neoliberal economic model in the country” (1998:27). In the chapter 
authored by Gregory in the same book, this type of statements, openly Marxist, appear even 
more radical: “we can organise ourselves to fight against the neoliberalism that is openly 
represented in the educational sector” (1998:96); or “despite there being enemies of Marxism 
and attacks by neoliberalism, Marx’s famous eleventh thesis is still in force” (1998:113). If 
Suzanne’s critiques of neoliberal economic policies and citations from Gramsci and Freire 
are frequent, Gregory’s critiques to neoliberalism and citations from Marx and Gramsci are 
constant in his texts as well. Understandably so, the vocabulary Gregory uses in his books is 
openly Marxist, e.g. how “the scientific conception of the universe triumphed because of the 
use of dialectic materialism in the understanding of nature and society” (2006:36); how to 
operationalise hypotheses “from a historical and dialectic materialism perspective” which 
“even Marx  carried out in The Capital” (2006:177); the necessary presence of “the 
hegemonic groups’ ideology” in the social research process (1999b:62); “capitalism as the 
dominant production mode” that “imposes life and work material conditions” (2002:46); or 
health and illness in society being “caused by the ways society organises itself to produce 
and reproduce, that is, the dominant mode of production: capitalism
261
” (1999c: 9). Similar 
critical statements, without explicit Marxist vocabulary, were located systematically in 
Gregory’s colleague Peter as well. In his article on racism and the Zapatista movement, Peter 
states  
 
Genocide, racial segregation and apartheid are forms of social relations that sill 
prevail in the world. However, the most dramatic expression of human cruelty is 
with no doubt represented by German Nazism (1997:141). 
 
In one of his conference paper, Peter explicitly argues: 
 
For hundreds of years, Indians [Mexico’s indigenous population] have never been 
heard, they are always stripped of their land, they are exploited, discriminated. [...] I 
am convinced that Mexican society, specially in urban areas, is terrible racist and 
discriminatory (2003: 257)  
 
Peter stated later in the same text: 
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 Literal translation 
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Dominant groups nowadays are not precisely the richest in terms of pro-environment 
values, they generated economic systems based on the exploitation of nature, not on 
respect of nature. (2003:275) 
 
Whereas there was no identifiable tread of constant concepts in Joseph’s texts – other than 
frequent references to “education” and “methodology”, which constitute Joseph’s research 
interests –  critical statements in his texts were readily identified too after my first literal 
readings. For example: 
 
Nation, nation-state and nationalism are concepts that re-emerged in contemporary 
social sciences and political discourse as theoretical proposals […] to counter the so 
called neoliberalism and its monster: globalisation. (2005: 211) 
 
In his journal presentation Joseph states that universities and educational institutions in 
Mexico 
 
strive to get a ‘good ranking’ instead of fulfilling their historical social functions 
[…]. It is all about efficiency, productivity, vision, mission and other marketing 
concepts aimed at increasing the confidence for international investors, thus ignoring 
the formative, human, civic and national aspects of education (2006) 
 
I take the statements above and others with the same explicit purpose, as enough evidence to 
describe texts by MxC lecturers as particularly critical from a collective point of view. The 
quotes above from the texts by Rachel, Suzanne, Gregory, Peter and Joseph are examples of 
the particular targets and the different levels and types of criticism. Whereas neoliberalism 
and its variants seem to be a common target among Suzanne, Gregory and Joseph, it was 
rather male domination and discriminatory-racist attitudes some of the targets in Rachel’s 
and Peter’s texts respectively.  
 
Interestingly, the two Mexico-City authors whose sampled publications could not be 
described as particularly critical, seem to share, on the other hand, a different common 
feature. Angela’s texts resemble Norma’s (above) in the sense of focusing, almost 
exclusively, on presentations or summaries of classic or contemporary mainstream 
sociologists. In 1989 Angela wrote an article on the concept of causality in Durkheim. The 
article consists basically of a summary of the concept of causality in Durkheim’s ‘Rules of 
the sociological method’ and ‘The suicide’. In her article on positivism and hermeneutics 
(2001), Angela’s’ presents authors such as Durkheim, Weber, Hempel, Merton and Schutz, 
and summarises their debates on social sciences as dependent or independent from natural 
sciences (2001: 200-204) and whether scientific knowledge is based on reliable observations 
of phenomena or interpretations of them (2001:2003-2008). In her book chapter (2002), 
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Angela presents Schutz’ work on social action. First Angela goes over Marx and Weber’s 
ideas on the conscious and rational aspects of social action (2002: 176-177), and then sums 
up the disagreements between Weber and Schutz on the subjective nature of social action 
and social actors’ motives (2002:180-183). In our interview, Angela referred explicitly to her 
“doing studies of sociological theory” and her “studying European and American 
sociological theory” (italics added).  
 
In short, whereas I found constant references to notions and concepts about modernity, 
tradition, diversity and power in the texts by AgC lecturers, I could not find visible series of 
constant concepts in texts by MxC lecturers –other than explicit and implicit Marxism-
related vocabulary in Gregory and Suzanne. However, I did find in MxC texts commonalities 
in terms of critical statements and review-types of content. 
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